Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 1929, Volume I

500.A15a3/425

The British Chargé (Campbell) to the Secretary of State

Washington, November 18, 1929.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: As requested by you during our conversation this afternoon I send you herewith an aide-mémoire containing the message I was instructed to deliver to you on the subject of the Japanese Government’s wish for an increase in their cruiser ratio.

As I informed you, I was to explain that my instructions to speak to you in this sense were despatched before your aide-mémoire on the subject of the Japanese Government’s claim had been seen by His Majesty’s Government. I was to add that His Majesty’s Government fully agreed with the forceful arguments employed by you therein, but that it would, in their opinion, probably be unwise to use precisely the same language to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington and London.

I should perhaps further explain that my instructions to speak in the sense of the enclosed aide-mémoire, resulted from my having informed my Government, after our conversation of November 7th, that you wondered what was being said by His Majesty’s Government to the Japanese Government on the subject of their wish to have a cruiser ratio of 70% of the United States figure for 8″ gun cruisers,—a wish which, you had said, you found embarrassing (1) because you did not wish in your conversations with Japanese representatives to have the understanding—as far as it went—between our two Governments attacked as it were in detail, while at the same time you were under the necessity to avoid saying anything by which they might receive the impression that the understanding was in the nature of a rigid Anglo-American agreement and so conceive that they were being confronted with a fait accompli: (2) because you were at the same time anxious not to offend the Japanese Government, who, you considered, genuinely desired naval limitation and reduction.

In speaking to you in the sense of the enclosed aide-mémoire I was to enquire whether you agreed.

I should add that since the instructions to me in the sense of this aide-mémoire were prepared the Prime Minister has found that even on an agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom with eighteen and fifteen 8″ gun cruisers respectively, Japan as I mentioned this afternoon will claim that to her strength of twelve such vessels must be added twenty thousand tons. The Japanese claim to a 70% ratio is based on tonnage and not numbers of ships—and, as is of course known to you, the displacement of Japan’s twelve 8″ gun cruisers built and building is only 108,400. If the 8″ gun cruiser tonnage of the United States can be reduced to 180,000 the settlement of the Japanese ratio difficulty will in His Majesty’s Government’s opinion still be difficult, but not impossible: but if the United States 8″ gun cruiser strength were to remain at a figure higher than 180,000 tons the settlement of the difficulty raised by the Japanese claim would appear to be impossible without some addition to the projected British 8″ gun cruiser tonnage.

I am reporting to my Government by telegram your request to be kept fully and early informed of any conversations carried on between His Majesty’s Government and the French and Italian Governments respectively, as well as of any thing they may know of the conversations between France and Italy. I am also reporting that you would wish to learn as fully and as soon as possible what passes between His Majesty’s Government and the Japanese Government.

Believe me [etc.]

Ronald Campbell

[Enclosure]

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide Mémoire

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom think that the answer to the three points raised by the Secretary of State is as follows:

(1) His Majesty’s Government consider there would be no objection to the Japanese Ambassador being frankly informed of the understanding with the Prime Minister, namely, that the ways and means of bridging the gap of 30,000 tons which divides the Governments of the United States and of the United Kingdom would be studied by each during the period before the Five-power Conference meets in January, the actual solution of this particular problem being left to the Conference. The problem is in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government of the type which is best left for treatment when the interested Powers meet round a table, since it depends to some extent on the attitude of other Powers for its solution.

(2) His Majesty’s Government find difficulty in the Japanese Government’s wish for a certain increase in their ratio for 8″ gun cruisers, only in so far as the Government of the United States may find it necessary to embark on a heavy programme of 8″ gun cruiser construction. On a comparison of the 8″ gun cruiser tonnage built and building for the Governments of the United Kingdom and Japan, it will be seen that the Japanese ratio will be nearly 74% of the 8″ gun cruiser tonnage of the United Kingdom. It is clear that any increase in the present building programme of Japan which might be brought about by the size of the 8″ gun cruiser programme of the United States, would impose upon His Majesty’s Government however reluctantly a revision of British 8″ gun cruiser strength. If it prove possible to find a way to enable the United States to reduce the number of their 8″ gun cruisers to eighteen, this particular difficulty of the Japanese ratio will have been reduced to small proportions for the Japanese by building twelve ships would almost have achieved a 70% ratio on numbers of ships, if not on tonnage.

However the difficulty is not only the Japanese demand for a 70% ratio which causes a difficulty for His Majesty’s Government with regard to the relative numbers of 8″ gun cruisers: for His Majesty’s Government find that any higher American figure for such vessels than eighteen would probably involve an agitation for further British construction of 8″ gun cruisers in order to achieve parity, whence it is the more desirable for the United States strength in this type of vessels to be kept down to eighteen.

(3) His Majesty’s Government agree that the Japanese Government sincerely desire reduction. They feel that that Government are clearly most anxious not to exceed their present building programme of twelve 8″ gun cruisers and that they would only do so if this necessity were imposed upon them by the size of the American building programme.

His Majesty’s Government do not for their part think there would be danger of offending the Japanese Government were the position explained to them frankly, and if it were added that both the Government of the United States and His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom feel confident of guaranteeing a solution of the problem of parity when the Conference meets, that the question of the size of the Japanese ratio is intimately associated with the bridging of the gap between the United States and the United Kingdom and that these Governments feel that both questions could most appropriately be left for final decision when the Conference meets.

Washington, November 19, 1929.