This volume is organized along chronological lines in one large chapter covering 1950–1955, and a second chapter that includes the key National Security Council Intelligence Directives of the period. The volume documents the institutional growth of the intelligence community during the first half of the 1950s. When Lt. General Walter Bedell Smith took over as Director of Central Intelligence in October 1950, he inherited an agency that was widely believed to have been unable to establish itself as the central institution of the U.S. intelligence community. Utilizing his great prestige, and a national security directive from President Truman, Smith established the multiple directorate structure within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that has continued to this day, brought the clandestine service into the CIA, and worked to effect greater inter-agency coordination through a strengthened process to produce National Intelligence Estimates. The exponential growth of the national security establishment and of the intelligence community was due to the impact of two factors: NSC 68 (a clarion call for more active containment of the Soviet Union) and the Korean War. The Central Intelligence Agency was called upon to expand the clandestine service, and the intelligence community was required to provide better and more definitive intelligence on the Soviet bloc and China. When Allen Dulles took over as Director of Central Intelligence in February 1953, these pressures continued. By 1955, the general consensus of two commissions appointed by President Eisenhower to review the intelligence effort was that the clandestine service had grown too rapidly and was plagued by poor management. In general, the commission implied that the clandestine service’s growth had come at the expense of the agency’s intelligence analysts.
This volume is part of a sub-series of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the foreign policy of the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower. It is a supplement to the 1983 publication of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume IV, American Republics. Volume IV covered both multilateral relations as well as bilateral relations for 20 American Republics, including Guatemala. The historian who collected and prepared the volume knew that the compilation on Guatemala as published was incomplete and flawed. The role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the ouster of Guatemala's elected president, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, was not documented in the volume.
This volume fills in many details about the role of the United States in Guatemala in the early 1950s. The CIA operation in Guatemala is an important instance of the use of covert action to implement U.S. foreign policy, and this volume provides a detailed account of that action. Because the focus of this volume is on a covert program, the documents published in the 1952-1954 American Republics volume are not reprinted here, but footnotes and editorial notes refer back to the more significant overt aspects covered in the volume published in 1983. The two volumes complement each other and should be read together for a full and comprehensive account.
Document selection for this volume proceeded on the basis of a research plan developed by the editors after a preliminary review of repositories in both governmental and private agencies. From the outset the editors also approached their research with the recognition of the need to supplement the written record of U.S. policy during the Vietnam war with interviews of officials who participated in the policy process. Early attention was also given to those oral history interviews of participants already in existence and available in various locations.
On the basis of their preliminary research and the review of already-published documentation, including the Pentagon Papers of 1971, the editors developed the following five major general areas of focus for the research and selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) Discussion and formulation of policy in Washington; 2) Policy implementation; 3) Reports from the Embassy in Saigon; 4) U.S. military involvement in Vietnam; and 5) Intelligence activities.
Preparation of this volume proceeded in 1984 on the basis of a research plan developed by the editors after a preliminary review of repositories in both governmental and private agencies. From the outset the editors approached their research realizing the need to supplement the written record of U.S. policy during the Vietnam war with interviews of officials who participated in the policy process. They also reviewed those oral history interviews of participants already in existence and available in various locations. Oral history citations are provided in the footnotes to the text.
On the basis of their preliminary research and review of already published documentation, including the 1971 "Pentagon Papers,'' the editors developed the following six areas of focus for further research and the selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) Discussion and formulation of policy in Washington; 2) Policy implementation in South Vietnam; 3) The relationship among the United States Government, the Diem government, and dissident elements in South Vietnam; 4) The implications of the Buddhist crisis which developed in May; 5) U.S. intelligence assessments of the situation in Vietnam and the viability of the Diem government and the prospects of a potential coup; and 6) U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. The editors did take careful account of the documentation in the "Pentagon Papers,'' but have, in general, sought to avoid reprinting documents already published there.
Document selection for this volume proceeded on the basis of a research plan developed by the editors after a preliminary review of repositories in both governmental and private agencies. From the outset the editors approached their research realizing the need to supplement the written record of U.S. policy during the Vietnam war with interviews of officials who participated in the policy process. Early attention was also given to those oral history interviews of participants already in existence and available in various locations. Oral history citations are provided in the footnotes to the text.
On the basis of their preliminary research and review of already-published documentation, including the 1971 "Pentagon Papers," the editors developed the following five areas of focus for the research and selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) Discussion and formulation of policy in Washington; 2) Policy implementation in South Vietnam; 3) The relationship among the United States Government, the Diem government, and dissident elements in South Vietnam; 4) U.S. intelligence assessments of the viability of the Diem government and the prospects of potential coup plotters; and 5) U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.
The editors have assembled and present in this volume the complete official record of President Kennedy's meetings with Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev at the Vienna Summit Conference, June 3-4, 1961, together with the related U.S. delegation records of the conference, the essential pre-conference preparatory correspondence and internal discussions, and the post mortems regarding the conference. A guide to the broader universe of State Department documentation at the National Archives and Presidential records at the John F. Kennedy Library is also included.
Also presented in this volume are the records of the major high-level U.S. meetings, policy discussions, working papers, and the principal comprehensive reports from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow regarding ongoing U.S.-Soviet conflicts. These major policy discussions and papers take up or touch upon a broad range of issues comprising U.S.-Soviet relations. This comprehensive accounting is more fully presented in more than 100 chronologically located editorial notes that describe major diplomatic episodes in U.S.-Soviet relations in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia and the ongoing arms control exchanges between the two nations that are fully documented in other volumes of the Foreign Relations series for the Kennedy presidency. This is an unprecedented procedure for the Foreign Relations series. It reflects the editors' conviction that users of the series require in one volume a synthesis of what is spread over nine volumes documenting the 1961-1963 period.
Volume VI presents the complete correspondence between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. It is important for an understanding of this critical phase in U.S.-Soviet relations that this correspondence be collected and published in one volume rather than being dispersed through six or more volumes of this Foreign Relations subseries where particular issues considered by the leaders are relevant. The exchange of correspondence obviously had its own internal coherence as well as periodically addressing one or another of the ongoing crisis issues between the two nations documented fully elsewhere in the series. The collected correspondence offers in one volume a comprehensive overview of major Cold War problems and possibilities.
This correspondence includes both formal and public exchanges as well as the more informal and very confidential exchanges, transmitted through special emissaries, which became known as the "pen pal" correspondence. The channel was intended to give the two men a chance to exchange ideas in a "purely informal and personal way," as expressed by Chairman Khrushchev in his letter of September 29, 1961. Some of the informal messages were, however, made public immediately, sometimes before the recipient received them, but most of the messages were declassified only in later decades. The editors have indicated in the source footnotes if and when a communication was released to the public if that information was found.
The primary focus of the documents in this volume is on the foreign policymaking process of the U.S. Government, including documentation illuminating policy formulation and major aspects and repercussions of its execution. Emphasis is placed on official memoranda that reveal policy positions, show differences within the U.S. Government over policy formulation, summarize developments and positions regarding an issue, contain intelligence or military assessments, and describe decisions or actions taken in the National Security Council. Some key instructions sent to diplomatic posts are included when they demonstrate the details of the execution of a policy. Memoranda of conversations with foreign leaders both abroad and in Washington were selected to provide additional information on the origins and impact of foreign policy decisions.
The major topics and issues the editors sought to cover in volume VII are as follows:
1) Debate within the administration over whether to resume nuclear testing.
2) Arms control bilateral talks with the Soviet Union and multilateral negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva.
3) Relations with U.S. allies, especially the United Kingdom, on the issue of nuclear testing.
4) Internal administration discussions on the relative merits and feasibility of negotiating a comprehensive test ban agreement versus a more limited treaty.
5) Initiation of talks on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons (nuclear non-proliferation) with U.S. allies, especially the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany, as well as with the Soviet Union.
6) Negotiations by the President's special emissary W. Averell Harriman leading to the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
7) The Kennedy administration's efforts to gain the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Senate for the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
The primary focus of the documents in this volume is on the foreign policymaking process of the U.S. Government, including documentation illuminating policy formulation and major aspects and repercussions of its execution. Emphasis is placed on official memoranda that reveal policy positions, show differences within the U.S. Government over policy formulation, summarize developments and positions regarding an issue, contain intelligence or military assessments, and describe decisions or actions taken in the National Security Council.
The editor sought principally to cover four interrelated developments in U.S. national security policy:
1. Upon taking office, the Kennedy administration dismantled much of the existing policymaking machinery of the National Security Council (NSC) and substituted a more unstructured policymaking style. The President met less frequently with the full NSC than had been the case in the preceding Eisenhower administration. In the 1958-1960 triennium, the Council met 125 times, while under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson during 1961-1963, it met formally only 46 times. The change was progressive; while the Council convened 21 times under Kennedy in 1961, it met only 13 times in 1963. At the same time, the role of the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs was enhanced and the administration continuously created issue-oriented, ad hoc bodies to deal with specific countries and crises. From time to time McGeorge Bundy attempted to reintroduce more regularized policymaking procedures. The NSC Standing Group was one result of these efforts. Documentation providing some additional details on the transformed administrative role of the National Security Council is scheduled for volume XXV.
2. Leading Kennedy administration policymakers in the White House, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense, but not the President himself, worked to frame a basic national security policy (BNSP), which would replace NSC 5906/1 of July 1959, the last such statement of policy in the preceding administration. While he had little interest in an umbrella BNSP paper, President Kennedy did from time to time set forth a multi-subject overview of U.S. policy, either in the full NSC meetings or with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3. President Kennedy took a special interest in strengthening U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities. Aided by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, he constantly prodded policymakers to do more in this area.
4. Under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the United States gradually formulated a comprehensive set of doctrines on strategic military posture, particularly with regard to the role of nuclear weapons and of conventional land-based forces. These policies evolved throughout the triennium and were most definitively expressed in a series of Draft Presidential Memoranda, or DPMs, from McNamara to the President.
In general, the editors of this volume, the research and editing of which was completed in 1992, have defined a "major issue" as a foreign economic policy or problem that received high-level attention within the U.S. Government, from the President, key White House aides, or Cabinet-level officials; and/or had long-range repercussions for U.S. foreign policy and interests. While it was impossible to include the details of U.S. policy on every foreign economic issue, documentation has been included, either in the print volume or the microfiche supplement, that delineates basic U.S. policies toward the subjects in question.
The major topics and issues the editors sought to cover in volume IX are 1) Policies to reverse the deteriorating U.S. balance of payments.
2) Burdensharing negotiations to permit reductions in U.S. expenditures abroad.
3) Multilateral trade negotiations aimed at increasing U.S. exports abroad.
4) New foreign assistance policy aimed at moving the developing nations into self-sustained economic growth.
5) Promotion of U.S. economic and military assistance and development goals in multilateral forums.
6) Debate over liberalization of U.S. trade control criteria vis-a-vis the Sino-Soviet bloc.
7) Disposal of the surplus of the U.S. stockpile of strategic materials.
In the first months of the Kennedy administration a crisis arose over the final planning and launching of the failed invasion of the Bay of Pigs. The failure of the invasion led to a searching reexamination of Cuba policy. In addition, President Kennedy established a committee under former Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor and Attorney General Robert Kennedy to examine the causes of the defeat suffered at the Bay of Pigs. The editor has selected the primary documents relating to the policy reassessment, as well as the records of the most important testimony taken by the Taylor committee and the committee's ultimate report to the President.
The policy assessment initiated in May 1961 led in November of that year to a decision to implement a new covert program to undermine and overthrow the Castro government in Cuba. This program was codenamed Operation Mongoose and much of the remainder of the volume after November 1961 is devoted to documenting Operation Mongoose. Oversight for Operation Mongoose was provided by the 5412/Special Group expanded to include General Taylor and Attorney General Kennedy. The focus of documentation selected on Operation Mongoose is on decisions made by the Special Group (Augmented) and their recommendations to President Kennedy.
Planning for Operation Mongoose was given additional impetus in the spring of 1962 by reports of expanded arms shipments from the Soviet Union to Cuba. The editor has included a selection of intelligence reports that indicated the growing concern in Washington over these shipments. These reports reveal a debate within the intelligence community in September over whether the Soviet weapons being introduced into Cuba included ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. The volume concludes with clear warnings from the United States to the Soviet Union that the introduction of such weapons into Cuba would precipitate a major crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations.
The editors of the volume focused much of their selection on documenting the most serious U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War, the Cuban missile crisis and its aftermath. Although the crisis itself was short, it was so intense that it absorbed the entire attention of President Kennedy and his closest advisers. Much of the documentation printed in this volume relates to discussions with key Soviet officials through a variety of channels ranging from Kennedy-Khrushchev letters to communications through an American newsman with a Soviet official. Because of space constraints, the editors have included only the most important examples of the frequent and detailed consultation with key allies regarding the crisis.
The documentation printed in this volume focuses on U.S. policy toward the American Republics of the Caribbean, Central, and South America. The guiding principle for selection was high-level interest within the Kennedy administration in policy and relations toward a specific country. This focus tends to give more coverage to countries in which there were crisis or specific problems and de-emphasizes countries that had basically good relations with the United States during the period. Documents were selected that highlight policy discussions within the U.S. Government, with particular emphasis on the highest level at which policy on a particular subject was determined, that revealed policy positions and internal differences over policy, and that summarized developments or positions regarding an issue. Records of conversations with foreign leaders both abroad and in Washington were selected to illuminate U.S. relations with those countries. Embassy reportage is limited to particularly significant cables that may have influenced or contributed to the making of U.S. policy at critical points. A number of relevant documents that conveyed finished intelligence to U.S. policymakers, in particular National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates, are included.
In selecting documents for inclusion in volume XIII, the editors recognized the predominant role of the Department of State in formulating policy with respect to Western Europe and Canada. This volume focuses on the many meetings of the Secretary of State with his advisers and with representatives of the White House and other agencies, as well as the written advice to the Secretary of State from these advisers. The editors have included internal U.S. Government policy recommenda- tions and decision papers relating to Western Europe and Canada. They have also included the advice and recommendations on foreign policy issues from top-level military commanders and advisers with regard to NATO. In focusing on the major lines of policy development toward Western Europe and Canada, the editors have also presented a record of the U.S. reaction and response to the major political events within France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Canada insofar as they figured directly in ongoing high-level political negotiations.
The volume presents a comprehensive collection of the records of the President's meetings with heads of state and government with respect to Berlin. Also presented are records of the principal negotiations on policy and military contingency planning regarding Germany and the Berlin crisis that took place among the Western Allies as well as with representatives of the Soviet Union.
In focusing on the major lines of the development of the crisis, the editors have expanded the principles of selection adopted for previous volumes documenting the Berlin problem, focusing more extensively on its military aspects. As before, they have presented a record of the U.S. reaction and response to the major political events within the Federal Republic of Germany insofar as they figured directly in ongoing high-level political negotiations.
Intelligence information regarding Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin and Germany in general was vitally important during the Berlin crisis and found its way into political documents selected for publication. The editors did not, however, attempt to document any particular operational activities by intelligence authorities in connection with the German problem or to explore the scope and impact of intelligence operations.
In selecting documents for inclusion in volume XV, the editors recognized the predominant role of President Kennedy and his advisers at the White House in formulating policy with respect to Berlin and to the German question. This volume focuses on the many meetings of the President with his advisers from the White House, the Department of State, and other agencies, as well as the written advice to the President from these advisers. The editors have selected from White House, Department of State, and National Defense University records memoranda of conversation and records of meetings between the President and his principal foreign policy advisers. They have also included internal U.S. Government policy recommendations and decision papers relating to Berlin. The editors also included the advice and recommendations on foreign policy issues from top-level military commanders and advisers.
The editors also focused on the principal aspects of the military contingency planning regarding Germany and the Berlin crisis that took place among the Western Allies as well as with representatives of the Soviet Union. Normal command and control activities of U.S. forces were not researched.
In focusing on the major lines of the development of the crisis, the editors have also presented a record of the U.S. reaction and response to the major political events within the Federal Republic of Germany insofar as they figured directly in ongoing high-level political negotiations.
Intelligence information regarding Soviet intentions with respect to Berlin and Germany in general was vitally important during the Berlin crisis and is reflected in the political documents selected for publication. The editors did not, however, attempt to document any particular operational activities by intelligence authorities in connection with the German problem or to explore the scope and impact of intelligence operations.
The documentation printed in this volume presents the major actions and discussions of the U.S. Government toward the states of Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia), three states of the Eastern Mediterranean (Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey), and Austria and Finland.
A single Eastern European regional compilation includes documentation on U.S. relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. In general, these documents illustrate the very limited contacts between the United States and these satellite nations and focus primarily on limited economic ties. Documentation on Hungarian efforts to secure a seat in the United Nations will be printed in volume XXV, General; United Nations. The documentation on Poland focuses on U.S. efforts to employ limited economic assistance as a tool to gain diplomatic leverage with an important Warsaw Pact state. Documentation relating to Yugoslavia deals with the continuing U.S. policy of providing support to this Communist state in order to ensure its independence from Soviet control.
The Eastern Mediterranean was an area of growing tension and instability during the early 1960s. The Cyprus portion of the volume outlines U.S. efforts to promote intercommunal harmony and to establish a firm working relationship with the government of the newly independent Cypriot Republic. Documentation on Greece and Turkey deals with U.S. efforts to provide military and economic assistance to these two states and ensure their domestic political stability.
This volume also provides coverage of U.S. relations with two important neutral nations bordering on the Soviet Bloc. Documentation on Austria deals primarily with U.S.-Austrian discussions regarding improvements in Austrian defense capabilities. Documentation on Finland outlines the U.S. response to the Finno-Soviet crisis of November 1961 and subsequent U.S. efforts to bolster Finnish security and independence, including the question of arms supply.
The primary focus of the documents in this volume is on the foreign policymaking process of the U.S. Government, including documentation illuminating policy formulation and major aspects and repercussions of its execution. Emphasis is placed on official memoranda that reveal policy positions, show differences within the U.S. Government over policy formulation, summarize developments and positions regarding an issue, contain intelligence or military assessments, and describe decisions or actions taken at the National Security Council. Some key instructions sent to diplomatic posts in the region are included when they demonstrate the details of the execution of foreign policy. Memoranda of conversations with foreign leaders both abroad and in Washington were selected to provide additional information on the origins and impact of foreign policy decisions. The major topics and issues covered in volume XVII are as follows:
1. Interagency review of U.S. policy toward Iran and the U.S. decision to support a program of reform in that country. This topic received the greatest amount of coverage in the volume because of the extensive attention given to it by the highest levels of the U.S. Government and because the decision to support a program of economic and social, but not political, reform and to throw complete U.S. support behind Iranian Prime Minister Ali Amini had important ramifications for subsequent U.S.-Iranian relations. Records of discussions with the Shah, especially during his June 1964 visit to the United States, are included.
Additional documentation dealing with the interagency review and containing additional details relating to U.S. economic and military assistance programs in Iran is included in the compilation on Iran in the microfiche supplement.
2. Policies toward and efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. Documentation is included describing U.S. policies and positions toward the numerous issues of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The most extensive coverage is given to U.S. support for and involvement in an initiative to resolve the Palestinian refugee question conducted by Joseph Johnson, who was a special representative of the U.N. Palestine Conciliation Commission.
Other issues include incidents of violence and violations of the 1949 Armistice Agreements, the Jerusalem question, Arab-Israeli differences over distribution of the waters of the Jordan River, matters relating to refugees and to Palestinian political organization, the Arab boycott of Israel, the question of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, Arab treatment of non-Israeli Jews, location of foreign Embassies in Israel, and Israeli border questions. Documentation concerning U.N. General Assembly and Security Council consideration of Arab-Israeli issues and on interactions between U.S. domestic politics and U.S. Arab-Israeli policies is also included.
3. U.S. efforts to improve U.S. relations with President Nasser of the United Arab Republic. An important focus of the volume is the policy discussion and debate within the U.S. Government concerning the possibility of improving U.S. relations with Nasser. This policy review addressed questions of U.S. economic assistance to the United Arab Republic and whether to invite Nasser on a State visit to Washington. U.S. policy concerning economic assistance to the United Arab Republic is a major subject, but specific economic assistance programs are not covered in detail. The volume includes reports of conversations between U.S. officials and Nasser, important intelligence assessments concerning Nasser and his country, records of the most important correspondence between Presidents Kennedy and Nasser, and material showing the interest of key White House aides in improving relations with Nasser and President Kennedy's views on this subject, as well as some reporting on political developments within the country and on Nasser's relations with other Arab countries and Iran.
4. Israeli security issues. Among the most important issues covered in the volume is the background to the U.S. decision in August 1962 to supply Israel with the Hawk missile, the first major weapon system provided to Israel by the United States. Another issue documented in the volume is U.S. concern over Israel's nuclear reactor at Dimona. Little coverage is given in this volume to U.S. economic assistance to Israel or to political developments within Israel, although some additional documentation on these topics is included in the microfiche supplement.
5. The withdrawal of Syria from the United Arab Republic.
U.S. officials were concerned that Syria's withdrawal from its union with Egypt in September 1961 might lead to a general Near East war with disastrous ramifications for U.S. interests. The editor has selected substantial documentation on the U.S. response to this event, primarily handled through diplomatic channels, including the available White House documentation. Special attention was also given to the formulation of U.S. policy toward the new Syrian Government.
6. The Kuwait crisis of 1961. The editor has included documentation on the reaction of the United States during the brief crisis that developed when Iraq reasserted claims to Kuwait at the time of Kuwait's independence from the United Kingdom.
The primary focus of the documents in this volume is on the foreign policymaking process of the U.S. Government, including documentation illuminating policy formulation and major aspects and repercussions of its execution. Emphasis is placed on official memoranda that reveal policy positions, show differences within the U.S. Government over policy formulation, summarize developments and positions regarding an issue, contain intelligence or military assessments, and describe decisions or actions taken at the National Security Council. Some key instructions sent to diplomatic posts in the region are included when they demonstrate the details of the execution of foreign policy. Memoranda of conversations with foreign leaders both abroad and in Washington were selected to provide additional information on the origins and impact of foreign policy decisions.
The major topics and issues covered in volume XVIII are as follows:
1. U.S. policy toward the conflict in Yemen and relations with the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. The large amount of documentation on this subject in the volume reflects the extensive attention it received from the Kennedy administration. The material covered includes the U.S. response to the overthrow of the Yemeni monarchy and subsequent civil war in that country; background to the U.S. recognition of the Yemeni Republic in December 1962; U.S. efforts to mediate the conflict, including the mission of Ellsworth Bunker; and the dispatch of a U.S. air squadron to Saudi Arabia (Operation Hard Surface) in July 1963. The selection of documents reflects the regional nature of the Yemen conflict, with emphasis on U.S. relations with the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia, rather than on the situation in Yemen per se. The documents record how the U.S. initiative to improve relations with UAR President Gamal Abdul Nasser waned as the United States sought to assuage Saudi Arabia's concerns for its security. The volume concludes with growing U.S. Congressional opposition to the administration's program of economic assistance to the UAR.
2. Israeli security issues and the Near East arms question. Emphasis is given to administration efforts to meet Israel's security concerns, including the decision in August 1962 to supply Israel with the Hawk missile, the first major weapon system provided to Israel by the United States. The volume records administration efforts to respond to Israel's request for a U.S. security guarantee and includes documentation on U.S.-Israeli military discussions in November 1963. The volume also documents the U.S. desire to avert the introduction of advanced weapons in the region, President Kennedy's concern over Israel's nuclear program, and the mission of special Presidential emissary John J. McCloy to Cairo to discuss the possibility of mutual arms limitation by the UAR and Israel.
3. Policies toward the Arab-Israeli dispute. Special coverage is given to U.S. support for the initiative to resolve the Palestinian refugee question (Joseph Johnson mission), and the initiative's demise. The volume also records the U.S. position on a number of Arab-Israeli issues, including incidents of violence, deliberations in the United Nations, the Jerusalem question, Israel's desire for direct negotiations with its Arab neighbors, and the growing importance of the Near East water question.
4. U.S. policy toward Iran. This volume documents U.S. relations with Iran during the Shah's implementation of an extensive program of social and economic reforms which the Kennedy administration had urged him to undertake. It also records the U.S. response to the first signs of violent resistance to the Shah's regime from Iran's Islamic religious community.
5. Other significant U.S. policies in the region. The volume also records U.S. support for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan during a crisis that developed during the spring of 1963, the U.S. responses to coups d'etat in Syria and Iraq leading to changes in government, the U.S. reaction to inter-Arab unity talks in the spring of 1963, and U.S. concern over developments relating to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
The volume focuses upon the Kennedy administration's efforts to reorient U.S. policy with respect to South Asia by improving relations with India while maintaining the established alliance relationship with Pakistan. It includes documentation on the impact of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the Indian invasion of Portuguese Goa, and the impact of the Pushtunistan dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It documents U.S. efforts to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan and India, as well as the attempt to take advantage of the border war between India and China that developed in 1962 in order to forge a closer relationship between the United States and India. In general, the emphasis is on political developments, but documents are included on significant economic concerns, including the use of developmental economic assistance as an important element in the revised policy approach to South Asia. The primary issues, interests, and factors in U.S. policy toward South Asia during this period were often interwoven and affected each other subtly or in clear linkages. The editor determined that a chronological compilation offered a more accurate, comprehensible, and economical presentation of the relevant documentation than a division of the official record according to bilateral relations with particular governments.
This volume focuses on U.S. policy formulation and diplomacy with regard to the Congo crisis. It includes documentation on U.S. support of the U.N. intervention in the Congo, discussions with U.N. authorities, U.S. political and economic relations with the Republic of the Congo, U.S. efforts to ensure that the Congo Government remained Western-oriented and not Soviet-influenced, diplomatic efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the Katangan secession, and, after the conclusion of the crisis in early 1963, efforts to promote stability in the Congo and to bring about the withdrawal of U.N. forces. In general, the emphasis is on political developments, including military and intelligence components of such developments. Documentation is also included on significant economic concerns, including the possible use of economic sanctions to end the Katangan secession. U.S. logistical support to U.N. forces in the Congo is not documented except insofar as it raises policy issues, nor is the implementation of U.S. economic aid to the Congo.
The documentation printed in this volume focuses on U.S. policy toward Africa, the formulation of U.S. policy, and on the most significant aspects of U.S. political, economic, and military relationships with African governments. Documents were selected that highlight policy discussions within the U.S. Government, with particular emphasis on the highest level at which policy on a particular subject was determined, that reveal policy positions and internal differences over policy, and that summarize developments or positions regarding an issue. The records of conversations with foreign leaders both abroad and in Washington that particularly illuminated U.S. relations with those countries were included. Space constraints precluded the inclusion of the substantial body of documentation from Embassies and from agencies in Washington on internal developments in African countries. Embassy reportage is limited to particularly significant cables that may have influenced the making of U.S. policy on the most critical issues. A number of relevant documents that conveyed finished intelligence on Africa to U.S. policymakers, in particular National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates, are included, but no effort was made to document the wider role of intelligence in the formulation or execution of policy.
The issues covered in the North African compilations include U.S. support for French President de Gaulle's announced program of self-determination for Algeria and U.S. relations with the newly-established Algerian government after July 1962. Material is included on U.S. economic and military assistance to Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia; the importance of the U.S. airbases and communications facilities in Libya and Morocco; and U.S. withdrawal from the Moroccan bases in December 1963. U.S. support for a negotiated settlement of the French-Tunisian clash over the French naval base at Bizerte is documented, as is U.S. support for peaceful settlement of the 1963 Algerian-Moroccan border conflict.
The compilations on Sub-Saharan Africa focus on expanding U.S. economic and military aid to the newly-independent nations of Africa and U.S. efforts to prevent the nations of the region from falling under Soviet domination. Documentation is included on U.S. policy concerns such as the U.S. decision to proceed with aid for Ghana's Volta River project, the strategic importance of the U.S. military base at Kagnew Station in Ethiopia, and U.S. efforts to find a modus vivendi between Ethiopia and Somalia.
The Southern African compilations document U.S. support for peaceful transitions to stable, multi-racial societies in the white-ruled countries of Southern Africa. The documentation on Portuguese Africa shows the tension within U.S. policy, as the United States sought to balance its concern over Portugal's colonial policies in Angola and Mozambique against its desire to negotiate renewal of the Azores Base Agreement with its NATO ally, Portugal. The Rhodesian compilation documents U.S. support for British efforts to bring about full participation of the African populations of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the political process. The South African compilation deals with conclusion of a U.S. missile and satellite tracking station agreement with South Africa, and U.S. opposition to proposed mandatory U.N. economic sanctions against that country, as well as continuing U.S. opposition to the policy of apartheid and the unilateral U.S. embargo on arms shipments to South Africa announced in August 1963.
The documentation printed in this volume focuses on the formulation of U.S. policy toward North Asia, particularly the most significant aspects of U.S. political, economic, and military relationships with the Governments of Japan, Korea, and the Republic of China on Taiwan. Also included is documentation on U.S. policies toward the People's Republic of China and Mongolia, with which the United States had no official diplomatic relations.
President Kennedy in conjunction with key advisers made the major foreign policy decisions during his presidency, and the editors tried to document his role as much possible. The role of White House and National Security Council Staff members in providing information and advice to the President grew during this period. The editors accordingly selected memoranda that presented to the President the views and recommendations of his White House advisers. Formal approved policy papers were rare in the Kennedy administration, and internal discussions between the President and his advisers were not always recorded. The editors sought to document Presidential decisions by drawing upon the best material available. The Department of State continued to play a leading role in formulating foreign policy and providing advice on foreign policy matters to the President, and it played the principal role in exchanges of view and negotiations on policy matters with foreign governments. The volume includes documentation on a range of lesser policy decisions that did not reach the President or were resolved in the Department of State or other foreign affairs agencies.
In selecting documents for inclusion in volume XXIII, the editor focused on the actions of President Kennedy and his immediate advisers at the White House and elsewhere in the government in formulating policy with respect to Southeast Asia. This volume documents the meetings of the President with his advisers from the White House, the Department of State, and other agencies, as well as the written advice to the President from these advisers. The editors have also included the major internal U.S. Government policy recommendations and decision papers relating to Southeast Asia.
In the compilation on Indonesia, the role the United States played in expediting the transfer of West New Guinea from the Netherlands to Indonesia meant that much of the documentation printed relates to consultations with the two parties to the dispute. In the case of the confrontation between Indonesia and the British Commonwealth over the formation of Malaysia, consultations with the British and Australians become equally important. In the compilation on the Philippines, the role of the U.S. Congress is highlighted.
Intelligence assessments regarding Southeast Asia are reflected in documents selected for publication here. The capabilities of Indonesia and the Netherlands in a potential conflict over West New Guinea was a key intelligence question. Thailand's ability to meet the threat of Communist insurgency in its northeast region was another. Cambodia's orientation vis-a-vis the West and East was still another. The editor did not, however, attempt to document the details of operational activities by intelligence authorities in connection with Southeast Asia.
The editors included in this volume documents indicating the advice and recommendations on foreign policy issues from top-level military commanders and advisers. The editors also focused on the high-level discussion of military contingency planning regarding Laos. The Kennedy administration produced an inordinate amount of contingency plans for Laos, most of which were never implemented. The emphasis in this volume, however, is on the high-level consideration of contingency planning, rather than on the mechanics and details of the actual plans. Normal command and control activities of U.S. forces were not researched.
In focusing on the major lines of the development of the crisis, the editors have also presented a record of the U.S. reaction and response to the major political events within Laos since they figured directly in the formulation of policy and the political negotiations at the Geneva Conference.
Intelligence information regarding Pathet Lao, North Vietnamese, Chinese, and Soviet political and strategic intentions with respect to Laos is reflected in documents selected for publication here. The editors did not, however, attempt to document the operational activities by intelligence authorities in connection with Laos.
The editors of the volume sought to present documentation illuminating responsibility for major foreign policy decisions in the U.S. Government, with emphasis on the President and his advisers. The documents include memoranda and records of discussions that set forth policy issues and options and show decisions or actions taken. The emphasis is on the development of U.S. policy and on major aspects and repercussions of its execution rather than on the details of policy execution.
The first section of this volume deals with the organization and administration of foreign policy. Following the 1960 election, President-elect John F. Kennedy and his transition advisers focused on various proposals for modifying and streamlining the structure of the National Security Council apparatus. Documentation is presented on the interdepartmental review of foreign policy, the abolition of the Operations Coordinating Board, the use of Country Teams in the planning process, and enhanced involvement of the Vice President in national security affairs. This section also provides documentation on organizational changes in the Department of State, such as combining the positions of Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, upgrading the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, abolishing 109 intra- and inter-departmental committees, closing marginal consular posts, improving the reporting system, and planning for the use of automation to expedite Department operations. Another part of this section covers the organization and administration of the Intelligence Community. The documents on information policy presented in the volume illustrate the U.S. Information Agency's initiatives in seeking to cooperate more closely with the State Department and other U.S. Government agencies, to present U.S. foreign policy objectives to the world in a positive manner, and to assess more accurately foreign opinion of the United States and its policies.
President John F. Kennedy and his advisers took a keen interest in United Nations affairs. This volume includes documentation on the summer strategy sessions that discussed themes that the President would use when addressing the UN General Assembly. In the United Nations, U.S. policy shifted from supporting a "moratorium" on considering the question of Chinese representation to declaring it to be an "important question." Other major topics include the election of U Thant of Burma as Secretary-General after the death of Dag Hammarskjold, and the financing of UN operations in general and of peacekeeping operations in particular in view of Soviet opposition to paying for UN activities that it opposed.
Also presented are documents on Department of State involvement in the U.S. space program, U.S. cooperation with the Soviet Union in scientific research in outer space, support for UN resolutions concerning the peaceful uses of outer space, and the Department's role in the organization of space-based communications systems.
On the basis of preliminary research and review of already-published documentation, including the 1971 "Pentagon Papers," the editors developed the following five areas of focus for the research and selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) discussion and formulation of policy in Washington; 2) missions of high-level Johnson administration officials to South Vietnam and their recommendations; 3) planning for military operations against North Vietnam and the actual implementation of U.S. military operations in Vietnam; 4) the relationship among the U.S. Government, the Khanh government, and opposition elements in South Vietnam; 5) the implementation of policy in South Vietnam.
The editors developed the following six areas of focus for research and the selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) formulation of policy in Washington, with particular emphasis on the series of decisions that led to the commitment of major ground forces to Vietnam; 2) the advisory process, including recommendations from key advisers in Washington, intelligence assessments of the situation in Vietnam, and reporting and advice from U.S. officials in Saigon; 3) efforts to negotiate a settlement to the Vietnam conflict, and other key diplomatic contacts; 4) military planning and strategy; 5) the relationship between the United States Government and the South Vietnamese Government, including the issue of political instability in South Vietnam; and 6) the implementation of policy in South Vietnam.
The editors developed the following six areas of focus for research and the selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) formulation of policy in Washington, with particular emphasis on the decision to commit major ground forces to Vietnam and its consequences for policy makers; 2) the advisory process, including recommendations from key advisers in Washington, intelligence assessments of the situation in Vietnam, and reporting and advice from U.S. officials in Saigon; 3) efforts to negotiate a settlement to the Vietnam conflict, other key diplomatic contacts, and the issue of bombing pauses; 4) military planning and strategy and non-military programs in Vietnam; 5) the relationship between the United States Government and the South Vietnamese Government, including the issue of political instability in South Vietnam; and 6) the implementation of policy in South Vietnam.
The editors developed the following thematic areas of focus for research and the selection of documents for inclusion in this volume:
1) formulation of policy in Washington by the President and his advisers, the Cabinet, and other responsible officials, with particular emphasis on decisions concerning the air and the ground wars, the pacification program, peace negotiations, and relations with the Government of South Vietnam;
2) the advisory process, including recommendations from key advisers in Washington, intelligence assessments of the situation in Vietnam, and reporting and advice from U.S. officials in Saigon;
3) diplomatic efforts to initiate peace negotiations and other key diplomatic contacts;
4) efforts to make contact with officials of the National Liberation Front;
5) military planning and strategy, including pacification;
6) Executive-Congressional relationships in Washington and opposition to the Johnson administration's conduct of the war;
7) the relationship between the U.S. Government and the South Vietnamese Government, including meetings of political and military leaders and the issues of political instability and constitutional government in South Vietnam;
8) the implementation in South Vietnam of major foreign policy decisions of the President and ancillary policy actions directed by the Secretary of State.
The volume covers a broad range of topics and themes, the foremost of which is the U.S. effort to explore a possible negotiated settlement of the war. There is in-depth coverage of the major unsuccessful peace initiatives, Sunflower and Pennsylvania to the North Vietnamese and Buttercup to the National Liberation Front, as well as less detailed coverage of other peace initiatives thought at the time by U.S. policymakers to be less promising. Another major theme of the volume is the military intensification of the war effort to force the enemy to accept a peace settlement. The Presidential decisions to intensify the bombing campaign against North Vietnam and the long debate and final compromise decision by Johnson to augment the level of U.S. forces in Vietnam are part of this theme. The problem of U.S. domestic support for the war is another theme, as the Johnson administration grappled with building anti-war pressure. During the period covered by the volume, the Johnson administration named a new Ambassador to Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, put Robert Komer in charge of pacification and rural development, and then engaged in an effort to encourage reorganization and reform of the South Vietnam Government. This campaign, which had mixed results, is another main theme.
Documents in the volume also cover the South Vietnamese presidential elections, especially U.S. concerns about lack of unity between the two military contenders for the presidency. Another focus is the debate within the U.S. intelligence community over the size of the enemy in South Vietnam, the so-called "order of battle" controversy. During 1967 the administration conducted a reassessment of the war, a continuing theme of U.S. Vietnam policy, which resulted in advice to the President to stay the course.
The volume contains a number of major themes. Of primary importance to President Johnson was his and the Department of State’s continuing efforts to find a negotiated end to the war. The volume covers U.S. diplomatic contacts with Romania, Norway, and the Vatican to explore possible negotiation formulas with Hanoi in the hopes that they would lead to formal peace negotiations. Also covered are continued tentative prisoner of war contacts with the National Liberation Front in the hopes that they might lead to a separate political settlement. These diplomatic efforts were overshadowed by another major theme of the volume, the Tet Offensive and the resulting policy debate in Washington on whether to raise the number of U.S. troops in Vietnam. This debate led to a broader reassessment of U.S. policy in Vietnam, which culminated in the President’s order for a partial bombing halt of North Vietnam, his decision not to run for reelection, and an announcement of U.S. willingness to meet anywhere to negotiate peace. The search for a venue for the talks and attempts by advisers to convince the President to institute a full bombing halt comprise the final focus of the volume. Two other themes are evident in the volume, yet they are captured in only a few documents: the growing anti-war movement in the United States and the upcoming presidential elections of 1968. These two events affected discussions within the Johnson administration.
The editor of the volume sought to present documentation that explained and illuminated the major foreign policy decisions and problems on Vietnam faced by the President and his key foreign policy advisers during the last 4 and 1/2 months of his administration. The documents highlight the Johnson administration's slow and agonizing internal deliberations on how to achieve formal four-party peace negotiations on Vietnam in Paris. A good part of this search for peace was carried out during the 1968 Presidential election amid suspicions by the Democratic and Republican candidates, and President Lyndon Johnson himself, that the respective Presidential candidates were using the peace process to influence the election. In addition, both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) had their own demands for the procedures and modalities of the formal peace process, all of which had to be reconciled. This volume is the account of how the Johnson administration achieved the opening of formal four-party peace talks in Paris.
On the basis of a review of already published documentation, such as the American Foreign Policy series, Department of State Bulletin, and the annual reports of the Department of the Treasury, as well as research in government repositories, the editors decided to focus mainly on the following subjects for the research and selection of documents for inclusion in this volume: 1) balance-of-payments matters; 2) international financial matters, including decisions by the International Monetary Fund and the central bank governors; 3) a series of international monetary crises involving sterling, gold, and the French franc; and 4) trade and commercial subjects.
In response to the persistent and even worsening U.S. balance of payments, the Johnson administration developed several initiatives to attempt to ameliorate the situation. Because some of the bilateral and multilateral financial and monetary negotiations with foreign countries became intertwined with balance-of-payments matters, documentation on general balance-of-payments policy and international financial and monetary policy was combined in a single compilation. The other compilation in the volume, trade and commerce, covers export promotion programs and bilateral tariff issues but focuses particularly on the complicated multilateral Kennedy Round negotiations within the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
The editors selected only the most important reports from diplomatic posts, particularly those containing records of multilateral international conferences on economic subjects and significant conversations held with foreign leaders and their diplomatic representatives on economic issues. Details of military and economic assistance programs for specific nations or their implementation are not included.
The major topics and issues the editors sought to cover in volume IX are as follows:
1. Struggle for foreign economic and military assistance funding with Congress.
2. Initiatives on private investment in international development.
3. Promotion of U.S. international development goals in multilateral forums.
4. Growing attention given to the world food crisis.
5. Disposal of the surplus of the U.S. stockpile of strategic materials.
6. Efforts to negotiate multilateral agreements regarding international trade in agricultural commodities.
7. Interagency debate over liberalization of U.S. trade control criteria vis-a-vis the Sino-Soviet bloc.
The editor tried to document as much as possible the roles of President Lyndon Johnson and his key foreign policy advisers, particularly his White House assistants McGeorge Bundy and Walt W. Rostow, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in the administration's consideration of a wide range of national security issues. Major topics covered in the volume include: analyses of the Soviet military threat, the development of new U.S. weapons, the question of U.S. development and deployment of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, chemical and biological weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, counter-insurgency policy, improvement of command and control systems, and military force structure.
The editors have reviewed the already published official record, particularly the annual publication of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, and have examined documentation available in government repositories. They decided to focus the record published in this volume on the following subjects: 1) levels of production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons production; 2) negotiation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; 3) negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty; 4) seabed arms control policies and discussions; 5) nuclear testing policy and its relationship to a possible comprehensive test ban agreement; and 6) the origins of the talks with the Soviet Union on strategic offensive missile and defensive anti-missile systems.
The volume presents a comprehensive collection of the records of the Committee of Principals, a high-level interagency group that formulated policies on arms control issues for the President's approval. It also presents the authoritative record of the correspondence between President Johnson and Nikita Khrushchev and Alexei Kosygin, the President's Soviet counterparts, on disarmament matters.
The volume includes intelligence information, such as the ability to verify possible arms control agreements, which is contained in National Intelligence Estimates and memoranda prepared in the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The editors did not, however, attempt to document the more technical and scientific dimensions of verification or to explore fully the scope and impact of intelligence gathering on arms control policies. Nor did they seek to document the intelligence available to top policymakers regarding the activities and intentions of the Soviet Union in the arms control area.
The documentation printed in this volume highlights the central role of the Department of State in bilateral policy formulation toward individual Western European nations and Canada. The documentation on Denmark focuses on Danish nuclear policy on Greenland and a supplementary understanding reached between the United States and Denmark on their 1951 Defense of Greenland agreement in the aftermath of the crash of a nuclear-armed U.S. B-52 bomber near Thule Air Force Base in Greenland. Documentation on France is more comprehensive and includes Franco-American differences, primarily those stemming from President de Gaulle's actions concerning NATO, as well as differences over Cuba, Southeast Asia, and the People's Republic of China. The documentation on Italy reflects U.S. interest in the internal political scene in Italy at the outset of the center-left coalition period, as well as developments in the Italian Communist Party. The documentation on Portugal highlights U.S. concerns about the policies of the Salazar regime in Africa. With regard to Spain, the documents focus on negotiations over renewal of U.S. base rights in Spain as well as Spain's thoughts about its future relationships with Western Europe in general and the European Economic Community in particular. The documentation on the United Kingdom is a tour d'horizon of economic, political, and defense issues. The main topics include the sterling crisis, British plans to pull back "East of Suez," and Anglo-American differences over Vietnam. Also included in this volume is documentation on the Vatican, which reflects the Holy See's increasing concern about the conflict in Vietnam and the Pope's efforts to mediate the conflict. Extensive consultations on Vietnam are also highlighted in the documentation on Canada, but there is also an important focus on trade, Law of the Sea, and fisheries issues.
The documentation printed in this volume highlights U.S. policy toward European economic and political integration, U.S. participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the U.S. attitude toward the Multilateral Force (MLF) and Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF). It further discusses the position of the United States with regard to the question of nuclear sharing within the Atlantic community.
Because of the extensive amount of documentation on U.S. participation in NATO, the editors selected summaries of the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meetings and summary records of the visits of the NATO Secretaries General to Washington, during which long series of conversations were held. The editors also focused on documenting the U.S. response to French withdrawal from the NATO military command structure in March 1966. President Johnson set the tone of the response and Francis Bator of the National Security Council Staff coordinated the details of the policy. For the period after the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the editors selected documentation that shows that the White House took an active role in the formulation of policy toward NATO. The editors also selected reports from posts in Brussels, London, and Paris to document U.S. policy toward the general question of European economic and political integration and toward the second British application for membership in the Common Market in 1967.
The volume focuses on the issues that primarily engaged high-level U.S. policymakers. Major topics include: (1) Contacts between President Johnson and Soviet leaders, including the Glassboro Summit in 1967; (2) Chairman Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 and its consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations; (3) assessments of Khrushchev's successors; (4) the impact of the Vietnam war on U.S.-Soviet relations; (5) discussions of bilateral issues, including arms control, trade, cultural exchanges, the Civil Air Agreement, the Consular Convention, the defection of Stalin's daughter, and new embassy sites; and (6) the Johnson administration's efforts during 1968 to initiate strategic arms control talks and arrange a summit meeting.
The volume focuses on the German issues that primarily engaged high-level U.S. policymakers: 1) U.S. efforts to retain a privileged relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany's leadership; 2) the attempts of U.S. policymakers to provide carefully measured support for West German initiatives aimed at achieving national reunification, including its emerging Ostpolitik; 3) U.S. efforts to secure a larger offset payment by the Federal Republic of Germany to cover the costs of maintaining U.S. forces in Europe; 4) the desire of the United States to secure West German support for a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; 5) U.S.-French differences over policy toward Germany; and 6) the development of policy toward the Berlin question.
Major topics covered in this volume include: 1) U.S. efforts to maintain the cohesion of the NATO alliance by avoiding outbreaks of violence on Cyprus that would provoke clashes between Greece and Turkey; 2) attempts of U.S. policymakers to devise a compromise solution for Cyprus that would meet the requirements of its major regional partners; 3) a growing U.S. involvement in Greece's internal politics as a result of a major constitutional crisis between political forces led by George and Andreas Papandreou on one side and a conservative coalition under the leadership of King Constantine II on the other; and 4) the U.S reaction to the Greek military coup of April 1967 and imposition of a dictatorship in Greece. Coverage of bilateral U.S.-Turkish relations focuses on the Cyprus issue.
The documentation in this volume highlights U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, particularly the U.S. response to the crisis created by the August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Prior to the invasion, U.S. policy in the region had been characterized by an ongoing effort to loosen ties between the Soviet Union and its Communist satellites through the use of limited economic assistance. This policy of "Bridge Building" to Eastern Europe through selective use of U.S. economic power was only partially successful. President Johnson faced serious opposition from within Congress to this initiative. In addition, Eastern European Communist regimes, while eager to obtain U.S. aid, wanted few conditions attached to its utilization and aimed to use outside assist-ance to consolidate their political control. The rise of a Communist reform movement in Czechoslovakia, while welcomed by the United States, offered U.S. diplomacy little practical assistance in carrying out this policy. The Communist reformers were fundamentally hostile to the United States. As a result the Johnson administration was an interested observer as the Czech and Soviet states confronted each other. After the Soviet invasion of August 1968, the United States feared further Soviet military moves and actively sought to provide support to bolster the independence of Austria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Finland.
President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk were directly involved in the many discussions relating to the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the editor tried to document their roles in the policy deliberations and decisions as much as possible. Their meetings and correspondence with Arab and Israeli leaders, as well as their responses to pressures from both sides to provide sophisticated weaponry and their appointments of special emissaries to visit the troubled region, for example, are included in the documentary record.
Major topics covered in the volume include: 1) U.S. efforts to continue the preceding Kennedy administration's policy of trying to foster more friendly relations with Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic (UAR) while maintaining good relations with Israel; 2) mounting tensions in the area, fueled by terrorist attacks on Israel and the flow of Soviet arms to the UAR, which undercut this approach and led to the U.S. decision to provide increasingly sophisticated armaments to Israel and Jordan; 3) the deteriorating U.S. relations with the UAR as a result of the UAR's intervention in Yemen and Nasser's criticisms of U.S. policies, which annoyed President Johnson and stirred Congressional opposition to economic assistance; and 4) the continuing U.S. efforts, despite these irritants, to pursue an even-handed approach to the Arab-Israeli dispute, prevent an arms race in advanced weapons in the area, and seek to defuse the increasingly frequent incidents on Israel's borders from flaring into full-scale war. The volume concludes on the brink of the crisis that preceded the Six Day War; the crisis and resulting war are documented in volume XIX.
The editor included a selection of intelligence estimates and analyses seen by high-level policymakers, especially those that were made available to President Johnson.
Major topics covered in this volume include: 1) the U.S. search for a peaceful solution to the crisis that erupted in the Middle East in May 1967, including efforts to persuade both sides to avoid military action, and attempts after Egypt's closure of the Strait of Tiran to obtain international action to guarantee the right of passage by ships of all nations through the Gulf of Aqaba; 2) the U.S. desire to avoid involvement in the war that broke out on June 5 and to see it end swiftly, including the halting of military shipments to both sides, U.S. support for UN Security Council resolutions calling for a cease-fire, and U.S. efforts to persuade Israel to comply with the resolutions; 3) the U.S. response to the decision by Egypt and some other Arab states to break off relations with the United States and to Egyptian charges of U.S. involvement in Israel's air strikes against Egypt; 4) U.S. concern with the possibility of Soviet involvement in the war and the exchange of hot-line messages between President Johnson and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin in which Johnson assured Kosygin of the U.S. desire for a swift end to the conflict and requested that the Soviet Union urge restraint on Egypt and Syria; 5) the U.S. response to the June 8 Israeli attack on the USS Liberty in international waters; 6) U.S. support for a comprehensive peace settlement in which Israel would exchange the territories it had conquered for recognition and secure borders, including U.S. attempts to persuade Israel against taking steps that might tend toward making its occupation of the occupied territories permanent; 7) the concern of Johnson administration officials with massive Soviet aid to Arab countries after the war and its effect on the military balance in the Middle East; 8) U.S. efforts to bring about a compromise UN Security Council resolution linking withdrawal of Israeli forces with mutual recognition and an end to belligerence, leading to the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967.
President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk were directly involved in the many discussions relating to the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the editor tried to document their roles in the policy deliberations and decisions as much as possible. Their meetings and correspondence with Arab and Israeli leaders, as well as their responses to pressures from both sides to provide sophisticated weaponry and their appointments of special emissaries to visit the troubled region, for example, are included in the documentary record.
Major topics covered in the volume include: U.S. efforts to promote the mediation efforts of UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring, U.S. interest in encouraging negotiations between Israel and Jordan, the possibility of a rapprochement between the United States and the United Arab Republic, U.S. concern over the possible development of an Israeli nuclear weapons program, and the failure of U.S. efforts to limit the flow of arms to the Middle East.
The editor included a selection of intelligence estimates and analyses seen by high-level policymakers, especially those that were made available to President Johnson.
The volume focuses on the issues that primarily engaged high-level policymakers. Major topics include: 1) U.S. efforts to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining influence in the strategically located and oil-rich Near East region; 2) the attempts of U.S. policymakers to pro-mote peace and stability in the region and to avoid being drawn into either inter-Arab or Arab-Israeli disputes; 3) U.S. efforts to preserve access to the region's oil supplies by maintaining and strengthening its position in the moderate Arab states, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; 4) reiteration of the long-standing U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity in the event of unprovoked aggression, while warning that such support would be difficult if Saudi involvement in Yemen provoked military confrontation with the United Arab Republic; 5) U.S. military assistance to the Saudi armed forces combined with support for a Saudi program of political, social, and economic progress; 6) the attempts of U.S. policymakers to prevent the escalation and spread of the civil war in Yemen by encouraging a negotiated settlement; 7) the attempts of U.S. policymakers to delay British withdrawal from South Arabia and the Persian Gulf; 8) U.S. support for British efforts to negotiate an orderly and peaceful transition to independence for Aden and the British Protectorates in South Arabia; 9) U.S. efforts to maintain access to and influence in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf as British forces prepared to withdraw; 10) the 1968 decision to establish a U.S. military facility on Diego Garcia, with British support, as a means of improving the overall Western military posture in the Indian Ocean; 11) the desire of the United States to preserve Iraq's political and social stability, thereby ensuring the contin-ued flow of oil and lessening the danger of inroads by Communists or radical Arab nationalists; and 12) U.S. efforts to rebuild relations with the Arab states after the Six-Day War.
The volume focuses on the issues that primarily engaged high-level U.S. policymakers. Major topics include: 1) the efforts of President Johnson and U.S. policymakers to retain a close relationship with the Shah of Iran; 2) U.S. attempts to buttress Iran's internal security by encouraging a far-reaching program of political, social, and economic reform; 3) the conflict between U.S. support for Iranian economic development and reform as a check against internal upheaval or revolution and the Shah's insistence on spending more of Iran's growing oil revenues on weapons; 4) increased U.S. support for Iran's military modernization program; 5) the upsurge of anti-Americanism and opposition to the Shah's government following the October 1964 passage of a status of forces bill granting U.S. military personnel stationed in Iran and their dependents full diplomatic immunity; 6) U.S. efforts to prevent the Shah from buying arms from non-U.S. sources, especially the Soviet Union; and 7) U.S. determination to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining a foothold in Iran.
The editor included a selection of intelligence estimates and analyses seen by high-level policymakers, especially those that were sent to President Johnson.
The volume focuses on the issues that primarily engaged high-level U.S. policymakers. Major topics include: U.S. efforts to strengthen North African ties to the West and forestall Soviet attempts to dominate any part of the region; the attempts of U.S. policymakers to find a basis for improved relations with Algeria without prejudicing the good relations enjoyed with Morocco and Tunisia; the desire of the United States to preserve Moroccan independence and unity; continuation of substantial U.S. economic and military aid to Morocco and Tunisia; U.S. efforts to preserve the independence and stability of Libya; renegotiation of the 1954 Wheelus Base agreement with the hope of prolonging U.S. retention of the base despite Libya's announced intention of not renewing the agreement; U.S. efforts to strengthen ties with the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and prevent them from falling under Communist domination; a revitalized and strengthened policy toward Africa following a review of African development policies and programs (the Korry Report) ordered by President Johnson in May 1966; U.S. efforts to maintain friendly relations with Nkrumah's successor following the February 1966 overthrow of his authoritarian and anti-Western regime in Ghana; U.S. support for peaceful resolution of Somali-Ethiopian border conflicts in the strategically important Horn of Africa; the U.S. effort to maintain a close relationship with Ethiopia, with its important U.S. military base at Kagnew Station and the largest Military Assistance Program in Africa, while maintaining good relations with Somalia; the U.S. policy of non-intervention and advocacy of negotiation and compromise following the July 1967 outbreak of civil war in Nigeria; the tension between U.S. support for reform and self-determination in Portugal's African colonies of Angola and Mozambique, on the one hand, and the U.S. and Portuguese membership in NATO, which granted the United States important military base rights in the Azores, on the other; U.S. support for British efforts to guarantee universal adult suffrage before granting Rhodesia full independence, and for mandatory UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia following the white minority government's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965; U.S. condemnation of apartheid while opposing mandatory UN economic sanctions against South Africa; and U.S. support for UN termination of South Africa's mandate to administer South West Africa. The editors included a selection of intelligence estimates and analyses seen by high-level policymakers, especially those that were sent to President Johnson.
Major topics covered in this volume include: 1) U.S. military assistance to India and Pakistan; 2) U.S. efforts to counter Chinese influence in Pakistan and Soviet influence in India; 3) the U.S. reaction to the crises in the Rann of Kutch and Kashmir and the hostilities between India and Pakistan in 1965; 4) the U.S. reaction to the food crisis on the subcontinent; 5) the U.S. response to the decision by Pakistan not to renew the agreement with the United States governing facilities at Peshawar; and 6) U.S. efforts in Af ghanistan to use limited economic assistance to promote economic development and to limit Soviet influence. Lyndon Johnson's personal involvement in the making of foreign policy decisions relating to South Asia was second only to his involvement in decisions relating to the fighting in Southeast Asia. Johnson's involvement is particularly evident during the 1965 crises over Kashmir and the Rann of Kutch and in the U.S. response to the threat of famine in India in 1965-1967. The editors sought to document the President's role as far as possible.
The Department of State, the staff of the White House, as well as the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency also played key roles in formulating and shaping U.S. policy, and their roles are also documented. Their advice and recommendations are found in telegrams from the Embassies, from the Military Advisory Groups, and in intelligence assessments. The dialogue between the Embassies and the Department of State comprises the core of this volume. Most of the finished intelligence included in this volume relates to Indonesia during the transition of power from Sukarno to Suharto and on the Philippines under President Marcos. Finally, the volume covers covert political action policy in general, especially in the Indonesia compilation.
Research and compilation of this volume was completed in 1997. The compilation on Indonesia is divided into four sections which define the focus of the coverage. The first, entitled, "Sukarno's Confrontation with Malaysia, January-November 1964," documents U.S. efforts to mediate and encourage a settlement of the dispute between Indonesia and the Federation of Malaysia over Indonesian claims to North Borneo and to convince Indonesia to desist from its policy of confrontation (confrontasi). Above all, the United States sought to prevent the sporadic low-level guerrilla war Indonesia was waging against Malaysia from escalating into more serious conflict. In addition, President Johnson and his advisers grappled with the related problem of whether to use U.S. aid to Indonesia to try to moderate Sukarno's campaign of confrontasi. The next section, "Sukarno's Confrontation With the United States, December 1964-September 1965," documents the deterioration of U.S.-Indonesia relations and the rise of the influence of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komus Indonesia (PKI)) within the Sukarno government. The third section, "Coup and Counter Reaction, October 1965-March 1966," is the heart of the compilation and documents in more detail the problems faced by the United States during a period of great transition in Indonesia. The final section, "The United States and Suharto, April 1966-December 1968," documents the return of U.S.-Indonesia relations to a more conventional state and the Johnson administration's primary consideration of strengthening Indonesia economically.
The small compilation on Malaysia-Singapore is initially an account of the U.S. reaction to the separation of Malaysia and Singapore, which took the Johnson administration by surprise. President Johnson was careful to maintain good relations with both states, and he visited Kuala Lumpur in 1966. It was Singapore President Lee Kwan Yew, however, with whom Johnson identified most closely, and he (and Vice President Humphrey as well) developed a close personal relationship with President Lee. This special bond is reflected in the selected documentation.
The Philippines and the United States had a special relationship. The long-standing bilateral issues left over from World War II are covered only when they required a Presidential decision. The question of Philippines claims to the Malaysian territories of Sabah was a complicating factor for the United States, but it never reached a point of actual conflict. It is handled only as a secondary issue. The primary focus of the compilation is on a number of themes that are not exclusive to the Philippines, but which dominated the thinking of U.S. policymakers. The first is the fate of democracy, especially during the Presidential elections of November 1965. The related question of corruption and reform also dominated U.S. efforts in the Philippines. The Philippines contribution of an engineering battalion to the war effort in Vietnam is documented in detail because the policy of "more flags in Vietnam" became increasingly important to President Johnson. The selection of documentation also reveals an initial enthusiasm for the newly-elected President Ferdinand Marcos and the growing concern over his and the Philippines economic performance. A final theme is the realization that the Communist insurgency in the Philippines was on the rise and Marcos seemed unwilling or unable to combat it.
This compilation concentrates on the increasingly close and personal relations between President Johnson and the Prime Ministers of Australia and New Zealand. It also documents at the highest level the growing concern by Australia and New Zealand about the defense of Malaysia and Southeast Asia after the projected British withdrawal from East of Suez. There are no bilateral compilations for Australia and New Zealand, but the most important bilateral issues are raised in this compilation when President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk met with the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers. Some documentation on commercial relationships with these two countries is included in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volumes VIII and IX. In addition, the compilation on Indonesia in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, volume XXVI, contains documentation on Australian and New Zealand concern about the Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia.
The other regional compilation has two primary themes: the increasing inability of SEATO to respond to the war in Southeast Asia and the effort by the Johnson administration to foster economic development in Southeast Asia. In documenting U.S. concern with SEATO, the formal meetings have been treated in summary fashion. The economic development theme is presented primarily through the work of former World Bank President Eugene Black, President Johnson's Special Adviser on Southeast Asia.
The compilation on Burma focuses on Ne Win's visit to Washington in September 1966 and the Johnson administration's principal initiative to keep Burma non-aligned, independent, and at least partially engaged with the West. The Cambodia compilation documents a bilateral relationship that increasingly felt the strain of the expanding war in Southeast Asia. The steady deterioration of the U.S. relationship with Prince Sihanouk resulted in the May 1965 break in diplomatic relations. Another focus of the compilation is the growing concern in the U.S. Government about the Viet Cong use of Cambodian sanctuaries. The Cambodian Navy's capture of U.S. soldiers in 1968 provided a hostage negotiation situation that the Johnson administration feared might become another Pueblo crisis. The resolution of this issue is documented along with the periodic U.S. attempts to explore reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Cambodia.
The compilation on Thailand focuses on the collaboration between the United States and Thailand in the face of wars in Vietnam and Laos and hostility toward both countries from Cambodia. The compilation highlights the deliberations leading up to the decision not to send U.S. troops to Thailand (as was done in 1962), joint U.S.-Thailand military planning, cooperation in Laos, the U.S. interagency debate over the scope of U.S. military assistance to Thailand and the orientation of Thailand's armed forces, the need to combat potential insurgency in Thailand's northeast, Thailand's contribution to the war in Vietnam, and the stirrings of Thai political life in anticipation of elections in 1969.
The editor of volume XXVIII developed eight areas of specific focus for the selection. (1) Formulation of policy in Washington on providing U.S. support for the air and ground war in Laos either by U.S. support of Lao Armed Forces or by U.S. direct actions. (2) U.S. policy decisions in Washington in conjunction with U.S. officials in Laos to support the neutralist Souvanna Phouma government against both its right-wing and Pathet Lao opponents. (3) Unsuccessful efforts to reach a new negotiated settlement on Laos to replace the failed Geneva settlement of 1962, especially through the influence and good services of the Soviet Union. (4) The campaign to interdict logistical supplies traveling down the Laos portion of the Ho Chi Minh Trail destined to support Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam and the bureaucratic battle for control of the ground intelligence on and harassment of these interdiction operations that was fought between the Ambassador in Laos and the Military Assistance Commander, Vietnam. (5) The Central Intelligence Agency 's support and direction of Meo (H'mong) and other tribal anti-North Vietnamese guerrillas. (6) The intelligence assessment controversy over the amount of North Vietnamese infiltration down the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the effectiveness of U.S. interdiction efforts. (7) The campaign by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to apply technology to the campaign against infiltration and to apply appropriate technology in the controversy over whether jet aircraft or propeller driven aircraft were more suited to the warfare in Laos. (8) The establishment and then the loss to North Vietnamese forces of U.S.-manned site 85 at Phou Pha Thi, the major navigation aide in northern Laos for the bombing campaign against North Vietnam.
The first section of the volume deals with U.S.-Republic of Korea relations during a period of strife and violence on the Korean peninsula unknown since the Korean War. The year 1964 was marked by an internal crisis within the Republic of Korea as students and opponents of the government of President Pak Chong-hui (Park Chung Нее) took to the streets in violent opposition to the government's alleged corruption and the potential treaty between the Republic of Korea and Japan. The government responded with the imposition of martial law. After the end of 1964, internal opposition lessened, but the threat from North Korea grew. In 1967, border clashes along the 38th parallel and infiltration of North Korean saboteurs increased. The culmination of this campaign occurred in January 1968 when North Korean commandos attacked the Blue House (the presidential residence in Seoul) in a brazen attempt to assassinate President Pak. A few days later North Korea seized the U.S.S. Pueblo and its crew. The United States was faced with South Korean demands for retaliatory action, and a serious crisis of confidence in Seoul. The volume documents how the Johnson administration responded, both in this first compilation and in the one on the Pueblo, to the strong possibility of renewed war on the Korean peninsula. The basic theme of the compilation is the Johnson administration's de-escalation of the crisis. The final major theme of this first compilation is the close personal relationship between Presidents Pak and Johnson and how this resulted in South Korea's support for the war in Vietnam. The second compilation, on the Pueblo crisis, begins with records of the almost daily meetings of President Johnson with his key military, intelligence, and diplomatic advisers to examine contingency options, none particularly good and some that were dangerous. After it became clear that a military response was unacceptable, the United States relied on a campaign of diplomacy, including using whatever influence the Soviet Union would bring to bear on North Korea, shows of U.S. force, and direct negotiations with North Korea at Panmunjom. The final and smallest section of the volume documents U.S. efforts to convince both Japan and Korea to settle their outstanding differences and sign in June 1965 and ratify that December a Treaty on Basic Relations. The compilation documents the high-level pressure brought by the Johnson administration on the two allies to resolve their longstanding differences.
This volume documents U.S. policy toward Japan during a period of increasing change in the relations between the two allies. Japan was fast becoming a major economic power while still relying on the United States for its security. A theme of the coverage, in fact, is the ongoing U.S. effort to encourage Japan to assume a greater role in its own military defense and to play a greater role on the world stage, especially in terms of the economic development of the rest of Asia. Another major theme is U.S. efforts to encourage the continuation of a moderate, pro-Western Japanese Government. The creation of a joint U.S.-Japanese economic planning group sought to coordinate the two economies. The eventual reversion of U.S. administered-Ryukyus to Japan was a goal of Japanese Governments, but it played out during this period in the successful effort by Japan to regain control in 1968 from the United States of the much less strategically significant Bonin Islands. A related theme was domestic Japanese opposition to the war in Vietnam and the use of U.S. bases in Japan to support the U.S. campaign in Vietnam. A final theme is the successful U.S. discouragement of closer Japanese-People’s Republic of China relations.
The volume focuses on the issues that primarily engaged high-level U.S. policymakers. Major topics include: 1) U.S. anticipation of the first Chinese nuclear explosion and the U.S. reaction when it took place in October 1964; 2) the attempts of U.S. policymakers to deal with the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations; 3) U.S. relations with the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan, especially the question of possible Nationalist operations against the mainland; 4) the ambassadorial meetings at Warsaw; 5) proposals to liberalize U.S. restrictions on travel to and trade with the China mainland; 6) the U.S. response to French recognition of the People's Republic of China; and 7) U.S. policy concerning Tibet.
The absence of U.S. diplomatic representation in the People's Republic of China increased the importance of intelligence on China. The editor included a selection of intelligence estimates and analyses seen by high-level policymakers, especially those that were sent to President Johnson, and made a particular effort to include a sampling of reports and analyses on the Cultural Revolution. Selected intelligence estimates and analyses on internal developments in Taiwan were also included.
The volume features eleven bilateral and two regional compilations, demonstrating the breadth of the U.S. Government's relations with the countries of South and Central America. Many of the bilateral compilations document the Johnson administration's responses to a series of crises: the 1964 Panama Canal flag incident; the 1964 coup d'etat in Brazil; the 1964 Presidential election in Chile; the 1966 coup in Argentina; the 1967 hunt for Ernesto "Che" Guevara in Bolivia; the 1968 coups in Peru and Panama. The bilateral compilations also show how the administration tried to address more fundamental problems: the Panama Canal treaty negotiations; the insurgencies in Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela; the authoritarian regimes in Brazil and Argentina; the continuation of covert political support in Bolivia and Chile; economic assistance to Brazil, Colombia and Chile; the protection of American business interests in Venezuela, Argentina, Peru, and Chile. The Latin America regional compilation emphasizes the broader themes of the administration's policy in the hemisphere: the Alliance for Progress; the threat of Cuban subversion; the Punta del Este conference. This regional compilation also highlights how personalities affected policymaking, especially the working relationship between President Johnson and Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Mann. The Central America regional compilation examines how the United States exercised its influence in the region, from elections in Costa Rica and Guatemala to authoritarian regimes in Honduras and Nicaragua. Given subsequent events, including the assassination of Ambassador Gordon Mein in August 1968, the compilation also emphasizes the U.S. response to the escalation of violence between the insurgents and the Government in Guatemala.
This volume documents U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic including a period of great crisis that culminated in the decision to send U.S. military forces to that country. The United States then oversaw a reconstitution of the Dominican Government and a Dominican presidential election in 1967. Also covered is U.S. policy toward Cuba, essentially an account of U.S. attempts to isolate Castro’s Cuba both diplomatically and economically through sanctions, and the internal Washington debate over the extent and nature of U.S. covert policy toward the island nation. The remainder of the volume does not cover a broad swath of countries, but concentrates on the two most difficult relationships in the area for the United States: Haiti and the British Colony of British Guiana (after 1966, independent Guyana). Lyndon B. Johnson made the major foreign policy decisions during his presidency, and the editors sought to document his role as far as possible. In the case of the intervention in the Dominican Republic, Johnson relied heavily upon the recommendations of his key advisers and special envoys, and their role and advice to the President is documented. It will become obvious that during the Dominican crisis— especially through the transcripts of Presidential tapes—Johnson was a hands-on President who after assessing advice, made the major IV Preface policy decisions. The role of the President and his major foreign policy advisers, including his hard-to-document Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, are less pronounced in the other chapters in the volume dealing with Cuba, Haiti, and British Guiana/Guyana. This volume follows the pattern of other volumes in the 1964–1968 subseries: focusing on policy formulation in Washington. In the case of the Dominican Republic there is a close connection between events in Santo Domingo and policy in Washington.
The volume focuses on the issues that primarily engaged high-level U.S. policymakers. The portion of the volume concerning the Organization and Management of Foreign Policy focuses on several important issues: efforts to improve the management of the Department of State and strengthen its overall direction and coordination of U.S. foreign policy; the increasingly informal operation of the National Security Council and the enhanced role of the National Security Adviser and his staff; problems confronted by the Director of Central Intelligence in coordinating the intelligence community, exercising influence over the National Reconnaissance Office, and advising the President; and the reexamination of the approval process for covert actions. The portion of the volume covering the United Nations focuses principally on the Article 19 dispute over financing United Nations peacekeeping efforts and on the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping force for Cyprus. Other topics include the reelection of U Thant as UN Secretary General in 1966, developmental and trusteeship issues, the Celestial Bodies Treaty of 1967, and the appointment of U.S. Permanent Representatives by President Johnson. Several major issues considered by the United Nations during the Johnson Presidency are documented in other Foreign Relations volumes: the Vietnam war, volumes I-VII; Arms Control and Disarmament, volume XI; the Arab-Israeli Crisis and 1967 War, volume XIX; South Asia, volume XXV; and China, volume XXX.
The volume focuses on the issues that primarily engaged high-level U.S. policymakers. Major topics include: 1) scientific issues, including U.S.-Soviet cooperation in outer space, communication satellites, and water for peace; 2) selected global issues; and 3) energy problems, especially oil policy and the U.S. response to the 1967 oil embargo. The editors also performed research on additional issues, such as the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which might supplement coverage in other volumes on the Johnson administration, but determined that the documentary record was mostly bilateral and regional and did not warrant separate compilations in this volume.
The purpose of this volume, which is a departure from previous volumes published in the Foreign Relations series, is to document the intellectual foundations of the foreign policy of the first Nixon administration. Previous volumes have been compiled to meet the legislatively mandated standard that the Foreign Relations series shall be "a thorough, accurate, and reliable documentary record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity." This volume is unique in that it explores the collective mind-set of the Nixon administration on foreign policy issues rather than documenting foreign policy decisions or diplomatic exchanges. It takes as its canvas the entire record of the first Nixon administration. Therefore the documents selected are necessarily a sampling chosen to illustrate policy perspectives and themes, rather than a thorough record of a bilateral relationship or of a major issue. A measure of the departure of this volume from previous volumes in the Foreign Relations series is the extent to which it draws upon the published record of speeches, press releases, press conferences and briefings, interviews, and testimony before Congressional committees to document policy positions and the assumptions of administration officials on the foreign policy process.
President Nixon had a strong interest in foreign policy and he and his assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger managed many of the more important aspects of foreign policy from the White House. Nixon and Kissinger shared a well-defined general perception of world affairs. The editors of the volume sought to present a representative selection of documents chosen to develop the primary intellectual themes that ran through and animated the administration's foreign policy. The documents selected focus heavily upon the perspectives of Nixon and Kissinger but also include those of Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Laird, Under Secretary of State Richardson and others.
The focus of this volume is the organization and management of the foreign policy process. This theme runs throughout the volume, but is most clearly evident in the first chapter, “The NSC System.” This chapter documents the Nixon administration’s foreign policy process as it was conceived by President Nixon, his Special Assistant Henry Kissinger, and other key advisers. The chapter shows how the foreign policy decision making process was supposed to work in theory, and then documents how the system worked in reality. A primary concern of Nixon and Kissinger was that the President retain control over the foreign policy process through his National Security Council (NSC) Staff, and that the White House oversee the implementation of presidential decisions.
As the documents indicate, the Nixon administration believed that it was fighting an ongoing battle to retain Presidential and White House control of the foreign policy decision making process against the bureaucratic forces of the Departments of State and Defense. The first chapter of this volume documents how this struggle for control caused friction between the White House and the Departments of State and Defense, as well as a certain amount of personal rivalry and tension between Kissinger, Secretary of State William Rogers, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.
The second chapter of the volume focuses on the related issue of reorganization and revitalization of the Intelligence Community. This reform was driven by President Nixon’s and the White House Staff’s view that they were not getting the right intelligence and that the United States was spending too much on intelligence for the product it was receiving. In addition, Nixon and the White House were concerned that covert operations, which they believed had a tendency to go on indefinitely, were not properly supportive of larger U.S. foreign policy objectives. Finally, the second chapter documents a formal reorganization of the intelligence function at the Department of Defense, where it was widely held that the intelligence function was too diffuse and not properly coordinated.
The third chapter deals with the administration and management of the Department of State by the Department’s principal officers and by President Nixon and the White House. The documents indicate that the President was determined to appoint his own people to key positions in the Department and ambassadorships, but he also wished to push forward younger Foreign Service officers to ambassadorial posts. Because of balance of payment problems, Nixon was also determined to cut overseas personnel, which would naturally affect Department of State overseas operations. The President also wished to upgrade the Department’s Latin American Bureau, but needed Congressional approval. This chapter deals with the question of the loyalty of the Foreign Service officers to the President, the role—or, more accurately, the lack of a role—for professional women in the Department of State and foreign affairs bureaucracy, and the question of Foreign Service spouses (then called wives, since the Foreign Service consisted overwhelmingly of men).
Compared with their ongoing preoccupation with international political and strategic policy, President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, did not express much interest in foreign economic matters. They nonetheless understood that domestic and foreign economic developments could have profound effects on their political programs and goals. In particular, the Nixon administration inherited a serious U.S. balance-of-payments deficit, which threatened to destabilize the international economic system. During the first term, 1969-1972, Nixon administration officials undertook an intensive re-evaluation of U.S. monetary and trade policies. From this reappraisal came several foreign economic initiatives, many of which were formulated in the Department of the Treasury, to try to stop the flow of U.S. capital abroad.
The first part of this volume documents the various foreign economic options that Nixon administration officials considered in trying to alleviate the balance-of-payments problem. Some of the following proposals were stillborn, but others became Nixon administration initiatives: reduction in non-military U.S. personnel stationed overseas; efforts to get Japan and especially West Germany to offset the costs of the U.S. military presence abroad with the purchase of more U.S. military equipment; reduction in the Interest Equalization Tax; revaluation of exchange rates of countries with trade surpluses; opposition to foreign governments' preferential trade policies; reductions in foreign aid; and reform of the international monetary system.
The second part of this volume treats the administration's interest in reform of the international monetary system. President Nixon and his economic advisers increasingly believed that the creation of a new economic system could alleviate major U.S. fiscal problems, such as tariff inequities and declining gold reserves. One proposal called for major European nations' acceptance of the International Monetary Fund's plan of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). Another called for flexible exchange rates. Nixon administration officials hoped to persuade individual countries, especially in Europe, to devalue or revalue their currencies, abolish fund controls, and agree on common trading rules, all of which would avert a large-scale financial crisis and promote international trade. Ultimately, the collapse of the British pound and European disagreements over currency revaluation prompted President Nixon to announce his New Economic Policy in August 1971, which ended the convertibility of dollars to gold and imposed a 10 percent surcharge on imports, as well as imposing domestic wage and price controls for 90 days.
Because of their ongoing preoccupation with international political and strategic policy, President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, expressed less interest in foreign economic matters than in Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and the opening to China. They nonetheless understood that domestic and foreign economic developments could have a profound effect on their political programs and goals, particularly with respect to the industrial democracies, the developing countries, especially those in Latin America, and the Communist countries. The first compilations in this volume focus on President Nixon's interest in developing bold and flexible foreign assistance and development policies (such as utilization of the private sector for foreign direct investment, which included the establishment of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation) and the administration's responses to the bureaucratic interplay among the concerned government departments and agencies and to the resistance from the Office of Management and Budget and Congress toward its proposed funding levels. A related compilation treats the emergence of an administration policy involving sanctions in reaction to the expropriation of U.S. properties without reasonable compensation by expropriating governments, particularly those of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile.
On trade policy, the administration resisted reverse tariff preferences by the European Community involving discrimination against U.S. exports and Congressional protectionist pressures, with some major exceptions such as textiles. Nonetheless the administration sought broad new trade negotiating authority, including a program for a generalized system of preferences for developing countries, a program that became particularly important in the resolution of the monetary crisis in late 1972 when trade issues were inexorably linked to international monetary reform.
Emphasizing "linkage" of trade issues with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Nixon administration at first refrained from liberalization of East-West trade, but by mid-1971 President Nixon accepted proposals for increased trade of non-strategic goods with the People's Republic of China and other Communist nations.
The final compilation documents the administration's policies toward the U.S. stockpile of strategic materials and the negotiation of multilateral agreements on grains, cotton, wool, sugar, and other commodities.
The editor of the volume sought to present documentation illuminating responsibility for major foreign policy decisions of the U.S. Government, with emphasis on the President and his principal foreign policy advisers. The documents include memoranda and records of discussions, telegrams, policy papers, and other documents that set forth policy issues and options and show decisions or actions taken. The emphasis is on the development of U.S. policy and on major aspects and repercussions of its execution rather than on the details of policy execution.
While United Nations affairs were not a high priority during the Nixon administration, they were a major concern for the Department of State. While two key issues, the question of Chinese representation and the selection of a new Secretary-General to succeed U Thant, rose to the level of high interest, most UN issues fell below the purview of the upper echelons of the Nixon administration’s foreign policy leadership. Furthermore, President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger both believed that they were realists more concerned with national self-interest and major power relationships than with political, social, and economic issues of the United Nations. Both Nixon and Kissinger were skeptical of the effectiveness and value of the United Nations. They therefore devoted scant attention to a organization dominated by smaller and developing nations and replete with specialized international organizations. Nixon and Kissinger did recognize that the United Nations was the most important and visible world organization and therefore could not be totally ignored. It could even be used to provided a useful and high-profile venue to support U.S. foreign policies. For these reasons the two issues that the Nixon administration believed were vitally important, Chinese representation in the United Nations and the selection of a new Secretary-General, are given the most coverage in the volume.
The scope of this volume is different from previous volumes on Vietnam in the Foreign Relations series. For the years 1955–1968 the series produced volumes exclusively on U.S. policy towards Vietnam and documented U.S. policy towards Laos and Cambodia in separate volumes. With the Nixon administration’s decision to take the war to the enemy in Cambodia and integrate more fully the secret war in Laos into its strategy for Vietnam, this format was no longer valid. This volume covers Vietnam in the context of the larger war that included the conflicts in Laos and Cambodia, and in the case of the former, also the role of Thailand in Laos. Consequently, the editors had to make choices about what to cover. When Vietnam was the main concern of President Nixon and his principal advisers—primarily Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger and his NSC Staff; Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon; Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams; and Chief Paris Peace Talks negotiator, Henry Cabot Lodge—the focus is on Vietnam strategy, planning and operations. The focus of the volume later shifts to the issue of the deterioration of the secret war in Laos in March 1970. In March and April 1970, after the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and his replacement by pro-American General Lon Nol, the volume moves its focus to Cambodia, culminating with the U.S.-South Vietnamese invasion of that country in an effort to attack the North Vietnamese troops in their sanctuaries. The volume concludes with the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Cambodia. In addition to this shifting emphasis on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, the volume has as one of its principal themes the search for a negotiated settlement to the Vietnam War.
During the period covered by this volume, July 1970–January 1972, the Nixon administration expanded the Vietnam war into Cambodia and Laos as part of its strategy. This volume covers South Vietnam in the context of this larger war in Southeast Asia; therefore, the volume begins in July 1970 in the aftermath of the Cambodian incursion. At the time, a variety of topics dominated the policy discussions of President Nixon and his principal advisers. Among these topics were U.S. troop withdrawals, Vietnamization, negotiations in Paris (both the public plenary sessions and the secret talks between Kissinger and North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho), and possible South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam. Throughout the rest of 1970 these themes moved forward on separate paths that occasionally intersected with one another. South Vietnamese operations, first in Cambodia and then in Laos, were seen in policy terms as providing South Vietnam additional time to develop a more effective military, to generate economic growth, and to achieve some degree of political stability. The operations were also to demonstrate the success of Vietnamization and justify the continuing withdrawal of U.S. troops.
In late 1970 and early 1971, the focus shifted to decision making regarding plans to implement a major South Vietnamese out-of-country operation called Lam Son 719, launched in early February 1971. The strategic purpose of the operation was to halt or slow the flow of military supplies to Communist forces in South Vietnam via the panhandle of Laos. At the same time, it would demonstrate the growing military prowess of the South Vietnamese Army. On the negotiating front, Kissinger continued in 1970 and throughout1971 to meet periodically in Paris with Le Duc Tho and other senior Vietnamese Communist functionaries, but made no progress. At the same time, representatives of both sides also met publicly in the plenary meetings. Each side used the public Paris meetings to exchange carefully calibrated propaganda, making the meetings, if possible, less productive than the secret talks. The volume focuses on the Kissinger–Le Duc Tho talks with only occasional documentary coverage of the public talks.
This volume also documents President Nixon’s penchant for secret operations and covert warfare: his continued support for secret bombing campaigns in Cambodia and Laos and his approval of the November 1971 Son Tay raid into North Vietnam to rescue American prisoners of war. Nixon also signed off on new and continuing information gathering initiatives and propaganda that supported intelligence operations against Communist forces, organizations, and governments in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Additionally, he approved clandestine support for South Vietnamese political entities friendly to the United States. These operations are documented in some detail to demonstrate the role of covert actions in support of overt political and military operations.
In the waning months of the period covered by this volume, deadlock had set in. Neither side appeared able to win militarily, or even to weaken his adversary sufficiently to make him negotiate in good faith. There were signs, however, that Hanoi might be preparing to mount a major military effort in 1972. Its purpose would be to break through this impasse without having to travel a diplomatic path. The volume concludes at this point.
The Easter Offensive, and its ramifications, represents the most significant event in Indochina for U.S. policy in this period, and documentary coverage of the event dominates the volume, concentrating mainly on what happened in North and South Vietnam, policy formulation and decision making in Washington, and the negotiations in Paris. Only a very small number of documents relate to events and policy in Laos and Cambodia, and then only as they relate to events and policy in Vietnam.
Documents in this volume examine the link between force and diplomacy in U.S. national security policy toward the Vietnam war. In the period the volume covers, force drove diplomacy. Only by recognizing this can the process by which America’s Vietnam war policy was formulated and implemented be fully understood. Controlling the process was a small circle of men, led by President Richard M. Nixon, and which included the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger; the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, Major General Alexander M. Haig; and a few National Security Council officials trusted by Kissinger.
Sources for this volume include messages and memoranda that illuminate the decision-making process in a bureaucracy. They can be found in Nixon’s papers, in Kissinger’s papers, in military and diplomatic records in the National Archives, and in other repositories. Transcripts of Nixon’s taped conversations with senior policy advisers, as well as a collection of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations, provide an additional level of detail. A third collection, less well known than the other two but almost as significant, is that of Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and includes diary excerpts and telephone conversations. This volume, therefore, documents the implementation of U.S. policy toward Vietnam during the Easter Offensive more thoroughly than ever before.
This volume documents the marathon four-day negotiating session between Kissinger and North Vietnamese representative Le Duc Tho in Paris (October 8-11, 1972). The peace agreement they reached was rejected by South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. The United States attempted to convince Thieu that he was wrong, and in November Nixon sent Kissinger back to Paris to renegotiate 69 points on behalf of the South Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese, fiercely disagreeing with the U.S. move, decided that they too would renegotiate issues previously agreed to. By mid-November, the talks were on the verge of collapse. Consequently, the central goals of U.S. foreign policy over the next few weeks were to compel both South Vietnam and North Vietnam to accept, in its main tenets, the agreement that the United States had negotiated with the latter in October.
In the wake of unproductive December meetings, Nixon took one of his most controversial decisions: re-mining Haiphong Harbor and ordering an air campaign against the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. Nixon hoped to shock the North Vietnamese back to negotiations and remind the South Vietnamese that America’s commitment to the defense and survival of South Vietnam was contingent upon South Vietnam supporting the agreement. North Vietnam agreed to return to the negotiating table, and Thieu agreed to the new terms. In early January 1973, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho returned to Paris and in several days of hard bargaining ironed out the last details of the settlement. Titled the “Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam,” the accords included a number of minor compromises negotiated in November, December, and January. In its essentials, however, it remained remarkably similar to the document that Kissinger and Le Duc Tho had agreed to in October.
This volume addresses the ending of the Vietnam war; a story central to the U.S. experience in the 20th century. Similar to other Foreign Relations volumes, this collection of documents emphasizes the formation of policy over day-to-day diplomacy. Several themes dominated U.S. policy and policy objectives in Indochina during this period: the relationship between force and diplomacy, the struggle between the President and Congress in the formation and implementation of U.S. policy, U.S. credibility in the world, and the limits of American power. These themes dictated the selection of documents in this volume. Soon after the fall of Saigon in April 1975, American officials in several agencies began looking back at U.S. policy toward, and political and military actions in, Vietnam in an effort to understand and learn from the American experience in Indochina beginning in the early 1960s. This volume places those analyses within the broader documentary context.
This volume concludes with documentation covering the May 1975 seizure by Cambodia of the SS Mayaguez and the successful recovery by U.S. forces of the ship and its crew. The documents cover the crisis deliberations in Washington among civilian and military officials that led to President Ford’s decision to use military force to recover the ship.
The scope of this volume is limited to the political crisis that began in Pakistan in March 1971 with the government's efforts to suppress Bengali demands for virtual autonomy in East Pakistan and concluded with the establishment of the state of Bangladesh at the end of the year. The limited time frame covered by the volume enabled the editor to compile the record of the Nixon administration's response to the crisis in considerable detail. The crisis was managed largely out of the White House by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, with the support of the National Security Council staff. The focus of the volume is on the management of the crisis by Nixon and Kissinger. The editor selected documentation to trace the evolution of the United States response to the crisis from Nixon's initial reluctance to become involved to his "tilt" toward Pakistan which was highlighted by the despatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to act as a restraint on India in the war that had developed between India and Pakistan as a result of the crisis. Nixon's response to the crisis in Pakistan was conditioned in part by the concern that he and Kissinger had to protect the emerging opening to China, which had been facilitated by Pakistani President Yahya Khan. The volume documents that concern, as well as the assurance offered to China that the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union if China took military action against India in support of Pakistan. The record of the Nixon administration's management of the crisis in South Asia thus also bears importantly on United States relations at the time with China and the Soviet Union. In that respect, the volume should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972; volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970- October 1971; and volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1971.
The Nixon administration presented a pressing argument to look at the U.S.-Soviet relationship in its broadest, global context. President Nixon created a secret, private channel of dialogue and negotiation between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, and the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Anatoly F. Dobrynin. The documentary record of the establishment and early use of that channel is presented in its entirety in this volume. In his relations with Moscow, President Nixon insisted on linkage of other issues with improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations. This volume highlights U.S.-Soviet interaction in the negotiations for a Middle East settlement, the role that the United States expected the Soviet Union to play in ending the Vietnam war, challenges to the U.S.-Soviet relationship in light of the Sino-Soviet border dispute, and the concern over Soviet strategic nuclear developments, such as the SS–9, in beginning Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. This expanded interaction between the two superpowers required a redesign of Foreign Relations coverage of the Soviet Union. The number of documents printed and the scope of their content were greatly expanded. There are five volumes for the Soviet Union within the Nixon-Ford subseries, 1969–1976, three of which document the crucial first Nixon administration. These volumes document U.S.-Soviet relations worldwide and more accurately reflect the global nature of the Cold War.
This volume continues the practice established in the previous Foreign Relations volume on U.S.-Soviet relations and focuses on the relationship in the global context, highlighting the conflicts and collaboration between the two superpowers on foreign policy issues from October 1970 to October 1971. Beginning with the confrontation over the construction of a Soviet military base in Cuba, the volume documents the development of the Nixon administration’s policy of détente and the crucial role of the private channel between Henry Kissinger, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. The backchannel was key to making progress on the most problematic issues in U.S.-Soviet relations: Berlin, the war in Indochina, strategic arms limitation talks, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, and trade. It also allowed the two nations to avoid conflict and to cooperate on managing crises around the world, such as the Middle East dispute and the Indo-Pakistani conflict.
The Nixon administration’s opening to China, beginning with Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in July 1971 and the subsequent announcement of Nixon’s visit to China, was a policy decision that required careful handling in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations. This volume documents the discussions within the administration of the impact on the relationship of the initiative, as well as Kissinger’s management of that impact in his discussions with Dobrynin.
As Kissinger’s prestige and importance to the superpower relationship grew, the Department of State was increasingly sidelined in the formulation and execution of U.S. policy in significant foreign affairs issues. The discussions between Nixon and Kissinger, many captured in Presidential tape recordings, on how to handle Secretary of State William Rogers’s attempts to reassert the Department’s authority are among the documents in the volume.
The volume also includes documentation on the internal and bilateral negotiations for the timing of a visit by Nixon to the Soviet Union and ends with the public announcement in October 1971 of the May 1972 summit between Nixon and Brezhnev, the first U.S.-Soviet summit since 1967. The era of détente and cooperation between the superpowers had begun.
The administration of Richard M. Nixon presented an even more pressing argument to look at the U.S.-Soviet relationship in its broadest, global context. President Nixon created a secret, private channel of dialogue and negotiation between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, and the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Anatoly F. Dobrynin. The documentary record of that channel is presented in its entirety in this volume, as well as a virtually complete record of the Moscow Summit. In his relations with Moscow, President Nixon insisted on linkage of other issues, e.g., Vietnam, the Middle East, South Asia, Arms Control, or trade, with improvements in U.S.-Soviet Relations. The President also employed triangular diplomacy—Nixon often referred to it as “the game”—to put pressure on the Soviet Union by improving U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of China, while denying to Soviet officials that he was doing so. Finally in 1972, Richard Nixon made his first Presidential visit to Moscow and signed a number of agreements with the Soviet Union that initiated a period of détente. These new initiatives and extensive connections between the two superpowers required a redesign of Foreign Relations coverage of the Soviet Union. The number of documents printed and the scope of their content were greatly expanded. There are five volumes for the Soviet Union within the Nixon-Ford subseries, 1969–1976, three of which document the crucial first Nixon Administration. These volumes document U.S.-Soviet relations worldwide and more accurately reflect the global nature of the Cold War.
The volume includes numerous direct personal communications between President Richard Nixon and Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev covering a host of issues, including clarifying the practical application of the SALT I and ABM agreements signed in Moscow. Other major themes covered include the war in Indochina, arms control, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), commercial relations and most-favored-nation status, grain sales, the emigration of Soviet Jews, Jackson-Vanik legislation, and the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. High-level meetings and summits, both in the United States and the Soviet Union, are documented in detail, including Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger's conversations with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko leading up to Nixon's final visit to the Soviet Union in June 1974.
The volume documents the lead up to the initial Kissinger visit to Beijing in July 1971, his next visit in October 1971, and President Nixon’s historic visit of February 1972. Through a variety of sources— telegrams, memoranda, memoranda of conversation, telephone conversations, transcripts of Presidential tape recordings, and briefing books with extensive handwritten annotation by Nixon—the volume documents how the President wanted Kissinger initially to engage the Chinese. Kissinger’s conversations in Beijing are covered in detail and the excitement that he felt during this first trip clearly comes through the official record. It is not difficult to see that Kissinger believed he had a special bond with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. The October 1971 trip by Kissinger is also covered in detail with similar documentation. The volume contains extensive documentation on President Nixon’s February 1972 trip and the issuing of the Shanghai Communiqué. After the Nixon visit, the United States sought to regularize its contacts with the People’s Republic of China, and this process is documented in the last chapter on China that includes documentation on Kissinger’s June 1972 visit to Beijing.
Although the volume concentrates heavily on the People’s Republic of China, there is considerable documentation on U.S. relations with the Republic of China during the 1969–1972 period. There is also documentation on a government-wide reexamination of U.S.-PRC relations that served as background to the more far-reaching decisions taken in secret by Kissinger and the President.
This volume is organized chronologically. As such it conveys the shift in control over U.S. China policy from the White House to the Department of State as a result of the Watergate crisis, the appointment of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State, the resignation of Richard Nixon as President, and Gerald Ford’s request that Kissinger relinquish his position as Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs. The chapters integrate documents about U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, reflecting the fact that the former government received much more attention from high-level American policymakers than did the latter. The central theme of the volume is the effort to strengthen and formalize the PRC–US relationship, which had been established during 1971 and 1972 after decades of bitter estrangement, and the concurrent disestablishment of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, a task that remained unfinished at the end of the Ford Administration. The primary means used to improve relations during these years were long conversations between U.S. and PRC leaders, which were supposed to initiate—but generally substituted for—a more developed and institutionalized relationship.
This volume documents U.S. satisfaction with the Republic of Korea’s increasing confidence as an international actor, a result of the South’s burgeoning economic prosperity and its (uneven) growth in political stability. Park successfully thwarted efforts to improve the relationship between Japan and North Korea. Instead, South Korea made its own contacts with the North Korean Government, an initiative that yielded few tangible results but did promote regional stability. Nonetheless, the Nixon administration was not fully successful at allaying Seoul’s misgivings about two of Nixon’s most important foreign policy initiatives: the improvement in relations between the United States and China, and the U.S. departure from Vietnam. Park’s fears about U.S. reliability added to tensions that resulted from economic competition, especially in the textile trade.
The Republic of Korea’s skepticism of the U.S. security guarantee was used to justify authoritarian domestic policies. In 1970 Park and his party amended the Korean Constitution to permit his election to a third term as the country’s president. The following year, the two titans of late 20th century South Korean politics, Park Chung Hee and Kim Dae Jung, competed for the presidency. Department of State officials endeavored to demonstrate balance by making themselves available to both candidates. When Park, victorious in the 1971 election, declared martial law in October 1972, the U.S. Government expressed frustration with this blow to the Republic of Korea’s political institutions. U.S. officials feared that alliance with South Korea could be seen by some as implicating them in Park’s actions. Given Park’s determination to adopt anti-democratic measures, U.S. efforts to respond by punishing South Korea would likely be either ineffective or create instability there, either outcome potentially damaging the U.S.-Korean relationship.
This is the last print volume to document U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia, other than those print volumes that document the Vietnam War during the Nixon–Ford administrations. For the January 1973 to January 1977 period, U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia (nations other than Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) is covered in an electroniconly volume. The decision to cover Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia for 1969–1972 in detail in this print volume was based on the fact that each country was a key ally—either formally or de facto—of the United States during the Vietnam war, and each played a specific role during the conflict. Thailand sent troops to fight in Vietnam, provided bases for U.S. airpower in Southeast Asia, and secretly provided training, troops, and arms to support U.S.-backed guerrilla forces in Laos. The Philippines sent a 2,000-man civic action group to South Vietnam, and Filipinos made up many of the administrative contractors in South Vietnam. Indonesia provided key arms support to the Lon Nol government at a crucial time. In addition, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia were important countries in their own right, with key U.S. military and economic assistance programs, large embassies, and close relations with the United States. In each country, the United States had a considerable interest in their government’s success.
The editors of this volume sought to present documentation that explains and illuminates the major foreign policy decisions of the President on the Middle East region, the Persian Gulf, and the Arabian Peninsula and Jordan, and represents the counsel of his key foreign policy advisers. The volume focuses on U.S. regional policy in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. It also has chapters on U.S. bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the smaller Persian Gulf states, and on the Jordan crisis of September 1970. The documents used in the Middle East regional part of the volume include memoranda, records of discussions, cables, and papers that set forth policy issues and options and show decisions or actions taken. The Jordan crisis section of the volume uses similar documentation and also relies heavily on transcripts of crucial telephone conversations.
Middle East Region. President Nixon relied upon his two principal foreign policy advisers, Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, for major foreign policy initiatives toward the region. Other high-level officials, such as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, provided additional counsel. Because the editors’ primary focus was on the policy process—recommendations, discussions, and then final decisions—the focus of the volume is largely on events in Washington; however, it also covers events and developments in the Middle East region and the Indian Ocean as they affected the policy process.
The themes of this section are framed by the Nixon administration’s efforts to replace the political and military structure left by the former British Empire with a newer structure that met America’s cold war needs. As the United States worked with the British to restructure the region militarily and politically, this required diplomatic contact with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the various sheikdoms that eventually made up the United Arab Emirates, as well as Qatar and Bahrain. Other themes emerged after Britain’s political and military departure from the region, including the Nixon administration’s efforts to articulate a grand strategy toward the Middle East region through arms sales and military modernization for its regional allies, enlarging the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean through negotiations with the British over Diego Garcia, and preventing Ceyelonese and Soviet efforts to demilitarize the Indian Ocean. Additional themes include competition between Kissinger and Rogers for dominance in policymaking and the reluctance of Nixon and Kissinger to be involved in regional issues, unless the Shah of Iran or King Faisal of Saudi Arabia demanded their personal attention.
The Jordan Crisis. This chapter documents the September 1970 crisis in Jordan. This crisis confronted the Nixon administration with the possibility that the monarchy of King Hussein, a major U.S. ally in the Middle East, would not survive. Although conflict existed between King Hussein and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the months preceding and following September 1970, this chapter focuses on the key 4-week period that defined the most intense phase of the conflict. It opens with the hijacking of four commercial airliners by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. These hijackings led to intense fighting between the PLO and the Jordanian Arab Army, and the chapter emphasizes Nixon and Kissinger’s close involvement in the day-to-day developments and the final resolution of the crisis.
The volume contains four chapters (entitled Regional Issues, Portuguese Africa, Angola, and Independence Negotiations), each documenting a segment of U.S. policy toward Southern Africa during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. The documentation reveals that both presidents pursued policies designed to maintain stability in the region and to avoid domestic and international criticism of U.S. ties to the white minority regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.
The chapter on Regional Issues covers South Africa, which both administrations viewed as a bulwark against Communist expansion in the region. The documents illustrate the tensions between the Nixon administration and the Congressional Black Caucus and between the administration and the Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs in dealing with South Africa’s apartheid regime. They also show a preference by Nixon and Henry Kissinger to avoid direct involvement in the growing unrest.
The chapter on Portuguese Africa reflects the evolution of U.S. involvement in Angola and Mozambique. Anxious to avoid alienating a key NATO partner, the Nixon administration sought to persuade the Portuguese Government to address the grievances of the black nationalist movements, while quietly granting limited assistance to the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) and National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) leader Holden Roberto. U.S. involvement increased dramatically in January 1975, when Portugal granted independence to its African colonies. Concerns about Soviet expansion and Cuban involvement led the United States to provide covert support to anti-Communist forces in Angola.
The chapter on Angola chronicles the continuation of U.S. support to anti-Communist forces after the Portuguese departed in November 1975. Despite substantial assistance and support from South Africa, Zaire, Zambia, and others, the U.S. was unable to turn the tide in Angola. Congressional passage of the Tunney Amendment in December 1975 cut off aid to Angola and effectively ended U.S. support.
The chapter on independence negotiations chronicles Kissinger’s effort to broker a negotiated settlement to the conflicts in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia.
The coverage of this volume is split almost equally between Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. The Eastern Europe section begins with a general chapter that covers the entire Soviet bloc region and deals almost exclusively with U.S. efforts to liberalize and expand trade with Eastern Europe. The second chapter is also a general one. It deals with U.S. Government policy and the bureaucratic debate about—and ultimately, the decision on how to fund—Radio Free Europe (the U.S.-directed—and clandestinely funded—broadcasting service aimed at Eastern Europe), and Radio Liberty (a similar service aimed at the Soviet Union). The remainder of the Eastern Europe section of the volume comprises eight chapters on U.S. bilateral relations with Soviet bloc Eastern European countries, as well as with Austria and Finland.
The countries covered in the three chapters on the Eastern Mediterranean generally have a much higher profile than the countries covered in the chapters on Eastern Europe, and indicate a strong Presidential and White House interest in events and policies there. This is particularly true for Greece. The Cyprus chapter is a continuation of the Foreign Relations series’ longstanding coverage of the ongoing dispute on that island between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which was overlaid with tensions between the governments in Athens and Ankara. The final chapter of the volume is primarily about U.S. efforts to discourage Turkish narcotics production.
This volume has three chapters: U.S. relations with Greece; the U.S. response to the Cyprus issue, which erupted into a crisis with the Turkish invasion of the eastern portion of the island in mid-1974; and U.S. relations with Turkey. The chapters on Greece and Turkey focus on bilateral relations and events in those countries. The chapter on Cyprus documents a multilateral relationship among Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Greece, Turkey, the United Nations, Great Britain, and the United States. Experts in Washington feared that Greece and Turkey, two NATO members already at odds over oil exploration in the Aegean Sea, might go to war over Cyprus and destroy NATO’s southern flank. The Cyprus chapter, therefore, has a high component of contingency planning and intelligence assessments and is documented in greater detail than the other two chapters. Where Greece or Turkey had an interest in Cyprus, the documentation is placed in the Cyprus chapter, although it was sometimes impossible to separate bilateral issues from Cyprus.
This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. This volume documents U.S. foreign economic policy from 1973 to 1976, focusing on international monetary policy, economic summitry, trade policy, commodity policy, and North-South relations.
This volume has a tightly defined understanding of foreign economic policy, one that focuses on three significant areas: international monetary relations, international trade, and efforts to redress global economic inequalities. The section on international monetary policy and economic summitry focuses on the aftermath of the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime envisioned at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference. It includes documents on the monetary crisis of February and March 1973; efforts to reform the international monetary system, with particular emphasis on the issues of exchange rate flexibility and the future of gold; and the creation of the G–7 summit. The section on trade policy, more than any other section in this volume, demonstrates the influence of domestic politics on foreign economic policy; this is particularly clear in the documents on the 1973 decision to impose export controls and the White House’s efforts to secure passage of a major piece of trade reform legislation, the Trade Act of 1974. This section also includes documents on the beginnings of a new round of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with particular emphasis on the role of agriculture in those negotiations, as well as foreign fears of U.S. protectionism. The final section, on commodity policy and North-South issues, documents the approach of the Nixon and Ford administrations to the persistent economic disparities between the industrialized nations of the North and the less developed countries of the South; it also explores U.S. attempts to grapple with the global trade in primary commodities in a post-1973 oil embargo world.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks produced a series of comprehensive arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union that for the first time limited the deployment of ballistic missiles and anti-ballistic missile systems. Commonly referred to as “SALT I,” the agreements were signed by President Richard Nixon and the General Secretary of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev at the Moscow Summit in May 1972. This volume documents the negotiations leading up to the agreement, the internal deliberations among U.S. policy makers, and reveals the play of political and national security considerations that factored into U.S. policy decisions.
The volume is organized chronologically covering the period of analytical preparation before SALT began, the various rounds of negotiations with the Soviet Union alternating among the cities of Helsinki, Geneva and Vienna, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Moscow in April 1972, discussions between President Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev at the Moscow Summit in May 1972, and the Nixon administration's efforts to secure congressional approval of the SALT agreement and ratification of the ABM treaty.
Sources for this volume include documents generated in the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The editor included extracts from memorandums of conversation between Henry Kissinger, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, telephone transcripts and meeting memoranda prepared by chief SALT negotiator, Gerard Smith, and a significant number of backchannel messages among Smith, Kissinger and Alexander Haig, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs. Additionally, the editor transcribed specifically for this volume more than twenty excerpts from conversations recorded among the President and his advisors on the secret White House taping system.
This volume documents U.S. national security policy in the context of the Vietnam War and the changing Cold War strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. When President Richard Nixon assumed office in January 1969, he was confronted with the fact that the United States no longer held commanding military superiority over its superpower rival. Since the end of his stint as Vice President in 1961, the Soviets had achieved a rough strategic parity that left the United States with “significant vulnerabilities” vis-à-vis the USSR. This volume documents the Nixon administration’s efforts to grapple with this new strategic situation and provides coverage of the following: The administration’s review of U.S. nuclear and general purpose forces and strategic doctrine; its attempts to ascertain the level of technological sophistication achieved by the Soviet missile program; and its decision to deploy Safeguard, a modified anti-ballistic missile system. The volume also examines chemical and biological weapons policy; U.S. nuclear policy in Asia; the evolution of the administration’s strategic priorities in light of an ever-shrinking defense budget; and the transition from military conscription to an all-volunteer armed force. Additionally, the volume provides previously unreleased material regarding the October 1969 Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, in which Nixon secretly placed on alert portions of the United States military, including its nuclear forces. Throughout this volume, a consistent theme is the relationship between military strength and diplomatic strength; in particular, the importance of military might—real or perceived—to the United States’ ability to maintain credibility in the eyes of allies and adversaries alike.
This volume documents U.S. responses to the dramatic changes that took place in the global oil production system from 1969 until 1974. During this period long-established relationships among oil producing nations, oil consuming nations, and international oil companies underwent a tumultuous realignment. As traditional contractual arrangements between producing nations and international oil corporations broke down, political and economic influence shifted from consuming nations to producing states. The diplomatic effects of this shift in the global monetary balance of power were wide-ranging and include the oil embargo imposed by Arab oil-exporting countries during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This volume documents U.S. efforts to negotiate an end to the embargo, relations with oil producing states such as Saudi Arabia, U.S. relations with allies in the Atlantic Alliance and elsewhere, the administration’s attempt to reformulate the U.S. oil import program in 1969, negotiations between international oil companies and oil producing states, efforts to create bureaucratic structures to deal with energy issues, and attempts to prepare U.S. consumers to adjust to the long-term consequences of a tighter oil market and higher priced oil.
This volume focuses on the topic of European Security, a key foreign policy concern for both the Nixon and Ford administrations. It is centered around the basic questions the U.S. Government faced: how best to achieve security and cooperation in Europe, and how to reduce both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. This volume has a broader scope than most, and covers the entire span of both the Nixon and Ford administrations, 1969–1976. While the general focus is European security, the specific focus is on two overriding issues that faced the Nixon and Ford administrations: 1) whether to hold a conference on European security attended by the United States and its NATO allies, and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies; and 2) whether the United States and its European allies would negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union and its East European allies on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe. Both President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger (Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and after September 1973, Secretary of State) were skeptical that a conference on European security would achieve very much—they believed that the Europeans were overestimating its potential impact. There were also related issues, such as whether to combine the security conference with negotiations on force reductions. In addition, the question of negotiations with the NATO allies looms large in the volume, which includes many memoranda of conversation between U.S. officials and their NATO counterparts.
This volume represents a departure in coverage on Germany and Berlin in the Foreign Relations series. Previous volumes covered bilateral relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany in breadth, including documentation on economic and military issues, as well as on matters of politics and diplomacy. Although this volume covers such issues, especially when decision-making was at a high level, more extensive documentation on discussions between Washington and Bonn on international economics and national security has been—and will be—published in other volumes: Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume III, Foreign Economic Policy, 1969–1972; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972; and Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972. This volume examines key issues in German-American relations in more depth, emphasizing two issues in particular: the response of the Nixon administration to Chancellor Willy Brandt and his Eastern policy (Ostpolitik); and the secret negotiations leading to signature of the Berlin quadripartite agreement in September 1971. Moscow was a key player in the diplomacy behind both Bonn’s Ostpolitik and the Berlin agreement. This volume, therefore, also focuses on the Soviet Union, and places bilateral relations between the United States and the Federal Republic in the context of the competition between the two superpowers. This is, in other words, a “cold war” volume—or perhaps, more accurately, a “détente” volume—and thus should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970; Volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971; and Volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972.
This volume documents the foreign policy of the Nixon administration concerning global issues, sometimes also called transnational issues. The table of contents provides the best idea of the kinds of issues documented by this topical, global issues volume: terrorism, hijacking, and other attacks on civil aviation; international narcotics control; international cooperation in space; international environmental policy; and oceans policy. This is by no means a complete list of the global issues that the Nixon administration confronted. Others, such as energy, disarmament, refugees, and human rights, will be covered in separate volumes in the 1969–1976 subseries. During the period covered in this volume, there were a number of refugee problems that resulted from regional conflicts or civil wars; however, the Nixon administration usually approached such refugee problems individually, rather than dealing with them as part of a global problem. Although not then considered to be a major factor in general U.S. foreign policy, human rights violations—especially the question of religious persecution—surfaced repeatedly during the period from 1969 to 1972. Again, the Nixon administration approached the problem bilaterally rather than multilaterally. Any attempt to link human rights into a single compilation with some ideological or philosophical coherence would not represent how contemporary policy makers conceived the issue. It is the opinion of the editors that this volume covers the era most faithfully by focusing on those topics that the first Nixon administration recognized as distinctly global issues and dealt with on a transnational basis. Topics treated primarily on a bilateral or regional basis can be found in other volumes in this subseries.
This volume documents the Nixon administration’s primarily multilateral arms control policy between 1969 and 1972. It does not cover the high profile Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union, culminating in the signing of the SALT agreements in May 1972. These negotiations are covered in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972. While the Nixon administration’s arms control policies have become synonymous with SALT, the SALT negotiations were actually just one of a panoply of historic arms control and disarmament initiatives that the Nixon administration pursued between 1969 and 1972. This volume focuses on the administration’s multilateral arms control policies, most notably its review of biological and chemical warfare policies, ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, negotiation of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, approach to nuclear testing and test-ban proposals, and ratification of the Geneva Protocol. Most of these negotiations were played out in international arenas such as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) and its successor, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the United Nations, but the documents here show they were fundamentally U.S.-Soviet dialogues, part of the cold war superpower struggle that underlay much of United States diplomacy at the time.
This volume documents United States policy concerning global/transnational issues during the Nixon and Ford administrations: Antarctic resource exploitation, international drug control, human rights, oceans policy, space and telecommunications, and terrorism. Additional global issues, including energy, disarmament, food policy, population control, and women’s issues are treated in other volumes in the 1969–1976 subseries. During the period covered in this volume, a number of refugee problems resulting from regional conflicts or civil wars occurred, but the Nixon administration usually approached those incidents individually rather than as phenomena requiring an overarching policy. It is the opinion of the editors that this volume recounts the era faithfully by focusing on those topics that the second Nixon and Ford administrations recognized as global issues and dealt with as worldwide phenomena. Issues treated primarily as bilateral or regional matters can be found in other volumes in this subseries.
This volume documents the foreign policy of the Nixon administration towards Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972, during a period when the United States viewed Iran as its staunchest friend in the Persian Gulf region and Iraq as a potentially dangerous opponent. Since Iran and Iraq were rivals, Washington’s increasingly close ties to Iran widened the gap with Baghdad.
This volume documents the foreign policy of the Nixon administration toward sub-Saharan Africa with the exceptions of the Republic of South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Namibia, which are covered in print volume Foreign Relations 1969–1976, Vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, 1969–1976. In addition, chapters on U.S. policy toward North Africa will be included in this electronic-only volume when they are declassified. This volume does not attempt to cover all countries in sub-Saharan Africa, but instead concentrates on those areas where U.S. interests and concerns were greatest. The chapter on general U.S. policy toward Africa provides the widest scope of coverage.
This volume documents the foreign policy of the Nixon administration toward North and sub-Saharan Africa and with the exceptions of the Republic of South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Namibia, which are covered in print volume Foreign Relations 1969–1976, Vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, 1969–1976. This volume does not attempt to cover all countries in sub-Saharan or North Africa, but instead concentrates on those areas where U.S. interests and concerns were greatest. The chapters on general U.S. policy toward Africa and North Africa provide the widest scope of coverage.
This volume documents the foreign policy of the Nixon-Ford administration towards sub-Saharan Africa, 1973-1976, with the exception of policy towards the Republic of South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia, and Namibia, which are covered in print volume Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa. In addition, chapters on U.S. policy towards North Africa will be included in this electronic-only volume when they are declassified. This volume does not attempt to cover all countries in sub-Saharan Africa, but instead concentrates on those areas where U.S. interests and concerns were greatest. Countries or regions not covered in specific chapters are included, if significant, in the chapter on general U.S. policy towards Africa, which provides the widest scope of coverage.
This e-volume documents the foreign policy of the Nixon administration toward South Asia, 1969–1972, and should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, which covers in depth the period from March to December 1971. Together, these two volumes provide full coverage of U.S. policy toward the larger countries of South Asia. For the period January 1969 to February 1971 and all of 1972, the e-volume provides full coverage of U.S. policy toward India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the newly created state of Bangladesh. The e-volume also contains documentation that supplements the print volume XI. These additional documents on India and Pakistan for the period March to December 1971 include intelligence assessments, key messages from the U.S. Embassies in Islamabad and New Delhi and the Consulate General in Dacca, responses to National Security Study Memoranda, and full transcripts of Presidential tape recordings that are summarized and excerpted in editorial notes in volume XI. Documentation on Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan is not included in the e-volume.
This e-volume documents the foreign policy of the Nixon-Ford administration toward South Asia, 1973–1976, and should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, and Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971 (GPO: Washington, March 2005; ISBN 0–16–072401–5). Both of these volumes document in depth the period of the Nixon administration, including the pivotal months of the India-Pakistan conflict of 1971 and its aftermath. Taken together, these three volumes provide comprehensive coverage of U.S. policy toward India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. In contrast with the previous volumes on South Asia during the Nixon administration, which were focused more tightly on the subcontinent’s crises, volume E–8 also provides detailed coverage of the smaller South Asian states of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka, and the Indian Ocean region, including the Republic of the Maldives. Read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, 1969–1972 (GPO: forthcoming), this volume will also provide comprehensive coverage of U.S. Indian Ocean strategy during 1969-1976.
This volume documents the formulation of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean between 1969 and 1972. Upon taking office in January 1969, President Nixon indicated that he intended to give a high priority to revitalizing relations with the region. On his first full day as President, Nixon asked New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, a Latin America expert, to assess the effectiveness of the Alliance for Progress program initiated by the Kennedy administration and to make policy recommendation