Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume I

763.72/1854a

The Secretary of State to President Wilson

Washington, June 7, 1915.

My Dear Mr. President: I am sending you the suggestions made by Mr. Lansing in the form of a re-draft of the note,⁷ together with a letter from Mr. Lansing⁷ explaining the changes so that the redraft can be intelligently read. While I have expressed to you orally and in former communications my views as to the line that should be followed, I feel that I owe it to you to offer some suggestions in regard to the text as you desire it to be. In the paragraph beginning near the top of page 3,⁸ you use the Cushing and Gulflight incidents as a justification for condemning the establishment of a war zone. It seems to me that, in view of the fact that we accept the offer made by the German Government and accept apologies and reparation in case of attack of neutral vessels by mistake, it is an unnecessary enlargement of our demand which really weakens the demand itself. Our interest in the war zone ceases to be acute if the right for which we ask, namely, that time will be allowed for passengers to escape, is recognized. While there is force in the suggestion that they should avoid the setting apart of a zone because mistakes are liable to occur, still, what we are really demanding of them is that everywhere, whether in any particular zone or upon the seas generally, they shall not sink a merchantman without giving the crew and passengers time to escape.

Second: the sentence beginning near the bottom of the third page and concluding on the second line of the fourth page⁹ states that there is no adequate compensation for the lives of the two seamen lost on the Gulflight. I suggest that that sentence raises a question which is nowhere answered in the note. If there can be no adequate compensation for the loss of life of these two seamen, how are we to settle this particular case? Would it not be well to indicate the manner in which this claim can be adjusted? Do you mean that although a pecuniary compensation is accepted, it cannot be adequate for the loss of life? This would indicate that in this particular case damages will be accepted—the vessel having been attacked without intention. If, however, you mean that money cannot be accepted in such cases, then what other compensation have you in mind? The punishment of the officer or the physical punishment of the government responsible for it? It would, in my judgment, be unfortunate to raise an inquiry upon the subject and then leave it a matter of doubt as to what would be acceptable or to leave the impression that nothing whatever can be done to atone for this mistake.

Third: the next sentence following, that is the sentence beginning on the second line of the fourth page,¹⁰ would seem to be not only a surplusage, but a surplusage that is calculated to offend. It evidently refers to the argument which is made by Germans not in their notes to us, but in their interviews in favor of the freedom of the seas, and, it seems to me, that it detracts from the dignity of the paper to turn aside from the main discussion to answer an argument that is not involved in the controversy. I think that in discussing the Falaba, some attention should be paid to the assertion that the failure to give sufficient time for the passengers and crew to escape was due to the alleged fact that “suspicious steamers were hurrying to the, aid of the Falaba.” This statement raises two questions, one of law and one of fact. In the first place we do not have any other evidence except that contained in this note that suspicious steamers were hurrying to the rescue, but if that is a fact and a material fact, it cannot be overlooked. The second point raised is whether if it were true it would be a justification for the sinking of the vessel. I feel sure that there must be precedents on this point and I have asked Mr. Lansing to investigate. I would not feel like answering from intuition and I could not answer it on information without knowing what the precedents are. It seems to me that many cases of this kind must have arisen during the operation of the rules in regard to prizes. It must often have occurred that vessels have hurried to the rescue of a prize ship before the passengers and crew could have been taken off. What is the rule in such a case? Must the attacking vessel withdraw and leave the prize ship or is it justified in sinking the prize ship, crew and all? If a merchantman, instead of stopping when ordered to stop, continued its efforts to escape, it can be sunk. Its refusal to stop changes to that extent the character of the vessel. Does the effort of another vessel to rescue it have the same effect as a continued effort to escape, or must the attacking vessel withdraw, if it sees a vessel of superior force approaching before it is able to rescue the passengers?

I am inclined to think that the use of the phrase “is surprised to find”¹¹ might be softened by the use of some milder phrase like “the United States is sure that upon more complete investigation” or that “upon more complete consideration, the Imperial German Government will not contend etc,” or something like that.

In the discussion of the Lusitania on pages six and seven¹² the note speaks as if our statement of the facts foreclosed further discussion. I do not understand that either side has a right to assert a statement of facts and then act upon the theory that there can be no further dispute. We think that the facts assumed to be true by the German Government are in fact erroneous, but the real facts are the things that must decide, not the facts as assumed by either side. And right here, it seems to me, is not only an opening for the suggestion which I have had the honor to submit to you, but a condition that really requires the thing suggested. If, in our reply, we say, as the note seems to say, “all of these things alleged or assumed by you to be facts and upon which you acted are without foundation, and, therefore, there is nothing further for you to do but to accept our view of the law as applied to the facts as we state them,” we shall, it seems to me, foreclose any further discussion of the facts and make ourselves the final judges. We would not, however, regard Germany as justified in saying to us “we have investigated this matter and we regret to inform you that all the facts upon which you rested your claim are erroneous, and therefore, we expect you to withdraw the claim.” Would it not be proper here to say something like this: “We have stated the facts as we believe them to exist and this statement, if true, would seem to remove the grounds upon which Germany bases her departure from the rules covering prizes. If she is satisfied that these assumed facts are erroneous, we feel sure that she will be pleased to acknowledge that a grave mistake was made. If, on the contrary, she feels that she has reason to question the facts as we have stated them, we respectfully suggest joint investigation in order that the true facts may be arrived at, since the real facts must determine the principle to be applied.” I think that if you are inclined to favor such a statement, it would be still further emphasized by the suggestion that the treaties which we have made with thirty countries, the principle of which Germany has approved, would indicate a means by which these facts might be arrived at.

I agree with Mr. Lansing in the reference which he makes in Section k, page 3 of his explanations to the Treaty of 1828.¹³ It does not seem to apply in this case. I do not agree with Mr. Lansing, however, in his view of the words “with honor” in the third line on page ten.¹⁴ I think a softer word would be better, for instance, “no Government is justified in resigning”—“with honor” might be regarded as offensive. I do not agree with him either in advising the omission of the paragraph covering the first half of page twelve¹⁵—I believe that is a very important part of your statement and not only adds strength to it, but indicates that the note is written in the language of a friend.

I think the reference to our willingness to be the means of bringing the two governments together on some concessions is a very important part of the note. The only trouble is that the first part of the note will, in my judgment, make it unnecessary as it now stands, for Great Britain to make any concessions. If we undertake the task of protecting her passenger ships from submarines she will not have as much of an incentive as she otherwise would to agree upon concessions that would be valuable to neutrals. The effect of what you say to Germany is more than counterbalanced by the encouragement which is given to Great Britain not to make any concessions at all, that is to refuse the concessions which are so important to our welfare. In saying that Great Britain will be encouraged to refuse concessions, I am only saying that she, like other belligerent nations, will view the matter from the standpoint of her own interests and not from our unbiased point of view.

It is not pertinent to this discussion of this note to reiterate what I have said in regard to the wisdom of making at the same time representations to Great Britain in regard to the interference with our ships, but I will venture to repeat that I believe the reception of this note and the action likely to follow would be much more favorable to us if, before the note was sent, you announced that, pending negotiations with Germany as to the use of submarines and without any surrender of any of our rights, you felt impelled to refuse clearance to belligerent ships carrying American passengers and to refuse clearance to American passenger ships carrying ammunition. I believe that the moral effect of such an announcement, coupled with the suggestion in regard to investigation, would, without in the least subtracting from the strength of the note, relieve the tension, deny to the jingoes foundation for their alarming statements and win the approval of our people, who, while firm in insisting upon the respect for our rights, will be quick to recognize the Christian forbearance exhibited at a time when the exigencies of war make it difficult, if not impossible, for Germany to consider this question upon its merits and apart from its connection with the war in which she is engaged.

With assurance [etc.]

[File copy not signed]

7. Supra.
7. Supra.
8. See p. 441, last paragraph.
9. See p. 442, 1. 5 (sentence beginning, “The submarine attack”).
10. See p. 442, 1.8 (sentence beginning, “The freedom of the seas”).
11. See p. 442, 1. 14.
12. See pp. 442–444.
13. The reference is apparently to Mr. Lansing’s memorandum of explanations, not printed.
14. See p. 444, 1. 14.
15. See p. 445, first paragraph.