IC–201A
Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Saturday, July 5, 1919, at 3 p.m.1
- Present
- Ameeica, United States of
- Hon. R. Lansing.
- Secretary.
- Mr. L. Harrison.
- British Empire
- The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M. M. P.
- France
- M. Clemenceau.
- Italy
- M. Tittoni.
- Secretary
- M. de Martino.
- Japan
- H. E. Baron Makino.
- Ameeica, United States of
- Also Present
- America, United States of
- Mr. H. Hoover.
- British Empire
- Sir William Goode.
- Italy
- M. Crespi.
- America, United States of
Joint Secretariat | |
America, United States of | Lieut. Burden. |
British Empire | Capt. Abraham. |
France | Capt. A. Portier. |
Interpreter—Professor P. J. Mantoux. |
1. (At M. Clemenceau’s request, it was agreed that experts should not be present at the Meetings of the Council but should only enter the room if specifically requested to do so by the Chairman.)Presence of Experts at Meetings of the Council
(During the following discussion, Mr. Hoover, Sir William Goode and M. Crespi were invited to remain.)
2. M. Clemenceau asked Mr. Hoover to explain the economic position in Hungary. Situation in Hungary
Mr. Hoover said that the problem was that of the economic re-habilitation of Central Europe. As matters stood, there was no hope of removing and distributing the Hungarian harvest unless the Danube and the railways across Hungary were re-opened for traffic. The question, [Page 21] therefore, was not merely an internal Hungarian question. It was one of external economic relations. The action of the Hungarians had tied up the Danube and with it a large proportion of the river craft used on it. Further, the withdrawal of the German Armies from South-Eastern Europe had left behind it in Hungary a large quantity of rolling stock and river craft. In order, therefore to set the economic life of Central Europe going again, it was necessary to have control of these essential means of transport. The third aspect of the question was largely political. Bolshevik ideas were impregnating the working classes throughout the area. Unless some means could be devised of abating the infection, the economic regeneration of Central and South-Eastern Europe would be difficult. Bela Kun’s2 government was spending a great deal of money on sending Bolshevik missionaries to industrial centres outside Hungary. This re-acted on production. Moreover, the military power of the Hungarian Government was growing. A kind of nationalist passion was thereby put at the service of the revolutionary theories advocated by the Government. It was not likely that Bela Kun would abstain from spreading his theories outside the borders of Hungary by the help of this military force. The next probable victim after Czecho-Slovakia was Austria. The social and political aspects of the question, Mr. Hoover said, were not his province, but he would like to observe that Bela Kun’s party until the last three weeks had not represented methods of violence. Latterly, however, executions had increased, which indicated that opposition was growing in the country and that the methods of red terror were being resorted to. Previously, it might have been possible to treat the Hungarian revolutionary party with indulgence. Now that it showed a tendency to overflow its frontiers, it must be considered as an economic danger to the rest of Europe.
M. Clemenceau asked Mr. Hoover what he thought of the Szegidin group.
Mr. Hoover replied that this group appeared to him to be composed of extreme re-actionaries without any notable intellectual capacity. For instance, their deliberations of late had been devoted to the question of the resumption of the right of duelling. He did not expect much help from that party. It appeared, however, that discontent with the Bela Kun Government was growing among the working classes. Information from British sources had been received to the effect that the Trade Unions would gladly see the Government upset. Communism would not appear to have penetrated very deeply into the population and the Government was becoming, like that in Russia, a tyranny of a minority. Another difficulty applying to any solution that might be suggested was the obvious duplicity of Bela Kun. In support of [Page 22] this, Mr. Hoover quoted the following messages interchanged between Lenin and Bela Kun:—
1. Message sent by Lenin from Moscow to Bela Kim at Budapest of 19th June, 1919, (includes following):
“It is necessary to make the fullest possible use of every opportunity to obtain a temporary armistice or peace, in order to give the people a breathing space. But do not trust the Entente Powers for a moment. They are deceiving you, and are only attempting to gain time in order to be able to crush you and us. Try and organise postal communications with us by aeroplane.”
2. Message sent on June 21st by Bela Kun (Budapest) to Lenin (Moscow) in reply to his telegram of June 19th:
“I thank you very much for your telegram in which you approve of my foreign policy. I am very proud of being one of your best pupils but I think in one point I am superior to you, namely, in the question of ‘mala fides.’ I think I know the Entente very well. I know that they will fight us to the end. In this war, only a state of armistice can occur but never peace. This is an out and out fight. Once more I thank you for your note.”
The authenticity of these messages was supported by the fact that they had been revealed first by British sources and subsequently intercepted by Austrian wireless. Of the various solutions proposed in the memorandum he had submitted (Appendix A), no doubt the military occupation of Budapest would be the best. He believed it would be welcomed by the population, but it was no doubt beset with difficulties. The alternatives to this policy were a more or less mitigated recognition of the Bela Kun Government. The plan he had suggested was that the various Inter-Allied Commissions working in the neighbourhood should establish economic relations with the Hungarians. There need be no direct recognition by the Governments, but by this side entrance it might be possible to obtain the opening of the river and the setting in motion of the means of transport and thereby the distribution of necessary supplies. He admitted that this might possibly strengthen Bela Kun’s Government, but, on the other hand, Bela Kun was supporting himself in favour with the working class on the back of the blockade. All the hardships of the situation were attributed to the Blockade. By removing it, the Powers would deprive him of this argument and he might find it more difficult to plead his case. Whether this would neutralise the advantage of semi-recognition, he did not know.
M. Cliemenceau asked what was being done to re-victual Hungary?
Mr. Hoover replied that nothing at all was being done. At the time when Bela Kun came to power, the Economic Council was about to re-victual Budapest, as the situation there was thought urgent. The Communist Government, however, had, on coming into power, made [Page 23] a stringent search for all supplies and had, by careful re-distribution, managed to feed the population tolerably well. It appeared clear that they would reach the next harvest without starvation. Communism, therefore, had saved the Allied and Associated Powers considerable expenditure on food and supplies, as, since the establishment of the Communist Government nothing whatever had been sent to Hungary.
M. Tittoni said that the question of Hungary was one of the most difficult the Conference had to deal with. The Bela Kun Government was a serious threat to the neighbouring countries, including Italy. There had been two periods in this movement. In the first a peaceful revolution had been brought about. The effect of this stage had been the most dangerous. The Russian Revolution had been represented to the people of Europe as being accompanied by carnage and general destruction. The Hungarian revolution had been quiet. It was, therefore, more attractive and more dangerous. It appeared to many in other countries that the sequestration of private fortunes for re-distribution and the re-allotment of house room were excellent measures which might be imitated to advantage in their own countries. The second period, however, appeared to reproduce the methods of the Russians. Not only were there executions but methodical and systematic massacres had been instituted. It was very necessary therefore, to suppress the volcano. The means of doing it, however, were not clear. He admitted he had no suggestions to make. The blockade obviously was not a solution. If rigidly enforced, all non-Bolsheviks would starve and Bolsheviks would eat. If, on the other hand, food were imported into the country the Government would only grow stronger. He would welcome any feasible solution that might be proposed, but he had none to make himself. There was one point, however, to which he wished to draw special attention, and that was the reported seizure of all securities in Budapest by the Bela Kun Government. Should these securities amounting to 6 milliards of francs be exported and sold abroad, it would be useless to demand reparation from Hungary. There would be nothing left to take possession of. He thought it was imperative to put a stop to this.
Mr. Balfour said that, in his extremely lucid statement, Mr. Hoover had approached a question of which he recognised the great complexity from the economic side alone. The economic problem was how to make transit by all means of communication through Hungary serve the purposes of equitable distribution of means of subsistence in South-Eastern Europe. This could not be brought about unless the situation in Hungary were radically changed. Neither Mr. Hoover nor M. Tittoni offered any plan for a complete alteration of that situation. He believed, therefore, that the case must be approached from the military side. A short time ago the Council of Four had sent orders to the [Page 24] Hungarian, Czecho-Slovak and Roumanian Governments with the object of promoting Peace among them. These orders had only been half carried out. Many things had happened since. M. Bratiano, in a private conversation, had told him that the Roumanians could not and would not retire from the Theiss until the Hungarians had been disarmed. The Hungarians were withdrawing from Czecho-Slovakia and massing their troops in Hungary. Universal armament had been ordered. If the Roumanians, therefore, retired from the Theiss which they could defend, they did not know what lines they could hold, seeing their commitments on other frontiers. He thought there was force in the argument put forward by M. Bratiano. He had caused further enquiries to be made and had discovered that the Hungarians had not carried out their Armistice engagements. They had not reduced their troops to six divisions; in fact, they appeared to have doubled their forces.
He therefore suggested that the Military Authorities be requested, through their agents on the spot, to order the Hungarians to disarm in accordance with the stipulations of the armistice. This was not only the right of the Allied Powers but their duty. It should be made known in Hungary itself that until this had been done there could be no kind of negotiations with the Hungarian Government. Should it persist in breaking the terms of the armistice, military action should follow. We had some hope that the threat alone would overthrow Bela Kun’s Government. Should it not, the Powers were bound to do to Hungary what they would have done to Germany had she broken the armistice. To carry this out it would be necessary to organise the Roumanian, Czecho-Slovak, Serbian and French troops at hand. When the Hungarians had been disarmed there would then be no excuse for the Roumanians not to retire after this, when Hungary had been put into her right place, negotiations could be undertaken either with Bela Kun or his successors. By this means the evil of giving credit to Bela Kun, which Mr. Hoover had shown was to be feared, would be avoided. At the present time Vienna was in danger and perhaps Roumania. This could be stopped by prompt military action, which would be justified by Hungary’s flagrant breach of the armistice.
M. Clemenceau said that he would like to state his opinion, though he feared it would not be a very clear one. He had agreed thus far with all the speakers. The situation reminded him of the La Fontaine fable in which a gathering of rats decided to hang a bell round a cat’s neck. All agreed this was desirable but no one knew how to do it. He thought that the situation had been accurately described by Mr. Hoover. He acquiesced in all M. Tittoni had said, and he thought Mr. Balfour had said excellent things. But how were the Powers to do what he proposed? France was demobilising and could not stop the process. At the end of October there would be but three classes with the Colours; [Page 25] ours; that was to say the Army would be on a peace footing. The French Chamber was resolutely opposed to intervention in Russia. He thought the Chamber was right, seeing the results hitherto obtained; a milliard or so was being thrown away on the expedition in Siberia. This was an absurd expense and could not continue. If Parliament, therefore, decline[s] to fight Bolshevism in Russia, it would equally refuse to fight it in Hungary. Mr. Balfour’s argument that the Hungarians had accepted the armistice and had then broken it and therefore deserved coercion was a strong one, if indeed they had accepted it. But what troops did Mr. Balfour mean to use to coerce the Hungarians? He had mentioned Czechs, Roumanians and French.
Mr. Balfour added and Serbs.
M. Clemenceau said that they would require money. He for one could not supply any. Moreover, Germany for the time being seemed ready to fulfil her engagements and to behave well. Should the Germans, however, see the Entente thoroughly embarrassed in Hungary this attitude might change. The march on Budapest had been thought of before. In particular the Italians seemed disposed to go there, and he heard that General Segro had gone to Rome to advocate the policy.
M. Tittoni said that the Italian Parliament was of the same mind as the French.
M. Clemenceau said that no strong economic argument could be brought to bear on the Hungarians. Whether the blockade were raised or not, little effect could be produced on internal policy. The population could hold out. He had some doubts about the capacity of the Czechs to fight the Hungarians. The Roumanians might or might not be willing. At the present time they seemed considerably dissatisfied with the Peace Conference. There were no British or American troops available. French and Italian troops therefore seemed called upon to do the work. He must state clearly that for his part he could not undertake it. He had consulted Marshal Foch and General Franchet d’Esperey, who had often wished to march on Budapest. He had asked for plans, and had been supplied with a plan more ambitious than that of Napoleon’s march on Moscow. French, British and Italian contingents were required. The fact was that both the peoples and the Parliaments of the Entente countries were anxious to settle the crisis more quickly than was really possible. After the vast upheaval of the war and the pulverization of military forces, and, on top of it, the universal inclination towards social revolution, it was hardly possible to produce order in a short time. The Conference had tried to establish justice in the world. This was not the first time that such an attempt had been made. All know what had resulted before. It was now clear to all who had taken part in the Conference how difficult it was to draw even frontiers equitably. His Italian colleague would doubtless agree with him. People like the Russians, who had been slaves [Page 26] under a terrible despotism, had thought that liberty could be exercised without self-control. They had betrayed their Allies and caused them immense losses. The evil had spread. Italy, though an old and wise community, had been shaken up. Great Britain and France had had their troubles. There had been disaffection in the French Navy and even in the Army. The world was sick of fighting. The Conference had therefore to deal with revolutions in military power, alterations of frontiers, and social revolutions inspired by no ideas. It had been thought that the Russian people would recover. That was a mistake; owing to the vastness of the Russian territory somehow the Russian people had survived its own disasters, but all intervention to assist them to establish a reasonable Government had been in vain. Now the evil had attacked Hungary, which had not been anticipated, as it was a country of peasants and relatively rich. The policy he had to offer was not one of which he was proud. It was simply this—to hold the issues and to wait. He said this after taking into consideration the feelings of the Entente Peoples, and of their Parliaments. All were in a hurry to cease fighting, and to resume normal life. They were probably wrong, but that feeling could not be gainsaid. This was not a noble policy, and might be said to look like impotence. He would not deny it. But, after losing hundreds of thousands of lives and spending the national treasure, he thought no other policy was possible. As to Hungary, he knew the country a little. Before the war the people had been the slaves of Germany, merely because they thought that Germany was the strongest power, but there was more common-sense there than in Russia. He had been struck in Mr. Hoover’s statement by the fact that the trades unions were sick of the Communist Government. He would therefore follow Mr. Balfour’s policy so far as to threaten Hungary with intervention should they not observe the armistice. Then he would consult the military experts. If military action had to be undertaken, all would have to help, and much money would have to be spent. In the meantime, however, he hoped that Providence might furnish some means of escape. It was not his nature to temporise, but in this case he would. Hungary could be surrounded by a “cordon sanitaire”; Communism would not last long in that country. If the Generals recommended a plan similar to that shown him some months ago by Marshal Foch he felt sure that no Government would undertake the task of coercing Hungary. It was not a showy policy that he recommended, but it was the best he could offer.
Mr. Lansing observed that there was one question of urgent necessity, namely, that of making peace with Hungary. To do this it was necessary to have someone there to make peace with. Did the Council propose to make peace with Bela Kun? If not, with whom? If it could not be made with Bela Kun, pressure must be brought to bear on him to go. The only means of doing this appear to be military means.
[Page 27](At this point General Bliss, General Sackville-West, General Thwaites, General Belin and General Cavallero entered the room.)
M. Clemenceau asked General Bliss to show what forces and what methods he thought would be necessary to compel Bela Kun’s Government to respect the armistice if other means failed, and what hope of success he entertained.
General Bliss said that some six weeks ago, at the request of the Council of Four, the Military Representatives at Versailles had made a report on the means that might be taken to prevent a Hungarian attack on Czecho-Slovakia. The report had been to the effect that if military measures had to be resorted to, the troops used must be those on the spot, namely, Roumanian, Serbian and French troops. It was then believed that the troops available locally would be sufficient. This was the opinion of the French General Staff. Since then, however, Bela Kun’s troops had increased from 150,000 to 220,000 armed men. The situation had also changed in other respects, and he was unable to say whether the troops then considered sufficient would be sufficient now. There had been an inconclusive discussion in the Council of Four on the report. Since that date he knew nothing of what had been decided. If the plan then recommended had been thought workable, it should have been submitted to General Franchet d’Esperey. This, as far as he knew, had not been done. Moreover, he could not say whether the Roumanians and Serbians would act. As far as he was concerned, he thought the question required study at Marseilles [Versailles?], in order that he might exchange views with his colleagues on the new situation.
General Cavallero agreed with General Bliss that a new study of the subject was necessary. The action now required was not quite the same as that contemplated previously, and in the meantime the Hungarian army had increased.
General Belin said that all the Military Representatives had agreed that a demonstration of force would have been sufficient when they were previously consulted. He still believed that a demonstration by the forces locally available would be enough to overthrow the Bela Kun Government.
M. Clemenceau said that he did not wish the Military Advisers to restrict their recommendations to the employment of forces at present on the spot. If more were required, he expected them to say so.
General Sackville-West said that he was in accord with his Military colleagues. He would like to re-consider the question.
M. Clemenceau asked how soon a report could be obtained.
General Buss said that if all the information required were available, the report could be made within 48 hours.
Mr. Balfour asked whether, in view of the flagrant breach of the armistice by Bela Kun’s Government, it would not be well to warn him at once that he must observe the armistice. He would be ready, [Page 28] however, if his colleagues preferred it, to wait 48 hours until the report of the Military Representatives had been received.
(It was agreed that the report be awaited.)
General Bliss pointed out that it would be necessary to consult the Commander-in-Chief on the spot.
M. Clemenceau said that it would be sufficient to consult Marshal Foch, who had all the necessary information from General Franchet d’Esperey.
Mr. Lansing asked that the Military Representatives add to their report a brief account of the armament at the disposal of the Hungarian Army, and of their means of replenishing this armament. In particular, he would like to know whether it was made within the country or imported from without.
(The following resolution was then adopted:—
“It was decided that the Military Representatives at Versailles in consultation with Marshal Foch, should examine the military possibilities of enforcing on Hungary respect for the Armistice conditions accepted, and make a report to the Council in 48 hours. The Military Representatives were also asked to report on the means of munitionment at the disposal of the Hungarian Government.”)
(The Military Experts then withdrew.)
M. Tittoni then suggested that the Allies take steps to forbid the exportation of all the securities seized by the Bela Kun Government, as the disposal of these securities abroad would render nugatory any claim for reparation on Hungary.
(The following resolution was then adopted:—
“That the Financial Commission be asked to submit at a very early date to the Council, a proposal for preventing the sale abroad of securities seized by order of the Bela Kun Government in Hungary.”)
3. High commissioner for Armenia At Mr. Lansing’s proposal (See Annexure “B”), the following resolution was adopted:—
“Colonel W. N. Haskell, U. S. A., is appointed by this Council to act as High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the United States, British, French and Italian Governments, it being understood that Colonel Haskell will be coincidentally appointed to take full charge of all relief measures in Armenia by the various relief organisations operating there. All representatives of the United States, British, French, and Italian Governments in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Constantinople are to be at once instructed to co-operate with and give support to Colonel Haskell.”
(The Meeting then adjourned.)
Villa Majestic, Paris, July 5, 1919.
[Page 29] [Page 31]- No copy of minutes of this meeting found in Department files; copy supplied by the British Foreign Office as enclosure to letter of December 30, 1943, to the American Chargé in Great Britain (026 Foreign Relations Peace Conference 1919/100).↩
- Head of the Bolshevik Regime in Hungary; People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Memoranda not attached.↩
- Henry Morgenthau, American Ambassador to Turkey, 1913–16.↩