500.A15a3/229

Memorandum by the Secretary of State

The French Ambassador said he came to present me with the following aide-mémoire from his Government:

“The French Minister of Foreign Affairs has been sincerely touched by the frankness and loyalty of the explanations given by the Secretary of State to the French Ambassador concerning the Anglo-American negotiations and the naval agreement to be conducted with a view to the general limitation of armaments.

“It is M. Briand’s understanding that the Anglo-American agreement is only of a relative value and that subsequently it will be placed within the limits of the general agreement to be reached by the Preparatory Disarmament Commission concerning the method of limitation of naval armaments. M. Briand is all the more pleased by the settlement of the difficulties which existed between the two great naval powers that up to now these difficulties were the main obstacle to the realization of a general agreement.

“In view of reaching such an agreement, the French Government still believes that the basis of compromisory proposals made by France, proposals which were received quasi-unanimously by the Preparatory Commission in March 1927, and which the American delegation made their own last April, seem to be the most appropriate ones. It is to be hoped that, if necessary at the price of slight retouching, it will be possible to conciliate the Anglo-American agreement with that proposal, the modalities of which could also be subjected to certain modifications. But in order to study the question, it will be necessary for the French Government to know shortly on what technical basis the Governments of London and Washington have reached an agreement, and especially the characteristics of the three categories of light surface units which they seem to have considered.

“As a whole the French Government would be interested in knowing the different elements, such as strategic or other considerations, protection of lines of communication etc., which have been considered for the determination of the respective needs of the English and American fleets and which have led to the fixation of the total of 340,000 tons of cruisers apparently considered by the British Empire as indispensable. Such information is important to the French Government in view of ascertaining in what measure the principles which have guided the Anglo-American agreement could be conciliated with French interests.

“Contrary to certain press comments, the French Government has no intention to raise objections of a ‘procedure’ nature to the proposed Conference among the five principal naval powers, provided it remains well understood that the main object of such a conference is to open [Page 262] the way to a final agreement at the Geneva Commission for the purpose of the conclusion of a general treaty of limitation concerning all categories of armaments.

“Washington, October 1, 1929.”

I read it and told him that there were some questions in it that were very easily answered. So far as the questions in regard to the protection of lines of communication were concerned they had not been discussed in any detail. The British had stated the number of ships and the tonnage which they considered their minimum for the protection of their lines of communication. In general, they had also stated on one occasion where their cruisers were situated. No further details had been made or furnished. Their case rested upon the geographical situation of their empire, the general needs of which were fairly well understood by us.

I asked him what he meant by the question as to the characteristics of the three categories of light surface units. He said he meant the two classes of cruisers and the destroyers. I said that there was no agreement in regard to the categories of cruisers except the one which had been stated in the press and which he knew and I restated to him the minimum positions of the two governments respectively which he said he had seen in the press. I said that there was no agreement on that point but that once an agreement was entered into before, we would enter the conference with that existing gap, feeling, however, that it was narrow enough to compromise at the conference.

He spoke of the difficulties of the question of parity. I told him of its importance not in regard to a doctrine of military precision but as a doctrine of statesmanship to restore a condition or [of?] agreement instead of one of competition.

When the Ambassador handed me the aide memoire and I had read it he said: “You will readily see that our previous interview was very helpful and that my Government is ready to go to the conference”.

H[enry] L. S[timson]