860H.01/7–444: Telegram

The Chargé to the Yugoslav Government in Exile (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Yugoslavia 2. Ban Subasic has given Premier Churchill a memorandum on his recent discussions with Tito and has given me a copy. The memorandum is divided into three sections, the first dealing with the main principles of the agreement with Tito (see my 1, July 420), the second dealing with the question[s] which should be solved immediately; and the third dealing with the new government. The substance of the memorandum is given below.

Under section 1, Subasic states: Before reaching their conclusions Tito and he agreed to divide their future work into two phases, the first preparatory and the second final. Tito and his leading collaborators in the anti-Fascist Council showed him documented proof of what Mihailovic and his Chetnik leaders had done in the name of the King. This they said was the main reason for the King losing his authority and popularity with the Partisans. Tito was aware that only the members of the former Yugoslav Governments were responsible for those deeds. He thinks there will be time enough to improve the position of the King and that this may be successfully [Page 1385] done if the King and the new government show themselves prepared to do everything in their power actively to help the people and the resisters. Tito will then be able to be more outspoken in the matter. This end would best be served if a common single representation could be formed within and outside the country.

Subasic adds that the recently concluded agreement has the following significance for the King and the Government. It signifies first of all recognition by Tito and his anti-Fascist and executive councils of the legitimate representatives of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. This recognition is demonstrated by the fact that Tito and his national committee have discussed and concluded an agreement with the Royal Government of Yugoslavia.21 In addition, Tito and his men agree to delegate two persons to the Royal Government.

For Tito and his associates the following claims have been accepted; recognition of the achievements by the people during their three years war: The democratic and federal organization of the state community; recognition of the established provisional administration and its executive organs in the country; recognition of the national fighting forces commanded by Marshal Tito, and condemnation of the traitors to the cause of the people.

It has been agreed that the problem of the King and the monarchy will not be discussed until the people themselves can freely decide on this matter. Similarly the question of the final organizations of the State will not be discussed for the duration of the war.

All national forces must be united and directed against the enemy. Both sides hope that their common efforts will help to eliminate existing difficulties and differences and bring the people on the one hand and the King and Government on the other nearer to each other.

Under section 2 of the memorandum Ban Subasic lists the questions which he and Tito agreed should be solved immediately;

Yugoslav Navy. Tito wishes to bring the whole navy under its [his?] operative command. As a result of a discussion at General Wilson’s headquarters, General Wilson, Admiral Cunningham22 and Subasic agreed that they should settle this question at a conference to be held in Italy, at which both Tito and Subasic should take part. Tito and Subasic agreed that the Royal Yugoslav Navy should sail and fight under the Yugoslav flag without insignia (Red Star).
Army and Air Force. Tito wishes that all those who have declared for the Partisans should be put at his disposal at once. He would also approve of the Yugoslav regular forces—wearing royal insignia—fighting on Yugoslav soil. He does not mind in which part of Yugoslavia they fight.
Supplies. Tito is asking for the following items; (a) armaments for the Navy and 10 speed boats; (b) 60 and 30 planes daily for the transport of supplies respectively to the forces in Yugoslavia and the civil population; (c) 80 tanks which he would be able to man with 960 trained men; (d) cannon and other weapons; (e) clothing; shoes, linen, food, medicaments etc. both for the forces and civilian population.
Establishment of a permanent military mission in Italy.
Proper disposition of Yugoslavs of Italian citizenship now in Italian concentration camps and wishing to fight in Yugoslav forces, estimated at about thirty thousand (20,000 in Sardinia and 10,000 dispersed over Italy).

Under section 3 of the memorandum Subasic states the government can only be formed of persons prepared to carry out the program of the recently concluded agreement. Tito agreed to designate two men from the liberation movement namely Dr. Drago Marusic (Slovene) and Sreten Vukosavljevic, a Serb. Subasic can nominate them as Cabinet Ministers without any further parley. In addition, Tito will nominate one member of the anti-Fascist council as liaison officer to the government. This will be a Serb from Sumadija. Further he will name delegates to various international commissions on which Yugoslavia is represented. He desires that Yugoslav Government nominate Dr. Smodlaka as Yugoslav delegate to Mediterranean commission.

Tito also asked whether Simic could be reinstated as Ambassador at Moscow. Subasic gathered from General Kornjejev23 that Soviet Government would also welcome such a decision. Subasic told Tito and Kornjejev that Simic would first have to put himself at the disposal of the King.

  1. Not printed; it contained the full text of the Tito-Subasić agreement.
  2. In despatch 604, July 6, 1944, from Algiers, Mr. Murphy reported conversations that he had held with Dr. Subasić in Italy the week before. He found the Yugoslav Prime Minister optimistic but, “He made no effort to conceal the fact that the real power under the arrangement concluded remained with Tito who, retaining command of all the forces now serving with him and aided by the substantial assistance given him by the Allies, is in a very strong position.” (740.0011 EW 1939/7–644)
  3. Admiral Sir John Cunningham, Commander in Chief of Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean Theater.
  4. Lt. Gen. Nikolay Vasilyevich Korneyev, Chief of the Soviet Military Mission, to Tito.