760N.00/116
Memorandum by the Minister in Latvia (MacMurray)
Mr. Munters,27 in reply to a question, expressed himself as very well satisfied with the results of the recent meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Baltic States, at Kaunas, May 6–8, saying [Page 275] that it had completely served its purpose of maintaining among the three States a coordination of views such as would obviate any possibility that divergencies would develop. I raised the question whether the other two States had found an obstacle, or at any rate a potential difficulty, in the disposition of Lithuania to fall in with the Soviet suggestion that the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia and Russia should join in some sort of an agreement for mutual assistance. He said that no concrete obstacle of the sort had arisen, that the Lithuanian Government had in fact neither done nor said anything which stood in the way of an entirely harmonious agreement upon the joint policy to be adopted by the three. He went on to say that, in the “somewhat strained situation” in which Lithuania had recently found itself, she had felt a need of some outside support, and had not only looked in the first place to the other Baltic States, but had inclined towards seeking such security as might be had from a closer understanding with the Soviet Government. But the Soviet had not in fact offered any concrete assistance, and, in view of her having no common frontier with Lithuania, could scarcely have offered to go to her support without having previously made arrangements with both Latvia and Poland—arrangements to which neither one of them could be expected to consent. The impression which he conveyed to me was that, in spite of a bias towards Russia, Lithuania had realized the impracticability of making herself dependent upon Russian support; and, now that the Memel question with Germany had become less critical, had no longer been disposed to insist upon a rather desperate policy of subordination to Russia.
As regards the Memel question itself, he felt that it was now beyond the danger point—that the tension of feeling on both sides was abating; and that, in view of the greater interests at stake elsewhere, not even a serious incident could now provoke Germany into taking direct aggressive action against Lithuania.
With regard to the general question of security in Eastern Europe, he insisted that the Baltic States are interested not with a view to obtaining a greater degree of direct assurance for themselves, but with a view to the establishment of some sort of equilibrium, between Russia and Germany, such as will obviate, at least for the time being, the danger of hostile action between them. He said that the Franco-Russian understanding, which in itself has only a psychological significance beyond what is already written in the League Covenant,28 but which might readily be made the basis of an armed alliance in case of need, would for the immediate future restrain Germany—perhaps [Page 276] for long enough to allow the present phase of exalted nationalism to run its course. He felt, however, that sooner or later this understanding between France and Russia must be subsumed into some more general arrangement, as it would otherwise degenerate into a mere combination against Germany, which would of itself be a challenge and a provocation. What the nature of such a more general security arrangement for Eastern Europe might be, the Baltic States did not greatly care; they would be prepared to fall in with any really practicable arrangement that the Powers more directly interested might succeed in working out. It was obvious that such an arrangement could not take the form, which Russia had desired, of an agreement for mutual assistance: Germany and Poland had both refused pointblank to consider such an arrangement, and the French negotiations with Russia had developed that France herself was not prepared to go so far. He in fact referred to “the danger of a pact of mutual assistance”; but when I asked if this phrase meant that the Baltic States would consider themselves endangered, he would not concede that that was the case, but referred in rather general terms to the danger of unexpected interpretations that might be given to any agreement that was too far-reaching in the obligations it imposed, and dismissed the point with the remark that the whole proposal had “washed out”. He surmised that it might prove possible to work out an Eastern European security arrangement along the lines of non-aggression and nonassistance to an aggressor, as suggested by the German Government through Sir John Simon at Stresa. He remarked, however, that only the British Government had thus far made any effort to promote a settlement along those lines, though possibly the failure of the French and Russian Governments to take up the suggestion was a merely temporary result of tactical considerations connected with their own negotiations.
To my surprise, he expressed quite unreservedly his opinion that the Russians had “tricked” the French into the recent agreement, through a year of negotiations in which the French had been outwitted and led on to a position from which they could not find any way of retiring. The agreement, he said, gave Russia the benefit of French support in the event of an attack by Germany, but, in view of the lack of a common Russo-German frontier, gave France no corresponding possibility of support from Russia.
Upon my asking whether he gave any credence to the belief that the underlying motive of the French government was to forestall a rapprochement between Russia and Germany, he unhesitatingly said that he was sure of it—that the relationship, particularly between the Russian and German armies, had been very close before the time [Page 277] of Hitler, and that there had been a real danger that it might be resumed if Russia had not been induced to commit herself to the other camp.
He surmised that the next developments in regard to the Eastern European question might be that the Soviet Government, which is now negotiating with Czechoslovakia for an arrangement similar to that already made with France, would propose a like arrangement to the Baltic States.