841.002/3–2246
The British Ambassador (Halifax) to the
Secretary of State
top secret
urgent
Washington, 22 March, 1946.
My Dear Secretary of State: Mr. Bevin received your
message through the United States Chargé d’Affaires in London early this
morning, March 22nd.56
He has asked me to give you the enclosed personal message in reply.
This personal message was despatched after Mr. Bevin had received my account
of my telephone talk with you yesterday.
Yours sincerely,
[Enclosure]
The British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs (Bevin) to the Secretary of State
top secret
[London,] March 22, 1946.
Many thanks for your message of March 22nd.
I still think it would be a mistake to send your proposed message to
Molotov until at least the Security Council has had some discussion of
the Persian issue and we can see how things are going to work out. This
would still give Molotov plenty of time to make his plans to go to Paris
on April 25th if he so desires. I fully agree that we should call this
Paris meeting of Foreign Ministers in order to show that we are resolved
that Peace Conference shall meet on May 1st and be a success. The
meeting would of course also deal with questions raised by the French
about Germany.
I really think I cannot attend a meeting next Monday. There are three
front-line Cabinet Ministers in India, and in addition there is the
enormous task of beating the famine in our areas in the Far East, as
well as a heavy Parliamentary programme. I assure you that I am
absolutely with you on the fundamental importance for U.N.O. of the Persian issue, but I really
don’t think that it would contribute if I hurried across to attend one
meeting. I feel that, if I did come over and Gromyko adopted the
stalling tactics which he has threatened,
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I should be placed in a difficult position. You in
such circumstances could retire to Washington; but if I were to return
to England with the business unfinished it would look extremely bad. My
view is that Russian tactics will not be influenced by my presence at
the meeting but I will remain constant. If a real crisis threatening the
whole future of U.N.O. were to develop
of course I should try to overcome all difficulties and join you.