Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-Eighth Meeting, Palais du Luxembourg, Paris, July 9, 1946, 5 p.m.⁷⁴

Paris, July 9, 1946, 5 p.m.

secret

Report of the Chairman of the Deputies

Mr. Bidault requested the Chairman of the Deputies to make his report.

Mr. Jebb stated that the Deputies had agreed in principle to the report of the Ministers on the organization and procedure of the Peace Conference (CFM (46)204).⁷⁵ They had also agreed in principle to the report on reparations (CMF(46)207).⁷⁶ In the afternoon they had given final consideration to these two documents and had made certain changes. A discussion had taken place on paragraph 2 in the paper on Organization and Procedure because of the translation from French into English and Russian of the words “aupres” and “en particular” [sic]. The UK, Soviet and French delegates believed that the second sentence in paragraph 2 might read “it shall coordinate the work of the various commissions.” The United States delegate reserved his position on this sentence. In paragraph 3 it was agreed to add the words “and to make recommendations to the Conference.” In sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) it was agreed to replace the words “to study” and the words “to deal with” with the words “to consider.” It was agreed that sub-paragraph (d) should read “a Drafting and Legal Commission”. The Soviet Deputy reserved his position on paragraph II. It was agreed that paragraph III should be headed by the words “invitation to other states.” Mr. Jebb called the attention of the Ministers to the fact that the second sentence in this paragraph was contained in square brackets.

Mr. Jebb then discussed the report on Reparations, stating that paragraph (b) thereof was a French redraft of the original British proposal. Certain changes have been made in this, namely the Allied claimants for reparations were named and sources of Italian reparations were defined in more detail. The United States Deputy had reserved his decision on the entire paragraph.

Invitation to the Peace Conference

Mr. Bidault stated that before asking for remarks on the Deputies’ report, he would like to inform the Council of Foreign Ministers that the invitations to the Peace Conference had been sent out this morning in the agreed upon form.⁷⁷

Organization and Procedure of the Peace Conference

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation agreed to the wording of paragraph 2 of the report to the Ministers as announced by Mr. Jebb. With respect to paragraph II concerning the chairmen, the Soviet delegation deemed it advisable to provide for China. It therefore suggested that this paragraph be amended to read as follows: “The chairmanship of the conference will be held in turn by each of the members of the CFM in alphabetical order who have participated in the preparation of the draft peace treaties, and China, each chairman holding office for one week.”

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet delegation did not object to the second sentence in paragraph III and that the square brackets might be removed.

Mr. Byrnes stated that the United States delegation withdrew its reservation to paragraph 2 and agreed to the wording suggested by the chairman of the deputies. It also agreed to the second sentence of paragraph III concerning invitations to other countries.

As to paragraph II Mr. Byrnes inquired whether Mr. Molotov would not agree to the original wording in the report. So long as the Soviet delegation had agreed that a Chinese representative might serve as chairman, the original wording was preferable since it provided for the participation of China. If, however, the new language were adopted, China might imply that it was no longer a member of the CFM and China would object.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had suggested this language because of the wording of the language in paragraph 3 (in (a) and (b)) which referred to the members of the Council who had prepared the draft treaties. But in order to meet Mr. Byrnes’ wishes he suggested the following language: “The chairmanship of the Conference will be held in turn by each of the members of the CFM in alphabetical order who have prepared the draft peace treaties and by the representative of China on the CFM.”

Mr. Byrnes stated that he saw no reason for the change. He also did not see why it was provided that each chairman would hold office for a week. If the conference lasted three weeks, certain of the representatives would never be chairman.

Mr. Molotov stated that he would not object to a period of one day rather than one week. He considered that his language was more accurate. It referred to the four members of the CFM who had prepared the draft treaties and to the Chinese representative who had not taken part in this work but who was a member of the CFM.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he believed the Conference should elect its own chairman. He remarked that it required some nerve to call a conference, to tell it how it should elect a chairman and also to tell it that it had to elect the members of the CFM to preside over it. He did not believe that it was necessary to say that China could participate in the chairmanship. This was provided for in the original language.

Mr. Molotov stated that he withdrew his proposal and that he would adopt the original wording.

Mr. Bidault inquired whether Mr. Byrnes considered it preferable to limit the term of the chairmanship to one day.

Mr. Byrnes stated that it was immaterial to him. He had made the suggestion because he thought that it might be more agreeable to Mr. Molotov.

Mr. Bidault remarked that such a brief term might cause difficulties.

Mr. Byrnes suggested that each chairman hold office for one session.

Mr. Molotov stated that the conference should be opened by a French chairman.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he was going to suggest that the following words be added to the first sentence in paragraph II: “But the host Government shall act as chairman at the first meeting.”

Mr. Bevin stated that the members of the CFM should hold office in alphabetical order according to the French alphabet.

The Ministers agreed to the suggestions of Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Bevin.

Mr. Bidault inquired whether the chairman should hold office one week, one day or four days. He had no preference for one week but he thought that it would be preferable for the chairman to hold office for a period longer than one day in order to get to know his duties.

Mr. Bevin suggested that each chairman hold office for three days.

The Ministers agreed to this proposal.

The Ministers adopted the report on the Organization and Procedure of the Peace Conference with the above noted amendments.

Reparation

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had not read paragraph (b) of the report on Reparation (Reparation for other Powers) until this afternoon. He agreed to the first sentence of this paragraph, to the effect that the claims of the other Powers should be put forward and considered at the Peace Conference, but, as he read the rest of this paragraph, it seemed to him that it provided that Reparations for France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania and Ethiopia would be met by the value of certain Italian assets in the ceded territories by share of the Italian factory and tool equipment and by Italian foreign assets. The value of these assets would be determined by the Four Ambassadors who would also determine the conditions under which the balance of the outstanding reparation should be settled. Nothing was said regarding the amounts of the reparations, although it was said that the Ambassadors would determine the conditions under which the balance should be settled. That meant that the Ambassadors would determine how some undetermined amount would be paid. He could not agree to this. He did not object to the first sentence. With respect to the remainder he must point out that, according to his understanding, the Reparations Committee which had considered carefully reparations going to the Soviet Union, had never considered reparations to the other Allied and associated powers. He could not agree to the consideration of the problem at this late date. Since no limiting clause was contained in the latter part of this paragraph, Italy would be obligated to pay the balance which was decided by the Four Ambassadors. Mr. Byrnes desired to know whether these claims would amount to 100 million dollars or one hundred billion dollars. He did not know the value of the Italian factory and tool equipment. He did not know the estimated value of the other items. He did not know anything about the balance which the Ambassadors would determine. He wished again to call attention to the economic situation in Italy which certainly had not improved during the last few days. He could not agree to the blank check which was contained in the latter part of this paragraph especially as Italy did not have any means of paying these reparations.

Mr. Bevin stated that he was anxious to get agreement. He inquired whether Mr. Byrnes would accept a phrase reading as follows: “The claims to be furnished by other Powers, in particular France, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania and Ethiopia will be considered at the Peace Conference together with the means whereby and the extent to which they can be met.”

Mr. Byrnes called attention to the fact that the Peace Conference would examine the draft treaties, make recommendations, that the recommendations would be referred back to the CFM and that the CFM would make the final decisions. According to the present proposal, however, the balance would be determined by the Ambassadors.

Mr. Bidault stated that he would agree to the inclusion of the first sentence with Mr. Bevin’s amendment.

The Ministers agreed that Mr. Bevin’s proposed wording replace paragraph (b) of the report on Reparation.

Postponement of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization

Mr. Bidault read a letter from Mr. Lie, Secretary General of the United Nations Organization, which had been sent to him by Mr. Sobolev, Assistant Secretary General.⁷⁸ This letter stated in effect that the coming Peace Conference would have repercussions on the meeting of the Assembly of the United Nations which was scheduled to take place in New York on September 3. It was obvious that such a conference would be of the greatest importance from the point of view of world peace in general and of the future work of the United Nations in particular. The Peace Conference should have absolute priority over any other meetings. In view of this situation it might be necessary again to consider the date of the reopening of the General Assembly. Mr. Lie stated in conclusion that he would appreciate obtaining the observations of the CFM on this matter. Mr. Bidault stated that he would like to know how he should reply to the Secretary General.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he had received a similar communication from Mr. Lie. In view of the fact that the CFM would convene after the Peace Conference to draft the final texts of the peace treaties, it might be advisable to request a postponement of the Assembly. He suggested that the Assembly be postponed until September 23.

Mr. Molotov stated that apparently all the Ministers had received a similar communication. He agreed with Mr. Byrnes’ suggestion.

The Ministers agreed that Mr. Bidault should suggest to Mr. Lie that the Assembly be postponed until September 23.⁷⁹

Outstanding Articles on the Peace Treaties

Mr. Bevin stated that certain outstanding points on the peace treaties had been referred back to the Deputies. A dead line should be given them for the termination of their work. He suggested Friday.

The Ministers agreed that the Deputies should clean up their work by Friday, July 12.

Committee To Draft the Trieste Statutes

Mr. Byrnes stated that before proceeding to the next subject on the agenda he wished to clean up one or two matters. Had it been agreed that a special committee should be appointed to draft the statutes for Trieste? This committee had not been appointed.

Mr. Bevin stated that Mr. Waldeck would be the British representative.

Mr. Byrnes stated that Mr. Mosely would be the United States representative.

Mr. Molotov stated that Mr. Dekanosov would be the Russian representative.

Mr. Bidault stated that he would inform the CFM of the French representative at a later meeting.

Transmission of Treaties to Ex-Enemy States

Mr. Byrnes called attention to the fact that the Deputies had no authority to send the draft treaties to ex-enemy states. He proposed that the Deputies be given this authority.

Mr. Molotov suggested that the Deputies consider this question.

Mr. Bidault and Mr. Bevin agreed to consider the question.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he did not know whether Mr. Molotov understood exactly what he meant. It was a question of the transmission of the draft treaties, whenever they were completed, to the ex-enemy states. The United States Deputy had advised him that the Deputies had no such authority at the present time.

Mr. Bevin stated that he would like to have a little time to think this matter over.

Mr. Bidault suggested that the subject be discussed tomorrow. The draft treaties would have to be sent to the ex-enemy states at some time. He was of the opinion that it might be a little premature to do so at an early date.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he agreed but since the ex-enemy states were to be invited to the Peace Conference, it might be a good idea to send the draft treaties to them in order to give them a little time to study the treaties and to cool off.

Mr. Bevin stated that he was a little concerned about the attitude of the other sixteen allied states. In any event he would like to see the final report of the Deputies before any decision was made on this point.

The Ministers agreed to discuss this subject tomorrow.

Germany

Mr. Bidault stated that he had expressed the position of the French delegation on the question of Germany on various occasions and that there was no need to repeat his views which have not changed.⁸⁰

Mr. Molotov said that he would like to make a statement on the draft treaty for Germany which had been submitted by Mr. Byrnes. Mr. Molotov thereupon read the following statement:⁸¹

“The Soviet Government has studied with due attention the draft treaty between the four powers about the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany submitted by Mr. Byrnes.⁸²

“The Soviet Government reaffirms that disarmament and demilitarization of Germany are absolutely essential. The Soviet Government feels that Germany should be kept disarmed and demilitarized not for 25 years as suggested in the draft but for at least 40 years. The experience has shown that the short period of time during which restrictions on Germany’s armaments were enforced after the first World War proved to be absolutely insufficient to prevent Germany’s renascence as an aggressive force endangering the peoples of Europe and the world. Only 20 years had passed since the end of the First World War when Germany unleashed a second World War. It is obvious that peace-loving nations are interested in keeping Germany disarmed as long as possible.

“The suggested draft treaty is motivated by the interests of world peace and security. The preamble of the treaty refers to the desire to make it possible for the peoples of Europe and the whole world to devote themselves wholly to peaceful pursuits. Yet the study of the draft shows the complete inadequacy of the measures it sets forth to safeguard security and to prevent aggression by Germany in the future. The said document is confined to the enumeration of certain military and war economy measures but even those measures are set forth in it in a less comprehensive form than this was done in the decisions of the Berlin Conference of the leaders of three powers which in addition indicated other no less essential conditions of safeguarding security and lasting peace. For this reason the Soviet Government has come to the conclusion that if the treaty between the four powers is confined only to what it says regarding Germany’s disarmament it cannot be a reliable guarantee of security in Europe and the world. On the contrary the inadequacy of the measures it sets forth might harbour the danger of Germany’s resurgence as an aggressive power.

“The question arises what the treaty between the 4 powers should be so as to serve to prevent a new aggression on the part of Germany and thus to really safeguard endurable peace and security of nations. To reply to this question one has to turn to those of joint decisions of the Allied powers which were adopted by them in the course of the war with Germany.

“Everybody knows that the joint decisions which were adopted by the Governments of the USA, the Soviet Union and Great Britain at the Crimea Conference⁸³ and subsequently elaborated at the Berlin conference⁸⁴ and which were joined by France set out main objectives in the matter of safeguarding Europe and the world against the danger of a new German aggression. There is no reason for us to renounce these decisions. They must form a basis for our further steps in the maintenance of peace.

“First of all it should be said that these decisions refer to the necessity to effect ‘the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production’. Thus the decision about a complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany was adopted by our countries long before the appearance of the draft treaty under discussion. At that time it was also found necessary to carry out an industrial disarmament of Germany and the Allies have always regarded the elimination of Germany’s war and economic potential and the establishment of proper Allied control over German industries as their primary objective in safeguarding security of nations in the future. The proposed draft however formulated these objectives in a restricted and utterly inadequate form. But if one asks as to what the position is in this respect at present, the situation will prove to be entirely unsatisfactory. The Soviet Government already proposed that investigation be undertaken in all the zones in Germany to see how the disarmament of German forces and disbandment of all other military and para-military organizations and establishments have been carried out in actual fact. This has not been done to this day. But we continue to press for carrying out this investigation in order to avoid all sorts of misunderstandings in this sphere. As to the elimination of German war and military economic potential the position is an entirely unsatisfactory one. There is yet nothing to investigate because up to now no plan for the elimination of war potential of Germany has been adopted and apart from certain measures taken independently of a general plan nothing has been accomplished in this respect. The Soviet Government therefore considers that there should be no further delay in the drawing up of such a plan and the establishment of a procedure for implementing measures to eliminate those branches of German industries which while producing enormous quantities of armaments for the German army formed a war and military economic base of aggressive Germany. Only a disarmament of Germany that will include the disbandment of German armed forces and all military and paramilitary organizations as well as the elimination of those German industries, which supplied Germany’s armaments—only such a disarmament and demilitarization of Germany will respond to the interests of lasting peace and security of nations. The four powers treaty which is intended to safeguard peace and security must above all be in keeping with the accomplishment of these tasks. The suggested draft does not however provide a satisfactory answer to these questions.

“At the same time we must be mindful of the fact that the safeguarding of security and the prevention of a new aggression on the part of Germany depend not only upon measures of military and military economic nature. Of no less importance are those of the decisions of the Crimean and Berlin conferences which deal with political objectives in respect of Germany the achievement of which has always been considered by the Allied powers as a precondition necessary to safeguard future peace and security of nations.

“The decisions of the Crimea conference referred to the necessity ‘to wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and military influences from public offices and from the cultural and economic life of the German people’. All this is set forth in greater detail in the decisions of the Berlin conference, which stress the necessity ‘to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of the German political life on a democratic basis’. The suggested draft evades the question of liquidating the remnants of German fascism and of reconstructing the German political life on democratic lines to which fact one cannot agree.

“Only yesterday we all admitted that our primary objective was not only ‘to wipe out the Nazi party’ but also to remove the effects of the domination of Hitlerism in all spheres of the public life of Germany. We regarded the accomplishment of these tasks as a condition necessary to reconstruct the German state on democratic lines in order that Germany may cease to exist as an aggressive force and may become a democratic and peace-loving state which will then be able to pass on to peaceful cooperation in international affairs. We all realized that this reconstruction would not be an easy task, that it would take some time and would require our active support for those democratic forces of the German people who will undertake this task. And it should be admitted that substantial democratic forces have sprung up in Germany who are already working with a certain amount of success for the democratic renascence of Germany. But after all this democratic reconstruction has just begun; only the beginning has been made; the forces of fascism in Germany are far from eradicated. It is well known that agrarian reform involving the elimination of big landowners who formed a reliable base of Hitlerism has been carried out only in the Soviet zone and has not been even started in the western zones. Monopolistic associations of German industrialists—all these cartels, trusts, syndicates and etc. on which German fascism relied in preparing for aggression and in waging the war still exercise their influence, particularly in the western zones. Consequently if we want to have reliable guarantees of security for the future we have no reason to pay less attention to the problem of complete elimination of Nazism and to the question of Germany’s democratization.

“In view of this how is one to understand the fact that the suggested draft does not say a single word about these important objectives of maintaining peace and security of nations? It must be clear to us that all advocates of lasting peace are interested in a complete implementation of the decisions of the Crimea and Berlin conferences. We must remember our joint decisions which say that ‘German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together now and in the future the other measures necessary to assure that Germany will never again threaten her neighbors and the peace of the world’. The suggested treaty does not conform to these objectives. It evades and disregards these extremely important prerequisites of ensuring lasting peace and security of nations. Thus in the light of security requirements the suggested draft treaty does not achieve its purpose not to mention the fact that it is in conflict with the earlier joint decisions of the Allies.

“Despite the complete inadequacy of the proposed measures set forth in the draft to prevent a new aggression by Germany the draft envisages the possibility of terminating the Allied occupation of German territory. Thus the draft ignores the aims by which the Allies were guided when they decided on Germany’s occupation. The presence of Allied and Soviet forces in Germany is accounted for by three objectives: first to secure and bring to conclusion military and economic disarmament of Germany; second to secure the democratization of regime in Germany; and third to assure reparation deliveries. We hold that presence of occupation forces in Germany and the maintenance of zones of occupation are absolutely essential as long as these objectives have not been achieved.

“It was already indicated how unsatisfactory the draft is in the light of securing a complete military and economic disarmament of Germany as well as the fact that the draft completely disregards the problem of securing the democratization of regime in Germany.

“It remains for me to add that Mr. Byrnes’ draft also fully ignores the necessity to secure reparation deliveries to which fact the Soviet Government can by no means agree.

“It is necessary to dwell upon the question of reparations from Germany. This question particularly affects the interests of those nations which were invaded by German armies and experienced exceptionally great sufferings of German occupation. Naturally the Soviet Union cannot forget about reparations as this was done in the suggested draft.

“With respect to the total amount of reparations from Germany for the USSR the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States already at the Crimea Conference felt possible to proceed upon the amount of ten billion dollars. At the Berlin Conference the Soviet Government again insisted on fixing reparations from Germany in favor of the Soviet Union at the amount of 10 billion dollars. At that time it was decided at the suggestion of the United States that the Soviet Union should draw reparations mainly from its occupation zone of Germany and partly from the western zones which fact was recorded in the decisions of the Berlin Conference. Naturally, these reparations must include not only equipment but also commodities out of current production of Germany. But as we know the fulfilment of reparation deliveries is encountering ever new obstacles. Notwithstanding the obligations which have been assumed by the United States of America and Great Britain and which have subsequently been joined by France, the Berlin decisions about reparation deliveries are not being carried out in the Western zones of occupation of Germany. Ever new pretexts are found to postpone and frustrate the implementation of these decisions. American General Clay recently issued an unlawful statement announcing the refusal to carry out reparation deliveries to the Soviet Union and other countries even under the first and utterly inadequate decisions which were already agreed upon by the four governments in the Allied Control Council.⁸⁵ The Soviet Government can by no means accept such an attitude towards the joint decisions of our Governments on the subject of reparations. All the more are we unable to accept the proposal contained in Mr. Byrnes’ draft which admits the termination of the Allied occupation of German territory irrespective of the fulfilment of reparation deliveries. The Soviet Government insists that reparations from Germany to the amount of 10 billion dollars be exacted without fail because this amount is but a small portion of the enormous damage that had been done to the Soviet Union by German occupation. It is possible that the United States of America and England which did not experience the sufferings of occupation somewhat underrate the value of reparations to the USSR but the peoples of the Soviet Union who experienced the sufferings of German occupation cannot accept such an attitude towards their legitimate claims.

“All what I have said indicates the attitude of the Soviet Union towards the draft submitted by Mr. Byrnes about Germany’s disarmament and demilitarization. It is clear to us that the draft treaty in the form in which it is submitted to us does not respond to the interests of ensuring peace and security of nations. The draft is in need of radical revision. The observations that I have made indicate the lines along which it is necessary in our opinion to revise this draft.”

Mr. Byrnes stated that when he had submitted the draft treaty on Germany he had said that he was submitting it as a working paper, as a basis for consideration, and that he would welcome suggestions as to how the draft treaty could be improved. He had not heard from Mr. Molotov and he was glad to hear today for the first time Mr. Molotov’s objections to the draft. The only concrete statement he recalled hearing was that the treaty should run for 40 years and not for 25. The working paper which he had sent to Mr. Molotov provided that the treaty would remain in force for 25 years and that six months before its termination consultation should take place between the signatories with a view to ascertaining whether the treaty should be renewed with or without modifications. Mr. Byrnes had believed that his original suggestion was the best one but had invited comment from his colleagues. Mr. Molotov had suggested 40 years and Mr. Byrnes accepted this period. Mr. Molotov had stated that the draft treaty did not provide for the demilitarization of Germany and did not properly provide for the disarming of German troops. Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the language in the treaty providing for the disarmament of German troops and the demilitarization of Germany’s plants was taken from the Agreement of June 5, 1945 which had been entered into by the US, UK, French and Soviet Governments.⁸⁶ Mr. Byrnes did not know who could define this language better than Generals Zhukov, Eisenhower, Montgomery and De Lattre de Tassigny.^86a It appeared that Mr. Molotov had not carefully read the treaty or he would have recognized this language. As a matter of fact Mr. Byrnes recalled that he had written Mr. Molotov that this language had been taken from this agreement. Mr. Byrnes continued that the treaty did not profess to be anything but a treaty for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. It did not try to settle reparation and political questions. It merely tried to carry out for 25 years agreements which had been reached between the Generals on the demilitarization of Germany. Mr. Molotov was under the impression that it would bring to an end the occupation of Germany.

Mr. Byrnes pointed out that according to the proposed language of the treaty the occupying powers should enforce the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany during the period of Allied Occupation. It provided further that the express acceptance by Germany of the conditions laid down by Generals Zhukov, Eisenhower and others should be the essential conditions for the termination of occupation. Nothing was said in the treaty regarding the termination of occupation. The treaty stated that occupation would not be terminated unless Germany agreed to carry on the program provided for in the treaty for a period of 25, and now 40, years. If Germany did not agree the occupation would never end. The purpose of the treaty was to disarm German troops and to demilitarize German plants. The treaty did not contain all the provisions that were included in the Yalta and Berlin Agreements. This was not necessary since these Agreements were still in force. It was contemplated at Berlin and Yalta that the matters which Mr. Molotov had referred to would be taken care of at the present time—during the present military occupation—and before the proposed treaty came into effect. Mr. Byrnes wished to repeat what he had said last April. When he had proposed the treaty he knew that the United States was doing something it had refused to do twenty years ago. He was trying to assist. He now resented it when he met with arguments from Mr. Molotov on reparations and on all the minor difficulties which were being encountered during the period of occupation. When he had first proposed the treaty Mr. Molotov had stated that the demilitarization of Germany was not being carried out. Since the Four Powers were responsible for the demilitarization of Germany Mr. Byrnes had asked for an investigation. He had telephoned his representative in Germany and asked him to take up the question of an investigation in every zone of Germany. When General Clay had discussed this matter with the Soviet representative in Germany, the Soviet representative stated that the investigation should be limited to troop disarmament and not to the demilitarization of industrial plants. General Clay had proposed that representatives of the Four Governments should go into the four zones in order to carry on the investigation. The US, UK and French Governments approved this course. But the Soviet Government had refused and would not permit representatives to enter the Soviet zone.⁸⁷ If Mr. Molotov desired such an investigation, one could be agreed upon at the next meeting.

Mr. Byrnes stated that he was not going to refer to all of Mr. Molotov’s statements on reparations. Mr. Molotov would remember the Yalta conference where Mr. Maisky^87a had proposed that the Soviet Union receive reparations from Germany in the amount of 10 billion dollars. The United States Government had never accepted this figure except as a basis for discussion. At the Potsdam Conference reparations had been discussed and a new agreement had been reached. Even Marshal Stalin recognized that after all the Allied armies had advanced through Germany there were not reparations in the amount of 20 billion dollars to permit the Soviet Government to receive 10 billion dollars. Mr. Byrnes continued that the Berlin decision stated that the payment of reparations should leave enough resources in Germany to permit the German people to live without external assistance. The United States budget for 1946 would provide for expenditures in the amount of 200 million dollars to cover the US zone in Germany. This amount was higher in 1945. Mr. Byrnes also wished to point out that the proceeds from current production and German exports, according to the Berlin Agreement, should be used in the first place to cover imports. That was not being done and as a result it was necessary for the U.S. Government to spend 200 million dollars in the U.S. zone. Mr. Byrnes stated that he did not know what was being exported from the Soviet or British zones. In the Potsdam Agreement it was said that Germany should be treated as one economic unit. That was not being done. Mr. Byrnes wished to point out that when Mr. Molotov complained concerning the order issued by General Clay, the order was being issued in justice to the United States under the Berlin Agreement. The United States was not asking for reparations or territories such as East Prussia. It did not know the value of the plants and equipment in the Soviet zone and was not asking for them. But it was asking for the fulfillment of the Berlin Agreement in order that it would not have to pay out 200 million dollars a year.

Mr. Byrnes continued that the treaty for Germany did not purport to be anything but a demilitarization agreement. He now wished to circulate a paper which proposed that special deputies be appointed to work out the economic questions which were arising in Germany during the present period of occupation.⁸⁸ This suggestion had nothing to do with the demilitarization treaty. These deputies should be appointed in order that they might ascertain whether they could come to agreement on the questions raised by Mr. Molotov today. He wished to circulate a copy of the statement he had made on May 15, with certain amendments. He would like to have this paper considered at a subsequent meeting.

Mr. Bevin suggested that the CFM adjourn.

The meeting adjourned at 8:30 p.m.

74. For a list of persons present at this meeting, see the Record of Decisions, infra.
75. For the version of this paper as finally approved by the Council at this meeting, see C.F.M.(46) 204 (Revised), July 9, 1946, p. 852.
76. Post, p. 854.
77. For text of the invitation as agreed upon by the Council of Foreign Ministers, see C.F.M.(46) 190 (revised), July 8, p. 834.
78. For text of United Nations Secretary General Lie’s letter of June 27, 1946, to the members of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris, see Department of State Bulletin, August 4, 1946, p. 220.
79. In a telegram to the 51 member nations of the United Nations, released to the press on July 11, 1946 (Department of State Bulletin, August 4, 1946, p. 220), Acting Secretary General Sobolev set forth the recommendation of the Council of Foreign Ministers that the General Assembly be convened on September 23. In an announcement released to the press on July 24, 1946 (printed ibid.), the United Nations stated that no nation had objected to the recommendation and that there had been issued a notice regarding the convocation of the General Assembly on September 23, 1946. Additional documentation on this subject is included in the Department of State numerical file 501.BC for July 1946.
80. For additional documentation regarding the problem of quadripartite control of Germany, French proposals concerning the Rhineland, the Ruhr, and the Saar, the question of centralized agencies, reparations, denazification, demilitarization, and related matters, see vol. v, pp. 481 ff.
81. Foreign Minister Molotov’s statement was subsequently printed in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia on July 10, 1946.
82. The reference here is to C.F.M. (46) 21, April 30, 1946, p. 190.
83. For the decisions of the Crimea Conference, February 4–11, 1945, with respect to Germany, see Parts I, II, and III of the Report of the Conference, and Parts III, IV, and V of the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Conference, Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 969–971 and 978–979.
84. For the decisions of the Berlin Conference, July 17–August 2, 1945, with respect to Germany, see Parts III–VI of the Report on the Conference and Parts II–VI of the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Conference, Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, pp. 1501–1507 and 1481–1489.
85. Regarding General Clay’s statement at the 51st Meeting of the Coordinating Committee of the Allied Control Commission for Germany, April 26, 1946, announcing the suspension of reparations deliveries from the American zone of occupation in Germany pending agreement among the occupation powers on the question of central governmental agencies for Germany, see telegram 1160, May 2, 1946, from Berlin, vol. v, p. 545, and the immediately following documents.
86. The reference here is to the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme Authority by the Allied Powers, June 5, 1945; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, p. 1051.
87. Together with Marshals Zhukov and Montgomery, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and General of the Army Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, then General Commanding in Chief of the First French Army, signed the Declaration identified in footnote 36 above.
87. For an account of the discussion at the 56th Meeting of the Coordinating Committee of the Allied Control Commission for Germany regarding the preliminary report of the Quadripartite Commission to Investigate Disarmament in Germany, see telegram 1342, May 25, 1946, from Berlin, vol. v, p. 559.
88. Ivan Mikhailovich Maisky, at the time of the Yalta Conference, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union; subsequently, Soviet representative on Moscow Commission on Reparations.
88. The reference here is to C.F.M.(46) 211, July 9, 1946, p. 855.