Roosevelt Papers: Telegram

The President to the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius)1

Memorandum from the President for the Under Secretary of State.

Neither the Prime Minister nor I are inclined to approve the proposed amendment.2

My thought has been that this amendment or a general reference to the subject should be mentioned in the agreement as having been discussed but without reaching any agreement or decision, thus leaving it up to the meeting of the United Nations.

Mr. Churchill, on the other hand, is afraid that this procedure will be unacceptable to the Russians, as they would know that they would be overwhelmingly defeated in a United Nations’ meeting and that they would get sore and try to take it out on all of us on some other point.

That is about the only information I can give you. Cadogan will return Monday, I think, and he can give you any further news.3

I think we should keep on trying but if we cannot agree on this or any other point, I am inclined to favor either not mentioning disagreement or putting disagreements under a general statement that certain points have not been agreed on. I am still greatly in favor of a reference to the United Nations for discussion as soon as possible.

  1. Received as telegram No. MR-in-154 at the White House Map Room, which forwarded the message to Stettinius.
  2. Quoted in Stettinius’ telegram of September 15, 1944, supra.
  3. When Cadogan returned from Quebec to Washington, he stated that he had been instructed to inform Stettinius and Gromyko officially that the British Government could not endorse the compromise voting formula which Stettinius had sent to Roosevelt at Quebec. See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. i, p. 815, fn. 96. Stettinius later learned from Gromyko that he had also received official instructions that the formula was unacceptable. See ibid., p. 816.