The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

No. 1630

Sir: During my recent visit to Washington the Department emphasized the importance and helpfulness of including in our current despatches an “evaluation of forces”. So far as such evaluation entails prophesy of future developments, it is perhaps trite to say that predictions in this part of the world are generally unwise because the unexpected can always happen—a fact often demonstrated in past and recent history. Nevertheless current trends and their contributing factors may be gauged without commitment as to the turn which these trends may take in future owing to the injection of new factors into the situation. It is on this basis that the Embassy submits the following discussion of the general situation facing Japan at the opening of the year 1936.

Economic and Financial

The year 1935 was in general a very prosperous and successful year for Japanese commercial and financial circles. Corporation earnings for the first half of the year amounted to 14.8 per cent of the paid-in capital plus reserves and unexpended balances, showing an increase of .9 per cent over the earnings of the previous half-year. No doubt these increased earnings were in part due to the so-called “munitions boom”, but they were also due in large measure to the general prosperity of the country. The average dividends against paid-in capital amounted to 7.8 per cent (per annum rate), or an increase of .5 per cent over the previous half-year. Over half of the earnings were placed to reserves, indicating not only a cautious attitude but a surplus of earnings over dividend necessities. Although the figures for the second half of 1935 are not available as yet, the available trade returns indicate that corporation earnings for the latter half will exceed those for the first half.

[Page 707]

In foreign trade the country had the best year since the Great War. Both exports and imports registered large increases over those for 1934, and the excess of imports for the Empire dropped from Yen 123,000,000 in 1934 to about Yen 19,000,000 in 1935 (complete figures are not yet available but the above calculations are based on figures to December 25, 1935). The invisible trade balance, according to preliminary figures, was slightly unfavorable for the year, showing an excess of payments over income of Yen 44,500,000, as compared with an excess of income of Yen 8,700,000 in 1934. In 1935, however, the Japanese redeemed the outstanding South Manchuria Railway sterling bonds and made large investments in Manchuria, including the purchase of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which account for the excess of payments over income. Combining the visible and invisible balances, moreover, it will be noted that the combined adverse balance in 1935 was Yen 63,500,000, as compared with an adverse balance in 1934 of Yen 114,300,000. If, therefore, Japan is exporting its capital, as some economists claim, it is doing so at a decreasing rate.

Money remained easy in Japan throughout 1935, with steady increases in both bank deposits and in loans outstanding, indicating increasing business activity. Bank deposits increased considerably faster than loans, however, and during the year there was an increase of about Yen 700,000,000 in the spread between deposits and loans, which naturally resulted in an easy money market. On the other hand, although the Government finances appeared sound, there seemed to be some doubt among the Japanese as to Government credit toward the year-end. During the year the Government issued large quantities of so-called “red-ink” bonds, or bonds issued for the purpose of covering budgetary deficits, and in the latter part of the year the private banks and individual investors appeared somewhat reluctant to absorb more of these bonds. Although exact figures are not yet available, it is believed that the total outstanding debt of the Government passed the ten billion yen mark by the close of the year—a record debt for Japan. The Governor of the Bank of Japan, however, in his New Year message, stated that the Bank was able to take up all further Government issues until the close of the present fiscal year (March 31, 1936), and appealed to the Japanese people to uphold the credit of the Government.

Although the Japanese nation had an unusually favorable year, economically and financially, in 1935, there is little reason to believe that 1936 will be any less favorable—in fact, practically all students of Japanese economics and finance predict a steady continuance of Japan’s prosperity. Their predictions are based largely on the fact that better financial conditions exist in the farming districts, due to higher prices for rice and raw silk, and that further large sums [Page 708] will be spent during the year by the Army and Navy for modern military equipment, both of which factors will ensure continued and perhaps increased activity in the industries of the nation. Foreign trade will, according to the predictions, continue to flourish during 1936, and may be considerably increased by the conclusion of a trade agreement with Canada, which will restore trade with that country to normal, and by the further opening of North China through the establishment of an autonomous government there which will be favorably disposed toward Japan. Moreover, the economic recovery of the United States will undoubtedly create a larger market for Japanese goods, while the war-nervousness in Europe will cause an unusual demand for such war supplies as Japan produces.

On the other hand, there are various factors which are not so favorable and which, in the opinion of this Embassy, may cause disturbances in Japan’s economic and financial circles during the year. The principal unfavorable factor consists of the uncertain position of Government credit. It is true that during the coming fiscal year (April 1, 1936 to March 31, 1937) the Government plans to issue a considerably smaller amount of “red-ink” bonds than in the present fiscal year, but even so the amount (about Yen 680,000,000) may be larger than the capacity of the market, in which case there may be serious dislocations of credit and serious financial disturbances. The Japanese, however, have proved themselves very able financiers and probably will find means to overcome the possible financial difficulties of the Government.

Another possible disadvantageous factor is the erection of further and higher trade barriers against Japanese goods. The Japanese Government is now fighting against the erection of such trade barriers by voluntarily restricting the exportation of goods to countries where it appears that opposition to the flood of Japanese goods is growing. Whether or not this means of combating the tendency throughout the world to restrict the importation of Japanese goods will be effective remains to be seen. The Japanese Government also has another weapon which was used effectively in the case of trade with Canada. This is the Trade Protection Law, which authorizes the imposition of greatly increased duties on goods imported from countries which impose discriminatory measures against Japanese goods.

Another factor which may militate against increased Japanese prosperity during 1936 is the extreme economic nationalism now apparent in Japan. This economic nationalism, principally promoted by the military for purposes of national defense, was illustrated in 1934 and 1935 by the passage and enforcement of the Petroleum Industry Law, which is designed to develop oil refining within Japan and to provide large stores of petroleum for use in time of emergency. [Page 709] The effect will be greatly to restrict the operations of the American and British oil companies in this field, and perhaps to eliminate them from the field altogether.2 In 1936 the Government plans to enact an Automobile Industry Law, which would have much the same effect upon the two large American automobile assembling and distributing organizations in Japan.3 The American and British oil firms have already been eliminated from the Manchurian field, and it is expected that in 1936 steps will be taken to eliminate the foreign automobile companies, turning the trade over to Japanese interests.

This rampant economic nationalism is apt to invite reprisals from other nations, which might seriously interfere with the further growth of Japan’s foreign trade. This fact is not generally understood in Japan, but the Embassy is aware that some of the leaders of the Government understand the dangers of the movement and are trying to curb it. The military, however, with their dominant influence in the Government, apparently do not understand the effect which their policies may have on Japan’s foreign economic relations and continue to insist upon the enforcement of their ideas of what is best for the nation.



The domestic political field has been largely occupied by discussions over what has been called the “Emperor organ” theory, a question which has been discussed in several despatches from the Embassy. The “fundamentalists” object to any attitude on the part of public officials to regard the Emperor as in any sense an instrument or organ of the State. He is to be considered Heaven’s Regent, the descendant of the Sun Goddess, and as such far above such mundane position as the Head of a State or the organ whereby the body politic makes its decisions known. Paradoxically this vigilance has been accompanied by agitation on the part of these same elements to remove all “non-fundamentalists” from positions in the Imperial Court which would have the effect of rendering such officials as the Minister of the Household, the Grand Master of Ceremonies, the Keeper of the Seals and perhaps the President of the Privy Council, responsible to the Government for their political views. Up to the present time these officers have been men of experience and prestige who have been considered as non-political appointees and have held office regardless of political changes in the Government. The agitation in effect is against the influence which these older men surrounding the Emperor have been [Page 710] able to exert without accompanying political responsibility. It is probable that the agitators do not see the results which would flow from the success of their efforts.

The Government has continued to be “national” or non-party in character, and has managed to stay in office. It has, however, been unable to control the Diet to the extent of obtaining much new legislation. The Diet adjourned last spring with most of the Government’s bills on the calendar.

In 1936 the Government will be confronted with a general election, as the four year term of office of members of the House of Representatives will expire, but it is not yet known whether the Government will dissolve the Diet, or allow the legislature to complete its session and then hold the election. This question will be decided by the political exigencies of the moment. There seems no doubt that this year as last, the Government will be able to put through the budget because the influence or fear of the military will probably be sufficient to accomplish it. There is no doubt, however, that the latter has not now the political prestige that it had when the present Diet members were elected four years ago. Besides, the Seiyukai have seized upon the “Emperor organ theory” as a political slogan and threaten to make a campaign issue of it. It will be interesting also to see the character of the new Diet, the first to be elected under the rigid rules of the Corrupt Practices Act, because the members will be less subject to the charge of owing their election to bribery or other sinister activities.


Abroad, the main arena of Japanese interest and activity for the moment centres in North China, Mongolia and the Manchukuo-Siberian frontier.4

North China.

Few observers will be found who fail to see in Japan’s announced policy of constituting herself the “stabilizing influence” in East Asia the thought of eventual domination of North China and Mongolia with exclusive Japanese influence therein. The conquest of Manchuria, as Mr. Owen Lattimore has pointed out in his article on “The Inland Gates of China” in the December issue of Pacific Affairs, could not be isolated or limited but was of necessity the beginning of a process. “Japanese control in North China” he considers “is in fact an inevitable corollary of the conquest of Manchuria; and this involves Mongolia, because military domination of North China cannot be made good without a solid strategic position in Mongolia, as the Manchus discovered in the seventeenth century. …”5 While [Page 711] the soundness of Mr. Lattimore’s theory may be open to argument, this is undoubtedly the view held by the Japanese military, and the only question at issue is how far and how fast the military will be permitted to proceed with this strategic program, and the extent to which the control of the Government in Tokyo can or will be exerted in restraining this movement. Herein lies the nub of the situation.

One fact is evident: the orders of the General Staff issued last June forbidding troops of the Kwantung Army from moving below the Great Wall without Imperial sanction is still in force and at least informal assurances have been given by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador that the order would remain in effect and that there would be no occupation of North China by Japanese military forces.* From its observations and from all information available, the Embassy believes that these assurances genuinely represent the intentions of the Government in Tokyo including the higher army officers responsible for military policy. In the domination of North China, military occupation is not envisaged. Quite apart from any question of treaty commitments or of international ethics, there are important practical considerations opposing such procedure, particularly the financial expense and the disadvantage of using troops now stationed in Manchuria, thereby weakening the defenses against Soviet Russia. The exertion of control by other methods is believed to be more effective and cheaper. This view is substantiated by current comment in Japanese military magazines and by officers with whom foreign contact has been established; they declare categorically that not a square foot of territory in North China will be occupied. The general conception abroad that Japanese troops have recently invaded North China—based on the activities of the garrison troops already there—are, so far as this Embassy is aware, incorrect, and save for a few additional staff officers the Embassy has no knowledge of recent increases in the North China Garrison forces. Domination of North China, as well as Chahar and possibly Suiyuan, the Army is determined to obtain as a defense against Soviet Russia and Russian and Chinese communism, and as a protection of sources of essential raw materials and Japanese trade and economic expansion, but the present military program aims to achieve this purpose by methods other than by military occupation. It is therefore believed that the Army authorities in Tokyo recommended and welcomed the “Imperial Sanction” restriction as perhaps the only effective means of restraining irresponsible and hot-headed officers looking south from the Great Wall.

[Page 712]

For the purposes of this discussion it does not appear necessary to go into the details of the so-called autonomy movement in North China, and the part played by the Japanese military therein, which have been fully reported by my colleague in Peiping. The Embassy wishes to deal here only with the broader aspects of the situation. Recent developments have however afforded a fairly clear conception of the methods by which the Japanese propose to establish control in the northern provinces, namely by the setting up of Chinese officials who at least to some degree will do their bidding. If these methods fail it will remain to be seen what other methods will be adopted, but for the present at least it is not believed that the intention exists to create an independent buffer state and to place Pu Yi6 on a newly-created throne, for that presumably would require military occupation.


If, as Mr. Lattimore believes, the conquest of Manchuria could not be isolated but was of necessity the beginning of a process, we should in 1936, four years after that conquest, be able to recognize further steps in the process. These have, in fact, not been lacking. During 1935 skirmishes along the border between “Manchukuo” and Outer Mongolia led to the unsuccessful Manchuli Conference, an ill-disguised attempt on the part of Japan to open Outer Mongolia. Moreover, to the south in Inner Mongolia, notably in the province of Chahar, the Japanese have been increasingly active and at the present time there appears to be emerging an autonomous regime acceptable to the Military.

The fact is then that the westward process has begun. In Inner Mongolia it is largely indistinguishable in aim and method from the process which is proceeding concurrently in North China. In both regions autonomous movements aiming at the concentration of authority in the hands of individuals subservient to the Japanese are being created. It matters little who the individuals are; the fact of importance with respect to Inner Mongolia is that the Japanese now dominate Chahar. Nor will the westward process end there. On the contrary, one new factor at least has appeared which tends to accelerate, if anything, the westward momentum and that is the increasing preoccupation of the Japanese military with Chinese communism. One hears much at present of Japan’s duty to save China from the Communists. The reported spread of communism in Kansu, Northern Shensi, and the Ordos region is undoubtedly a source of concern to the Japanese military who perceive that it is not far from these districts to revolutionary Outer Mongolia and that an avenue of [Page 713] easy communication between the Communists in China and those to the north may thus be created. This factor may spur Japanese agents to greater activity, but the same considerations which militate against military conquest in North China and which were discussed earlier in this despatch apply here as well.

There remains then the question of the vast desert region of Outer Mongolia. Japan’s efforts to gain a foothold here can not be ascribed to any desire for economic opportunity for little opportunity exists in this inhospitable region. No section of the Japanese people can be vitally interested save the Military and their interest is primarily strategic. Lately the “Manchukuo” authorities have deplored the failure of the Manchuli Conference, which proved that Outer Mongolia was not to be opened by diplomatic means, and have voiced their intention of dealing with the problem of determining the frontier towards Outer Mongolia independently and to their own satisfaction. Although on December 19 and again on December 24 there were clashes on the border between “Manchukuo” and Outer Mongolian forces, the fears of serious trouble which have been expressed in certain quarters seem unnecessarily grave. The Mongolian winter is not favorable to extensive military operations.

To date Japan has only made it clear that she would like to open Outer Mongolia. There is no evidence that she is as yet prepared to back up this desire with any considerable expenditure of money or resources. In fact, according to report, the War Office professes to have little knowledge of events in the northwest and there is no available evidence that an effort to penetrate this region and to flank Baikal and the Transiberian from the south is being planned. Nor is it possible to secure from the local Soviet officials any expressions of opinion on this situation. The Soviet Ambassador will say nothing and, despite the reported presence of the Mongolian Prime Minister in Moscow for the last month, it is likely that he has little or no information. Accordingly, although a gradual increase in Japanese interest in Outer Mongolia has been fostered by the Manchuli Conference of last year, by border incidents, and by mutual recriminations between “Manchukuo” and Outer Mongolia, it is not possible to say that the issue is becoming critical or that it has left the province of military strategists concerned with possible but distant future developments.


At the beginning of 1936 no serious trouble between Japan and Soviet Russia is foreseen in the near future. The Soviet Ambassador here professes to be thoroughly optimistic and remarked to me several days ago that the Japanese would not dare to attack the USSR because the latter’s preparations along the border were so formidable. He has [Page 714] taken the same attitude with several of my colleagues. Doubtless the “Manchukuo”-Siberian border will remain a danger spot and incidents will occur. But there appears to be nothing in this situation nor in the unsettled fisheries case nor in that involving the oil leases of North Saghalien comparable in gravity to the Chinese Eastern Railway issue which at this time a year ago remained unsolved. That problem, involving the final elimination of the Soviets from Manchuria, was considered vital by the Japanese; to replace it no issue equally vital has as yet appeared. In the more or less remote future one can picture the further westward spread of Japan as a continental power presenting a serious threat to Russia’s security in Siberia, but such forebodings belong to the realm of speculation rather than to an appraisal of existing trends. For the present, the danger of Japanese aggression in Siberia, believed two years ago to be imminent, appears to be in abeyance.

Having in mind the foregoing brief survey of the program and activities of the Japanese military in bringing to bear Japan’s “stabilizing influence” in East Asia, we may return to an evaluation of the forces which may influence the Government in Tokyo in restraining or accelerating the inevitable movement westward.

First of all, the weight of the personal influence of the Emperor himself in shaping policy and procedure is extremely difficult for any foreign observer to gauge. Few Japanese are willing to touch upon that subject, but the consensus of opinion is that such influence as the Emperor does exert, having in mind the varied interests and viewpoints within the country which he must so far as practicable conciliate, is pacific. The Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,7 who is generally regarded as an ardent nationalist with somewhat chauvinistic leanings, in recent conversation with one of my colleagues confirmed this fact and added that the development of the Emperor’s personality, mental attributes and grasp of public affairs during recent years has been little short of amazing; indeed Mr. Shigemitsu went so far as to predict that the present Emperor would go down in Japanese history, in point of enlightened outlook, as on a plane with the Emperor Meiji himself, a statement somewhat surprising to a foreigner in view of the fact that the present ruler’s personality, influence and constructive activity have been hidden behind a veil of secrecy which few have had an opportunity to penetrate. Mr. Shigemitsu is, however, a direct and hard-headed official not given to weaving fanciful theories and his opinion may therefore be listened to with reasonable respect.

If it is true that the leanings of the Emperor himself are in principle pacific—or perhaps a better word is moderate—it can with equal truth [Page 715] be held that his principal advisers, notably Prince Saionji, Count Makino, Viscount Saito, Baron Ikki, and probably the present Prime Minister8 and Minister for Foreign Affairs,9 would prefer to achieve gradually and by peaceful means what certain elements in the Army would accomplish by force. While they unquestionably support the doctrine of Japan’s “stabilizing influence” in East Asia, her strategic security, her protection against communism and her economic development westward, it is believed that their views as to the methods of consummating such a position differ from the views of the more radical school of chauvinists. Despite the bluster of the occasional utterances of the spokesman of the Foreign Office and other officials, Japan’s reputation in the world at large is to them far from inconsequential, nor do they desire to risk unnecessary embroilment with foreign Powers even while convinced that those Powers are highly unlikely, either from policy or because they are occupied elsewhere, to fight. In other words, statesmanship is not wholly lacking in Japan today, and at least for the moment the more moderate elements in the Government appear to have control of the general situation. There is a feeling that the military have recently overplayed their hand in North China, and at a given moment the curbing rein was pulled from Tokyo just as it was last June.

As for the Japanese military themselves, they are no longer riding on the crest of the wave to the same degree as in 1931 and 1932. As one of the two bulwarks of the nation, the Army can hardly become unpopular within Japan, yet it may be said with assurance that the Army does not command the same extravagant enthusiasm and support which it enjoyed during and immediately after the Manchurian adventure. More and more Japan is developing into a commercialized and industrialized nation; business is becoming paramount; money talks; the worker who was content with 30 sen a day is beginning to reach out for a higher standard of living; the whole social aspect of the country is gradually changing from the old feudal conception. In this state of the public mind the extravagant military budget, in spite of intensive propaganda, cannot be popular. Apart from its strategic value, the economic advantages of the conquest of Manchuria are not yet apparent; the costs of its development and defense are enormous; as an outlet for the over-population of the home country it has failed; the promised financial returns from the investment are not yet in sight and will not appear for many a day. While the thought of eventually commanding the raw materials, [Page 716] industries and markets of North China no doubt appeals to the Japanese business man as a pleasing future prospect, the outlook for the steady development of business in the home land, in industry, commerce, shipping, banking, is not as yet sufficiently cramped to inspire a public demand, or indeed a public desire, for further military conquest in the present day. The financial and economic status of the country is sound and active; domestic and foreign business is steadily developing and expanding; an inherent urge towards new fields of military conquest does not at present predominate. Economic conquest more aptly describes the stimulus.

Other considerations may conceivably influence Japan’s future course of action. The stiffening attitude in China, as manifested especially by the student movement in Peiping and other cities, has not been lost upon the statesmen in Tokyo. My British colleague is informed that the solidarity of the movement has taken the military by surprise and that it has given them “furiously to think”. My own information is that the movement is discounted and that army circles believe that it will soon lapse. More attention is given to the sanctions against Italy,10 the ostensibly growing influence of the League of Nations and especially the force of public opinion in Great Britain against an aggressor, as palpably demonstrated in the recent public outburst against Sir Samuel Hoare11 and his enforced resignation arising out of the obvious effort to conciliate Italy in the Hoare-Laval12 peace proposal.12a These things are being carefully weighed in Japan. Now comes the President’s address to Congress,13 and whatever may be its effect in Europe, I am of the opinion that it has come at a timely moment to influence Japanese thought and policy. While Japanese officials and the press have carefully avoided fitting the Presidential shoe to their own foot, the implications of the address and especially the words (as reported in the press here) “The point has been reached where the peoples of the Americas must take cognizance of a growing ill will marked by trends toward aggression, of increasing armaments, of shortening tempers—or a situation having many of the elements that lead toward the tragedy of a general war”, must inevitably sink deep if tacitly into the consciousness and conscience of the Government and public of Japan.

There is another element in the situation which, if no unexpected incidents occur, I am inclined to believe may play a not unimportant part in influencing Japanese policy during the next few years. The [Page 717] Japanese, as is well known, are rapidly and effectively becoming a race of first-rate athletes; their interest in sport is nation-wide and the public enthusiasm for baseball especially, and in hardly less degree for track athletics, swimming, skiing, golf, tennis, and other sports, is quite as intensive as in our own country. Their outstanding champions and winning teams in the various sports are acclaimed as public heroes quite as extensively as their outstanding soldiers. Here is a healthy and emotional channel into which, if the Government plays its cards wisely, public interest can be directed and concentrated with the Olympic Games of 1940 in view. The Department is aware of the efforts which are being made to secure the meeting for Japan; Italy, we are informed, has definitely waived her claim in favor of Tokyo, and it appears that only the claim of Finland remains to be overcome. In 1940 will be celebrated in Japan the 2600th anniversary of the founding of the Empire by Jimmu Tenno. If the Olympic Games can be secured for that year, the preparations for the meet and for the synchronous celebration of the national anniversary will tend to eclipse all other matters in popular interest. The Government, too, may appreciate the opportunity which such an occasion will offer for bringing Japan more intimately into the international circle from which, inevitably, she feels temporarily on the periphery. The Asahi, in an editorial, has already given a hint in that direction. “The crisis that did not come in 1935”, it says, “is not likely to come in 1936, but the 2600th anniversary of the accession of Emperor Jimmu is certain to come. Preparations for it are necessary. …14 Preparations are already in full swing for the big international exposition and the Olympic Games to be held here at that time… it is questionable whether there is need for reckless crisis propaganda. In this sense we wish to bury 1935 and look forward with hope to the 2600th anniversary of the accession to the Throne of Emperor Jimmu, which is four years away.…”

Let us hope that the Government and the statesmen of Japan will recognize in this a goal upon which to rivet the attention and interest of the country during the next few years.

But since this despatch deals with trends rather than with events, and must therefore give consideration to the long future pull together with the immediate outlook, I quote the following paragraphs from The Price of Peace by Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny (page 230) which seem to me to be sound alike in fact and reasoning:

“As the situation stands today, despite an enormous expansion of industry, Japan is still, as in the past, confronted by two facts of ominous import, a rising standard of living and a rapidly expanding population. For the moment it is still possible to foresee the preservation of that parity in progress and population. Doubtless there [Page 718] will be further gains in foreign trade, alike in textiles and in rubber goods, electric appliances, novelties, and in certain other directions. An adequate supply of cheap labor is also assured, and costs of production may therefore for the present fall rather than rise.

“Nevertheless, Japanese exports are already encountering constantly multiplying obstacles in the way alike of competition from India and China and tariff barriers amongst the Western nations as the march of economic nationalism continues uninterruptedly. The further advantage of the depreciated yen, to which no inconsiderable part of recent trade expansion has been due, is patently transitory. Thus, so far as Japan and her Korean and Formosan possessions are concerned, it is plain that these cannot long continue to support their growing population under existing conditions.”

These are facts, not theories, and should be given due weight in any evaluation of forces influencing the probable trends in Japanese policy and action during the years ahead. The procedure to be followed and the methods to be pursued are open to influence by some or all of the factors suggested in this despatch, but the expansionist urge is fundamental, and I think there is no doubt that whether quietly and gradually or openly and aggressively Japanese energies will be found, from now on, steadily directed towards consolidating Japan’s control in North China and Mongolia as a primary axiom of her future strategic safety and economic welfare.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew
  1. See pp. 786 ff.
  2. See pp. 981 ff.
  3. See pp. 1 ff.
  4. Omission indicated in the original despatch.
  5. Embassy’s telegram 128, June 11, 1935, 6 [5?] p.m., paragraph 3. Embassy’s telegram 245, December 19, 1935, 11 a.m., paragraph 1. [Footnote in the original; for telegram No. 128, see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. iii, p. 230; telegram No. 245 not printed.]
  6. “Emperor Kang-teh of Manchoukuo.”
  7. Mamoru Shigemitsu.
  8. Admiral Keisuke Okada.
  9. Koki Hirota.
  10. Embassy’s telegram 128, June 11, 1935, 6 [5?] p.m., paragraph 5. Embassy’s telegram 132, June 18, 1935, 1 p.m., paragraph 2. Embassy’s telegram 143, June 29, 1935, 11 a.m. [Footnote in the original; for telegrams see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. iii, pp. 230, 262, and 283.]
  11. See vol. iii, pp. 34 ff.
  12. British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, June-December 1935.
  13. Pierre Laval, President of the French Council of Ministers (Premier).
  14. See Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. i, pp. 699723, passim.
  15. For text of address of January 3, see Congressional Record, vol. 80, pt. 1, p. 27.
  16. Omissions indicated in the original despatch.