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Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)89
The chief danger attendant upon the holding of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister is that if such a meeting is held there must emanate from it an agreement. The only kind of an agreement that could possibly be arrived at would be an agreement in most general terms. Such an agreement would not (in the light of what we know of this country’s attitude and policy and of what we are now given regarding Japan’s attitude and policy) represent any real meeting of the minds of the two persons who would become parties to it, and still less would it represent a meeting of the minds of the people of the two countries thus committed by it. In [Page 426] entering into such an agreement neither of the parties to it would intend or expect that his country would, by the consummation of that agreement, be diverted from its present principles, objectives, policies or even procedures. Each of the parties would be motivated in large part by political fears and hopes; each would be playing for time and hoping for miracles-to-come; each would be expecting that a makeshift and make-delay agreement would be advantageous for his side; each would be expecting to tell his own people far less than the whole truth about the meeting and about the agreement.
For the Japanese Premier, most of this would be “all to the good”. Not so, however, for the American President.—The world is not expecting of Japan today any battle for peace, any support of high principles, any aid for countries resisting aggression: Japan is one of the three allied aggressor powers and Japan intends to remain in the Tripartite Alliance for a good while to come. The United States has proclaimed itself the “arsenal of democracy” in support of principles and in resistance to aggressor powers; the world expects of the United States that it will not compromise with any aggressor power and that, on the contrary, it will assist the countries which are being aggressed against by giving them aid (and comfort) and by withholding aid (and comfort) from aggressor powers.
The United States has done no injury to Japan or to the world. Japan has done injury both to the United States and to the world.
The holding by the President of the United States now of a rendezvous with the Premier of Japan would be, so far as the United States is concerned, a gesture born of lack of confidence in the present position (actual military capacity) of the United States. It would be utterly unlike the meeting between the President and the British Prime Minister. It would more nearly resemble meetings which were held between Mr. Chamberlain90 and Mr. Hitler. Whatever might be said in some quarters of the “courage”, the “vision” and the “nobility” of attempts to make and to maintain peace, this gesture would be construed and interpreted by, to and for the Japanese—and the Germans—as an indication of weakness and uncertainty on the part of the United States. And, it would give a terrific jolt to the Chinese and the Dutch and the Russians and even the British.
And then — — the agreement — — —. It would not put a stop to Japanese aggression. It would not bring to an end Japan’s effort to conquer China: it would on the contrary tend to facilitate that effort. It would not give the United States any time that we would not have in the absence of it. It would not afford us security. It might, if we relied on it as a factor in our defense, lead us faster and more surely toward war—not war with Germany alone but war with [Page 427] Germany and Japan, a war from which on our side the Chinese and the Russians might be missing.
For, if the United States makes an agreement with Japan, there would be no reason for us to assume with any confidence that the Chinese would continue to resist Japan or that the Soviet Union would not make an agreement with Japan. Then, were there such developments, the world line-up would be the United States and Great Britain (two only) against the Tripartite Alliance (Japan included). [Note: A scrutiny of point A in the latest Japanese proposal91 indicates that the Japanese intend to retain their membership in the alliance and at the same time to “hunt” or not to “hunt” with their Axis partners according to their own “independent” estimate, at any moment, of relative advantages.]92
The Chinese question is the central question now, and it will be that for a good while to come, in the problem of the Far East. That question cannot be disposed of without China’s having a “say-so”. And it cannot be disposed of between Japan and China without a military victory by Japan over China or a dissolution (which cannot be other than gradual) of Japan’s military effort in and against China.
Whatever is necessary as a factual condition precedent for peace in western Europe is necessary, in broad terms of similarity, as a factual condition precedent for peace in eastern Asia.
To wean Japan away at this time—on paper or in appearance—from the Axis would be an achievement spectacular in aspect but of no substantial political or military value. For, Japan is not helping Germany except in a negative way (which she is doing only because the United States overestimates Japan’s capacity to injure us) and Japan will not be helping Germany in any positive way unless and until the United States goes to war with Germany (at which time, if and when, it is problematical what Japan would do[)].
From point of view of United States interests: Conclusion of an agreement with Japan is not an urgent desideratum. We are not in great danger vis-à-vis Japan and Japan is not capable of doing us any great injury. Japan, involved and weakened as she is by the “Chinese incident”, does not possess military capacity sufficient to warrant an attack by her upon the United States with any reasonable expectation on her part or ours of her defeating us in war. Were Japan to attack us, we could with a wisely strategic use of less than one-half of our Navy maintain a sound defensive position while we prepared for an ultimate offensive.
The degree of “tension” between the United States and Japan is exaggerated. The facts of the situation that now exists are working [Page 428] real hardship to Japan (as a nation at war) but are not working any real hardship to the United States. This condition of “tension” can continue for an indefinite period without our suffering much. Were Japan to make war on us, she could interfere for awhile with our procuring of tin and rubber. But, there is a low minimum of likelihood that Japan will make war on us, for (a) there are easier wars that she might make nearer home and (b) she is already at war with China and making out none too well there, and (c) she is waiting for clear signs—which are not likely to come in the near future—that the Germans are winning against either the Soviet Union or Great Britain. [If, however, Japan should get an agreement with us, the chance of her attacking the Soviet Union would be substantially increased.]93 There is little for us to gain but much for Japan to gain should a conclusion now of an agreement between the two countries be consummated. We are not “in a hole” and we need no helping out. Japan is “in a hole”, she needs helping out, and she is trying to get us to be her helper. [But at the same time she is neither willing nor able to give up her position in the Axis Alliance.]93 She is half whipped in her war with China—and she hopes that, with the “lift” that conclusion of an agreement between her Premier and the President of the United States would give her, she will either be able to knock out China or be able to avoid being knocked out by China.
- Unsigned “Comment on the question of holding (at this time) a conference.”↩
- Neville Chamberlain, former British Prime Minister.↩
- This is point “(c)” in draft printed in Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 608; telegraphed text not printed.↩
- Brackets appear in the file copy.↩
- Brackets appear in the file copy.↩
- Brackets appear in the file copy.↩