123 Bullitt, Wm. C./32
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bullitt) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received January 9.]
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Sir: I have the honor to report to you the details of my visit to the Soviet Union December 10–22, 1933.
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We reached Moscow on Monday, December 11. Troyanovsky,68 Divilkovsky, Florinsky and a number of other officials met us at the railway station. We were taken to the Hotel National, where the American flag was suspended over the entrance. The apartment reserved for me was, curiously enough, the same which I was occupying when Austria sent her ultimatum to Serbia.69 It had been beautifully refurnished and was most comfortable. The hotel was adequately heated and the food and service were good.
I was received at once by Litvinov at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and had a brief, friendly conversation in the course of which I asked him to obtain as quickly as possible the data on payments due by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Germany during the year 1934, in accordance with the telegram of the Department received by me in Berlin.
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On Tuesday, December 12, which was a Soviet holiday, I called on the leading officials of the Foreign Office: Krestinsky, Karakhan, Sokolnikoff, Stomoniakoff, and Roubinin who is in charge of the American Section.
I then lunched en famille with Litvinov. I had left the remarks which I proposed to make on presenting my credentials70 with Litvinov, and after luncheon he told me that he was delighted by them and that Kalinin was also, and that as a special politeness, contrary to diplomatic precedent, he would like to give me an advance copy of the reply which Kalinin would make.71 He did so.
December 13, at noon, I presented my credentials to Kalinin in the reception room of the large palace of the Kremlin. Mr. Flack72 and Mr. Kennan73 accompanied me. President Kalinin was accompanied [Page 834] by Mr. Litvinov, Mr. Krestinsky, and Mr. Yenukedze.74 My remarks on this occasion and Kalinin’s reply are contained in my Despatch No. 1, dated December 14, 1933.75
After I had presented my letters, Kalinin invited me to accompany him to an adjoining room and we had a delightful conversation of a half hour. I had never met Kalinin and had thought from what I had read and heard of him that he was a simple-minded old peasant. I was surprised to find that he is far from simple-minded. He has a delightful shrewdness and sense of humor and had evidently followed with considerable attention the development of the President’s program in America. He requested me to say to the President that he and everyone else in Russia considered the President completely out of the class of the leaders of capitalist states; that it was clear to them all that the President really cared about the welfare of the laboring men and the farmers and that he was not engaged in protecting the vested rights of property.
Kalinin said that he hoped that I would travel in every part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and I told him that I should be delighted to do so, but that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a continent rather than a country and that I feared I should be restricted to Moscow and Leningrad unless I could cover it by airplane. He told me that I could go any place I might wish in the entire Union by plane. I replied that I should perhaps be able to arrange to have a plane of my own in Moscow for trips if he would permit me to use it without restrictions. He answered that there would be no restrictions whatever on my movements.
Kalinin was very agreeable to me personally, saying that Lenin76 had talked to him about me on several occasions, and that he felt as if he were welcoming someone he had known for a long time.
The afternoon of December 13 I received the Press and gave them my remarks and Kalinin’s reply. The entire press of the Soviet Union published articles on my arrival and on this exchange of remarks which were not only enthusiastic but undeservedly complimentary.
On Friday, December 15, I had a long talk with Mr. Rosenholz, People’s Commissar for Foreign Trade. He impressed me as a highly intelligent and likeable person. We talked for the most part in generalities, but I asked him how much manganese the Soviet Government could furnish to the United States per annum in addition to the amounts already contracted for by other countries. He replied that in his opinion not more than 300,000 tons per annum could be furnished.
[Page 835]That afternoon I had a long talk with Molotov and found that I had underrated him as I had underrated Kalinin. He has a magnificent forehead and the general aspect of a first-rate French scientist, great poise, kindliness and intelligence. He talked freely about the difficulties of the Soviet Union in the Far East, saying that the primary desire of the entire Soviet Government was to avoid war and to obtain time to work out the domestic reconstruction which had scarcely been begun. He said that he feared greatly that Japan would attack this spring; that he considered an eventual attack inevitable and 1935 as the probable limit of peace.
That evening, December 15, Litvinov gave a formal dinner in my honor at which Molotov and nearly all the Commissars were present. It was a superb banquet and many toasts were drunk to President Roosevelt, to myself and to the United States. After dinner I talked for two hours with Molotov, Voroshilov, Kouibychev and Litvinov.
The following day I began to exchange calls with the various Ambassadors and Ministers in Moscow, and before my departure had some forty conversations with these colleagues. I was particularly impressed by the French Ambassador, Alphand, an intelligent, charming old gentleman who for many years was assistant to Delcasse.77 The Polish Minister, Mr. Juljusz Lukasiewicz, is young and vigorous and seems highly intelligent.
I had a long talk with Karl Radek,78 who does not believe that Japan will attack this spring, contrary to the belief of the members of the Government.
That evening I was Litvinov’s guest at the Ballet, which was as excellent as ever.
On December 19 I had a talk with Mr. Osinski, Chief of the Central Administration of Economic and Social Statistics, who promised me that he would place at the disposal of the staff of the Embassy and Consulate all the statistics available in his department as well as the complete library of his department.
I also had a long talk with Grinko, People’s Commissar for Finance, and discussed the problem of obtaining roubles at prices satisfactory to us. I am absolutely opposed to the smuggling of roubles in our diplomatic pouch, or to the purchase of roubles in the Black Bourse in Moscow. I am convinced that we can handle this matter of rouble exchange in an honorable and above-board manner and that we can make a satisfactory arrangement with Grinko. Grinko promised me that the cost of supplies at Torgsin would be reduced and would be collated with the cost of living index of the leading countries of Europe and the United States. He furthermore promised me that he would make a private [Page 836] arrangement with me for members of the American diplomatic and consular staffs in Moscow to obtain through me an adequate number of roubles for minor expenses at a fair rate. I told Grinko that we should probably wish to charge consular fees in roubles at a rate to be fixed by ourselves and to use the roubles thus acquired for minor living expenses. He said that he had no objection.
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The same morning, December 20, I had a long talk with Mejlaouk,79 who told me that the tempo of light industry producing consumer’s goods would be raised in the new Five Year Plan to the same tempo as that of heavy industry and that a great effort would be made to raise the standard of living of the population during the next five years. I asked him what articles he considered the Soviet Union would need to import from the United States in large quantities during the coming years. He replied that machine tools of all sorts would be the chief articles of import. I asked him about railroad building in Siberia. He said that the line to the Lena gold field region had not been begun, but that 100 kilometers of the line running around the north end of Lake Baikal had already been completed. I asked him how much of the Trans-Siberian still needed to be double-tracked. He said about 2,000 kilometers. I checked this statement from a number of other sources later and found a considerable discrepancy in the statements probably due to the vagueness of the word “completed”. As nearly as I can discover, about 1,500 kilometers are still untouched, but material is on hand for the building of 500 kilometers. This leaves 1,000 kilometers entirely untouched with no material whatever for completion.
I had a long talk with Voroshilov the same morning, December 20. He discussed frankly the situation in the Far East and expressed the opinion that a Japanese attack was imminent. He also expressed confidence that if such an attack were made the Japanese would be defeated. Voroshilov said that he was especially anxious to have a full equipment of American military, naval and air attaches in Moscow. I replied that it was not our custom to have air attaches. He then asked if it might not be possible to have as Assistant Military Attaché and Assistant Naval Attaché men who were experts of the first water in aviation, as he hoped that he could obtain much good advice from our representatives. He also asked that these men, if possible, should speak Russian, as he speaks no other language, and he would like to be able to confer with our representatives personally in private. I told Voroshilov that I would bring this matter to the attention of our Government when I reached Washington. He made it clear that, if our Government desires, [Page 837] our military and naval men can have a relationship of the utmost intimacy with the military authorities of the Soviet Government.
That evening, Wednesday, December 20, I dined with Voroshilov at his apartment in the Kremlin. In addition to Voroshilov and his wife the following were present: Stalin, Kalinin, Molotov, Litvinov, Egorov, Mejlaouk, Piatakov, Kouibychev, Kaganovitch, Ordjonikidze, Krestinski, Karakhan, Sokolnikoff, Troyanovsky and Dovgalevsky. Litvinov remarked to me that the persons present constituted the “inside directorate”. The dinner was an extremely friendly one with continual toasts, the first of which was offered by Stalin who proposed a toast “To President Roosevelt, who in spite of the mute growls of the Fishes, dared to recognize the Soviet Union.” His reference to Hamilton Fish created considerable laughter. I then proposed the health of President Kalinin and thereupon Molotov raised his glass to me and proposed “The health of one who comes to us as a new Ambassador but an old friend.”
After dinner I had a long talk with Stalin. He regards an attack by Japan this spring as certain and on introducing Egorov, the Chief of Staff, to me said, “This is the man who will lead our Army victoriously against Japan when Japan attacks.” Stalin then referred to the matter in regard to which I telegraphed the Department from Paris on December 25,80 saying, “There is one thing I want to ask of you. The second line of our railroad to Vladivostock is not completed. To complete it quickly we need 250,000 tons of steel rails at once. They need not be new rails. Your rails are so much heavier than ours that the rails you discard are good enough for us. Your railways, I understand, are reequipping themselves and will have many old rails to dispose of immediately. Cannot you arrange for us to purchase the old rails? I do not ask that they should be given to us, but only that our purchase of them should be facilitated.” I replied that I should be glad to do anything I could in the matter and asked where the rails should be delivered, to which Stalin replied, “Vladivostock.” I then asked who in America would make the arrangements for their purchase and he replied, “Bogdanov.”81 Stalin then said, “Without those rails we shall beat the Japanese, but if we have the rails it will be easier.”
Stalin had evidently followed the development of the President’s program with close attention and expressed an admiration for the President which seemed to be genuine, saying finally, “President Roosevelt is today, in spite of being the leader of a capitalist nation, one of the most popular men in the Soviet Union.”
Before I left Stalin said to me, “I want you to understand that if you want to see me at any time, day or night, you have only to let me know [Page 838] and I will see you at once.” This was a somewhat extraordinary gesture on his part, as he has hitherto refused to see any Ambassador at any time.
In order to avoid the jealousy of my colleagues, I said to Litvinov that it seemed to me desirable that it should be made known to the Press merely that I had been at Voroshilov’s and that Stalin had dropped in, and that I had had a talk with him. It was so arranged. It is valuable to have the inside track, but it seems to me not desirable to emphasize the fact to the world.
After I had said good-bye to Voroshilov and the others, Stalin went to the door of the apartment with me and said, “Is there anything at all in the Soviet Union that you want?” I told him that I should be glad to know that the property on the bluff overlooking the Moscow River might be given to the American Government as a site for an Embassy. Stalin replied, “You shall have it.” The next day Litvinov told me that Stalin had given orders to the Moscow Soviet that the property in the park should be ours if we wished to have it.
I had a long and important conversation with Litvinov on that morning, December 21, in regard to which I cabled to you briefly on my arrival in Paris, December 25.
Litvinov began by saying that he wanted to have a serious talk with me and asked me whether the Government of the United States would have any objection to the Soviet Government joining the League of Nations. I replied that as I had no codes I could not communicate with my Government, but speaking for myself I could say without hesitation that the Government of the United States would have no objection.
I then asked Litvinov why the Soviet Government was considering such a reversal of its established policy. He said that the Soviet Government was under great pressure from France to join the League, that he and all other members of the Soviet Government considered an attack by Japan in the spring so probable that everything possible must be done to secure the western frontier of the Soviet Union from attack; that he did not fear an immediate attack by Germany or Poland or both combined, but that he knew that conversations had taken place between Germany and Poland looking toward an eventual attack on the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union should become embroiled in a long war with Japan; that he feared that a war with Japan might drag on for years and that after a couple of years Germany and Poland combined might attack the Soviet Union, Poland with the hope of annexing the Ukraine and parts of Lithuania and Germany with the hope of annexing the remainder of Lithuania as well as Latvia and Estonia. France had offered to make a defensive alliance with the Soviet Union providing that if either party were attacked by Germany the other party should at once declare war on Germany, but France felt that this could be done only [Page 839] within the framework of the League of Nations because of the difficulties caused by the Locarno agreements, and that in order to obtain this defensive alliance with France it would be necessary for the Soviet Union to enter the League.
I asked Litvinov how an alliance of this sort could be reconciled with the Covenant of the League and he said that it would be brought before the League as a “regional understanding.” I told him that there seemed to me to be a considerable region separating France and Russia and he said that the proximity of both to Germany was a sufficient excuse. I pointed out that Russia had no common border with Germany, but he said with a laugh that Germany was quite close enough to make an agreement a “regional understanding.” I asked him if he considered it probable that the Red Army would march against Germany to support France. He said he considered that it would be easy compared with the difficulty of getting the French Army to march against Germany to support the Soviet Union.
We had a long discussion of the situation in the Far East and he expressed the opinion that no one could say, not even in Japan, whether or not an attack by Japan would be made this spring; that the issue would depend on very personal factors; that the civil government had today no power whatever and that if General Araki82 should reach the position of Dictator, which was probable, an attack on the Soviet Union this spring would be certain.
We discussed ways and means of preventing such an attack. Litvinov suggested that in addition to the supplying of the steel rails, of which Stalin had spoken to me the previous evening, the most effective means of forestalling an attack would be the institution by the United States of proposals for non-aggression pacts between the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan. I explained to him the difficulties in the way of any such proposal. He then said that he felt that anything that could be done to make the Japanese believe that the United States was ready to cooperate with Russia, even though there might be no basis for the belief, would be valuable. He asked whether it might not be possible for an American squadron or an individual warship to pay a visit during the spring to Vladivostock or to Leningrad. I said that I could not answer that question, but would submit it to my Government.
Litvinov also said that it would be very important if it should be possible to obtain assurances from France and Great Britain and the United States that loans or credits would not be given to the Japanese Government for war purposes.
I again attempted to obtain from Litvinov the figures which were wanted by the Department in regard to Soviet obligations in Germany. [Page 840] Litvinov replied that the figures were not available in Moscow but only in Berlin; that he had telegraphed to Berlin for them and that he would telegraph them to Skvirsky to communicate to the Department of State as soon as they were available.
Certain of these figures were handed to me in Paris by the Soviet Commercial Attaché there and I telegraphed them to the Department.83
We then talked about general commercial policy and Litvinov expressed the opinion that the United States could not take more than $60,000,000 worth of goods from the Soviet Union in any one year, and that if we wanted an export trade with the Soviet Union of more than this amount we would have to extend long-term credits. He said that the Soviet Union was not interested in developing a large export and import trade, but hoped to make itself as nearly self-sufficient as possible. On the other hand, if considerable credits could be obtained, the Soviet Union would be glad to continue to buy from the United States considerable quantities of imports of all kinds. I queried him in regard to payments and he replied that his idea was that the United States should take from the Soviet Union each year sufficient imports to cover interest payments and amortization on long-term loans.
Litvinov gave a tremendous reception for me on the next afternoon, December 21, and that evening we left for Paris, crossing the Russian border at noon, December 22.
Respectfully yours,
- Alexander Antonovich Troyanovsky, Soviet Ambassador in Japan, 1927–33; Ambassador to the United States, January 1934 to June 1939.↩
- Cf. note of July 24, 1914, from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement, p. 17.↩
- Ante, p. 827.↩
- Ante, p. 828.↩
- Joseph Flack, First Secretary of Embassy in Germany.↩
- George Frost Kennan, Third Secretary of Legation in Latvia.↩
- A. S. Yenukedze, Secretary of the Presidium of the Soviet Ail-Union Central Executive Committee.↩
- Despatch not printed.↩
- V. I. Lenin, leader of the Red Revolution of November 1917, and President of the Soviet Council of People’s Commissars until his death on January 21, 1924.↩
- Théophile Delcassé, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1898–1905, 1914–15.↩
- Soviet publicist.↩
- V. I. Mejlaouk (Mezhlauk), Soviet First Vice President of the State Planning Commission.↩
- See telegram No. 576, December 24, 7 p.m., p. 830.↩
- Peter A. Bogdanov, chairman of the Soviet Amtorg Trading Corporation.↩
- Gen. Sadao Araki, Japanese Minister of War.↩
- See footnote 67, p. 832.↩