891.00/10–1846
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near
Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to
the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
top secret
[Washington,] October 18, 1946.
There is attached hereto a memorandum prepared in this Office reviewing
the background of events in Iran and suggesting certain
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action which, if taken, might strengthen
the hands of this Government in its efforts to preserve the independence
of Iran and to prevent that country from succumbing to Soviet pressure
and thus passing completely into the Soviet orbit of satellite
states.
You will note that these suggestions include (1) the extension of credits
to Iran for the purpose of financing specific approved development
projects which have for their general purpose the raising of Iranian
standards of living and (2) the sale to Iran of a limited amount of
nonaggression military equipment to enable the Iranian authorities to
maintain internal order.
We feel that unless we show by concrete acts that we are seriously
interested in carrying out our various assurances to Iran, the Iranian
Government and people will eventually become so discouraged that they
will no longer be able to resist Soviet pressure. If the suggestions
contained in the attached memorandum are approved at the highest levels
of the Department, it will be much easier for the various Offices to
solve the problems which arise daily with regard to Iran.
It will be observed that the memorandum is devoted primarily to long-term
policies. We are faced at the present time, however, with an extremely
critical situation in Iran which may require quick action on our part.
Recent telegrams from Tehran are causing us deep concern. It has become
clear to our Ambassador and to us that Qavam is now virtually a prisoner
of his own policy of retreating before Soviet pressure and that Iran is
daily losing what remains of its independence. The Shah apparently is
alarmed at the situation and is considering utilizing the authority
vested in him by the Iranian Constitution to dismiss Qavam and appoint a
new Prime Minister.… We have been hoping that at a given point Qavam
would show the required degree of firmness, but have reluctantly come to
the point of view that Qavam has become so enmeshed in Soviet intrigue
that he is no longer in a position to act as defender of the
independence of Iran.
It is quite possible that within the next few days the Shah will remove
Qavam and appoint a new Prime Minister. If such an event should take
place, in our opinion we should at once give to the new government all
appropriate moral support and at the same time make it clear that we are
now prepared to extend to Iran the economic assistance which we have
been promising for the last three years.
There is at the present time in Washington an Iranian military mission,
headed by a Brigadier General, which is endeavoring to purchase on
credit $10,000,000 worth of nonaggression military equipment. Thus far,
we have been noncommittal with regard to this request. We can not delay
giving a reply much longer. In case the Shah should appoint a new Prime
Minister, it seems to us that we should indicate our willingness to sell
at least a certain amount of
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this type of equipment to Iran at once.1 It
is our understanding that the Export-Import Bank has no authority to
advance credits for the purchase of arms. Our suggestion, therefore, is
that we sell such surplus noncombat military equipment as is obtainable
to Iran on credit and a reasonable amount of nonaggression, combat
equipment for cash.1 A separate memorandum on this
subject is being prepared.
[Annex]
Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern
and African Affairs
top secret
[Washington,] October 18,
1946.
Implementation of United States Policy Toward
Iran
[Here follows background material.]
In brief, the Iranian question transcends the mere bilateral
relations between Iran and the United States. Politically, it
involves our policy of supporting the independence of small
countries in the spirit of the United Nations. Strategically, it
involves the defense of our military interests in the entire Near
and Middle Eastern area, having particular relevance to the position
we have taken with regard to Turkey. Both the political and
strategic aspects of this problem are an integral part of the
broader question of United States relations with the Soviet
Union.
These political and strategic interests require that we should give
positive encouragement and assistance to Iran in an endeavor to save
it from falling completely under Soviet domination and to rescue it
if possible from its present state of partial subservience to the
Soviet Union. In implementation of our declared policy toward Iran
and of our moral commitments under the United Nations Charter, it is
recommended that the following steps be taken by this
Government:2
- 1.
- Ambassador Allen be authorized to express to the Shah and the
Prime Minister on appropriate occasions the genuine interest of
the United States in the independence of Iran and assure them
that this Government is prepared, so long as the Government of
Iran sincerely desires independence and is willing to stand up
for its sovereignty against external pressure, to support the
independence of Iran not only by words but by appropriate
acts.
- 2.
- This Government be prepared to extend an Eximbank loan to Iran to
enable the carrying out of specific approved development
projects, the execution of which will tend to raise Iranian
standards of living.
- 3.
- This Government furnish, in reasonable quantities, arms and
ammunition requested by the Iranian Military Mission presently
in
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this country, for
the purpose of maintaining internal security. This view is
supported by recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as
follows: “The United States should accede to Iranian requests
for non-aggression items of military material, in reasonable
amounts, to enable the Iranian Government to maintain internal
security, in view of the fact that Iran cannot supply its own
military needs as they have no established sources for security
supplies. They (JCS) consider
such non-aggression items of military material as small arms and
light artillery, ammunition, small tanks, transportation and
communication equipment, quartermaster supplies, and perhaps
short range aircraft and naval patrol craft, to be appropriate
for release to Iran in reasonable quantities upon the request of
Iran, so long as the United States is satisfied that Iran
demonstrates a desire to maintain its independence in the
community of nations. Technical advice given unostentatiously
and on request would also be appropriate and contributory to the
defense of United States strategic interests in Iran and the
Near and Middle East area.”
- 4.
- United States military missions in Iran be supported and
strengthened, and legislation permitting their detail beyond the
period of national emergency should be supported before
Congress.
- 5.
- Information and cultural relations between Iran and the United
States should be intensified by a well-executed program.
These recommendations are based on the assumption that Iran still
possesses a degree of independence and that the Iranian Government
is working for the true national interests of the country. Should
the course of events cause us to believe that the assumption no
longer holds, the recommended acts would of course not be taken but
held in abeyance.
