500.A15A5/133: Telegram
The Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 5—2:52 p.m.]
385. My 378, July 3, 3 p.m. From Norman Davis. When I called to see Baldwin yesterday afternoon, Simon was also present, which was a surprise to me but which had perhaps been arranged in order that Simon might inform me of what the Japanese Ambassador had just told him to the effect that the Japanese representatives would not arrive until October, at which time they would be prepared to discuss the naval question in all its aspects.
[Page 288]Baldwin began by saying that in view of the Japanese delay, which caused him some concern as he felt we were going to have trouble with Japan, he did not feel that there was any hurry in attempting to reach any definite conclusions as between ourselves except as to broad general principles, and that in any event he would like first to find out what arrangements if any the British can arrive at with France next Monday and Tuesday, not only with regard to the navy, but with regard to Germany and the whole European situation, as this would have a definite bearing on Great Britain’s ability to conform more closely to the point of view of the United States. He felt, however, that our conversations to date had been most beneficial in that while they have brought out a difference of view with regard to technical questions, they have helped to bring about a more friendly and frank understanding as to the necessity for us to work in harmony, and that if we can only avoid the mistake of 192716 of allowing our technical differences to be aired in the press instead of between ourselves, there will be no difficulties which we will not be able to overcome.
I then reviewed what had happened with regard to publicity and our justifiable complaints on this score. Simon showed real concern over this, insisting that the Foreign Office was in no way to blame and trying also to exculpate the Admiralty, which I am now satisfied has been the cause of the trouble. I believe Baldwin is determined to prevent a recurrence of such incidents in the future. Baldwin said he considered it of the utmost importance that there should be no statements given out by either Government, but that after they have talked with the French he would like for us to have some further conversations. I stated that in view of the postponed arrival of the Japanese I felt it was not necessary or quite right for me to remain here much longer after the departure of the French. He agreed that we should probably then discontinue for the present the conversations but that we should consider giving out a joint statement. Under the circumstances I thought it inopportune to discuss with him the draft statement cabled you in the telegram under reference. Baldwin said that in the meantime and in order to avoid any publicity it would be very easy for us to meet informally at dinner any time.
Simon said that if we could only produce our figures as they had done, we could proceed with the technical discussions. I repeated that if we were to attempt such discussions before we have agreed upon a common objective, we would be floundering in the dark. At this point I placed categorically before Baldwin the two questions outlined in the second paragraph of my cable under reference, but he evaded a definite answer, saying he would like to think that over [Page 289] although Simon said that they were of course in favor of a renewal of the treaty, but that they would like to discuss certain technical modifications which would make it more acceptable to themselves. I emphasized that if it should prove impossible to renew the London Treaty it was most important in my opinion that neither England nor the United States should be the cause of the failure, and that we at least ought to be wise enough to let some other power assume that onerous role. Baldwin said that he was impressed by that argument and would like to think it over but that he considered Anglo-American cooperation as more important now than anything else and that in spite of all the perplexing problems that are facing Great Britain now, he was satisfied that with the spirit that now animates us both we would reach a mutually satisfactory meeting of minds.
Throughout the talk Baldwin was exceedingly friendly and impressed me as not being so converted to the Admiralty point of view as MacDonald. [Davis.]
- For correspondence on the Three-Power Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, Geneva, June 20–August 4, 1927, see Foreign Relations, 1921, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.↩