611.6731/117
The Ambassador in Turkey (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 13.]
Sir: With reference to the Department’s instruction No. 109 of December 26, 1928,2 and to my telegram No. 12 of February 18, 6 p.m. from Angora,3 regarding the commercial relations between the United States and Turkey, I have the honor to inform the Department that I proceeded to the capital on February 15 and that on February 17 I discussed this question with the Minister for Foreign Affairs along the lines of the Department’s instruction. A memorandum of the interview is enclosed herewith,3 as well as a copy of my telegram mentioned above.
From the memorandum of my conversation with the Minister it will be seen that after I had presented the desirability of negotiating an agreement by means of an exchange of notes of indefinite duration providing for mutual unconditional most-favored-nation treatment in customs matters, Tevfik Rüştü Bey4 said he regretted that it would be utterly impossible according to Turkish law for him to conclude an exchange of notes of that nature without a time limit, the Government possessing no legal authority for such procedure. On the contrary, the Government was specifically restricted by existing provisions of law in this respect. He said however that in view of my presentation of the point of view of the Government of the United States opposing a tariff-rebate treaty, he would meet our views to the extent of negotiating with the United States a brief and simple treaty according mutual unconditional most-favored-nation treatment in customs matters, with full appreciation of the fact that this treaty could not, probably, be ratified by the American Government before next December at earliest. In the meantime, he said, our present [Page 804] commercial modus vivendi,5 which expires on April 10, 1929, could be extended until January 1, 1930, because an article would be included in the new Turkish tariff law providing authority for such action. The Minister thought that the new Turkish tariff law would be enacted before April tenth, but if by any unforeseen circumstances this enactment should be delayed, he said that he would have a special law passed by the Grand National Assembly in order to permit the extension of our commercial modus vivendi until such time as the tariff law should be enacted. This modus vivendi, according mutual unconditional most-favored-nation treatment, would have reference to the present Turkish tariff until the expiration of the Allied Commercial Convention of Lausanne6 in August when the new Turkish tariff would apply. If the United States should be unable to ratify the simple treaty proposed by the Minister before January 1, 1930, the Turkish Government would make every effort to find means of still further extending our modus vivendi, first, because the Turkish Government desired to see no break in the continuance of the present commercial relations between Turkey and the United States and, second, because the Turkish Government is firmly determined to continue to accord to the commerce of the United States all advantages given to the commerce of other nations.
At this point in the conversation, the question arose in my mind as to whether I should immediately debate the matter on the basis of the arguments advanced in the Department’s instruction in order to carry out its exact wishes, or whether I should seek further directions in view of the Minister’s willingness to discard a tariff-rebate treaty in favor of a brief treaty giving mutual unconditional most-favored-nation treatment in customs matters, which seemed to me to be an important concession. As my instructions were not mandatory, it seemed to me wiser to make no mention at that moment of the risk of stirring up further anti-Turkish agitation in the United States through the negotiation of a formal treaty, but to await the Department’s further instructions after consideration of the following observations which seem to me to be pertinent.
- (1)
- The Minister’s statement to me that the Turkish Government possesses no legal authority to conclude an agreement by means of an exchange of notes according mutual unconditional most-favored-nation treatment in customs matters without a definite time limit as to its duration appears to be sound. It is true that no legislative action was considered necessary for the conclusion of the general agreement between the United States and Turkey effected by the exchange of notes of February 17, 1927,7 certain provisions of which carry no time limit. On the other hand, the Grand National Assembly [Page 805] has restricted the authority of the Government in the conclusion of provisional commercial modi vivendi (see the laws of December 12, 1925, and April 10, 1927).* This legislative action may readily be invoked by the Government as nullifying whatever authority it might have possessed to conclude by exchange of notes commercial agreements without time limits.
- (2)
- There is little doubt that the Turkish Government could obtain from the Grand National Assembly the necessary legal authority for the conclusion by an exchange of notes of a commercial agreement unlimited as to time, if such action were in accord with the Government’s policy and if it should desire to make such a recommendation to its legislative body.
- (3)
- It does not appear, however, that such action is in accord with the Government’s policy, nor, so far as I am aware, has such an agreement been concluded by the Turkish Government with any nation. It will remain to be seen, in case the Minister’s present proposal is found by the Department to be unsatisfactory, whether further arguments will persuade Tevfik Rüstü Bey to alter his attitude towards the proposal contained in the Department’s instruction No. 109. These further arguments could be advanced, if desirable, at the moment when the Minister proposes the commencement of treaty negotiations with the United States, presumably after the negotiations between Turkey and Italy shall have been concluded, or sooner. In the meantime, if the Department so desires, it appears from the statement of the Minister that there will be no difficulty in maintaining Turco-American commercial relations on a mutual unconditional most-favored-nation basis through a further exchange of notes from April 10, 1929, until January 1, 1930.
- (4)
- The Department will be able to estimate the probable attitude of the Senate in the next Congress far better than the Embassy. I can hardly believe that a brief and simple treaty with Turkey according mutual unconditional most-favored-nation treatment in customs matters such as the Minister for Foreign Affairs has proposed to me, avoiding all controversial questions between the two countries, would fail of ratification nor that any anti-Turkish agitation which the negotiation of such a treaty might raise in the United States could make itself effectively heard. Nevertheless I recognize the fact that the risk must be considered and that a carefully balanced judgment must determine the wisdom or unwisdom of pressing for a commercial agreement without time limit by an exchange of notes instead of by a treaty.
- (5)
- Our argument that a treaty should not now be negotiated because it could not be ratified by the United States until next December at the earliest has been effectively met by the Minister for Foreign Affairs by offering to extend our present commercial modus vivendi until January 1, 1930. Furthermore, the Minister gave way on the question of a tariff-rebate treaty, thereby indicating a desire to meet our views. There remains in the Department’s instruction [Page 806] only the argument on page 2, namely that while the opposition in the United States to the American-Turkish Treaty of August 6, 1923,8 which led to its disapproval by the Senate has doubtless decreased and will eventually disappear, it is believed that, with a view to avoiding any action that might encourage further anti-Turkish agitation in the United States and thus perhaps compromise the growing sentiments of friendliness toward Turkey, it would be preferable to postpone for the time being the negotiation of a further formal treaty with Turkey.
- (6)
- There can be no doubt that the risks of using, or at any rate of pressing, the foregoing argument with the Minister for Foreign Affairs are considerable and that they should not be used unless the Department believes that serious risk exists of encountering another rebuff in the Senate through the submission of the brief and simple type of commercial treaty set forth above. The Turkish Government is intensely sensitive as to its prestige. It has negotiated or is about to negotiate commercial treaties with all the other nations. It stomached the first rebuff administered by the American Senate, no doubt through the astuteness of the Turkish Government in recognizing the fact that it was both to its material and moral interest to pocket its pride rather than to place further weapons in the hands of its opponents in the United States. This attitude was facilitated by the friendly action of the Government of the United States in proposing the resumption of diplomatic relations and the exchange of Ambassadors.9 But if the Minister for Foreign Affairs should now be called upon to go before the Council of Ministers and then before the Grand National Assembly to seek authority to make a single exception to his treaty program in the case of the United States, by concluding a commercial agreement through an exchange of notes without a time limit, on the ground that the United States is unwilling to negotiate a formal treaty with the Turkish Government, I believe that grave resentment might be evoked which would seriously injure the present friendly attitude of Turkey towards the United States and find its expression in many concrete ways. My entire staff, including Consul Allen10 and Mr. Gillespie,11 with whom I have conferred at length on this subject, emphatically share this view.
- (7)
- I therefore respectfully recommend that the Department, in
formulating its further instructions to me, should give
consideration to the following joints:
- (a)
- Is there appreciable risk that the United States Senate, taking into consideration its political complexion in the next Congress, might refuse to give its advice and consent to the ratification of a brief and simple treaty with Turkey according mutual unconditional most-favored-nation treatment in customs matters when such a treaty would materially benefit American exporters to Turkey?
- (b)
- Is there appreciable risk that the announcement of the negotiation of such a treaty would stir up anti-Turkish agitation in the United States of any consequence?
- (c)
- If so, do these risks appear to the Department to predominate over the alternative risk of alienating the present friendly attitude [Page 807] of the Turkish Government toward the United States through pressing for exceptional machinery to regulate our commercial relations on the ground that we are unwilling to negotiate a formal commercial treaty with the Turkish Republic?
I trust that the Department, after its receipt of this despatch, will instruct me by telegraph on the following points:
- (1)
- Whether the Department desires me to continue to press for an exchange of notes without time limit, in lieu of another temporary modus vivendi, explaining that we are unwilling now to negotiate a treaty and using the arguments contained on page 2 of the Department’s instruction No. 109 of December 26, 1928; or
- (2)
- Whether the Department desires me to endeavor to obtain a temporary extension of our present commercial modus vivendi until January 1, 1930, while postponing the negotiation of a treaty for the present or until the sentiment of the Senate in the next Congress can be ascertained; or
- (3)
- Whether the Department is willing to accept the proposal of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to negotiate a brief and simple treaty of commerce between the United States and Turkey according mutual unconditional most-favored-nation treatment in customs matters, meanwhile extending our present commercial modus vivendi from April 10, 1929 until January 1, 1930.
I earnestly hope that the Department’s estimate of the potential political situation in the United States may justify the Department in discarding the procedure under point 1 next above, for the reasons which I have set forth in this dispatch.
The procedure set forth in point 2 would be in the nature of a compromise. It might be possible to arrange for the extension of our present temporary commercial agreement from April 10, 1929, until January 1, 1930, before informing the Minister for Foreign Affairs of our intention to postpone the negotiation of a treaty. But if I should exchange notes for a new temporary commercial modus vivendi without informing the Minister of our further intentions, he would clearly be taking this action in the full expectation of the early negotiation of a treaty and might readily charge me with bad faith when he should find that this was not our intention. On the other hand, if I should first inform the Minister that it was our desire to postpone for the present the negotiation of a treaty, the reasons for our attitude would have to come out, with the risk of evoking the resentment above mentioned which, at least conceivably, might cause the Council of Ministers to refuse to prolong our present commercial relations after April 10, merely through a sense of injured prestige. This risk is problematical but must be reckoned with.
I cannot too strongly emphasize the advantages, as I see them from this angle, of adopting the procedure set forth in point 3. The offer of the Turkish Government to solve the problem in this way—namely by a [Page 808] brief and simple treaty according mutual unconditional most-favored-nation treatment in customs matters and with a new modus vivendi providing time for ratification—is a more favorable offer than I had expected. Should the Department find in December that sentiment in the Senate rendered it inadvisable to submit the treaty at that moment for the Senate’s consideration, the Turkish Government might well be persuaded to seek legislation which would permit still further a continuation of our commercial relations uninjured. In other words, I believe that delay in obtaining ratification of a treaty would probably create a less unfavorable impression upon the Turkish Government than would a refusal on our part to negotiate any commercial treaty at all.
Furthermore, should such a simple and advantageous commercial treaty be approved by the Senate, would this not favorably pave the way for the eventual submission to that body of other instruments effectually regularizing the general relations between the United States and the Turkish Republic?
In determining the relative merits of the three procedures outlined above, the Department will of course give full weight to the powerful leverage which we have in our hands, the importance of which I do not at all underestimate, namely that Turkey cannot afford, either from the material or the moral point of view, to antagonize the Government of the United States. Apart from Turkey’s important trade with the United States, her exports to the United States being three to four times as great as the exports of the United States to Turkey, the Turkish Government knows that when the time comes to seek capital and other assistance abroad, it will instinctively turn to the United States as the politically most disinterested Power, and the Power of whose motives Turkey has less suspicion than of the motives of any other Power. Apart from this element, the moral effect of a commercial break with the United States would be damaging to Turkey’s prestige.
Thus far there has been no debate with the Minister for Foreign Affairs—merely an exchange of views. If therefore the Department feels that its own proposal is distinctly more desirable from the point of view of American interests than the proposal of Tevfik Rüştü Bey, in spite of the important concession already obtained from him in the type of treaty proposed, I am fully prepared to press the Department’s wishes with every available argument, based on the underlying leverage which I have set forth above, in order to further what the Department may conceive to be the best interests of the United States Government.
Respectfully requesting telegraphic instructions on the foregoing points,
I have [etc.]
- Ibid., p. 962.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Also known as Tewfik Rouschdi Bey.↩
- See notes exchanged May 19, 1928, Foreign Relations, 1928, vol. iii, pp. 953–954.↩
- Signed July 24, 1923; League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. xxviii, p. 171.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. iii, p. 765.↩
- Excerpt from the Law No. 691 of December 12, 1925: “Provisional agreements are effective for a maximum period of six months and can be renewed a second time, by decision of the Council of Ministers”. Excerpt from the Law No. 1005 of April 10, 1927: “While awaiting the conclusion and ratification of a definite treaty of commerce with any foreign State, the Council of Ministers is authorised to conclude, with that State, provisional agreements for a period not exceeding two years”.[Footnote in the original.]↩
- Foreign Relations, 1923, vol. ii, p. 1153.↩
- See ibid., 1927, vol. iii, pp. 765 ff.↩
- Charles E. Allen, Consul at Constantinople.↩
- Julian Gillespie, Commercial Attaché.↩