500.A15a3/417
The British Embassy to the Department of State
Aide-Mémoire
On November 11th an interview took place between the Prime Minister and the Japanese Ambassador, when the latter expressed the hope that whatever agreement might be arrived at between Great Britain and the United States it would not be on such a basis as to necessitate further construction by Japan: for example, if Great Britain maintained fifteen 8″ gun cruisers as against eighteen for the United States, Japan would require to add 20,000 tons to her present programme while, if the United States maintained twenty-one of the above units, it would necessitate additional Japanese construction to the amount of 40,000 tons. These figures were calculated upon the American programme.
The Japanese Ambassador also expressed, on behalf of his Government, the hope that Great Britain would not object to Japan having a 70% ratio in relation to Great Britain or the United States, whichever of the two fleets was the stronger, and further that this ratio should apply to all categories of war vessels with the exception of capital ships.
In replying that he would note what His Excellency had said and would in due course furnish him with a memorandum as soon as there had been time to consider his points, the Prime Minister expressed surprise that an American strength of eighteen 8″ gun cruisers, as opposed to fifteen for Great Britain, would necessitate additional [Page 285] construction for Japan. In return for certain compensations in the matter of small vessels, this country would accept fifteen 8″ gun vessels as against eighteen for the United States, and regard this as parity. Mr. MacDonald also hoped that the present Japanese strength, which he understood to be twelve 8″ gun cruisers, would be accepted as an equilibrium: and that the United States, Great Britain and Japan, as the three great naval Powers, would rest content with an 8″ gun cruiser ratio of 18–15–12.
On November 18th a further interview between the Prime Minister and the Japanese Ambassador took place, when the Ambassador enquired whether Mr. MacDonald had any further communication to make regarding the Japanese claim to a 70% ratio. Mr. MacDonald said that he had not, but that he strongly advised the Japanese Ambassador to let the matter rest. The Prime Minister pointed out that the Japanese Ambassador had begged him to come to such an agreement with the United States as would not necessitate any new building on the part of Japan, and that he had taken this as a sincere request. The Prime Minister assured the Ambassador that it fitted in with his own ideas. If, however, the Japanese Ambassador wished to supplement that with a request that his Government might increase its ratio of building, he would lay himself open to the charge, or at any rate the suspicion, that their real object was to increase the relative strength of the Japanese navy. That would have a very bad effect on everybody concerned.
The Prime Minister explained to the Japanese Ambassador the general idea of His Majesty’s Government. His Majesty’s Government were working on tonnage figures and also on numbers of ships and that, in the end, would have to be the form which any agreement took. What they were really driving at was to get to an agreement upon what would be a state of equilibrium, and they were working on the assumption that if Japan would agree to twelve, 8″ gun cruisers, the United States to eighteen and His Majesty’s Government to fifteen, they would regard those as the figures of equilibrium in that particular class of vessel.
The Japanese Ambassador emphasised the necessity of Japan possessing means of security and on this Mr. MacDonald had two observations to make:—firstly that in these modern days security was being sought for more in the effective creation of a peace organisation than in competition and comparative building and, secondly, that Japan would have to be very careful that in seeking her own security she did not upset the sense of security of other nations. Nobody wanted Japan to be insecure, nor did any nation wish to feel insecure herself.
Mr. MacDonald emphasised that the conversations he was having [Page 286] with the Japanese Ambassador were a kind of process of thinking aloud, and that he was not negotiating with him, but was surveying with him the elements of a problem to which His Majesty’s Government and the Japanese Government were to come to close grips when the five Power conference entered upon its work.