711.1928/331
The Chargé in Panama (Burdett) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 18.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that I saw President Arias by appointment today at the Presidencia and had a long talk about the new treaty. He has been out of town and I had not seen him alone since Minister Gonzalez8 left Panama a month ago.
[Page 895]The President first asked me whether I thought the negotiations would succeed. I said there seemed to be no reason to doubt their success, given the willingness on both sides to make every practicable concession and the thorough sympathy with which the discussions were conducted. The President said he hoped the discussions would succeed and that it all depended on two subjects which had not yet been agreed upon. These two were Article II and what the President described as an obligation written in the treaty for Panama to cooperate with the United States in case of war.
I said I did not realize that this was in the draft, whereupon the President said the implication, rather than the exact language should be considered; that in case of war Panama could do nothing to assist the United States and that inclusion of this clause would merely provoke bad feeling and give the treaty opponents ground to tear up the treaty. The President evidently referred to Article XI of the draft. I said I thought the State Department would make every effort to meet Panama’s wishes in the matter of phraseology. The President was quite firm in saying that the present wording was not acceptable to Panama.
… If there is any doubt of ratification, it would be much better not to sign the treaty at all, that if the two Governments feel they cannot get together they should at once draft a statement to give out to the press regarding the failure of the negotiations.
The President then said that he would render a disservice if he failed to say that he could not sign Article II in its present form, that he would not bring a treaty to Panama that could not be ratified, and that with the menace of Article II hanging over Panama, the people would feel that they were being sold out. He talked at considerable length on this subject, and, while he did not commit himself, I gathered the impression that he might be receptive to a compromise wherein the Panamanian territory subject to acquisition would be definitely delimited. He said that it was absurd to keep the people from Chiriquí and Darién under a threat of having their lands seized for the Canal many years from now, yet that was precisely what the draft means in its present form.
He said, referring to the suggestion that the waters of the Bayano River might some day be needed for the Canal, that another river, to the east of the Bayano, the Lagarto, might also be needed.
The President said that a note supplementing Article II had been prepared and was intended to soften the blow for Panama. He felt that this should be included in the treaty rather than as a separate note to be sent the day the treaty was signed. He said this note, however, did not meet the Panamanian aspirations.
The President said that much of the treaty discussion hinged on a question of phraseology which would mean nothing to the American [Page 896] public but which meant everything to the Panamanians, that the relation between the countries was a sentimental matter to Panama but was not to the United States. He said that if the treaty is signed he will at once call a special session of Congress. Under Panamanian law, only such legislation as may be proposed by the President can be considered at a special session. He said that there would be some attacks by his political enemies, but that he thought these enemies realize that the Panamanian commissioners in Washington were working patriotically and for the good of the country, that he was surprised at the weakness of the opposition that had developed.
He said that the opponents of the treaty in Congress were not well informed; that the ones who understood it best were Crespo, Goytía and Sucre. He referred to these men as “opponents of the treaty”, not as “opponents of the administration.” Some of these had on the floor of the Assembly asked searching questions about the treaty. He, the President, did not know whether there had been a leak, and when the Assembly inquired as to what was being done in Washington, he told Secretary Arosemena to go before the Assembly and read the treaty draft as presented by the Panamanians at Washington. He said Arosemena did this, but that the opposition did not understand enough of the treaty to make intelligent criticism. He feels certain that a treaty which he can conscientiously have signed will be ratified without great opposition.
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President Arias took occasion to say kind words for Dr. Arosemena, who, he said, was tremendously interested in the treaty conversations and who had occasionally felt that they could not be carried through to a successful conclusion.
The President said that he wanted to get the treaty through during his administration, although the good effects would not be felt until later on, that there would be an era of good feeling between the two countries after, and if, the treaty takes effect. He admitted relations between the two countries were not nearly so bad as the newspapers intimate and that they are surprisingly good, considering the opportunities for friction.
I said that he had travelled a great deal and asked him if the relations between Americans and Panamanians here on the Isthmus did not strike him as being more cordial than those between the people on opposite sides of any other international frontier he had seen. He said that was true and that one of the chief objects of his administration was to promote this cordial feeling, that only yesterday he had personally signed letters to all rural policemen urging them to treat Americans with extra consideration.…
He said, regarding Article III, that there were very few changes and jokingly remarked that the only people adversely affected were [Page 897] the American managers of the National City and Chase Banks, and the Power and Light Company, who would lose their commissary privileges. He said that he was convinced that the Canal authorities were cooperating to the fullest of their ability in the prevention of smuggling. That the modified free trade law in Panama, he hoped, would result in a gradual cessation of complaints about the commissaries. He hoped this law would work out in a way to attract heavy immigration to Panama and increase business turnover. He thought, if the plan succeeds, there will be no further commissary trouble. He said, however, that his administration would feel the pinch of raising the funds necessary to take care of the budgetary deficit during the first few months of operation of the new law, while his successors would get the credit for the prosperity expected to result therefrom.
Doctor Arias is not, for the moment, interested in the commissary or sales to ships contentions. He said that he felt the United States wanted to meet all valid Panamanian objections to the matters treated in Article III. That all the complaints concerning the commissaries had been prompted by the merchants of Panama and Colon and never originated with the Panamanian Government.
The President remarked that it was not necessary to express in the treaty that Panama would cooperate with the United States, and cited the radio question. He said that, although the 1903 treaty did not mention radio and Panama was under no obligation to comply with American requests regarding radio control, it, however, had done so for many years through a voluntary spirit of cooperation. He said that, if the Canal should be attacked, by the Japanese for instance, Panama would obviously cooperate with the United States in its defense without any treaty obligation to do so.
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Respectfully yours,
- Antonio C. Gonzalez, transferred from Panama to Ecuador in January 1935.↩