Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941, The Far East, Volume IV

711.94/23441425/26

Memorandum by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine

[Washington,] September 23, 1941.

On August 28 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the President a proposal⁵¹ for a meeting between the responsible heads of the Government of Japan and of the Government of the United States to discuss important problems between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area. On September 3 the President delivered a reply⁵² to the Japanese Ambassador, stating that this Government is prepared to proceed as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for such a meeting and suggesting that the two Governments take precaution toward insuring that the proposed meeting shall prove a success by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and essential questions upon which we seek agreement.

In response to this suggestion the Japanese Government, on September 6, through Ambassador Nomura presented certain proposals.⁵³ These proposals in our judgment served to narrow and restrict not only the application of the principles upon which our previous informal conversations have been based but also the various assurances given by the Japanese Government of its desire to move along with the United States in putting into operation a broad program looking to the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the entire Pacific area.

On September 10 we raised with the Japanese Ambassador here,⁵⁴ as Mr. Grew had already raised with the Foreign Minister in Tokyo,⁵⁵ certain questions designed to obtain further clarification of the Japanese Government’s proposals. The answers made by the Japanese Government to Mr. Grew on September 13⁵⁶ in regard to the questions which we raised have made even clearer that Japan’s intention is to narrow and restrict the application of the principles to which they profess adherence.

The statement of the Japanese Government⁵⁷ which accompanied the Japanese Prime Minister’s message to the President on August 28 contained various broad assurances that Japan has no intention of using without provocation military force against any neighboring nation and that Japan desires to pursue courses in harmony with the fundamental principles which this Government regards as the foundation upon which relations between nations should properly rest. Nevertheless, the concrete proposals which the Japanese offered on September 6 appear to reveal that, while the Japanese Government is willing to subscribe to liberal principles in the abstract, when it comes to concrete cases the intentions of the Japanese Government do not square with respect for the principles to which the Japanese Government is willing to give adherence in the abstract. For example, in the peace terms which the Japanese Govermnent has just confidentially communicated to us,⁵⁸ in one place the Japanese Government pledges itself to respect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but in another item under the heading “Cooperative Defense between China and Japan” Japan’s peace terms call for the “stationing of Japanese troops and naval forces in certain areas in Chinese territory for a necessary period” for the “purpose of preventing communistic and other subversive activities which may constitute a menace to the security of both countries and of maintaining the public order in China.”

In our informal conversations we tentatively arrived at an agreed-upon formula in regard to economic policy providing that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. In the Japanese Government’s proposals of September 6 the commitments contained in that formula were restricted to the countries of the southwest Pacific area (not the Pacific area as a whole). In reference to China, the Japanese Government stated that it would respect the principle of nondiscrimination, but the explanation it gave in regard to this point would seem to be open to the implication that the Japanese Government has in mind some limitation upon the application of this principle occasioned by reasons of Japan’s geographical propinquity to China. Furthermore, in the Japanese peace terms for China it is stated that “the Japanese Government does not mean to restrict any economic activities by third powers in China so long as they are pursued on an equitable basis.” This would imply that the Japanese Government would expect to be in a position of overlordship over China and would be the judge as to whether the economic activities of third powers in China were being pursued on an “equitable” basis.

Under item three of Japan’s proposed peace terms to China, Japan would have the right to station troops in China indefinitely under the guise of “cooperative defense,” and Japan could and probably would exercise such a right to retain control of mines and other extensive properties and economic privileges which Japan has acquired in North China and Inner Mongolia during the past 4 years. The Japanese peace terms call for the recognition of “Manchukuo”. In our informal conversations we suggested the formula of amicable negotiations in regard to “Manchukuo” and it is believed that this is as far as we could go.

The Japanese proposals give no indication of an intention to give up the privileged economic set-up which Japan has arrogated to itself in China, and consequently there is given no assurance that American enterprises in China will be able to function without being subjected to discriminatory treatment and interference by Japan.

There is given no specific assurance that Japan will withdraw its armed forces from Indochina or will refrain from endeavoring to exercise a special economic position for itself in that country.

There is given no specific assurance that in the event of the entry of the United States into the European war in pursuance of our policy of self-defense Japan will not interpret its obligations under the Tripartite Pact as requiring Japan to attack the United States.

The Japanese Government has stated that, in view of its desire to bring about the proposed early meeting between the heads of governments and to make that meeting successful, it was prepared to place its cards face up on the table and provisionally enter into certain commitments as well as provisionally specify reciprocal commitments which it would expect on the part of the United States as a basis for the proposed discussions between the President and the Prime Minister. While this might give grounds for hope that it might be possible at a meeting of the heads of governments to persuade the Japanese Government to adopt a more moderate attitude, it is believed, in view of the fact that during the last several months we have been unable to budge the Japanese Government on certain fundamental points which we regard as essential, that there is no likelihood in the light of the present-day world situation that Japan would at such a meeting, if held, make further material concessions. Furthermore, in view of the commitment which the Japanese Government desires that this Government give, that the United States will take no measures prejudicial to Japan’s efforts to reach a settlement with China, it is believed that sooner or later it would be necessary for us to make clear to the Japanese Government that this Government could not enter into such a commitment. The likelihood is that if and when we did this the Japanese Government would be even more reluctant than otherwise to move toward meeting our views.

The Japanese Government’s proposals do not in our opinion offer a basis for a settlement in the Pacific area which is likely to establish peaceful conditions and stability.

There would appear to be four courses which this Government might conceivably follow, namely:

(a) This Government might inform the Japanese Government categorically that we are unable to regard their proposal as a satisfactory basis for a meeting.

(b) This Government might make reply along the lines of a draft statement which we recently drew up and which, while making our position unmistakably clear, is friendly in tone and is designed to leave the door open for a continuation or resumption of the conversations, and would place the responsibility of any termination of the conversations upon Japan. In this way we might be better able to take advantage of a favorable turn in the world situation or in Japan’s domestic situation to continue to explore the possibility of an agreement.

(c) 1. This Government might proceed with arrangements for a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister on the basis of agreement on fundamental principles as expressed in the documents delivered to the President on August 28 and as expressed to Ambassador Grew by the Japanese Prime Minister on September 6⁵⁹ (Tokyo’s telegram no. 1413, September 6, 10 p.m.)⁶⁰ Ambassador Grew seems to favor a meeting between the heads of state and has expressed the view (Paragraph 5 of Tokyo’s 1405, September 5, 10 p.m.⁶¹) that no commitments on the part of Japan afford complete assurance that such commitments will be implemented to our complete satisfaction, and that the first step is obviously to halt Japan’s aggressive course. He suggests that the latest Japanese proposed commitments would if carried out at least serve this purpose, and that, as a detailed program of reconstruction might not be practical of formulation in advance it would seem desirable that relaxation of our measures of pressure upon Japan might be effected pari passu with action by Japan in the direction of implementing her commitments. Ambassador Grew suggests further in his telegram 1384, September 4, 9 p.m.,⁶² that it might be agreed at such a meeting to express concurrence with the principles which the Secretary of State has enunciated as governing international relations, to announce a program in process of formulation to put into effect those principles and to adjust on a broad-gauge basis general Pacific problems and to make reference to efforts of both governments to establish a world of freedom.

2. This Government might, without endeavoring to work out matters any further than we have now gone, proceed with arrangements for a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister. Such a meeting should, it is believed, be preceded by a public announcement, that the purpose in view is to effect a frank exchange of views between the heads of state and that the negotiation of an agreement is not contemplated. It would appear desirable, following the meeting, to make another public announcement to the effect that a frank exchange of views has taken place which has been mutually helpful, but that no agreement has been concluded.

In considering the advisability of a meeting under either of the above conditions thought would have to be given to the effect of the holding of such a meeting upon the public in this country, and the effect in China, Great Britain, the Netherlands and other countries as well as in Japan. We would have to consider both the immediate effects and effects that would be some time in developing. The immediate effect in China, and possibly in Great Britain and the Netherlands, of the announcement of the proposed meeting would be to create a feeling of depression and a lowering of morale, especially in China. China has been engaged for four long years in a desperate conflict. China is tired. Morale, however, continues high. If anything should happen seriously to impair that morale or to cause a relaxation in China’s war effort, it might be impossible for China to revive the psychology necessary to continue resistance. In Japan, the immediate effect would probably be one of elation as presaging that the differences between Japan and this country and between Japan and China are to be settled peacefully. However, a serious reaction in Japan would be likely to set in if that proposed meeting did not result in our discontinuing our aid to China and in our relaxing our economic and political measures against Japan. It is, therefore, a question whether the immediate favorable reaction in Japan would not be more than offset by the consequences of possible disappointment in Japan over a failure of the meeting to produce the results which the Japanese have anticipated. At the same time and on the other hand, the psychological effect in various parts of the world of indications that tension between Japan and the United States is in process of diminution and of a definite prospect of Japanese withdrawal from the Axis might be of an immediate advantage and, if those indications were followed by concrete materializations, would doubtless be of long-swing value. Many observers would, however, be skeptical.

Psychological disadvantages of a meeting between the heads of state might be largely obviated if Chiang Kai-shek were present at the meeting. However, unless and until this Government has reached with the Japanese Government a meeting of minds in advance of any meeting between the heads of state, it is doubtful whether Chiang Kai-shek if asked to attend such a meeting would be able to accept; and it is believed that under existing circumstances it would not be advisable to issue such an invitation.

(d) This Government might present a counterproposal to the Japanese Government. One disadvantage of such a course would be that we could never be sure that the Japanese, in subscribing to a draft which we had prepared, have, in fact, reached a meeting of minds with us. Furthermore, there is also a danger that the contents of the counterproposal would, if it were comprehensive and precise, reveal so clearly the wide discrepancy in our viewpoints that it might be made capital of by the reactionary elements in Japan to torpedo any proposed agreement.

Each of the above courses is susceptible of being pursued either to the exclusion of or in combination with one or more of the other suggested courses of action or parts thereof.

It is the consensus of opinion among the officers preparing this memorandum that this Government should make clear to the Japanese Government that the proposals made on September 6 by Ambassador Nomura do not offer a satisfactory basis for a preliminary agreement. There is a further consensus of view that the position of this Government in regard to the proposals of September 6 should be indicated to the Japanese Government along the lines of the course set forth in paragraph (b) above, namely, that, while making this Government’s position clear, notification of that position should be friendly in tone, should leave the door open for further discussion, and should endeavor to place the responsibility for any termination of the discussions upon Japan. It is believed that the proposals presented by the Japanese Government on September 6 do not represent the final word of that Government, that the position now taken by Japan has been influenced by recent news of Soviet Russia’s reverses in its struggle with Germany, and that if Soviet resistance continues the Japanese may be likely to move nearer in the direction of meeting our position. Conversely, disaster in Soviet Russia would strengthen Japanese extremists.

It is further believed that the holding of the meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister on the basis of present status of the discussions between this country and Japan would result in more of disadvantage than of advantage as regards this country’s interests and policies.

51. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 572.
52. Ibid., p. 591.
53. Ibid., p. 608.
54. See memorandum of a conversation, September 10, 1941, ibid., p. 614.
55. See memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan, September 10, 1941, ibid., p. 610.
56. Ibid., pp. 620 and 623.
57. Ibid., p. 573.
58. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 633.
59. See memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 604.
60. Not printed.
61. Telegram not printed, but see Ambassador Grew’s comment of September 5, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 601.
62. Not printed, but see Ambassador Grew’s comment of September 4, ibid., p. 594.