Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943

Defense Files

United States Minutes

secret
JCCSs–7

December 31, 1941.

Withdrawal of United States Marines From Iceland

Admiral Stark said that he was very anxious to withdraw the 4,500 U. S. Marines from Iceland as soon as possible, as they were urgently needed for other tasks. He hoped that this could be arranged even at the risk of delay in the relief of British troops.

Marshal Dill agreed as to the importance of withdrawing the Marines. He suggested that the local Commanders might be instructed to draw up the best possible plan for arranging this withdrawal as early as possible. He would telegraph to England to give the necessary instructions.

Admiral Stark said that the details of what was required could be furnished by Brigadier General Gerow.

It was agreed that the withdrawal of the 4,500 U. S. Marines now serving in Iceland should be arranged as soon as possible and Sir John Dill undertook to telegraph the necessary instructions to England on receipt of the details of what was required from Brigadier General Gerow.

2. American-British Strategy

The Conference considered a revised version, prepared by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff, of the Memorandum on American-British Strategy. (WW–1. U. S. Revised).¹ The various amendments proposed by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff were considered, and with a few exceptions were agreed to. It was also decided that the lists of sea and air bases contained in Paragraph 12 should be omitted. It was further agreed that the paper should be circulated only to the United States and British Chiefs of Staff and their immediate subordinates, and that a note should be inserted in the paper to this effect.

Air Marshal Harris said he would like to check with General Arnold the list of Air Routes which had been inserted.

Subject to a final check by Air Marshal Harris with General Arnold of the Air Routes paragraph, the U. S. and British Chiefs of Staff approved the memorandum (See Annex No. 1, American-British Strategy, WW–1 (Final)),² on American-British Strategy as amended in the discussion, and agreed that it should be submitted to the President and the Prime Minister.

3. Supporting Measures for the Southwest Pacific

The Conference considered a report (U.S. ABC–4/3, British WW (J.P.C.)3), by the Joint Planning Committee on supporting measures for the Southwest Pacific.³

Admiral Pound said that as there would be an interval before General Wavell could take up his command, he thought it would be desirable to dispatch a telegram to the U. S. and British Commanders-in-Chief in the Far East to inform them of the general policy which had been agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff. He handed across copies of a telegram which he had drafted for this purpose. The draft telegram was considered and a number of amendments were agreed upon.

Later in the meeting, after Admiral King had entered, further consideration was given to the telegram, and some additional amendments made. A few minor amendments to the report were also accepted by the Joint Planning Committee.

It was agreed:

a. That the telegram, as amended in the discussion, should be dispatched forthwith to United States and British Commanders in the Far East.

b. That the report by the Joint Planning Committee, subject to the incorporation of the minor amendments agreed to in the discussion, should be approved.

The report and the telegram in their final form were subsequently circulated as U.S. ABC–4/3, British WW–4 (See Annex 2).⁴

Northwest Africa Project

Admiral Stark said that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not ready to discuss the report by the Joint Planning Committee on this subject, (U.S. ABC–4/2, British WW (J.P.C.)2).⁵

Admiral Pound said that certain officers bringing full information on reinforcements and shipping programs were expected to arrive from the United Kingdom on the following day. He thought that the Joint Planning Committee should then be in a position to examine the three main problems which were confronting us in the near future: namely,

a. Northwest Africa Project.

b. Relief of British Garrisons in Northern Ireland and Iceland.

c. Reinforcements for the Far East and consequent replacements in the Middle East.

He thought that there were two cases which should be considered. First, one should assume that reinforcements to the Far East must be given priority; to what extent then must the gaps in the Middle East be filled, and could the Northwest Africa project be carried out? Alternatively, supposing the Northwest Africa project had to be carried out by invitation in the immediate future, what would happen to the rest of the program?

Admiral Stark said that with the Naval resources at present available, it did not appear possible to undertake anything which involved opening up a new convoy route.

Rear Admiral Turner said that the Joint Planning Committee felt the Northwest Africa project should be considered under more realistic hypotheses. Guidance from the Chiefs of Staff was required on this point. It should be realized that entry into French North Africa was only possible through Casablanca, which was a good but small port. The maximum rate at which forces could be disembarked was that given in the report, and this would be inadequate if opposition was likely to be met.

Admiral Stark thought that the Joint Planning Committee should consider what could be done in French North Africa if the situation was different from that assumed in the present report.

After further discussion, it was agreed that the Joint Planning Committee should be instructed to examine the questions in view of the discussion which had been raised.

General Marshall asked—on the assumption that it would be impossible to enter Morocco under resistance and the Germans moved through Spain—what would be the next move?

Admiral Pound replied, the occupation of the Canaries.

(At this point Admiral King entered the meeting).

5. Relief of the British Garrison in Northern Ireland

Admiral King said that it had been decided that for the present, U.S. forces destined for the relief of the British garrison in Northern Ireland should be transported in the S.S. George Washington, which would shortly be fit for service, this vessel being used on a continuous shuttle service to and from Northern Ireland. In a few weeks’ time, when the general trend in the Atlantic theatre could be judged, a decision could be taken as to whether the transport of these troops should be accelerated or not.

The Conference took note of this statement.

6. Draft Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area

The Conference gave further consideration to this directive (U.S. ABC–4/5, British WW(J.P.C.)5).⁶ One minor verbal alteration was agreed to and it was also decided to bring the statement of the general strategic policy into line with that telegraphed out to Commanders-in-Chief in the Far East by defining the Malay Barrier. (See Annex 2.)⁷

Admiral King said that he had reason to believe that the directive would meet with the approval of the President,⁸ and this also applied to the statement on the higher direction of war in the ABDA Area contained in U.S. ABC–4/5, British WW–3 (Final), (See Annex 3.)⁹ He had also received a request that the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff should draft for consideration the public announcement setting up the unified command in the ABDA Area. He thought this should be completed on Friday.¹⁰

The U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff gave final approval to the draft directive to the Supreme Commander of the ABDA Area as amended in the discussion (U.S. AB04/5, British WW–3 (Final), (See Annex 3), and took note of Admiral King’s statement.¹¹

7. Proposed Tasks for the Joint Planning Committee

The Conference considered the statement of tasks proposed for the Joint Planning Committee in U.S. Serial ABC–4/4, British WW (J.P.C.) 4, (See Annex 4.)¹² At the suggestion of Admiral Stark, it was decided that the following note should be added to the end of the paper:

“Consideration of the Southwest Pacific theatre, including the matter of unity of command therein, was treated as a first priority, and a decision reached prior to the acceptance of the foregoing document.”

The U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff accepted the statement (Annex 4, U.S. ABC–4/4, British WW (J.P.C.)4), of the proposed tasks for the Joint Planning Committee, subject to the insertion of the note recorded above.

8. Naval Dispositions

Sir Dudley Pound suggested that one of the matters which might be discussed was the size of the Naval Forces available in the ABDA Area, and whether they were sufficient for the tasks they would encounter.

There was some discussion on this point in the course of which Admiral King pointed out that such a study would necessitate examination of the Naval resources in other theatres.

It was stated that the Naval staffs were already at work on this and it was finally agreed that this point should continue to be dealt with by them in direct consultation.

The Conference adjourned at 5:15 P.M.

1. Post, p. 210.
2. Post, p. 214.
3. Post, p. 280.
4. Post, p. 296.
5. Post, p. 240.
6. As amended by the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on December 30, this report became ABC–4/5, WW–3, post, p. 289.
7. Annex 2 was the draft memorandum of December 30 from the United States Chiefs of Staff to the President, post, p. 287.
8. According to the President’s appointment calendar, King had lunch at the White House on December 31.
9. Post, p. 297.
10. The announcement took the form of a White House Press Release, dated January 3, 1942, printed in Department of State Bulletin, vol. vi, January 3, 1942, p. 4.
11. The report, ABC–4/5, WW–3 (Final), was apparently sent to the President on the afternoon of December 31, under cover of the memorandum from the United States Chiefs of Staff to the President, post, p. 287. Changes were made in the draft directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA area and in Annex 2 thereto as a result of the meeting in the White House on January 1, 1942; see post, p. 152.
12. The report is printed post, p. 247, with additional note suggested by Stark.