Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress with the Annual Message of the President, December 2, 1872, Part II, Volume III

VII.—The Alabama.

June 10, 1872.

As to this vessel, Her Majesty’s Government admits, “that at the time when she sailed from England in July, 1862, she was, as regards the general character of her construction, specially adapted for warlike use; that the adaptation had been effected within British jurisdiction;”¹ and that “the general construction of the vessel was such as to make it apparent that she was intended for war and not for commerce.”²The Alabama. Her adaptation to war is not disputed.

The drawings found among the archives of the insurgents signed by the Messrs. Laird, as early as the 9th October, 1861, copies of which are part of the documents and evidence filed by the United States with their Counter Case, show conclusively that she never was intended for anything else than a vessel of war.

It is also admitted in the British Counter Case that “the question for the arbitrators is, whether the British Government had, according to the fair and just sense of those words, reasonable grounds to believe that she was intended to carry on war against the United States; and having it, failed to use such diligence as any international obligation required to prevent her departure from Great Britain, or to prevent her equipment within its jurisdiction.”³The question to be decided.

The United States will now proceed to consider the facts necessary to a decision of that question, and for that purpose will use almost excusively the evidence presented to the Tribunal by Her Majesty’s Government.

As has been seen, the Florida sailed from Liverpool, without any attempt at her detention by the Government, on the 22d of March, 1862. The attention of Earl Russell had been called to her by Mr. Adams more than a month previous to her departure, and in so doing he declared that his opinion as to her destination for war against the United States was based upon the “evidence furnished in the names of the persons stated to be concerned in her construction and outfit.” These persons named were Fawcett, Preston & Co., and Frazer, Trenholm & Co. As late as the 9th of May, the Foreign Office appears to have been in correspondence with the officers of the Treasury in respect to her escape.⁴ She arrived at Nassau on the 28th of April, and her arrival at that port became known in Liverpool and was announced in the Liverpool Journal of Commerce on the 27th of May.⁵ It must have been apparent, at that time, to the officers of the customs at Liverpool, that she had not been intended for the Italian Government, but for the insurgents, and that any pretense of Italian destination was false.

Under these circumstances, on the 23d of June, Mr. Adams, in a note to Earl Russell, said:

Some time since, it may be recollected by your Lordship, that I felt it my duty to make a representation touching the equipment from the port of Liverpool of the gun-boat Oreto, with the intent to make war upon the United States. Notwithstanding the statements returned from the authorities of that place, with which your Lordship favored me in reply, touching a different destination of that vessel, I have the strongest reason for believing that that vessel went directly to Nassau, and that she had been there engaged in completing her armament, provisioning, and crew for the object first indicated by me.Mr. Adams gives information of, June 23, 1862.

I am now under the painful necessity of apprising your Lordship, that a new and still more powerful war-steamer is nearly ready for departure from the port of Liverpool on the same errand. This vessel has been built and launched from the dock-yard of persons, one of whom is now sitting as a member of the House of Commons, and is fitting out for the especial and manifest object of carrying on hostilities by sea. * * * The parties engaged in the enterprise are persons well known at Liverpool to be agents and officers of the insurgents in the United States, the nature and extent of whose labors are well explained in the copy of an intercepted letter of one of them, which I received from my Government some days ago, and which I had the honor to place in our Lordship’s hands on Thursday last. I now ask permission to transmit, for your consideration, a letter addressed to me by the Consul of the United States at Liverpool in confirmation of the statements here submitted, and to solicit such action as may tend either to stop the projected expedition or to establish the fact that its purpose is not inimical to the people of the United States.¹

The intercepted letter referred to was from Caleb Huse, “Captain of Artillery,” to Major J. Gorgas, “Confederate States Artillery, War Department.” It is said in the Case presented by Her Majesty’s Government,² that the copy of the intercepted letter referred to “was a paper purporting to be a copy of a letter or report from a Confederate officer of artillery, addressed to some person unknown,” and what purports to be a copy of the letter itself is printed in British Appendix, vol. i, p. 178, without the name of the party to whom it was addressed. The same letter is printed by the United States in their Appendix, vol. i, p. 538, where the name of the person to whom it was addressed appears. It was transmitted by Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams with a dispatch under date of June 2, in which he says:³

There has just now fallen into our hands a very extraordinary document, being a report made by Caleb Huse, who calls himself a captain of artillery, and who is an agent of the insurgents in Europe, to the chief of the artillery of the War Department of the insurgents.

The letter was “placed in the hands” of Earl Russell by Mr. Adams on the Thursday which preceded the 23d of June,⁴ and inasmuch as the dispatch of Mr. Seward transmitting it stated in terms to whom it was addressed, there can scarcely be a doubt that if the copy omitted his name, the proper explanation was made by Mr. Adams at the time. So that it is hardly to be supposed that the party addressed was unknown to Earl Russell at the time he received Mr. Adams’s letter of the 23d of June, although it may have been to the persons who prepared the British Case.

The letter is found in the British Appendix, vol. i, p. 178. It bears date April 1, 1862, at Liverpool, a few days after the sailing of the Oreto, and does, as is stated in the British Case,⁵ relate “to purchases of military supplies for the Confederate army and to vessels employed in blockade running.” It also states that “Messrs. Frazer, Trenholm & Co., of this city, placed at my disposal a fine ship, the Bahama, which I supposed would take all the batteries.” This is the same vessel which, as has been seen, took out the armament of the Oreto, and which afterward took out that of the Alabama.

In the letter of the consul of the United States at Liverpool, transmitted by Mr. Adams to Earl Russell, on the 23d, it was said: “The evidence I have is entirely conclusive to my mind. I do not think there is the least room for doubt about it. * * * The strictest watch is kept over this vessel; no person except those immediately engaged upon her is admitted into the yard. On the occasion of the trial-trip, made last Thursday week, no one was admitted without a pass, and these passes were issued to but few persons, and those who are known here as active secessionists engaged in sending aid and relief to the rebels.” He also stated that “the foreman in Messrs. Laird’s yard says she is the sister to the gun-boat Oreto, and has been built for the same parties and for the same purpose; when pressed for a further explanation, he stated that she was to be a privateer for the Southern Government in the United States.” And the Consul further stated that certain officers from the Sumter, whose names he gave, had said the vessel was being built for the Confederate States.¹

This letter of Mr. Adams with that of the Consul, was referred by Earl Russell to the Law-Officers of the Crown and to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, on the 25th of June, of which Mr. Adams was duly advised.²Referred to law-officers of the Crown.

On the 30th June the Law-Officers reported to Earl Russell that “the report of the United States Consul at Liverpool, * * * besides suggesting other grounds of reasonable suspicion, contains direct assertion that the foreman of Messrs. Laird, the builders, has stated that this vessel is intended as a privateer for the service of the government of the Southern States; and, if the character of the vessel and of her equipment be such as the same report describes them to be, it seems evident that she must be intended for some warlike purpose. Under these circumstances, we think that proper steps ought to be taken, under the direction of Her Majesty’s Government, by the authorities of the customs at Liverpool, to ascertain the truth, and that, if sufficient evidence can be obtained to justify proceedings under the foreign-enlistment act, such proceedings should be taken as early as possible. In the mean time, Mr. Adams ought, we think, to be informed that Her Majesty’s Government are proceeding to investigate the case; hut that the course which they may eventually take must necessarily depend upon the nature and sufficiency of any evidence of a breach of the law which they may be enabled to obtain; and that it will be desirable that any evidence in the possession of the United States Consul at Liverpool should be at once communicated to the officers of Her Majesty’s customs at that port.”³Their action upon it.

The Lords Commissioners of the Treasury sent the letter of Mr. Adams, with that of the Consul, to the Commissioners of Customs on the 25th of June.⁴ These letters were forwarded by the Commissioners to the Collector of Liverpool previous to the 28th.⁵ But before that time, on the 20th, and before the letter of the Consul to Mr. Adams, or that of Mr. Adams to Earl Russell, the Collector’s attention had been called to the same vessel by the Consul in a letter to him,⁶ in which was detailed, with more particularity than in the letter to Mr. Adams, his knowledge of facts and his grounds of suspicion. This letter the Collector must have had when he received the communication from the Commissioners.

On the 28th of June the customs surveyor at the port of Liverpool reported to the Collector “that the vessel to which these papers refer has not escaped the notice of the customs officers, but, as yet, nothing has transpired concerning her which appeared to demand a special report. The officers have at all times free access to the building-yards of the Messrs. Laird, at Birkenhead, where the said vessel is now lying, and there has been no attempt on the part of her builders to disguise, what is most apparent to all, that she is intended for a ship of war. Agreeably with your directions, I have personally inspected her and find that she is rightly described in the communication of the United States Consul, except that her engines are not on the oscillating principle. * * * The current report of that vessel is that she has been built for a foreign government, and that is not denied by the Messrs. Laird, with whom I have communicated on the subject; but they do not appear disposed to reply to any question with reference to the destination of the vessel after she leaves this port, and we have no other reliable source of information. It will be in your recollection that the current report of the gun-boat Oreto was, that she had been built for a foreign government, which vessel recently left this port under a British flag, without any guns or ammunition on board, as previously reported.”¹Proceedings of customs authorities.

This report was transmitted by the collector to the commissioners of customs on the same day (the 28th) and by them referred to the solicitor of customs, who, on the 30th, (the same day that the Law-Officers made their communication to Earl Russell, as just stated,) gave his opinion that “the officers at Liverpool have acted discreetly in keeping watch upon her, and should continue to do so, immediately reporting to the board any circumstances that they may consider to call for directions, or advisable to bring under the board’s notice; but the officers ought not to move in the matter without the clearest evidence of a distinct violation of the foreign-enlistment act, nor unless at a moment of great emergency, the terms of the act being extremely technical and the requirements as to intent being very rigid. It may be that the ship, having regard to her cargo as contraband of war, might be unquestionably liable to capture and condemnation, yet not liable to detention under the foreign-enlistment act, and the seizers might entail upon themselves very serious consequences.”²

On the 1st of July the commissioners of customs transmitted their own report to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, in which they embodied the substance of the report of the surveyor to the collector, including his statement that the builders did not appear disposed to reply to any questions respecting the destination of the vessel after she left Liverpool, and added that “having referred the matter to our solicitor, he has reported his opinion that, at present, there is not sufficient ground to warrant the detention of the vessel, or any interference on the part of this department, in which report we beg leave to express our concurrence. And, with reference to the statement of the United States Consul, that the evidence he has in regard to this vessel being intended for the so-called Confederate Government in the Southern States, is entirely conclusive to his mind, we would observe that, inasmuch as the officers of customs of Liverpool would not be justified in taking any steps against the vessel, unless sufficient evidence to warrant her detention should be laid before them, the proper course would be for the consul to submit such evidence as he possesses to the collector at that port, who would thereupon take such measures as the provisions of the foreign-enlistment act would require. Without the production of full and sufficient evidence to justify their proceedings, the seizing officers might entail on themselves and on the Government very serious consequences. We beg to add that the officers at Liverpool will keep a strict watch on the vessel, and that any further information that may be obtained concerning her will be forthwith reported.”¹

This report of the commissioners of customs was transmitted by the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to the Foreign Office, and received there on the 2d of July.²

Thus it will be seen that twenty-seven days before the departure of the vessel, Her Majesty’s Government was informed by its own officers that the “character of the vessel and of her equipment” was such as the report of the consul described them to be, and that, therefore, in the opinion of the Law-Officers of the Crown, “she must be intended for some warlike purpose.” And the Government was also, at the same time and in the same manner, informed that in the face of what had been acknowledged by the Law-Officers of the Crown to be “grounds of reasonable suspicion” of the Consul, the builders of the vessel, (a firm, one of the ostensible members of which, at the time of the original contract for her building, was a member of the House of Commons,)³ on being inquired of by one of the officers of the Government, did not appear to be disposed to reply to any question with reference to the destination of the vessel after she left Liverpool.

At the same time, too, one at least of the departments of the Government was reminded by one of its officers that the Oreto, referred to in the letter of Mr. Adams, had recently left the port, built for a foreign government, but “under a British flag, without any guns or ammunition on board.” But the Arbitrators will look in vain for any evidence whatever tending to prove that any officer of the Government, of any grade, ever propounded to the builders, or any other person, a direct question as to the destination of the vessel, insisting upon an answer or a refusal to answer. This, too, when, under the opinion of the Law-Officers, the only material fact remaining to be ascertained was, by whom the vessel was to be employed.

A copy of the report of the commissioners of customs was sent by Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, accompanied by a note which bears date the 4th of July, but which does not appear to have been received until the 7th, when it was acknowledged. In this note Earl Russell says: “I would beg leave to suggest that you should instruct the United States Consul at Liverpool to submit to the collector of customs at that port such evidence as he may possess tending to show that his suspicions as to the destination of the vessel in question are well founded.”⁴Mr. Adams informed that the American consul may submit evidence to collector at Liverpool.

This was the first request ever made of Mr. Adams or any other officer of the Government of the United States, to assist the Government of Her Majesty in procuring testimony against any vessel as to which complaint had been made. As has been seen, Mr. Adams offered the assistance of the United States in respect to the Florida, but his offer was not accepted. Down to this time, therefore, no complaint should be made against the United States because they failed to accompany their representations with proof. But the United States believe that, in view of facts already stated, the Arbitrators will feel as did the Consul when he received notice from Mr. Adams of what was required, and addressed the Secretary of State of his Government in the following language:

I do not think the British Government are treating us properly in this matter. They are not dealing with us as one friendly nation ought to deal with another. When I, as the agent of my Government, tell them from evidence submitted to me that I have no doubt about her character, they ought to accept this until the parties who are building her, and who have it in their power to show if her destination and purpose are legitimate and honest, do so. It is a very easy matter for the Messrs. Laird & Co. to show for whom they are building her, and to give such information as to her purpose as to be satisfactory to all parties. The burden of proof ought not to be thrown upon us. In a hostile community like this it is very difficult to get information at any time upon these matters. And if names are to be given it would render it almost impossible. The Government ought to investigate it and not call upon us for proof.¹

And they will not be surprised that two days after, the Consul wrote Mr. Adams as follows:

When the United States Government, through its acknowledged representatives, say to the British Government that it is satisfied that a particular vessel, which is being built at a certain place in the kingdom by certain parties who are their own subjects, is intended as a privateer for the rebel government, it is the duty of that government to call up the parties who are fitting out the vessel, tell them what the charge is, and require them to state for whom and what purpose she is being built, and if the charge is admitted or shown to be true, to stop her sailing. Our Government has a right, it seems to me, not only to expect but to require this much of another friendly government. And if there was any disposition to do right and act honestly, this much at least would be accorded.²

On the 7th of July, and at once upon the receipt of the letter of Earl Russell, Mr. Adams wrote the vice-consul at Liverpool, in the absence of the Consul, transmitting a copy of the letter of his lordship, and in accordance with the suggestion therein, said:The consul directed to furnish information to the collector.

“I pray you to furnish to the collector of customs, so soon as may be, any evidence which you can readily command in aid of the object designated.”³

On the 9th of July the consul, having returned to Liverpool, addressed a letter to the collector at that port, in which he detailed with great particularity the circumstances which had come to his knowledge tending to show that the vessel was intended for the use of the insurgents. This letter is printed in full in the Britsh Case,⁴ and is explicit in its statements. It certainly made a case which was worthy the attention of the Government. The Consul does indeed say that he cannot, in all cases, state the names of his informants, “as the information in most cases is given to me by persons out of friendly feeling to the United States, and in strict confidence;” but he adds: “What I have stated is of such a character that little inquiry will confirm its truth;” and the names of many persons, all of whom were within reach of the officers, were given to whom inquiries might have been addressed.He does so.

He then says, the Messrs. Laird “say she is for the Spanish Government. This they stated on the 3d of April last, when General Burgoyne visited their yard, and was shown over it and the various vessels being built there, by Messrs. John Laird, jr., and Henry H. Laird, as was fully reported in the papers at the time.” On this point the Consul says he caused inquiries to be made of the Spanish minister as to the truth of the statement, and the reply was a positive “assurance that she was not for the Spanish Government.” If the statements in the letter of the Consul to Mr. Adams on the 21st of June contained, as the Law-Officers of the Crown said, “grounds of reasonable suspicion,” this letter certainly ought to have put the officers of the Government upon inquiry as to the truth of the statements made; but the arbitrators will fail to discover in all the evidence submitted by Her Majesty’s Government any proof tending to show any attempt at that, or any other time before the departure of the vessel, by any officer of Her Majesty’s Government, to inquire as to the truth of any fact stated by the Consul.

The only statements made by him which have not been fully substantiated by subsequent developments are that Captain Bullock was to command the vessel and that the Florida was then arming at Nassau. In point of fact, it was true, however, that Captain Bullock had been, originally, assigned to the command of the Florida, and it was only about the 15th of June that a change was made.¹ As to the arming of the Florida at Nassau, it has already been seen why that had not then been accomplished as it afterward was. This last-named error in the statement of the Consul has, however, been considered of sufficient importance by Her Majesty’s Government to be made the subject of special mention on page 85 of its Case.

On the 10th of July the collector acknowledged the receipt of the letter from the Consul, but accompanied his acknowledgment with the remark, “I am respectfully of the opinion, the statement made by you is not such as could be acted upon by the officers of this revenue, unless legally substantiated by evidence.”² The collector, however, on the same day, (the 10th) ordered the vessel again to be “inspected” by the the surveyor, who immediately reported that it had been done, and that she was in the same state as regards her armament as on the date of his former report.³ And the same day (the 10th also) the collector transmitted to the commissioners of customs the letter of the Consul and the report of the surveyor, accompanying them with a copy of his letter to the consul and the statement that “if she is for the confederate service the builders and parties interested are not likely to commit themselves by any act which would subject them to the penal provision of the foreign-enlistment act.”⁴Conduct of the collector.

On the 11th of July the solicitor of the customs, having considered the letter of the consul, reported:

There is only one proper way of looking at this question. If the collector of customs were to detain the vessel in question, he would no doubt have to maintain the seizure by legal evidence in a court of law, and to pay damages and costs in case of failure. Upon carefully reading the statement, I find the greater part, if not all, is hearsay and inadmissible, and as to a part the witnesses are not forthcoming or even to be named. It is perfectly clear to my mind that there is nothing in it amounting to prima facie proof sufficient to justify a seizure, much less to support it in a court of law, and the consul could not expect the collector to take upon himself such a risk in opposition to rules and principles by which the Crown is governed in matters of this nature.⁵

On the 15th of July, four days after the opinion of the solicitor was given, and six days after the letter of the Consul, the commissioners of customs advised the collector that “there does not appear to be prima-facie proof sufficient in the statement of the Consul to justify the seizure of the vessel, and you are to apprise the Consul accordingly.”⁶

It is almost incredible that it never occurred to any one of these several officers of the Government that there was anything in the letter of the Consul calling upon them for investigation of the facts submitted by him. And this, too, when, according to the opinion of the distinguished Law-Officers of the Crown given on the 30th of June, “the grounds of reasonable suspicion” suggested in the letter of the consul of the 21st were sufficient to make it proper that steps should be taken to ascertain the truth of the statements then made,¹ and when Mr. Adams, in his first communication upon this subject, had asked an inquiry by the officers of the Government as to the actual destination of the vessel.

On the 16th of July the collector informed the consul that the solicitor of customs had advised the commissioners of customs that “the details given by you in regard to the said vessel are not sufficient, in a legal point of view, to justify me in taking upon myself the responsibility of the detention of this ship.”²He declines to act.

On the same day (the 16th) a copy of the letter of the Consul of the 9th was submitted to Mr. Collier, afterward attorney-general and now one of the members of the judiciary committee of Her Majesty’s Privy Council, for his opinion, and he promptly replied: “I think the evidence almost conclusive. * * * * As the matter is represented to me to be urgent, I advise that the principal officer of the customs at Liverpool be immediately applied to, under 59 Geo. III, cap. 69, to exercise the powers conferred upon him by that section to seize the vessel, with a view to her condemnation, an indemnity being given to him, if he requires it. It would be proper at the same time to lay a statement of the fact before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, coupled with a request that Her Majesty’s Government would direct the vessel to be seized, or ratify her seizure if it has been made.”³ On the next day (the 17th) the commissioners of customs advised the commissioners of the Treasury that the collector at Liverpool had been informed by them “that they do not consider there is prima-facie proof sufficient in the Consul’s statement to justify the seizure of that vessel, and have instructed him to apprise the Consul accordingly.”⁴

On the same day (the 17th) Mr. Adams wrote the Consul directing him “to employ a solicitor and get up affidavits to lay before the collector.” That letter was received by the consul on the morning of the 18th and he immediately retained Mr. Squarey.⁵ The great difficulty for the solicitor and the Consul with their means of information was “to get direct proof. There were men enough who knew about her, and who understood her character, but they were not willing to testify, and in a preliminary proceeding like this it was impossible to obtain process to compel them. Indeed, no one in a hostile community like Liverpool, where the feeling and sentiment are against us, would be a willing witness, especially if he resided there, and was in any way dependent upon the people of that place for a livelihood.”⁶Mr. Adams instructs the consul to continue to collect proof.

But as early as the 21st, the Consul and his solicitor appeared before the collector and presented to him as witnesses William Passmore, John De Costa, Allen S. Clare, Henry Wilding, and Mathew Maguire, and their affidavits, with that of the Consul, were then taken by the collector, who administered the necessary oaths. Upon this testimony, under oath, the collector was requested to seize the vessel, and the portions of the foreign-enlistment act applicable to the case were read to him.¹The consul does so, and presents it to the collector with a request to seize the vessel.

The witnesses were all present before the collector. He had full opportunity, if he desired, to examine them personally, and thus test the accuracy of their statements or their credibility. This he does not seem to have done, or, if he did, he has not put on record any suspicion as to the reliability of the testimony.²

On the same day (the 21st) the collector transmitted the affidavits to the commissioners of customs, stating that he had been requested to seize the vessel, and asked the board to instruct him “by telegraph how I am to act, as the ship appears to be ready for sea, and may leave any hour she pleases.”⁶

The affidavits were received by the commissioners of customs on the 22d of July,⁴ and at once referred to the solicitor of customs, who, with his assistant, immediately advised the board that the evidence submitted was not sufficient to warrant the seizure or detention of the vessel. The assistant solicitor said “the only justifiable grounds of seizure under section seven of the act would be the production of such evidence of the fact as would support an indictment for the misdemeanor under that section.”⁵ On the same day (the 22d) the board informed the collector that, as they were advised by their solicitor, the evidence was not sufficient to justify a seizure, and he should govern himself accordingly, but they added: “The solicitor has, however, stated that if there should be sufficient evidence to satisfy a court of enlistment of individuals, they would be liable to pecuniary penalties, for the security of which, if recovered, the department might detain the ship until these penalties are satisfied or good bail given; but there is not sufficient evidence to require the customs to prosecute. It is, however, competent for the United States Consul, or any other person, to do so at their own risk if they see fit.”⁶Law advisers of the customs.

No copy of the opinion of the solicitor or his assistant was sent to the Consul or Mr. Adams, but on the 23d of July the collector advised the Consul that the board, upon the advice of their solicitors, had concluded the evidence submitted was not sufficient to justify any steps being taken against the vessel, but he added: “It is, however, considered to be competent for the United States Consul to act at his own risk if he should think fit.”⁷

This last clause attracted the attention of the Consul at once, and Mr. Squarey called upon the collector and asked its meaning. “His response was that this was copied from the letter addressed to him by the board.” Mr. Squarey, of course, advised the Consul he had no power to stop the vessel; that the power to detain her was lodged with the collector.⁸ The collector did not intimate that the board referred in their instructions to the prosecution of the individuals and to a possibility of detention by them in case of such a prosecution. But if he had, it is not easy for the United States to discover why they should be called upon to prosecute individuals criminally in the courts of Great Britain for a violation of its municipal law. It was not the punishment of individuals they sought. They asked the detention of the vessel and by that means the prevention of a crime against the law of nations.

On the same day (the 22d) the affidavits, and the action taken upon them by the board of commissioners of customs, were, by the board, submitted to the lords commissioners of the Treasury, with the suggestion that, if they had any doubt, it might be advisable to take the opinion of the law-officers of the Crown,¹ and at once the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury transmitted to the Foreign Office copies of the papers received from the commissioners of customs, with a statement that the vessel was “nearly ready for sea.”²Proof submitted to the treasury, July 22.

On the same day (the 22d) Mr. Adams transmitted to Earl Russell copies of the same affidavits “tending,” as he said, “to establish the character and destination of the vessel.”³ Upon the 23d the papers from the commissioners of customs were sent from the Foreign Office to the Law-Officers, with a request for consideration and an opinion at their “earliest convenience.”⁴Also, to Earl Russell.

On the 23d, also, the Consul and his solicitor, having heard from the assistant solicitor of the customs that the previous affidavits were not considered sufficient and that the collector had been directed not to detain the vessel, procured further affidavits from Edward Roberts and Robert John Taylor.⁵ They also procured a further opinion from Mr. Collier, predicated upon the eight affidavits which had then been obtained, in which he used this significant language:Additional proof.Opinion of Mr. Collier.

I have perused the above affidavits, and I am of opinion that the collector of customs would be justified in detaining the vessel. Indeed, I should think it his duty to detain her; and that if, after the application which has been made to him, supported by the evidence which has been laid before me, he allows the vessel to leave Liverpool, he will incur a heavy responsibility, a responsibility of which the board of customs, under whose directions he appears to be acting, must take their share. It appears difficult to make out a stronger case of infringement of the foreign-enlistment act, which, if not enforced on this occasion, is little better than a dead-letter. It well deserves consideration whether, if the vessel be allowed to escape, the Federal Government would not have serious grounds of remonstrance.”⁶

The additional affidavits were on the same day presented by Mr. Squarey, with the opinion of Mr. Collier, to the commissioners of the customs, with a letter in which he said:Presented with affidavits to the customs, July 23.

I learned this morning from Mr. O’Dowd that instructions were forwarded yesterday to the collector at Liverpool not to exercise the powers of the act in this instance, it being considered that the facts disclosed in the affidavits made before him were not sufficient to justify the collector in seizing the vessel. On behalf of the Government of the United States, I now respectfully request that this matter, which I need not point out to you involves consequences of the gravest possible description, may be considered by the board of customs on the further evidence now adduced. The gunboat now lies in the Birkenhead Docks, ready for sea in all respects, with a crew of fifty men on board; she may sail at any time, and I trust that the urgency of the case will excuse the course I have adopted of sending these papers direct to the board, instead of transmitting them through the collector at Liverpool, and the request which I now venture to make, that the matter may receive immediate attention.⁷

The Board on the same day referred all the papers to their solicitor, whose assistant reported that he could not concur in the views of Mr. Collier, but “adverting to the high character which he bears in his profession, I submit that the Board might act judiciously in recommending the Lords of the Treasury to take the opinion of the Law-Officers of the Crown.”¹ On the same day (the 23d) the papers were sent from the Foreign Office to the Law-Officers, with a request for an opinion at their earliest convenience.² On that day also Mr. Squarey called at the Foreign Office and, ascertaining that the papers had been sent to the Law-Officers, but that an opinion had not up to that time been received, obtained from the Under Secretary, upon his “representation of the extreme urgency of the case,” a promise that the opinion should be sent for at once.³Action of the board.

On the 24th Mr. Adams also transmitted to Earl Russell copies of the same additional affidavits and the opinion of Mr. Collier.⁴ Mr. Collier was also retained by the Consul to institute proceedings for condemnation in case the seizure was made.⁵Further evidence submitted by Mr. Adams.

On the 25th another affidavit was presented by Mr. Squarey to the customs authorities, from whom it found its way on the 26th through the Foreign Office to the Law-Officers, the opinion of the solicitor of the customs being still adverse to the detention.⁶ On the 26th also, Mr. Squarey again called the attention of the secretary of the customs to the matter, and said he “had hoped that, ere this, the decision of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Treasury might have been made known particularly, as every day affords opportunities for the vessel in question to take her departure.” To this the secretary replied that, “in the absence of instructions from their lordships, the board are unable to give any directions in regard to the gun-boat in question.”⁷

Thus, on the 26th, ended the labors performed by the representatives of the United States. The Consul, in making his report to the secretary of state of his Government, after detailing what had been done by him and those with whom he had been associated, said, “I have done about all that I can do to stop this vessel; much more, I think, than this Government ought to require any friendly government to do. My counsel say I can do no more.”⁸ The United States confidently believe the Arbitrators will concur in this opinion of the Consul.

The entire proof was in the possession of the Law-Officers of the Crown on the 26th. Substantially it was all there on the 23d. The affidavit of Redden, presented after that date, simply confirmed the already existing proof. That it was sufficient is shown by the opinion of the Law-Officers of the Crown, given as soon as it was examined. Even the first letter of the Consul, written on the 21st of June, and considered by the Law-Officers on the 30th, was sufficient to show that “grounds of reasonable suspicion” existed at that time and called for an inquiry into the truth. After that followed the letter of the 9th of July, with its more particular statement of details; then the affidavits of the 21st; then the affidavits of the 23d, and the pointed opinion of the most eminent counsel; then the affidavit of the 24th; and at all times cautions by the officers of the United States against delay and representations of the extreme urgency of the case. The vessel was in the dock. From the commencement, the builders were not disposed to reply to any question with reference to her destination after she left Liverpool. As early as the 21st of July it was known to the collector she had her coal on board, and might leave any hour she pleased.¹

On the 23d the commissioners of customs were advised that she was ready for sea in all respects, with a crew of fifty men on board; she may sail at any time.”² On the 28th she was moved from the dock into the river; the men had taken their clothes and beds on board, and received orders to hold themselves in readiness at any moment. She had no register or clearance, but the collector said that was not necessary and that she could go anywhere without.³ She remained at anchor in the river until 11 or 12 o’clock of the 29th and “was seen from the shore by thousands of persons.”⁴ The customs officers were on board when she started, and only left her when the tug left.⁵

During all this time Her Majesty’s Government was under its promise to Mr. Adams, made as early as the 4th of July, that “the officers at Liverpool will keep a strict watch on the vessel, and that any further information that may be obtained concerning her will be forthwith reported.”⁶Her Majesty’s government agree to keep a watch on the vessel.

Alter the vessel had sailed, but not before, the Law-Officers announced their opinion that, upon the evidence furnished by the United States, she should be detained.⁷ At what hour in the day this opinion was actually given does not appear, but it was agreed upon on the evening of the 28th, the same day that the papers were considered.⁸ It was said by Earl Russell to Mr. Adams at a conference on the 31st of July that a “delay in determining upon it [the decision] had most unexpectedly been caused by the sudden development of a malady of the Queen’s advocate, Sir John D. Harding, totally incapacitating him for the transaction of business. This had made it necessary to call in other parties, whose opinion had been at last given for the detention of the gunboat.”⁹ And in the British Case it is said: “One of Her Majesty’s ordinary legal advisers, the Queen’s Advocate, now deceased, was at that time seriously ill of a malady from which he never recovered, and this was mentioned at the time (on the 31st July, 1862) by Lord Russell to Mr. Adams, as a circumstance which had occasioned some delay.”¹⁰The law-officers think the vessel should be detained.Illness of Sir John Harding.

The United States find among the documents and evidence furnished by Her Majesty’s Government for the information of the Arbitrators eight opinions, given by the Law-Officers of the Crown previous to the 29th of July. Of these, all before that which was given on the 30th June, upon the representation of Mr. Adams under date of the 23d, were signed by Sir John D. Harding, the Queen’s advocate, Sir William Atherton, the Attorney-General, and Sir Roundell Palmer, the Solicitor-General, or by the Attorney-General alone. That of the 30th of June was signed by the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General. From this circumstance the United States infer that the Queen’s Advocate was unable to attend to his duties as early as that date, (the 30th June,) and that then the opinion of the other distinguished gentlemen who were the legal advisers of Her Majesty was considered sufficient; and they also infer that it was not necessary on the 23d of July to call in new parties, but only to call upon the old. The opinions previous to June 30th will be found in British Appendix, vol. ii, pages 2, 16, 32, 98, 100, 138; that of the 30th June, in vol. i, page 181.

On the 28th of July the solicitor of the Consul wrote the secretary of the commissioners of customs that he had every reason to believe the vessel would sail on the 29th; and on the morning of the 29th telegraphed him she had gone. The letter reached the secretary before the telegram.¹

When this information was received, therefore, by the commissioners of customs, the vessel could not have been far from Liverpool, perhaps not yet out of sight of some of “the thousands of persons” who “from the shore” had seen her “anchored in the river.” Yet no order was given for her pursuit. In another case it might, but in the present the United States are inclined to think it will not, surprise the Arbitrators to learn that the opinion of the Law-Officers of the Crown advising the detention of the vessel, delivered at the Foreign Office on the 29th, was not made known to the commissioners of customs “until 4 p. m. on the 31st of July, or two days after the Alabama had left the Mersey, and twelve hours after she had finally sailed from Moelfra Roads.”²Escape of the Alabama.

She was accompanied as she left Liverpool by the tug Hercules, which “kept in sight of her until she lay to, about a mile off the Bell Buoy, and about fourteen miles from the Canning Dock.” The tug returned to Liverpool about 7 p. m. of the 29th, bringing back from the “new gun-boat” “some of Mr. Laird’s workmen and riggers.”³

On the morning of the 30th, the Consul called in person upon the collector and informed him that the tug was then in port, having returned from the Alabama the evening previous; that she reported the Alabama cruising off Port Lynas, and that she (the tug) was then taking on board men and equipments to “convey down to the gun-boat.”⁴Inefficiency of the subsequent proceedings.

The collector sent the surveyor to the tug and he reported that he found a considerable number of persons on deck, “some of whom admitted to me that they were a portion of the crew and were going to join the gun-boat.” He also informed the collector that it was said she had cruised off Port Lynas the night before.⁵

After this the Hercules left Liverpool and went to the Alabama, finding her at Beaumaris Bay about 3 o’clock in the afternoon of the 30th, She remained with her until about midnight and then returned to Liverpool.”⁶

The tug was not followed. Her movements were not watched. No telegrams were sent to the customs officers or any other representative of Her Majesty’s Government at Port Lynas, Beaumaris, or any other station or district in the vicinity of where the Alabama was known to have been. She arrived near Port Lynas, at Moelfra Roads, at 7.38 in the evening of the 29th, and remained there at anchor until 3 o’clock in the morning of the 31st.⁷

This was ascertained by the collector at Beaumaris, and reported by him to the secretary of the customs on the 2d of August, in reply to a telegram addressed to him on the 1st. Had such telegram been sent on the 30th, when the Consul informed the collector at Liverpool of what had been learned from the tug, the vessel might have been stopped. At least she could not have communicated with the tug. This is apparent from what was done by the collector at Beaumaris on the 1st, when he did receive his instructions.¹

Nothing was done until the 31st of July, when there was suggested to the Duke of Newcastle the propriety of sending the Governor of the Bahamas a copy of the report of the Law-Officers of the Crown of the 29th;² and at 7.30 p. m. a telegram was sent to the customs officers at Cork to seize her if she arrived at that port.³

On the 1st of August similar orders were sent to the officers at Beaumaris and Holyhead, the instructions to send them not having been given the evening before until after the telegraph offices to those places had been closed.

The first telegram to Cork was sent more than thirty hours after the collector had been advised by the surveyor of the port, who had obtained his information from the master of the tug, that the Alabama had been, the night before cruising off Port Lynas, and that the tug was about to start from Liverpool to meet her. The excuse for sending to Cork was that Mr. Squarey on the 29th had advised the collector he had reason to believe she had gone to Queenstown;⁴ but mention is omitted of the fact that afterward advice had been received that, up to the time of the departure of the Hercules, on the 30th, she was at some point nearer to Liverpool, at which she was to receive her crew and supplies from the tug.

In view of these facts, the United States believe the Arbitrators will have no difficulty in agreeing with Earl Russell in his opinion, as subsequently expressed to Mr. Adams, and reported by himself to Lord Lyons on the 27th of March, 1863, that “the cases of the Alabama and the Oreto were a scandal, and in some degree a reproach to our laws.”⁵ This opinion he repeated on the 16th of February, 1864, in the House of Commons, when he said:Earl Russell thinks this a scandal.

I say that here as I said it in that dispatch; I say that, having passed such a law in the year 1819, it is a scandal and a reproach that one of the belligerents in this American contest has been enabled, at the order of the confederate government, to fit out a vessel at Liverpool in such a way that she was capable of being made a vessel of war that, after going to another port in Her Majesty’s dominions to ship a portion of her crew, she proceeded to a port in neutral territory, and there completed her crew and equipment as a vessel of war, so that she has since been able to capture and destroy innocent merchant-vessels belonging to the other belligerent. Having been thus equipped by an evasion of the law, I say it is a scandal to our law that we should not be able to prevent such belligerent operations.⁶

The Arbitrators will also readily find that the scandal was not the fault of the law, but of its execution.

As was truly said by Mr. Cobden in the House of Commons, on another occasion, July 23, 1863, in reference to the iron-clads:Mr. Cobden’s views.

I do not think it is very difficult to find out for what government any vessel which is being built in this country is intended, if it be intended for a government which can legitimately come to this country to buy a vessel.⁷

And the same distinguished statesman, on the same occasion, said, and said truly:

I perceive a fallacy which runs through Lord Russell’s dispatches and the solicitor-general’s speeches. They constantly confound two very different things, namely, the evidence necessary to detain a vessel and the evidence necessary to convict a vessel. The consequence is that we refuse to interfere until Mr. Adams has brought forward conclusive evidence on oath that is sufficient to convict. * * * The departure of that privateer [the Alabama] might have been prevented. That vessel, according to Lord Russell’s dispatch, left the port of Liverpool without a clearance, clandestinely * * * but the government might have prevented that. They had grounds for suspicion and might have said to the collector for the port: “Before this vessel leaves or has her clearance we must he satisfied on these points;” and to prevent her leaving without a clearance, they might have put custom-house officers on board. I maintain that you have power to do that under your customs consolidation act.¹

That act provides (section 13) “that the commissioners of customs, or the collector or comptroller of any port under their directions, may station officers on board any ship while within the limits of any port in the United Kingdom and (section 145) that “before any ship shall depart in ballast from the United Kingdom for parts beyond the seas, not having any goods on board except stores from the warehouse borne upon the victualling bill of such ship, nor any goods reported inward for exportation in such ship, the collector or comptroller shall clear such ship in ballast, by notifying such clearance and the date thereof on the victualling bill, and deliver the same to the master of such ship as the clearance thereof, and the master of such ship shall answer to the collector or comptroller such questions touching her departure and destination as shall be demanded of him.” And again, (section 146,) “Any officers of customs may go on board any ship after clearance outward within the limits of any port in the United Kingdom, or within four leagues of the coast thereof, and may demand the ship’s clearance.”² It is true, there is no provision for a forfeiture of the ship, and perhaps at that time there was no penalty imposed upon a master for a failure to comply with these provisions, but when Her Majesty’s Government enacts that “before any ship shall depart” from the United Kingdom certain things shall have been done, there will be found somewhere, the United States believe, some power by which she can be detained until such things are done.Want of due diligence: in what it consisted.

Subsequently, in the case of the Laird iron-clads, the law as it stood when the Alabama escaped, was used and made effectual. When the Government was afterward called upon in the House of Commons to answer for the seizure of those vessels, and inquired of as to the authority by which it was made, an elaborate and conclusive reply was given by the Attorney-General in a speech from which extracts have already been presented for the consideration of the Arbitrators.³

Now, what was done in the case of the iron-clads? Earl Russell requested the secretary of the treasury to “move the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to desire that those vessels may be prevented from leaving the port of Liverpool until satisfactory evidence can be given as to their destination; or, at all events, until the inquiries which are now being prosecuted with a view to obtain such evidence shall have been brought to a conclusion.”⁴

In consequence of this request, one of Her Majesty’s ships of war was placed on the watch, and the vessels did not leave port. Had the law been executed in the same manner with respect to the Alabama, the present Tribunal would never have been called upon to consider the subject now under discussion. When the builders appeared not disposed to reply to any question with reference to her destination after leaving port, there were reasonable grounds for supposing that the destination was an illegal one, and the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury could and should have been moved to prevent her leaving until satisfactory evidence was given that it was lawful.

Much stress is laid in the Case presented by Her Majesty’s Government upon the fact, that while the attention of Mr. Adams and the Consul had long been given to the vessel and she was launched as early as the 15th of May, no representation had been made to Earl Russell in respect to her until the 23d of June, and this is considered of sufficient importance to be made the subject of a second reference in the Counter Case.

The 23d of June, the Arbitrators will notice, was more than one month before she sailed; sufficient time certainly to have enabled the Government to detain her, if it had been so inclined, upon information after that time obtained. But it will also be remembered that the vessel had escaped the notice of the customs officers,¹ and they took no action, although it was but a few weeks before that the Oreto had been permitted to escape, and was then known to have arrived at Nassau, a port entirely inconsistent with an innocent destination. In fact, on the morning of the 28th of July, the day before the Alabama sailed, and before she was moved out of the dock into the river, the Journal of Commerce, one of the public prints at Liverpool, contained an account of the proceedings which were being carried on against the Oreto at Nassau.²

It was not time for action which the officers of the Government required, but inclination.

Again, it is said she was not overtaken by the Tuscarora, which had been brought to Southampton by Mr. Adams for the very purpose of intercepting her; nor by any other of the vessels of war of the United States until finally destroyed by the Kearsarge. No better answer to this can be given than in the words of Sir Thomas Baring in the House of Commons, on the 13th of May, 1864, when he said, that “even with our cruisers afloat it would not be easy to pick up an Alabama:”³ or in those of Mr. Cobden, in the same debate:

Perhaps nothing is more difficult, not to say impossible, than to find a ship on the ocean after she has once got out of sight. Nelson himself passed many months trying to find a fleet of five hundred sail going from France to Egypt. You may find a vessel in a harbor just as Nelson found the French fleet at the Nile; but even if you should find an American cruiser in a harbor, by your own rules you must allow her to escape, because you say she must have a start of twenty-four hours.⁴

The latter gentleman on another occasion, July 23d, 1863, also said:

Now, when still the great bulk of our commerce is carried on by sailing-vessels, two or three steamers, built especially for speed, may harass, and, in fact, may render valueless, the mercantile marine of a whole nation. I have heard it said, “O, if it were our case, we should soon those vessels.” * * I have four times crossed the Atlantic, and sailed for two thousand miles without seeing a strange sail. The ocean is a very wide place. You cannot follow a vessel when it has once got out to sea with any chance of catching it. You have no stations where you can hear of it, and no road which you can follow with the chance of catching it.⁵

Especially does this difficulty exist if the laws and regulations of neutrality are not strictly enforced. In January, 1863, Commodore Wilkes, of the United States Navy, wrote to the Secretary of the Navy of his Government:

The fact of the Florida having but a few days’ coal, makes me anxious to have our vessels off the Martinique, which is the only island they can hope to get any coal or supplies at, the English islands being cut off under the rules of Her Majesty for some sixty days yet, which precludes the possibility, unless by some chicanery or fraud, the hope of their getting coal and comfort there; therefore the island of Martinique it seems to me to be the only one to which they will attempt to resort.¹

The Florida did get coal at Barbados, an English island, and the plans of Commodore Wilkes failed.

The Alabama having escaped, the British steamship Bahama cleared on the 13th of August from Liverpool for Nassau with her armament, shipped by Fawcett, Preston & Co.² The Bahama also had on board Captain Raphael Semmes, who afterward commanded the Alabama, and some officers and seamen, as passengers.³ The English bark Agrippina also cleared from London in August tor Demerara with a cargo of coal and munitions of war.⁴Armament from the Bahama.

At Angra Bay, in the Azores, which “had been used and abused by corsairs and pirates during centuries,”⁵ on the 22d and 23d of August, this armament, coal, ammunition, and stores, and these officers and seamen, were transferred, under the British flag, from these vessels to the Alabama. On the 24th, Captain Semmes, with his officers, took possession of the Alabama and mustered the crew, eighty-four in number and mostly British subjects.⁶ The English ensign was hauled down and the flag of the insurgents hoisted.⁷ Thus armed, manned, and equipped, the Alabama sailed from the Azores as a cruiser of the insurgents.

On the 18th of November she arrived at Martinique, and anchored in the harbor of Fort de France.⁸ She went there to coal, arrangements having been made to meet the bark Agrippina, (the same that had taken part of her outfit to Angra,) which had arrived about one week previous with a cargo of coal from an English port.⁹ On the 5th of September Mr. Adams had forwarded to Earl Russell a letter from the consul at Liverpool, stating that the Agrippina was to carry out another cargo of coal to the Alabama. On the 25th the commissioners of customs informed the lords commissioners of the treasury that they had no power to interfere.¹⁰At Martinique.

The Agrippina left port upon the order of Captain Semmes to get under way forthwith and proceed to a new place of rendezvous, as “it would not do for him to think of coaling in Martinique under the circumstances.”¹¹ Martinique was under the jurisdiction or the French Government and not under that of Her Majesty.

On the evening of the 19th the Alabama herself left port, the United States steamer San Jacinto having appeared in the offing.¹² On the afternoon of the 20th she joined the Agrippina, and the two ran together to their concerted anchorage in Blanquilla, “one of those little coral islands that skirt the South American coast, not yet fully adapted to the habitation of man.”¹

They remained there five days, the Alabama coaling and making other necessary preparations for sea, when the coal-ship, which had still another supply of coal on board, was dispatched to another rendezvous, the Areas, little islands in the Gulf of Mexico, off the coast of Yucatan.² This new rendezvous was reached by both vessels on the 23d of December.³ The Alabama remained at the Areas a week, coaling, repairing, and refitting. At the end of that time the Agrippina was put under sailing orders for Liverpool to report to Captain Bullock for another cargo of coal, to be delivered at Fernando de Noronha, another rendezvous agreed upon.⁴

On the 11th of January Captain Semmes engaged and sunk the United states gun-boat Hatteras twenty-five miles southeast of Galveston, Texas, one of the ports of the insurgents. In the engagement the Alabama received “six large shot-holes at the waterline.”⁵Destroys the Hatteras.

On the evening of the 20th she arrived at Port Poyal, in the island of Jamaica, and within the jurisdiction of Her Majesty’s Government, “to repair damages sustained in the action,” and to land prisoners.⁶ The distance from the place of the engagement to Jamaica, was about fifteen hundred miles. On arriving Captain Semmes applied to the naval officer in command at the station for permission to land his prisoners, repair damages, and to receive coal and supplies, stating it was absolutely necessary the damages “should be repaired before he could proceed to sea with safety.”⁷ This was the first British port the vessel had visited after her escape from Liverpool.At Jamaica, January 20, 1863, repairs and lands prisoners.

In this connection it will be recollected by the Arbitrators that on the 31st of July, after her escape, Earl Russell suggested to the Duke of Newcastle “the propriety of a copy of the inclosed report (that of the Law-Officers, of the 29th of July) being sent to the Governor of the Bahamas.”⁸

On the 16th of September, after the receipt at London of information of the release of the Oreto at Nassau, the Law-Officers were inquired of whether it would be “necessary to modify the instructions sent to the Governor of the Bahamas” for the detention of the Alabama,⁹ and on the 25th they replied that they were of “the opinion that if the vessel 290 should put into Nassau, she ought to be there seized and proceeded against, provided that there be nothing in the condition of the vessel when at Nassau tending to rebut the inference which the law-officers drew from the facts laid before them with respect to the vessel when she lay at Birkenhead.”¹⁰

This was after it was known that the Alabama had been armed and equipped and had started on her cruise, as that fact was communicated by Mr. Adams to Earl Russell on the 4th of September.¹¹

After the necessary correspondence between the naval officer at Jamaica and the Lieutenant-Governor of the island, the permission to repair asked for by Captain Semmes on his arrival was granted.¹² This was reported to the Government of Her Majesty, and on the 14th of February Earl Russell informed the Duke of Newcastle that, in his opinion, the proceedings of the Governor should be approved, but he trusted “the Alabama has been warned to depart as soon as the necessary repairs are finished.”¹

When the Alabama arrived at Jamaica, although she had on board the officers and men of the Hatteras as prisoners, four officers of Her Majesty’s ship Challenger, four of the Cygnet, and one of the Greyhound, went on board of her upon visits of courtesy,² and the band played the tune called Dixie’s Land as a compliment to her, “because it is the ordinary usage and custom among the navies of civilized nations to play complimentary tunes to each other on such occasions.”³ It may have been done by the junior officers, “entirely from thoughtlessness,” and that the “inconsiderate young man who ordered Dixie’s Land to be played” was “severely reprimanded yet it was done, and the most cordial relations were at once established between the officers of all these ships (the English squadron) and those of the Alabama.”⁴

“The fractures made by six large shot or shell near the water-line * * required extensive repairs, which could not be completed by the unskillful workmen hired here before late in the afternoon of the 25th, and the Alabama sailed at 8.30 of the same evening.” She “was treated * * exactly as I [the naval commander at the station] shall act toward any United States man-of-war that may hereafter call here.’’⁵ Why she did not remain longer may be inferred from what Captain Semmes said to the Vice-Admiral on his arrival, which was, “If I remain here an hour more than can be avoided I shall run the risk of finding a squadron of my enemies outside, for no doubt they will be in pursuit of me immediately.”⁶

She arrived at the harbor of Rata Island near the island of Fernando de Noronha,⁷ in the jurisdiction of His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, on the 4th of April, expecting there to meet the Agrippina with coal. That vessel did not arrive and Captain Semmes supplied himself from one of his prizes taken on the day before he entered the port.⁸At Rata Island.

While at these islands waiting for his coal, Captain Semmes cruised in the neighborhood and captured two vessels near the shore, and, as was claimed, within the territorial waters. He was entertained by the governor and provided with horses to go about the island. The Governor returned his official visit in uniform. Upon this becoming known to the president of Pernambuco, he “dispatched an officer in the Brazilian steam-vessel Mamanguape to inquire into these statements, to require Captain Semmes to leave the island within twenty-four hours, and to supersede the Governor if what had been asserted should prove to be true.”⁹

The inquiry was made, the Governor dismissed, and the Alabama ordered to leave the islands.¹⁰

This action of the President of the Province was approved by the Government of His Majesty the Emperor.¹¹

On the 11th day of May, the Alabama arrived at Bahia. The bark Castor was also there with coal, but the Government, “taking into consideration the circumstances of suspecting that the bark bad gone direct to that port by preconcerted agreement, refused permission decisively to the commander of the Alabama, who had asked to be permitted to receive the coal from on board the bark.”¹At Bahia.

She arrived at Bahia after the proceedings were commenced to investigate the facts imputed to her at Fernando de Noronha, but before their conclusion. Upon their conclusion an order was made that “the Alabama shall no more be admitted in any port of the empire. She would have suffered the same exclusion from Bahia if she had not presented herself at that port even before proof of her culpability could be obtained, and before the Imperial Government, surprised by such audacity, could have been enabled to take measures concerning the penalty which in such cases ought to be applied.”²Is excluded from Brazilian ports for violation of sovereignty of Brazil.

On the 29th of July the Alabama appeared in Saldanha Bay, in the Cape Colony, and thus came once more within the jurisdiction of Her Majesty’s Government.³ On the 1st of August, Captain Semmes availed himself of “an opportunity offered by the coasting schooner Atlas to communicate with the Cape,” and informed the Governor that he had arrived in the bay “for the purpose of effecting some necessary repairs.”⁴ On the 4th of the same month the Consul of the United States also informed the Governor of the presence of the Alabama in the bay, and asked that she “should be at once seized and sent to England, from whence she clandestinely escaped.”⁵ The Governor caused a reply to be sent on the next day to the effect that he “has no instructions, neither has he any authority, to seize or detain that vessel.”⁶At Cape Town.

At two o’clock in the afternoon of the same day (the 5th) she appeared off Cape Town, and, at the entrance of Table Bay, within sight of the town and hundreds of persons, captured the American bark Sea Bride.⁷

This was made known to the Governor at once by the United States consul, who claimed that the capture was “clearly within British waters.”⁸ The Governor caused inquiries to be made of the captain of the Alabama and also of the port-captain and other persons, and satisfied himself that “the vessels were not less than four miles distant from land.”⁹ It was not denied, however, that this was in full sight from the town. Indeed, that was shown to be the case by the statements of all who were inquired of by the Governor.¹⁰

After this capture on the 5th, the Alabama came into Table Bay, and Captain Semmes at once announced to the Governor that he had come in for “supplies and repairs,” and asked leave to “land prisoners.” On being inquired of by the Governor as to the “nature and extent of supplies and repairs” required, he replied: “I shall need some provisions for my crew; * * * and as for repairs, my boilers need some iron work to be done, and my bends require calking, being quite open. I propose to take on board the necessary materials here, and to proceed with all dispatch to Simon’s Bay for the purpose of making these repairs.”¹¹

The vessel remained at Table Bay three days and then went to Simon’s Bay, also in Her Majesty’s dominions, to calk and refit, arriving there on the 9th. On the way over Captain Semmes chased and captured another American vessel, but, “on my pointing out to him,” says Bear-Admiral Walker, “that he had done so in neutral waters, he assured me that it was quite unintentional, and, being at a distance from the land, he did not observe that he had got within three miles of an imaginary line drawn from the Cape of Good Hope to Cape Hanglip, but on discovering it, he did not detain the vessel.” This explanation was considered sufficient.¹At Simon’s Bay.

After the capture of the Sea Bride, she was brought within a mile and a half of the shore.² Upon the representation of this fact by the Consul of the United States to the Governor, he immediately replied that he did not feel warranted in taking steps to remove the prize crew,³ upon the ground, as he afterward said, that the vessel was brought in through “inadvertence.”⁴

After his arrival at Cape Town on the 5th, Captain Semmes “mentioned to the Governor” that he left outside one of his prizes previously taken, the Tuscaloosa, which he had equipped and fitted as a tender, and had ordered to meet him in Simons Bay, as she also stood in need of supplies.”⁵The Tuscaloosa.

On the 8th this vessel arrived at Simon’s Bay. She was “a bark of five hundred tons, with two small rifled twelve-pounder guns and ten men, and was captured by the Alabama on the 21st of June last, off the coast of Brazil, cargo of wool still on board.”⁶ She had never been condemned by a prize court, but had been commissioned by Captain Semmes on the high seas as a tender to his ship, one of his lieutenants having been placed in command.⁷ The Attorney-General of the Colony was of the opinion that “if the vessel received two guns from the Alabama, or other Confederate vessel of war, or if the person in command of her has a commission of war, or if she be commanded by an officer of the Confederate Navy, in any of these cases there will be a sufficient setting forth as a vessel of war to justify her being held to be a ship of war.” And she was admitted into the harbor as such.⁸

The Tuscaloosa remained at Simon’s Bay until the morning of the 14th, and the Alabama until noon of the 15th.⁹ The Tuscaloosa went to Saldanha Bay, where she found the Sea Bride, driven there, as was said, by stress of weather. Both vessels remained two days, then proceeded to Angra Pequena on the west coast of Africa, where they, were afterward joined by the Alabama. On leaving the bay they were communicated with by a steamer. The Sea Bride and her cargo were sold at Angra Pequena to an English subject who resided at Cape Town. The Tuscaloosa also landed there her cargo of wool.¹⁰

The Tuscaloosa and Sea Bride were ordered to Angra Pequena by Captain Semmes. “The object of sending the Tuscaloosa there was to get wool taken out of her and replaced by ballast. * * * Captain Semmes had previously had an offer for the Sea Bride, which he resolved to accept. * * * A day was fixed for both the Tuscaloosa and Sea Bride to be at anchor in the harbor of Angra Pequena. Upon that day Captain Semmes took in the Alabama, met the parties who had made him the offer for the Sea Bride, and completed the sale of her. * * * The wool was taken out of the Tuscaloosa and landed, * * * and is now (September 19) on its way to market.”¹¹

The account of the transaction, as given by Captain Semmes himself, is as follows:

Tuscaloosa went to sea at daylight on the 14th, and we followed her in the Alabama the next day. The former was to proceed to Saldanha Bay, and thence take the Sea Bride with her to one of the uninhabited harbors, some distance to the northward, and the Alabama was to follow her thither after a cruise of a few days off the Cape. At length, when I supposed the Tuscaloosa and the Sea Bride had reached their destination, I filled away and followed them. On the morning of the 28th of August we sighted the land, after having been delayed by a dense fog for twenty-four hours, and in the course of the afternoon we ran into the bay of Angra Pequena and anchored. This was our point of rendezvous. I found the Tuscaloosa and the Sea Bride both at anchor. I had at last found a port into which I could take a prize. I was now, in short, among the Hottentots, no civilized nation claiming jurisdiction over the waters in which I was anchored. When at Cape Town an English merchant had visited me, and made overtures for the purchase of the Sea Bride and her cargo. He was willing to run the risk of non-condemnation by a prize-court, and I could put him in possession of the prize, he said, at some inlet on the coast of Africa without the jurisdiction of any civilized power. I made the sale to him. He was to repair to the given rendezvous in his own vessel, and I found him here, according to his agreement, with the stipulated price—about one-third the value of the ship and cargo—in good English sovereigns, which, upon being counted, were turned over to the paymaster for the military chest. The purchaser was then put in possession of the prize. I had made an arrangement with other parties for the sale of the wool still remaining on board the Tuscaloosa. This wool was to be landed at Angra Pequena also, the purchaser agreeing to ship it to Europe, and credit the Confederate States with two-thirds of the proceeds.¹At Simon’s Bay.

On the 16th of September the Alabama again arrived at Simon’s Bay.² Upon his arrival Captain Semmes immediately waited upon Bear-Admiral Walker and “frankly explained” to him, as the Admiral reported to the Secretary of the Admiralty on the 17th, his proceedings at Angra Pequena.³ On the 19th a full account, as given by Captain Semmes to a reporter on the 18th, was published in the Cape Town Argus.⁴

Captain Semmes returned to the port at Simon’s Bay “for coal, some provisions, and to repair her condensing apparatus.”⁵ He would not have come back there, “but his condensing apparatus got out of order.”⁶

The Alabama remained in port until 3 p. m. of the 24th, when, having completed her repairs and taken on a supply of coal, she sailed for the Indian seas. “The officers of the station were as courteous” as before, and Captain Semmes renewed his “very pleasant intercourse with the Admiral’s family.”⁷

On the 22d of December she arrived at Singapore, also within the jurisdiction of Her Majesty’s Government, and was supplied with coal and provisions. While there, some of the crew having deserted, Captain Semmes “permitted half a dozen picked fellows to come on board, to be shipped as soon as we should get out into the strait.”⁸At Singapore.

On the 20th of March the Alabama again arrived at Simon’s Bay. Captain Semmes was “permitted to receive a supply of coal, and complete provisions,” after which he nut to sea on the 25th.⁹ From there she proceeded to Cherbourg in France, at which place she arrived on the 11th of June. On the 19th she left that port to engage the United States steamer Kearsarge, and was sunk in the engagement, many of her officers escaping to Great Britain in an English yacht which came out from Cherbourg to witness the action.¹⁰At Simon’s Bay: coals and provisions.Is destroyed by the Kearsarge, June 19, 1864.

Thus it will be seen that in a cruise of about two years, the Alabama received all her repairs, previous to her arrival at Cherbourg, (except such as could be made in the open sea or at anchorages found in uninhabited islands,) in the ports of Great Britain. She was supplied with coal from Great Britain exclusively, except once when it was taken from one of her prizes and once at Bahia. This last would not, however, have been allowed, had the facts in relation to her conduct in the waters of His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil been known at the time. Having made “Rata Island the base of her operations, for to that place she carried prizes, and from thence proceeded to make others, which she ordered to be burnt, after having kept them there some days at the anchorage place of that island,” His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil “ordered that the said steamer be no more received in any port of the Empire.”¹Reasons why Great Britain is responsible for acts of.

The “toleration” of such abuses was, in the opinion of His Majesty, “equivalent to permitting the ports of the Empire to serve as bases for operations for the belligerents.”² Therefore, this first “disrespect to the sovereignty” of that Empire was followed, as soon as discovered, by a peremptory order of banishment.

The United States ask the Arbitrators to contrast this conduct with that of the Government of Her Majesty.

This vessel was built and specially adapted to warlike use in Great Britain, and in violation of the laws of that sovereignty. She sailed from a port in that sovereignty, unarmed, but fitted in all respects to receive her armament; she escaped after her detention by the Government had been determined upon; her armament was constructed in Great Britain; her ammunition, stores, and crew were all provided there; these were shipped by the insurgents on board of English vessels in English ports, transported to the waters of another Government, under the English flag, and there transferred. After her cruise commenced, her coal was supplied from Great Britain in English vessels dispatched from English ports, with instructions to proceed to places of rendezvous arranged by “preconcerted agreement” through agents of the insurgents, having their places of business, and carrying on the operations of their government, upon English soil.

She sailed a distance of more than fifteen hundred miles to reach an English port after an engagement with the enemy only twenty-five miles from one of her own ports, in order to repair damages and refit. While cruising along the coast, going from one port to another in British jurisdiction, within cannon-shot of the shore, and in sight of the town in which was located the seat of the colonial government of Her Majesty, she captured an innocent merchantman and “inadvertently” brought it within the territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty. While again coasting between other ports of Her Majesty’s dominions she again chased and detained another merchantman, but upon being informed by one of the officers of Her Majesty’s Navy that this was within the jurisdiction of Her Majesty the captain again put in a plea of “inadvertence” and released his prize.

She brought an uncondemned prize into a port of Her Majesty under pretense of a commission as a tender; her officers there made contracts for the sale to Her Majesty’s subjects of the prize cargo of this so-called tender, and of the prize vessel and cargo taken within sight of the land; and, in pursuance of an arrangement made in port, proceeded to an unfrequented island, and completed the sale of the uncondemned prizes by delivery and receipt of the purchase-money; and afterward, in an English port, her captain “permitted” a few picked fellows to come on board for “shipment” outside of the jurisdiction.

All these facts, save perhaps the last, were made known to Her Majesty’s Government as soon as they occurred, yet no “disrespect to the sovereignty” of Her Majesty was discovered; such practices were “tolerated;” the vessel, with her officers, was at all times and on all occasions admitted without hesitation to the hospitalities of all British ports, and “treated exactly as any United States man-of-war would have been.” In short, she was permitted at all times to do, in the ports of Great Britain, what, in the opinion of His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, was “equivalent” to their use as the bases of belligerent operations. During all this time no instructions were ever issued from the home Government which could, in any manner whatever, embarrass the operations of a vessel whose Government had so persistently abused and insulted the power and sovereignty of Her Majesty.

As to the vessel, therefore, the United States believe the Arbitrators will find that she was not only constructed and specially adapted to warlike use within Her Majesty’s jurisdiction, and that due diligence was not used to prevent her departure therefrom, but that after her departure she was permitted to use the ports and waters of Her Majesty as a base of naval operations against the United States.

As has been seen, the Tuscaloosa was commissioned as her tender, Before her arrival within the jurisdiction of Her Majesty’s Government at the Cape of Good Hope, she had captured and released upon ransom-bond one vessel. After her visit and supplies there, on the 13th of September, 1863, she captured and destroyed one more. As to her, Great Britain permitted her ports to be used as a base of belligerent operations. In addition to this, having been commissioned by the Alabama, her acts are to be treated as the acts of her principal.

1. Brit. Counter Case, p. 80.
2. Brit. Case, p. 118.
3. Brit. Counter Case, p. 80.
4. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 9.
5. Dudley to Seward, Am. App., vol. vi, p. 238.
1. British Case, p. 81.
2. Page 81.
3. Am. App., vol. i, p. 537.
4. Brit. Case, p. 81.
5. Page 81.
1. Brit. Case, p. 81.
2. Ibid., p. 82.
3. Brit. Case, p. 83.
4. Letter from Mr. Arbuthnot to Mr. Hammond, July 2, Brit. App., vol. i, p. 181.
5. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 183.
6. Am. App., vol. vii, p. 73.
1. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 183.
2. Ibid.
1. Brit. Case, p. 83.
2. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 181.
3. Brit. App., Counter Case, vol. v, p. 204.
4. Brit. Case, p. 84.
1. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 382.
2. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 386.
3. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 242.
4. Page 84.
1. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 488.
2. Brit. Case, p. 85.
3. Ibid., p. 86.
4. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 184.
5. Brit. Case, p. 86.
6. Ibid.
1. Brit. Case, p. 83.
2. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 247.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 187.
5. Ibid., p. 244.
6. Ibid., p. 245.
1. American Appendix, vol. vi, p. 395.
2. British Case, p. 87.
6. Ibid.
4. British Case, p. 90.
5. British Appendix, vol. i, p. 188.
6. Ibid.
7. British Appendix, vol. i, p. 248.
8. British Appendix, vol. i, p. 246.
1. British Case, p. 91.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Dudley to Seward, British Appendix, vol. i, p. 245; Squarey to Gardner, Ibid., p. 194.
6. British Appendix, vol. i, p. 196; British Case, p. 93.
7. British Appendix, vol. i, p. 194.
1. Brit. Case, p. 94.
2. Ibid.
3. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 248.
4. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 246.
5. Brit. Case, p. 94.
6. Brit. Case, 95.
7. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 405.
8. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 246.
1. Edwards to Commrs. of Customs, Brit. App., vol. i, p. 188.
2. Squarey to Gardner, Brit. App., vol. i, p. 194.
3. Dudley to Adams, Am. App., vol. vii, p. 76.
4. Mr. Laird in the House of Commons, Am. App., vol. v, p. 694.
5. Ibid., Am. App., vol. iv, p. 528; Hansard, vol. clxx, p. 90.
6. Brit. Case, p. 84.
7. ibid., p. 95.
8. Sir Roundell Palmer in the House of Commons, Aug. 4, 1871, Am. Case, p. 373.
9. Adams to Seward, Brit. App., vol. i, 249.
10. Page 118.
1. Brit. Case, p. 96.
2. Report Commrs. Customs, Brit. App., vol. i, p. 226.
3. Brit. Case, p. 97.
4. Brit. Case, p. 96; Am. App., vol. vi, p. 407.
5. Brit. Case, p. 97.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 98.
1. Brit. Case, p. 98.
2. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 202.
3. Ibid., p. 205.
4. Brit. App., vol. i. p. 203.
5. Am. App., vol. i, p. 585; Brit. Blue Book, (North America,) No. 1, 1864, p. 2.
6. Am. App., vol. v, p. 528; Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, vol. clxxiii, pp. 634, 634.
7. Am. App., vol. v, p. 690.
1. Am. App., vol. v., p. 693.
2. Am. App. Counter Case, 1158, 1165, 1166.
3. Ante, pp. 78, 88.
4. Brit. App., vol. ii, p. 352. On the 26th October, 1863, the law-officers of the Crown, on being inquired of as “to the course which, under the circumstances, * * should be adopted” by Her Majesty’s Government in respect to these iron-clads, replied, “We are of opinion that it is competent to them to direct those vessels to be detained in any place which the commissioners of Her Majesty’s customs may think fit to order under section 223 of 16 and 17 Viet., cap. 107, (the customs law consolidation act,) which is incorporated by reference into the foreign-enlistment act, 59 Geo. III, cap. 69, sec. 7.” Brit. App., vol. ii, p. 419.
1. Brit. Case, p. 83.
2. Am. App., vol. vii, p. 76.
3. Am. App., vol. v, p. 579.
4. Ibid., p. 593.
5. Am. App., vol. v, p. 690.
1. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 338.
2. Brit. Case, pp. 100, 101, 104.
3. Ibid., p. 104.
4. Ibid.
5. Am. App., Counter-Case, p. 1013.
6. Brit. Case, p. 105.
7. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 214; Brit. Case, p. 105.
8. Brit. Case, p. 107.
9. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 257; Am. App., vol. vi, p. 491.
10. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 213.
11. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 491.
12. British Case, p. 107.
1. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 491.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Am. App., vol. vi, pp. 492, 493.
5. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 264.
6. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 267.
7. Ibid., p. 264.
8. Ibid., p. 202.
9. Ibid., p. 211.
10. Ibid., p. 212.
11. Ibid., p. 209.
12. Ibid., p. 264.
1. Brit. App., p. 268.
2. Ibid., p. 269.
3. Ibid., p. 270.
4. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 493.
5. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 269.
6. Ibid., p. 264.
7. Ibid., p. 276.
8. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 493; Brit. App., vol. i, p. 272.
9. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 272.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
1. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 293.
2. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 299.
3. Brit. Case, p. 111.
4. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 368.
5. Ibid., p. 301.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 312.
9. Ibid., p. 313.
10. Ibid., pp. 318, 319.
11. Ibid., p. 314.
1. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 307.
2. Ibid., p. 316.
3. Ibid., p. 317.
4. Ibid., p. 329.
5. Brit. Case, p. 113.
6. Brit. App., vol i, p. 310.
7. Ibid., p. 308.
8. Ibid., p. 311.
9. Brit. Case, p. 113.
10. Forsyth to Walker, Brit. App., vol. i, p. 324; Walker to Admiralty, ibid., p. 325.
11. Am. App., vol. vi, pp. 454, 455.
1. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 498.
2. Brit. Case, p. 115.
3. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 325.
4. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 453.
5. Brit. App., vol. vi, p. 325.
6. Am. App., vol. vi, p. 455.
7. Ibid., p. 499.
8. Ibid., p. 501.
9. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 372.
10. Brit. Case, p. 116.
1. Brit. App., vol. i, p. 295.
2. Ibid., p. 294.