Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II

C.F.M. Files: Lot M–88: Box 2063: US Delegation Minutes

United States Delegation Record, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Second Informal Meeting, Paris, May 6, 1946, 11 a.m.

Paris, May 6, 1946, 11 a.m.

secret

Present

	France
	M. Bidault (Chairman)
	M. Couve de Murville
	M. Courcel
	Interpreter
U.K.		U.S.S.R.
Mr. Bevin		M. Molotov
Mr. Jebb		M. Vyshinsky
Mr. Waldock		M. Pavlov
		Interpreter
	U.S.A.
	Secretary
	Senator Connally
	Senator Vandenberg

M. Bidault, who presided, opened the discussion by listing the following questions with regard to the Italian treaty which were still open:

• Reparations
• Venezia Giulia and Trieste
• Italian colonies

He added there was also the question of the revision of armistice terms. At M. Bevin’s suggestion he added the Dodecanese.

M. Molotov said, in his opinion, they should today deal only with the questions relating to the treaty.

M. Byrnes pointed out that in regard to the revision of the armistice terms, since there was general agreement except on one small point by the British Delegation, he felt that they could proceed to reach a final agreement on this question, which would set a good precedent for others. However, he did not insist that it be done today.

M. Molotov suggested that they should consider all the peace treaties, that is, Italy first, Rumania second, Bulgaria third.

M. Bidault proposed they start with reparations and referred to the new French proposal.²⁶

M. Byrnes said he had nothing new on reparations since he had no line [new?] information from the Experts Committee, but that he had caused a study to be made of Italian assets abroad and had found out that these assets were larger than had been anticipated in countries such as Rumania and Hungary. He thought these assets should be taken into consideration as available sources of reparation. It was agreed that the Experts would be requested to have their report ready by Tuesday²⁷ afternoon.

M. Bidault then stated that as a political question he suggested they start with Trieste since they had already broken the ice on that point, and from there they might move on to the consideration of more general questions.

M. Byrnes said he had nothing to add to what he had stated last Saturday, but he had no objection to reciting briefly the basis of the US position. He said we felt that the US line represented the best execution of the London decision to consider chiefly ethnic considerations, but taking into account economic and geographic fators, the British Expert had proposed a line leaving less territory to Italy and the French line left less still. However, he stated that the US in a spirit of compromise was willing to have the Experts try and work out a line somewhere between the British and the French as a possible basis of agreement. He did not include the Soviet line since it was so far to the west that it could not be said to conform to the London decision on the ethnic principle. In agreeing to accepting the British and French lines as a basis for compromise, he wished to draw attention to the fact that this would involve the transfer of a very important Italian coal mine to Yugoslavia, but since the guiding principle was ethnic, he hoped the Experts could find a line somewhere between the French and British which would equalize the minorities left under alien rule.²⁸

M. Bevin said that the British Delegation had adhered to the London decision since they had no right to depart from it. The slight difference between the French and British lines offered a possibility for a compromise which he could accept, but he could not agree to the handing over of the Italian city of Trieste to Yugoslavia as this would be an injustice.

M. Bidault then said he wished to give his colleagues some statistics based on the 1910 census regarding the ethnic question under the various lines proposed. He said these figures tended to support the French position as in closest conformity to the London decision. He said according to these figures if the Soviet line was adopted, there would be slightly less than 400,000 Italians under Yugoslav rule, but no Yugoslavs in Italy. Under the US line, there would be 52,000 Italians in Yugoslavia and 190,000 Yugoslavs in Italy. Under the French proposal, there would be 135,000 Italians in Yugoslavia and 153,000 Yugoslavs in Italy. He said he had no figures for the British line.

M. Molotov said he would not repeat the arguments with regard to Trieste which he had stated before, but he wished to say that the Soviet Union had no interest in this territorial question, and furthermore the Soviet policy is not in conflict with the London decision. He would like to ask M. Bidault if he remembered a fact which closely affected France, namely, the transfer of Alsace and Lorraine after the last war and the ethnic composition of the city of Trieste [Strasbourg?]. He would like to know what was the predominant population of that city—German or French. He added that consideration must be given to the history of this question, as well as to the basic fact of the present situation. This question was of national importance to Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union considered that, viewing the question as a whole, it should be unquestionably decided in favor of Yugoslavia and not of Italy. He said that if this question could be settled in favor of Yugoslavia, it would be possible to meet Italy’s interest to a greater extent on other questions, namely, reparations and colonies. The Soviet Delegation felt that the demands on Italy should be just and not excessive, but the minimum obligations she is to assume now in the peace treaties should achieve a settlement that would last for many years.

M. Bidault said, with regard to Strasbourg, that the French Delegation had not forgotten 1918. There had never been any doubt nor could there be any now that the population was predominantly French and had been for many years. This had been demonstrated many times in free elections. As to the possibility of meeting Italian wishes on other questions, he said that they should be studied, but up to the present we did not know exactly what that meant.

M. Molotov replied that he viewed the matter as follows: In regard to reparations, if Yugoslavia and Greece received territories—Trieste and the Dodecanese Islands, respectively, as well as the Italian assets in their countries—this should immediately reduce their reparation claims. As to colonies, Italian interests might also be further considered here, possibly along the lines of the French proposal of an Italian trusteeship. If these questions were taken all together in this manner, he felt that the interests of the countries which are directly concerned, which are Yugoslavia, Greece and also Italy, could be taken care of.

M. Bevin stated that he thought it was improper to bargain one nationality against the other. Trieste was proved to be Italian. It would be unjust to transfer this city against the will of the inhabitants to Yugoslavia, to say nothing of the local industries which were built by Italy. As to the colonies, he felt this suggestion ignored the Arab populations and also the promises to the Arabs made by England when she stood alone in the war. Also Ethiopia, which had had three wars with Italy, should be heard. He was not saying whether the claims of Ethiopia were just or not, but merely that she should be heard before Eritrea was handed back to Italy or to anyone else. He had put forth a proposition with regard to the Somalilands which had been called selfish, but had merely asked for an investigation as to the possibility of some economic combination.²⁹ He said he thought it best that the matter of the Somalilands be dealt with by the United Nations. As to Libya, he had proposed independence, which brought no harm to France since it was nothing but a proposal for a Class A mandate leading to eventual full independence. He felt that his proposal on this point should be studied. He said he could not be a party, in view of the fight which Britain had put up to win these colonies, to any arrangement which went one inch beyond the US proposal of last September.

M. Molotov inquired if that meant that M. Bevin agreed to the US proposal.³⁰

M. Bevin said he might. He had not yet decided, but he would like to see his proposal and that of the US studied. At London, Britain had proposed that in the treaty Italy merely renounce its sovereignty over these islands [colonies?]. This had been done because it was possible to anticipate the difficulty of settling the final disposition of the colonies at this time since the United Nations trusteeship machinery had not yet been set up. He thought these colonies might then be held in trust by the Four Powers for later disposition since their many considerations involve interested countries and the local population. If the treaty could be concluded and a final disposition of the colonies be postponed, Italy would then be a member of the United Nations and she and Egypt and other countries which had asked to be heard could participate in the final solution. He repeated his suggestion that his proposal and that of the US for a collective trusteeship should be studied. He said alternatively he would be willing to accept an Italian renunciation of these colonies and to have the matter left in the hands of the Council for future disposition. In regard to the Dodecanese Islands, he said he wished to know whether the property on those islands if they went to Greece would count as reparations.

M. Byrnes said that on the subject of reparations he felt there was not a wide area of disagreement. As a result of the investigation he had had made, it turned out that there were larger external Italian assets than had been anticipated. He said, for example, there were appreciable Italian assets in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, and that these might be considered as available sources of reparations for the Soviet Union. In the Soviet proposal on reparations, reference was made to the claims of Yugoslavia and Albania he so far as Yugoslavia is concerned, whatever lines are adopted, that country will receive mines, equipment, power stations and other valuable property, which, together with Italian assets in Yugoslavia, should take care of any claim for reparations. In Albania, he also understood there were some Italian assets, which Albania could claim as reparations. There were also the capital installations in Italy, used only for war purposes, which were admittedly a source of reparations.

Turning to the colonies, M. Byrnes said he did not know whether it would be of much advantage to Italy to have these colonies under trusteeship since they had always been a liability to her. He said that at London the US had adopted a new approach to this question, namely, that the development of the local inhabitants and assistance to its self-government should be the guiding principle, and for these reasons the US had come to the conclusion that the best solution would be a trusteeship under the United Nations. He said that all four delegations were apparently agreed to the principle of trusteeship, but the only difference was who was to administer these colonies. He thought, therefore, it might be possible to have Italy renounce sovereignty to these colonies in the treaty and leave to the four nations represented here to assume the responsibility for these colonies for one year, during which period they would endeavor to agree on the future administration. If, at the end of that time, there was no agreement, the whole matter could be referred to the Trusteeship Council which would then be in existence. He said he had no objection, however, to having the Deputies study M. Bevin’s proposal.

As to the question of Trieste, the US Delegation could not accept any proposal which would run counter to the Atlantic Charter on the rights of self-expression or to the London decision regarding the ethnic principle. He said that the figures cited by M. Bidault show that the Soviet proposal would leave 400,000 Italians in Yugoslavia. This was not in conformity with the ethnic principle of the Atlantic Charter. He repeated that the US was willing to have the French and British lines studied with a view to finding a line which would leave the least number of people under Allied [alien] rule.

M. Molotov said that, with reference to M. Bevin’s remarks concerning bargaining, he wished to point out that the Soviet suggestion did not propose a bargain, but a compromise in order to avoid a one-sided decision, but he would not repeat what he had already said regarding the reparations question and the Dodecanese Islands. He said he felt that the considerations advanced by the Soviet Delegation in regard to Trieste were decisive.

As to colonies, he said that Mr. Bevin had again advanced his idea concerning independence for Libya, but which, like the present arrangement for Trans-Jordan, would not provide for any real independence since British troops would remain. It was, in fact, a means of prolonging British rule. The same view applied to the proposal for Somaliland plus the fact that certain demands were being made of Ethiopia, a member of the United Nations, and a country which had suffered greatly in the war. This, he felt, was unjust to Ethiopia. He said that M. Byrnes had proposed a temporary decision, but a temporary decision was no decision at all if we were to eliminate the causes of friction and misunderstanding. He also doubted that it was to Italy’s interests to have a trusteeship over some of these colonies and he doubted whether Italy would agree to this.

M. Bevin said that he wished M. Molotov could understand him in regard to Ethiopia. Ethiopia had a claim for Eritrea. Great Britain had no claim there and he would not press the proposal in regard to the union of the Somalilands unless a solution was reached in friendly negotiation with Ethiopia. If there was no agreement, he was quite prepared to have Italian Somaliland under United Nations trusteeship. He said that Great Britain had set a good example in asking for no new territory. He had merely wished to help the natives in that area, which in the past had been split up between British and Italian Somaliland. In fact, if he could be given credit for an honest motive, it would seem that he was merely trying to remedy some Nineteenth Century wrongs. In any case, he was only asking for an investigation. As regards Libya, if we were to hear Italy, he felt that the people who had been under Italian rule should also be heard. Also England as the occupying power of areas won at high cost should have the right to have a voice in the decision. He said that the British plan was not the same as Trans-Jordan although he was not apologizing for the latter. The British proposal for Libya was entirely through the medium of the United Nations. Since he had been in Paris he had received an appeal from the local inhabitants not to be returned to Italy. He concluded with the statement that Nineteenth Century imperialism was dead in England, which was no longer an expansionist country, but that there was suspicion that their place was taken by others. As a Social Democrat, he was not envious.

M. Bidault said that the French position in regard to the colonies was not because of the merits of the Italian Administration, but because of the size and economic importance of the Italian population there and difficulties of any other decision. He said he doubted the wisdom of any provisional clause in a final treaty which would suppose to settle such matters. To leave it to time, he felt, would have bad consequences and not be a good solution. He said that the exchanges of views this morning would perhaps be found not without value, but that they should think the questions over.

M. Molotov said he had some observations to make with regard to M. Bevin’s remarks. When M. Bevin said that Nineteenth Century imperialism was dead, he forgot there were Twentieth Century imperialist tendencies in the world, including in Great Britain. When Churchill calls for a new war and makes militant speeches at home and abroad, he represents the worst imperialist tendencies of the Twentieth Century, and it is to be noted that Churchill approves M. Bevin’s foreign policy. He said it is easy to divert attention from one’s self to others, but facts are stronger than any slander, or attempts at slander of another government. It is sufficient to say that England has troops and military bases in Greece, Denmark, Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia and elsewhere. The Soviet Union has no bases beyond its border, and this shows the difference between expansion and security. Soviet troops were stationed abroad only in accordance with treaties and for the periods provided for in treaties. In Poland there were Soviet troops just as there were Allied troops in Belgium, France and Holland in order to protect lines of communication to the occupying forces of Germany. There is not a single Soviet soldier outside of these legal limits. He said he wished to recall that Egypt, a member of the United Nations, wants British troops out, but England would not comply with this request. He inquired as to what sort of relationship existed between two members of the United Nations when one maintains troops in the territory of another against its will and how long could such a situation continue. He said the Soviet Government had been astonished when India had been proposed for admission to the United Nations, but she had been admitted and still Great Britain did not intend to grant the desires of India. He inquired as to what kind of relationship existed when one nation imposes its will by force on another. He concluded by saying that he would not have raised all these points had he not been forced to do so by M. Bevin, but the truth must be brought to light.

M. Bevin said he hoped that now that Mr. Molotov had gotten that off his chest, he felt better.

M. Byrnes then said that since they had not reached agreement on the main problem, could they not think those over and in the meantime ask the deputies to report on the status of the other treaties which they were to consider. He said he thought it would be a mistake to do nothing until these main points in the Italian treaty were settled.

This suggestion was accepted by the other Ministers and after some discussion it was decided that the Deputies would meet at four o’clock this afternoon and report to the Foreign Ministers at 11:00 a.m. on the status of the other peace treaties.

26. Presumably, the reference here is to the proposals on reparations by the French Delegation, C.F.M. (46) 20, May 2, 1946, the text of which is included in the Report by the Committee on Reparations, C.F.M. (46) 53, May 7, 1946, p. 286.
27. May 7.
28. The lines proposed for the Italo-Yugoslav boundary by the French, Soviet, British, and American experts on the Italo-Yugoslav Boundary Commission are set forth in annexes (pp. 149–152) to the Minutes of the 73rd Meeting of that Commission, April 28, 1946, and on the map facing p. 152.
29. The British proposals with regard to the disposition of the Italian Colonies were set forth in C.F.M. (46) 22, April 30, 1946, p. 194.
30. Reference here is presumably to the American proposal for a United Nations trusteeship for Italian colonies in Africa, included as Section III of C.F.M. (45) 16, September 14, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 179.