Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1932, General, Volume I

500.A15A4/739

The Secretary of State to the Acting Chairman of the American Delegation (Gibson)

Washington, January 19, 1932.

Dear Mr. Gibson: The President has appointed me Chairman of our Delegation to the General Disarmament Conference. As I am unable to leave Washington at this time, due to the pressure of many other international affairs, he desires you to assume charge of the Delegation as Acting Chairman. I know you will inform me when you think that my presence would contribute to the successful conclusion of the Conference.

For your guidance, I am setting forth my views on some of the questions which will come before the Conference. They are based on the series of conferences held in the Department by the members of the Delegation² and the representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments, on the principles and certain of the problems which will come before the Conference. These considerations are not in any way mandatory, and are merely destined for your guidance as I rely on the discretion of the acting head of the Delegation in all cases, and realise that changes in circumstances are sure to arise in the course of the Conference which may call for radical alterations in the points of view set forth here. I know that you will consult with me by telegraph when such occasions arise.

It is understood that the Draft Convention elaborated by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference which met in Geneva from 1926 to 1930, inclusive, will serve as a basis for discussion.³ The Draft Convention represents the principles upon which the various governments have thus far been able to agree, and the methods of technical progress in definition and precision. It is a frame-work which contains no quantitative factors, and the task of the Conference will be to adjust these principles to reality and to give life to the convention by an agreement for limitation and reduction. It is not anticipated that the Draft Convention will survive without considerable alteration of form.

The general guiding principles for the American participation in the Conference may be set forth along the following lines:

The principal purpose of the Conference is to arrive at a general treaty limiting and, as far as possible, reducing all armaments, thus removing the menace of competition in arms and relieving the world of the heavy burden of unproductive expense. The practical universality of such a treaty implies new bases of relativity, and hence new conceptions of the essentials for defense. The basis for the whole Conference is the principle already generally accepted in the Kellogg-Briand Pact⁴ that the principal function of armaments other than the maintenance of internal order is defense. Therefore it is necessary to renounce plans and equipment destined to give aggression a probable chance of success. This country has always maintained the policy of a reasonable posture of defense, and it should be our purpose not to fall below that level in the new conditions created by generally accepted limitation. The very nature of the projected treaty should, however, preclude any nation retaining armaments likely to be used for successful aggression particularly initial surprise attacks and it will be the purpose of this Government to work against any such possibility.

It must be borne in mind that any world-wide limitation would in itself be a step in advance, since the determination of the relationship in armaments between one country and the others has been, to a great extent, dependent upon the fear of surprise which world-wide limitation would remove. Limitation, if it does nothing else, paves the way for subsequent reduction.

It would seem that consonant with the obligations which the major portion of the world has assumed in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the principle of an absolute minimum force should be admitted for the preservation of internal order and in addition some increment for defense, in which the principle of relative strength should apply, and in which stringent reductions be sought.

If, for example, the present German Army may be considered as containing the appropriate number necessary for the maintenance of internal order in that country, on the same basis the American Army of approximately 130,000 would be well under the minimum allowed by this method of calculation. Therefore, it would seem that an estimate of the armed forces in each country computed by a separation into the portion necessary for the maintenance of order and the additional contingent essential for defense would clearly bring out where reductions could be made since the defense contingent would necessarily be a relative matter. On the other hand the minimum army for internal order would be an absolute number not subject to reduction. Therefore, for example, if the conference should consider any projects for the reduction by a given percentage of the expenditure of land forces, the costs and maintenance of the personnel and the equipment of that portion of the army computed upon the basis of the amount necessary for internal order should not be included in such a percentage of reduction. It would seem rather that it should be computed separately as not bearing upon the similar quota of another nation.

In the Draft Convention, personnel on active duty is limited, but not trained reserves. This omission has been severely criticised by “liberal” publicists in this country. It is however effectively impossible quantitatively to limit the trained reserves of a country unless conscription is abolished. This Government has never accepted the idea of conscription for itself, except in time of war; and American public opinion has always viewed voluntary armies as essentially defensive. We recognize, however, that most Continental Powers, with equal conviction, believe that compulsory military service is a guarantee of a pacific policy and a logical development of democracy in that it imposes equal burdens on all, whereas a voluntary or professional army presents the dangers of a Pretorian guard. Five years of earnest discussion throughout the Preparatory Commission failed to bridge this basic difference of viewpoint.

With a view to breaking the deadlock on trained reserves, Mr. Gibson on April 26, 1929, made the following declaration:

“Allow me in a few words to recapitulate the attitude of the American delegation on this problem. We have always maintained that trained reserves should be included with peace time armaments since both actually exist in time of peace. In our eyes a nation which possesses an adequate and equipped trained reserve is in a position promptly to undertake offensive battle. Such a nation is therefore in a markedly more favorable position than one which must train its personnel and equip it. Untrained civilians cannot be turned into efficient fighting men without many months of training. Starting with these premises the American delegation reached the conclusion that logic and fairness called for trained reserves being included among peace time effectives in the Draft Convention.

“These principles for which we stood during the first session we still believe. Nevertheless, as I indicated the other day, I fully recognize that other delegations which hold opposing views believe their thesis with the same conviction. Therefore if we are to reach an agreement—if we are to be able to join in a common draft—it will be necessary for concessions to be made not only on the part of one but on the part of every delegation here present. With this in mind I am able to declare that the American Government as a practical matter is disposed to defer to the views of the majority of those countries whose land forces constitute their chief military interest and in the Draft Convention before us to accept their ideas in the matter of trained reserves.”⁵

While the circumstances which led to this statement have somewhat altered, it would not seem opportune to press for the inclusion of trained reserves in the Convention unless there is any likelihood that the support of the United States could bring about a change of attitude on the part of the principal military powers.

It seems quite possible that within the field of limitation of expenditure resides the best hope of concrete achievement in the forthcoming Conference. We have previously been opposed to this form of limitation, believing that reduction in personnel and matériel is the most effective and direct method, since it does away with possibilities of surprise and uncertainty which are resident in limitation of expenditure without concomitant limitation of men and arms. Furthermore, the difference in costs, living conditions and wages in the various countries make comparisons of budgets between countries entirely misleading. However, since it has been made clear that limitation of expenditure is not designed to serve as a basis of comparison of expenditure between nations, but is designed to be a check on each nation’s individual military development, and to serve as a basis of comparison of military development within any given country over a period of years, the problem has altered. Furthermore, emphasis is henceforth to be placed not on a limitation of credits but on a limitation of actual expenditures. If limitation of expenditure should be coupled with limitation and reduction of matériel, preferably by categories, it might be possible to agree on this as a complementary method. Any fair proposals on this basis, which, jointly with direct reductions, would bring about a just and proportionate reduction in expenditure, might well be acceptable.

Throughout the sessions of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission discussion centered on two methods of limiting land matériel: the direct, which consists in agreement not to exceed certain specified numerical items by categories, and the indirect, or limitation by expenditure. Only one-half the States represented at the Preparatory Disarmament Conference were willing to adopt the thesis of direct limitation; all the States represented, excepting the United States, were willing to accept indirect limitation in some form, either alone or as complementary to direct limitation.

There is reason to believe that if we should, at the outset of negotiations, let it be known that in return for some measure of direct limitation by categories, we would be willing to agree to some form of limitation by expenditure, and thus prevent a qualitative race in matériel once a quantitative race had been ruled out, it would be probable that the great majority of nations would go a considerable way to meet us.

Whether the discussion turn on direct or indirect limitation of land matériel, the following division into categories, suggested by the War Department, would seem logical, avoiding on the one hand such detail as would make application of treaty terms difficult, and on the other would appear to be all-inclusive.

1. Rifles.

2. Machine guns.

3. Trench Mortars, 37 mm and similar weapons.

4. Light Artillery.

5. Medium Artillery.

6. Heavy Artillery.

7. Tanks.

8. Armored Cars.

It is obvious that a limitation in expenditure should refer only to actual military activities, whether or not they appear in the budgets for the War and Navy Departments or in other sections of the national budget. Conversely, the non-military activities which form a part of every military budget, such as administration expenses, war graves service, engineering activities on behalf of the civil governments, et cetera, should be omitted. Similarly, non-recurring expenses (the details and definition of which must be left to the technical advisers) should receive special examination. Non-recurring expenses such as permanent fortifications, which are essentially for defense and cannot serve any aggressive purpose, hospitals, et cetera, should receive special attention.

Limitations of matériel already in force among the five naval treaty powers and the consequent limitation of personnel have automatically limited the budgets of those powers for naval defense, and it is believed that there is little possibility of reduction of budget figures on navies during the terms of the present treaties. If, however, it is proved that by greatly increased expenditure it would be possible so to improve the efficiency of a ship already limited by tons as to result in a new form of competition in construction, the possibility of determining the cost of future construction per ton in the different categories on a proportionate basis to post-war building figures may be studied.

We have informed the British Government that in so far as the Parties to Part III of the London Naval Treaty⁶ are concerned the figures to be inserted in any disarmament convention should be kept within the limitations already agreed to at the Washington and London Naval Conferences.⁷ However, it does not seem that the time limit of any general convention which may come out of the forthcoming Geneva Conference should be limited to so brief a time as the period up to December 31, 1936. This Government feels since no treaty could possibly be signed until late in 1932, it could not obtain sufficient ratification to put it into force until late in 1933. This would mean a new general conference of all the nations in 1935, which would prepare the way for the termination of the treaty in 1936.

We would be willing, if the French and Italian Governments complete the Treaty of London by adhering to Part III, to consider favorably the prolongation of the Washington and London Treaties. If this is not feasible, it seems possible that some provisions should be inserted whereby the High Contracting Parties agree that if there were any changes of naval strength for the signatories of the Washington and London Naval Treaties resulting from the Conference provided for in Article 23 of the London Treaty, all High Contracting Parties which had entered naval figures in the proposed treaty for the categories limited by these treaties, should meet in accordance with Article 58 of the Draft Convention to advise as to the revisions that might be necessary. Thus the naval provisions of the forthcoming General Convention would be coterminous for all practical purposes with the London and possibly the Washington Treaty; while on the other hand, should the provisions of either or both of these treaties be continued no changes in the General Disarmament Treaty would be required. In this way it would seem that a greater element of stability could be achieved for the General Disarmament Convention than would be possible should provisions for all armaments terminate in 1936.

The President in his message to Congress stated:⁸

“Both our Army and Navy have been maintained in a high state of efficiency. The ability and devotion of both officers and men sustain the highest traditions of the service. Reductions and postponements in expenditure of these departments to meet the present emergency are being made without reducing existing personnel or impairing the morale of either establishment.

“The agreement between the leading naval powers for limitation of naval armaments and establishment of their relative strength and thus elimination of competitive building also implies for ourselves the gradual expansion of the deficient categories in our Navy to the parties provided in those treaties. However, none of the other nations, parties to these agreements, is today maintaining the full rate of construction which the treaty size of fleets would imply.

“Although these agreements secured the maximum reduction of fleets which it was at that time possible to attain, I am hopeful that the naval powers, party to these agreements, will realize that establishment of relative strength in itself offers opportunity for further reduction without injury to any of them. This would be the more possible if pending negotiations are successful between France and Italy. If the world is to regain its standards of life, it must further decrease both naval and other arms. The subject will come before the General Disarmament Conference which meets in Geneva on February 2 next.”

Therefore in accordance with this expression it would be our purpose to work for reductions within the limits of existing naval treaties maintaining the present ratios. Certain possibilities present themselves, namely, the general abolition of submarines and the consequent reductions which could then be made by all powers in the destroyer category, as well as marked proportionate reductions in the aircraft carrier category in which no nation is built up to its allowed limits.⁹

With respect to the problem of the size of battleships at present limited by the Washington Treaty at 35,000 tons, the question is purely academic at this time, since there are no battleship replacements to be completed before 1937. A conference is provided in 1935 for the consideration of this problem. What progress may be made in the technique of construction before that time it is impossible to say, although it is a general principle that large ships are necessary on account of their resistance and fuel carrying capacity. The naval advisers of the American delegation feel that this is particularly the case in respect to the United States, owing to the absence of naval bases. It cannot, however, be excluded that some reduction in size from the present tonnage may be possible in view of the advance of the art of construction. It is possible psychologically that the mere fixation at the present time of a lower figure for capital ships would act as an encouragement to further building, as soon as permitted, whereas, the maintenance of the present large and costly capital ships would act as a deterrent to their being replaced and in favor of their life being yet further prolonged.

The Draft Convention provides for the reduction and limitation of air armaments on the basis of two factors: (1) number of planes; (2) total horse power. The American experts are of the opinion that the second factor is misleading and that the direct limitation by numbers, with a possible concomitant limitation of expenditure, would produce every desired effect.

In view of the difficulties of measuring the air forces of those countries that maintain a separate establishment for air with those whose air services are component parts of the Army and Navy, it would seem desirable that every country be asked to enter figures in three columns: (1) airplanes allocated to service with the Army; (2) airplanes allocated to service with the Navy; (3) airplanes maintained in a separate establishment. Thus the United States, for example, would enter figures only in columns (1) and (2), while Great Britain, for example, would enter in all three columns thus aiding the commensurability and adding a factor of information which would give stability to. the Treaty.

It seems certain that the total abolition of military aircraft is unlikely at this time, as this would give superiority in the air and the greatest potential threat of attack to countries having the largest civilian aircraft development. Just as merchant shipping affords no danger in face of naval vessels, so the experts point out that civil aircraft is powerless against military aircraft.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of dividing aircraft into categories, should it be found possible to define the characteristics of a heavy bomber, it would seem that in line with the general proposition that armaments should serve for defensive purposes only, a proposal might be made or at least acquiesced in for its total abolition. The threat of injury to the civilian population at the outbreak of war would thus be greatly diminished. If this solution is not feasible, some modification of the rules of war which should be generally acceptable to prevent the bombing of civilian population by military planes or to restrict such activity to purely military objectives as in the case of the present rules of war governing bombardment on land or sea, would be desirable.

As at present drafted, the Convention contains an article dealing with chemical and bacteriological warfare.

The following text has been prepared by our military and naval advisers as the basis for discussion either as an article of the Convention or as a separate instrument:

“The High Contracting Parties undertake, as among themselves, to abstain from the use in war of asphyxiating or lethal gases, except within the boundaries, and in defense, of territory over which they exercised sovereignty or de jure control at the outbreak of war.”

The present provision regarding bacteriological warfare is satisfactory.

While it was generally admitted that some form of central body should be set up in connection with the Disarmament Treaty, the discussions in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission indicated a wide diversity of opinion as to its proper functions. The original continental conception of the Commission was that it should be equipped with power to make investigations within the territory of a state against which complaints were entered. This idea of supervision or control was of course repugnant to us and many others and was reluctantly abandoned by its sponsors. Later, an attempt was made to give the Commission judicial attributes, which might be termed a disguised form of control. This too, was rejected. There may be attempts by certain powers to reintroduce the idea of supervision and control in a direct or indirect manner. It is believed that any such provision in the treaty would find great difficulty of acceptance by the American Senate.

In our conception the Permanent Disarmament Commission should be a body set up for study and report, for the mobilization of public opinion and the coordination of information. Emphasis should be placed less on its negative duties, such as holding hearings on complaints, and reporting on the fulfillment of the Convention, than on its positive duties, which might well include a study of the technical development of armaments, as well as reports to the Governments as to possible new ways and means to accelerate the continuing process of disarmament.

The next question to arise is whether all signatories to the Treaty are to be represented on the Permanent Disarmament Commission or only a limited number of states. On practical grounds, the latter appears the more desirable, as experience has proved that a smaller body can work more expeditiously and effectively than a larger and more cumbersome group. Perhaps the best solution would be to give permanent right of nomination to the larger military and naval powers, while a system of rotation in office should be evolved for the other states.

An attempt to define in greater detail the rules of procedure of the Permanent Disarmament Commission would probably be a mistake. It is impossible to foresee at this juncture all possible circumstances that may arise, and any procedure laid down in the Convention, and consequently unalterable without a modification of the entire document, would in our opinion be too rigid to achieve the most effective results.

The article on derogation which was proposed by the American Delegation to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, was originally phrased so as to follow the wording of Article 21 of the London Treaty which reads:

“If, during the term of the present Treaty, the requirements of the national security of any High Contracting Party in respect of vessels of war limited by Part III of the present Treaty are in the opinion of that Party materially affected by new construction of any Power other than those who have joined in Part III of this Treaty, that High Contracting Party will notify the other Parties to Part III as to the increase required to be made in its own tonnages within one or more of the categories of such vessels of war, specifying particularly the proposed increases and the reasons therefor, and shall be entitled to make such increase. Thereupon, the other Parties to Part III of this Treaty shall be entitled to make a proportionate increase in the category or categories specified; and the said other Parties shall promptly advise with each other through diplomatic channels as to the situation thus presented.”

The debates in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission made it clear that the phrase “thereupon the other High Contracting Parties will advise as to the situation thus presented” used in a treaty with fifty or more signatories, was of a wider scope than a similar phrase used in a three-Power Treaty and providing for a contingency created by the building program of any one of a very limited number of outside powers. In the General Disarmament Treaty it is hoped that there will be no non-signatory Powers, or at least that such Powers as do not sign will be of so little importance from a military point of view as not to affect, for practical purposes, the universality of the Treaty.

Now it was intended to include in this one general and simple undertaking to advise as to the situation arising from the suspension of the Treaty provisions, various contingencies. A state might have taken the serious step of suspending the Treaty in whole or in part, (a) as the result of a violation (or alleged violation) of the Treaty by another contracting party; (b) as the result of an altered circumstance arising from some action of a contracting party, that did not violate the Treaty; (c) as the result of some action taken by a non-contracting party, et cetera. Whichever the cause, it would seem that the derogating Power should have an opportunity to join in the deliberations of the other contracting parties: (1) to give information explaining or justifying the serious step it had taken in suspending part of the Convention; (2) to be on a footing of equality with the other state whose violation of the Treaty is alleged; and (3) to facilitate an adjustment of the difficulty and a consequent withdrawal of the temporary suspension. In the circumstances, the second paragraph of this article might be rephrased as follows:

“Thereupon the High Contracting Parties shall promptly advise as to the situation thus presented.”

This article bears enough superficial likeness to a “Consultative Pact” to merit careful explanation. The fundamental objection to a Consultative Pact is that many people regard it not as a promise to consult, but as an implied promise to take some further step usually to carry out the recommendations not unanimously agreed to of the consultative body. No opportunity should be lost to make it clear that an acceptance of this article does not carry with it any undertaking (1) to accept the conclusions of the deliberating High Contracting Parties; (2) to take action of a discriminatory nature against any other Power; or (3) to advise with the League of Nations or any organ thereof. The willingness “to advise” as to the situation presented is an undertaking assumed in all seriousness, voluntarily and not as a quid pro quo for concessions elsewhere, and upon the clear understanding of the delegates of other Powers that it means what it says and that it contains no hidden implications or commitments.

Furthermore no prescription should be made as to the method by which the powers should advise among themselves, and thus there is no implication that a conference is mandatory every time a suspension is claimed. There is every reason to presume that the purposes of this article would in most cases best and most speedily be carried out through diplomatic channels.

With respect to the many matters of detail not treated here, I shall rely on your judgment as head of the Delegation as to whether it will be necessary to ask for instruction or to decide the question on the basis of the general principles with which you are familiar.

Sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson

2. For the personnel of the American delegation, see Foreign Relations, 1931, vol. i, p. 534.

3. For correspondence on the work of the Preparatory Commission, see Foreign Relations, 1926, vol. i, pp. 40 ff.; ibid., 1927, vol. i, pp. 159 ff.; ibid., 1928, vol. i, pp. 235 ff.; ibid., 1929, vol. i, pp. 65 ff.; and ibid., 1930, vol. i, pp. 187 ff.

   For text of the draft convention, see League of Nations, Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference Entrusted With the Preparation for the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Series X, Annex 20 (C.P.D.292–2), pp. 597–620; Department of State Conference Series No. 7: Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference and Draft Convention (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1931), pp. 71 ff.

4. Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. i, p. 153.
5. For complete text of declaration, see Documents of the Preparatory Commission, Series VIII, Minutes of the Sixth Session (First Part), p. 114.
6. Signed April 22, 1930, Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, pp. 107, 120.

7. See memorandum to the British Embassy, December 30, 1931, ibid., 1931, vol. i, p. 535.

   For correspondence concerning the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament, November 12, 1921–February 6, 1922, see ibid., 1922, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.; the treaty for the limitation of naval armament, signed February 6, 1922, is printed on p. 247. For correspondence concerning the London Naval Conference, January 21–April 22, 1930, see ibid., 1930, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.

8. Message delivered December 8, 1931; for full text, see Foreign Relations, 1931, vol. i, p. ix .
9. The original bears a notation that the clause beginning “as well as …” was later excised. See footnote 31, p. 24.