Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978

113. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 26, 1977, 8:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Israel
• Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan
• Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
• Minister Hanan Bar-On
• Mr. Meir Rosenne, Legal Advisor to the Israeli Foreign Minister
• Mr. Naphtali Lavie
• Mr. Elyakim Rubinstein
• United States
• Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
• Under Secretary Philip Habib
• Assistant Secretary Alfred L. Atherton
• Ambassador Samuel Lewis
• Deputy Assistant Secretary Arthur R. Day
• William B. Quandt, National Security Council
• David Korn, Policy Planning Staff

Dayan asked if the cease-fire in southern Lebanon is holding.² The Secretary replied that it is. The Palestinian rejectionists are the main problem. Dayan said he guessed that there was nothing else to do now but wait for implementation of the Shtaura agreement. Dayan asked if the Secretary had seen Rabin’s very hawkish statement on southern Lebanon. Dayan observed wryly that he and Begin had become “super doves” compared to Rabin.

The Secretary said he would like to say a word about our talks with Fahmy.³ The Secretary said he had given a copy of the Israeli treaty to Fahmy and discussed with Fahmy the question of a peace treaty. The Secretary said he thought that although there are big gaps between the Egyptian and Israeli positions, there is a basis for negotiations. Between the Egyptians and Israelis? Dayan asked. No question about it, the Secretary reiterated, there is a basis for negotiations. Dayan asked whether the Egyptians could negotiate with Israel without Syria. The Secretary said the Egyptians would like to but we will have to bring about the circumstances for it. The Secretary repeated that in his judgment there is a real basis for negotiations between Egypt and Israel.

Dayan asked if there is a basis for agreement, not just negotiations. The Secretary said it is too early to say yet if a final agreement could be reached by the Israelis and Egyptians. Dayan asked whether Egypt would make a separate agreement with Israel, in case the other Arabs don’t reach agreement with Israel. The Secretary said he could not yet give Dayan an answer to that, but he has raised the question with Fahmy, and Fahmy has gone back to Sadat on it. So we have only questions so far, Dayan remarked. The Secretary said he would have answers before Dayan left New York, but he could say now that the Egyptians do want an agreement with Israel.

The Secretary said he would like to fill Dayan in on the talks with Gromyko.⁴ Dayan remarked that he had never met with Gromyko, although Allon did. Dayan said the Israelis had been approached indirectly by the Soviets. He had a feeling that Gromyko would like to have a meeting with him provided he (Gromyko) didn’t have to ask for it. (At this point Ambassador Dinitz handed the Secretary a letter from Prime Minister Begin to the President.)⁵ The Secretary said that Dayan could tell Prime Minister Begin that during the President’s meeting with Gromyko the President had raised the question of the Prisoners of Conscience.

The Secretary said the Soviets agree with the Israelis and us that peace must mean more than the end of the state of war. It must mean normal relations. They are willing to make a public statement on this; the Secretary said he thought that would be helpful. Regarding borders the Soviets want the 1967 lines. Regarding the Palestinian question, their position is that there should be a Palestinian state that is independent and that should include the West Bank and Gaza. Regarding Palestinian representation at Geneva, the Soviets feel the best solution would be a united Arab delegation. On Israeli settlements in the occupied territory, the Soviets feel very strongly and will vote for whatever resolution comes up. These are the main points of the Soviet position as stated by Gromyko, the Secretary said.

Dayan said if the Soviets agree to Palestinians in a united Arab delegation, what do they say about the PLO. The Secretary said the Soviets think there should be PLO in the united Arab delegation. They believe the conference should break down into functional working groups along the lines proposed by the Syrians, for both territorial issues and the Palestinian problems. Dayan asked if these would be different working groups. The Secretary said yes there would be one group to deal with all territorial questions and one group to deal with Palestinian-related questions such as a Palestinian state, Gaza and the West Bank, and water rights; all these things would be handled in functional groups. Not geographic working groups, Dayan asked? No, the Secretary replied.

The Secretary said the problem is the Soviets want to play a role in terms of input. They don’t want to be pushed aside. They probably don’t care too much about the structure of Geneva, but they are concerned about being left out. The Secretary said he didn’t think the Soviets would stay locked into their position if other ways could be found to ensure their involvement. He did not think the functional approach was the be-all and end-all of the Soviet position. Dayan asked if the Soviet position regarding Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines was simply their position, “or do they mean it?” The Secretary indicated that he thought there might be some flexibility in the Soviet position. Dayan said Israel would say that it does not agree with the Soviet position but that it would nonetheless negotiate. Would the Soviets agree with that? Dayan asked. The Secretary replied that he thought so.

The Secretary reiterated that the Russians’ greatest fear is that they will be excluded from the negotiations. Dayan indicated that in any case most of the negotiations would take place outside Geneva. In response, the Secretary stressed that there must be meaningful negotiations in the working groups in Geneva. Dayan said that during the 1949 Rhodes Armistice negotiations the really important talks took place outside Rhodes. Dayan recalled that he flew to Amman to negotiate with King Abdullah; the negotiations were really in Amman with King Abdullah, not in Rhodes. Mr. Rosenne said Geneva is only a framework. The Secretary replied that the Arabs have said that if we go to Geneva we must stay there this time. The working groups must work in Geneva. Talks outside Geneva are not excluded but there must be talks in the working groups in Geneva. Ambassador Lewis pointed out that the format would be very similar to that of the SALT talks. We have an on-going conference in Geneva as well as meetings on SALT elsewhere. Mr. Rosenne objected that the SALT negotiations are not about territory. He added that negotiations between Israel and the Arabs have to be bilateral.

The Secretary said the Arabs have not agreed to bilateral negotiations. He wanted to go over this clearly so that there would be no misunderstanding. The Secretary said that we do not like to have to say publicly things that contradict what Israel has said. But first, the Secretary said, he would like to go back to the southern Lebanon question and get it out of the way. Dayan had asked if the cease-fire was holding. The answer is yes and we hope it will hold in the future. The real problem is the rejectionists. The Secretary said he had seen a report from the Israel radio saying that if attacks on Israel territory continue this will be a basis for Israel to go back into Lebanon. The Secretary said he wanted to make clear that we do not believe that this would be a basis for Israel to go back into Lebanon. The Secretary mentioned the President’s letter to Prime Minister Begin⁶ and said the President had made it very clear that the cease-fire should be respected. The Secretary noted that we have done everything in our power to bring about cessation of military activity.

Dayan said what do you expect us to do, just sit quiet and let them attack us? The Secretary said the Israelis could shell back if necessary, but sending troops in is too much. Dayan said it is a waste of ammunition, and totally inefficient for Israel to shell back against Palestinian guerrillas. It would be different if Israel were shelling a big Arab town like Irbid. But the situation along the Lebanese border is a little like Vietnam, Dayan said. Five or six Palestinians go out into the brush and shell one of our towns. They don’t stay and wait for us to shell back. By the time we do shell, they are gone. The only thing to do is go in and get them, Dayan said. To fire back to somewhere in the mountains in the hope that some PLO would be there to receive our shells would be wishful thinking, Dayan said.

The Secretary said he wanted to be very clear and frank and to avoid misunderstanding. For the last five days we have been under heavy pressure from the press and Congress in regard to Israel’s use of our equipment in Lebanon in violation of our law. The Secretary stressed that when Israel sends troops into south Lebanon with U.S. equipment it is a violation of American law and we have to report it to our Congress. We have not done this so far, the Secretary said, because we want to avoid complications. Dayan said that as an Israeli he had to say that Israel could not just sit back and allow the PLO to attack Israel’s towns. He could not go to the people of Kiryat Shemona and tell them “there is nothing we can do for you.” If the problem is American equipment, Dayan said, maybe we can do something without American equipment, using British tanks and British and French equipment. But to let the PLO open fire during the cease-fire and have to say to our people “we can’t help you,” no Israeli government can say that, Dayan said. We don’t want to break your laws, Dayan said, but we have to defend ourselves. The Secretary said that the real question is that what was done by Israel in moving troops into southern Lebanon to work with the Maronites was wrong. Dayan asked if Israel was responsible for the war in Lebanon. The Secretary said we only want Israel to know where we stand on this matter.

Talk then turned to the Israeli Cabinet statement of September 23 announcing acceptance of an alleged American proposal on organization of Geneva. The Secretary asked what the Israeli Cabinet had in fact decided. He pointed out that we have seen only press reports.⁷ Dayan said he had passed to the GOI “only what we were sure you had passed to us.” Dayan said that “we had absolutely no doubt about it; it was honestly what I thought we had agreed on.” The Secretary said he had no question that that was the case. There seemed to have been a real misunderstanding.

The Secretary read the text of the Israeli press release. He then went down the points made by the President in his meeting with Dayan on September 19,⁸ as follows:

1. The Arab parties would be represented by a united Arab delegation. In the delegation there should be non-prominent PLO Palestinians.

2. The working groups for the peace treaties would be Egypt/Israel, Syria/Israel, and Jordan and the Palestinians of the united Arab delegation for negotiations on the Palestine entity problem. There would be a separate working group of all interested parties, perhaps separate from Geneva, to deal with the problem of refugees. Concluding, the Secretary said there obviously was a wide gap between what the Israelis understood and what we understood.

Dayan said that on refugees Israel had said that the negotiations should not be within the Geneva framework. The Secretary said that the important point was about Jordan and the Palestinians. The Israelis had said that our proposal was that the Palestinians should be part of the Jordanian delegation. The Secretary stressed that the President’s recollection and his own was that the West Bank should be negotiated by Jordan and Palestine members of the united Arab delegation. The Secretary said this is a big difference and he wanted to clarify it.

Dayan said he recalled that the agreement was that if any Palestinian should be asked what delegation he belongs to, he would have to say the Jordanian. The Secretary said he had checked the minutes and confirmed that the President had made clear that we were talking about Jordanians and Palestinians, not Palestinians in a Jordanian delegation. In any event, the Secretary said, the problem is that the Israeli Cabinet came out with a statement which we had not seen before, and which differed from our understanding of what was said in the meeting with the President. The Secretary said he hoped this sort of thing would never happen again. We do not want to be in conflict with you, the Secretary said. But suddenly on Sunday⁹ we were confronted with a report on the wire of an Israeli Cabinet decision. We spent all day trying to find a way to deal with it. Finally, we concluded we had no alternative but to respond.¹⁰ The Secretary said it makes it very difficult for us when the Israelis do things like this. He hoped that we and the Israelis could find ways of avoiding this sort of situation in the future.

Dayan said he hoped so too. Dayan said if the Secretary felt that the Israeli Cabinet action was not helpful, he accepted that. He suggested that perhaps the right way to proceed would be to put any understandings down in writing and show them to both sides. The Secretary said it would have been much better if we had proceeded that way. Mr. Habib remarked that if the Israeli Cabinet statement had claimed to be only the Israeli position, that would not have been so bad. But the Israelis called it an agreed U.S./Israeli position. The Secretary said he thought in the future that such things should be put in writing.

Ambassador Dinitz said he was under the impression that the United States and Israel had agreed on a position, subject to approval by the Israeli Cabinet. Dinitz said the Foreign Minister had even suggested that it might be better to state that it was only an American position. The Secretary replied that that was all the more reason for Israel not to do it alone. If it were an American position, we should be the ones to put it forward. The Secretary said he had had to make a statement that afternoon clarifying the whole matter, when the press asked him about it. The Secretary said he had told the press that he welcomed the Israeli view that a united Arab delegation is a good idea. But when he was asked by reporters whether discussions should be bilateral or not he had said they should be bilateral where possible but there might be other ways. We had also had to say that the Israeli statement did not accurately reflect our views.¹¹

The Secretary said he would like to clarify this evening with Dayan what we can and cannot agree on concerning the organization of the Geneva Conference. The Secretary said, let’s go down the list. He then read the following: “The Arab parties are to be represented by a united Arab delegation at the opening session of Geneva. Within the Arab delegation there will be Palestinians, without well-known PLO.” Ambassador Dinitz asked what we meant by the opening session of Geneva? Would this be only a brief ceremonial affair, or would there be speeches or even negotiations and voting? The Secretary replied that he did not believe it would be only ceremonial. Dayan said that Israel could agree concerning the united Arab delegation just for the opening session, but could not agree to it for any negotiations, except for a subject like the refugees. Otherwise, the negotiations would have to be bilateral, not between Israel and the united Arab delegation.

The Secretary said the second point is that after the opening session the parties would break up into the following working groups: Israel/Egypt, Israel/Syria, and Jordanians and Palestinians. The Secretary emphasized that the Palestinians would not be members of the Jordanian delegation: the formula is Jordanians and Palestinians. Dayan said the first point was to find out if we agree on Syria and Egypt. He asked if his understanding was correct that after its opening the Conference will break up into two working groups—Syria and Israel, and Egypt and Israel. The Secretary said yes. Before that, Dayan continued, Israel’s view is that there are not to be any negotiations with the united Arab delegation and there will not be any other negotiations with the united Arab delegation except for the refugees. As far as Egypt and Syria are concerned, all matters would be negotiated bilaterally. The Secretary said this coincides with our view of how things should be. We are not sure we can persuade all the Arabs to proceed this way, but we will try. Mr. Habib suggested that the opening session might last three or four days. Dayan said the question is not how long it will last but what will be done there.

Ambassador Dinitz said that before we left the subject he wanted to be sure there was no misunderstanding. He wanted to know precisely what the U.S. meant when it talked about the opening session. Will there be one speaker for all the Arab states or will there be several? If there are several, will one of them get up and speak in the name of the PLO? The Secretary said he could not give clear answers to those questions now. Dayan interjected that in any event he did not think such questions needed to be answered tonight. We do not need to go into all the details now, Dayan said, we do not need to decide now what kind of champagne we will drink when the peace treaty is signed.

The Secretary said that in addition to the Egyptian/Israeli and Syrian/Israeli working groups there would be a working group of Jordanians and Palestinians to negotiate regarding the West Bank and Gaza. Dayan asked if we might break this down into smaller parts, going into more detail. First, he wanted to ask about Jordan’s position. The Secretary said that the Jordanians’ position is that they cannot negotiate by themselves regarding the West Bank; they can negotiate only along with the other Arabs. Their view is that there should be a functional working group for this issue. Dayan remarked that there are purely bilateral matters between Jordan and Israel and asked if there should not be negotiations between Jordan and Israel alone on these issues. Mr. Quandt remarked that there should be no objection to separate Jordanian/Israeli or Lebanese/Israeli negotiations for strictly bilateral matters. Dayan noted that Israel has boundaries with Jordan outside the West Bank and that an Israeli/Jordanian peace treaty will have to be negotiated. The Secretary said he did not believe that would be a problem. Dayan said let us then note that it is the West Bank/Gaza issue that is problematic. But let us say that for Jordanian/Israeli problems there should be bilateral negotiations between Jordan and Israel. The Secretary reiterated that as far as the United States is concerned we see no objection to bilateral Jordanian/Israeli negotiations on problems solely of concern to those two states.

Dayan said the next question is what to do about the West Bank and Gaza issues. What is your position, he asked? The Secretary said the President’s view is that both Jordanians and Palestinians should be involved in the negotiations on the West Bank/Gaza and Palestinian issues. He added, however, that he personally thought it would be very hard to negotiate these issues with only those two—i.e., Jordanians and Palestinians—involved. The Syrians will almost certainly want to get involved in any such negotiations. Dayan said the Syrians have no ground to be involved in negotiations regarding the West Bank and Gaza. The Egyptians might make a claim to such involvement, on the grounds that Gaza was under their control until 1967 and they want to have a say in its disposition. But, Dayan said, we never thought the Syrians would try to get involved. The Secretary said the Palestinians are so closely tied with the Syrians that he thought the Syrians would want to be a party to anything concerning them. Mr. Habib remarked that the Palestinian issue is one that concerns more than one country. Dayan asked if he understood correctly that the President believes that the West Bank issue should be negotiated by Jordan and the Palestinians. The Secretary said yes and repeated that he himself thought the Syrians would also want to be involved.

Dayan then said he would like to suggest that, regarding the West Bank and Gaza, negotiations would be with the Jordanians and the Palestinians. Dayan cautioned, however, that he did not know if he would have a majority in the Israeli Cabinet for this position. Mr. Rosenne interjected that “nobody can be brought into Geneva unless we agree.” Mr. Rosenne pointed out that the Israelis had always insisted the Palestinians be part of a Jordanian delegation. Dayan said he was saying that there should be a separate group dealing with the West Bank and Gaza. On one side there would be Israel and on the other, Jordan and the Palestinians. Dayan added, however, that Jordanians and Palestinians would not be two separate delegations. The Secretary replied that we do not see the Palestinians as being part of the Jordanian delegation. Israel would be negotiating the question of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordanians and Palestinians as co-equals. Dayan said he understood, the negotiations would be with the Jordanians and Palestinians in one delegation. The Secretary said it would not be a single delegation—there would be Jordanians and Palestinians as members of a unified Arab delegation. The Secretary again explained that the Jordanians and Palestinians would be separate groups, not members of the same delegation. Mr. Rosenne objected that to put the Palestinians on the same level as the Jordanians or the Egyptians would mean recognizing them as a state. Dayan said we are talking now about who we are going to negotiate with, not anything more. He again asked if Israel would be negotiating regarding the West Bank and Gaza with Palestinians and Jordanians. The Secretary replied affirmatively. Dayan then said that he agreed to what the Secretary was proposing.

Ambassador Dinitz then asked if he might have a word privately with Dayan. The two got up from the table and went to the corner of the room; they were joined by Mr. Rosenne and Mr. Bar-On.

When Dayan returned to the table, the Secretary remarked that we want no flags and no name plates at Geneva. Dayan said that his colleagues were concerned about the formula for negotiations regarding the West Bank and Gaza. We seem to be putting Palestinians on the same level as Jordanians, Egyptians and Syrians. And there seems to be an implication that Israel would be negotiating regarding a future Palestinian state or entity. Dayan said perhaps it would be better to forget about what had been said about the organization of the negotiations and instead talk about what we are negotiating about. First of all, Dayan said, he would have to reiterate Israel’s position that there should be no foreign sovereignty on the West Bank. However, he added, we do want to negotiate about how we and the West Bank Arabs can live together. So, Dayan said, let’s talk about what we would negotiate about. Israel would say it thinks there should be no foreign sovereignty and no state. The other parties would disagree.

The Secretary said he would like to repeat the American position on this issue. Our view is that there should be a Palestinian entity. We have chosen the word carefully because it does not say a state, it leaves room. But we believe there can be no resolution of the Palestinian question without a Palestinian entity, preferably one linked to Jordan. On this point, the Secretary remarked, there is a real difference of opinion between Israel and ourselves. But we feel the issue has to be on the agenda at Geneva. If not, it would probably not be possible to have real negotiations at Geneva, and the parties might not even agree to come to Geneva.

Dayan said the President had told him he did not support a Palestinian state. The President had said this also to the press, Dayan said. Dayan then asked “what do you mean by a Palestinian homeland or entity if it is not a state?” The Secretary said he would tell Dayan what he thought the President had been saying. The President meant that there ought to be some territory—territory linked to Jordan—as a homeland for the Palestinians. In his own mind he has not ruled out a state if the parties want a state, but preferably the entity should be linked to Jordan. Mr. Rosenne interjected that the word Palestinians is not to be found in Resolution 242. Since Resolution 242 is the basis for Geneva, to add the Palestinian issue now would not be in conformity with Resolution 242 or with the U.S./Israeli Memorandum of Understanding.¹² Mr. Rosenne then read from an Israeli government Statement of Principles regarding the West Bank.¹³

Dayan said perhaps the best thing to do would be to find a way to mention each subject without defining it. The Secretary said suppose we refer to it as the Palestinian question. Dayan said suppose Israel would agree to say the West Bank, the Palestinians and Gaza could be discussed at Geneva. Then Israel could come forward with its views and the other party could state its views as well. The subject can be mentioned, Dayan said, and each side can interpret it as it sees fit. The Secretary said he thought that was a constructive idea. The subject could be put on the agenda but we would not say who would discuss it and we would not try to define it too clearly. Mr. Habib suggested that the subject might be called the West Bank, Gaza and the Palestinians. The Secretary said that is good, that moves us forward. Mr. Habib cautioned, however, that the Arabs will be split over the issue of functional versus bilateral negotiations. The Secretary asked whether the question of free navigation should be a separate issue. Mr. Rosenne said he thought it should be dealt with in the Egyptian/Israeli working group, and Ambassador Dinitz made the same remark. The Secretary said that was fine. Dayan confirmed that the free navigation issue should be dealt with in the Egyptian/Israeli working group.

The Secretary said it is important to note that the Soviets say that peace is not just the end of war, but normalization of relations. Mr. Rosenne asked if that included diplomatic relations? The Secretary said we had discussed that with the Soviets. Gromyko said “normal relations between states.” Dayan remarked that that type of relations did not even exist between the Soviets and Israelis. The Secretary said Gromyko had specified that when there is progress in the Middle East peace talks, the USSR would reestablish relations with Israel.

Dayan raised the question of American guarantees. The Secretary said he had not yet had a chance to discuss this at length with the President. But, he added, what we are talking about is a bilateral treaty between the United States and Israel similar to treaties the U.S. has with the NATO countries. This is a treaty that would put us on the line with you, the Secretary said. The Secretary said it was his view that the President and he would recommend that we sign such a treaty with Israel in the framework of peace. The Secretary said it was further his view that we would be able to get the votes in Congress for approval for such a treaty. Dayan said he was not familiar with the NATO treaties. He said he understood that the Secretary was informing him of his (the Secretary’s) attitude. The Secretary said yes he was telling Dayan what our attitude is. Dayan asked if we would consider similar treaties with the Arabs. The Secretary said yes but he did not think the Arabs would ask for such treaties. They might want Security Council guarantees. Dayan asked what the Security Council could do to guarantee the Arab states? The Secretary said the Security Council would decide as appropriate to take action as appropriate (laughter). But the Secretary stressed that he was talking about a U.S./Israeli agreement, ratified by the Senate. The Secretary asked Mr. Atherton to get out the typical kind of agreement we have with the NATO countries. The Secretary said he would talk with the President about this, if Dayan thought it useful. Dayan said he felt Israel must know what its various possibilities are in the different contingencies. Then, he added, we will have to look at them, “take a cold shower” and decide.

The Secretary said there is another matter he wanted to mention to Dayan. The Soviets have talked with us about the possibility of issuing a joint statement concerning the Middle East conflict and the need to convene in Geneva. The Secretary said the issue will come up again when Gromyko meets with the President. But he wanted to let Dayan know about it now. He could not be sure that anything would come of the idea but if something does, he said, we will show Israel the draft of the joint statement before issuing it.¹⁴ Ambassador Dinitz said the Israeli side would much appreciate this but he knew that there are things which the Soviets and the U.S. agree on that the U.S. and Israel do not agree on. Thus a joint Soviet/American statement might prejudice Israel’s position at Geneva. The Secretary said we have not made any final decision on this, we just want to let the Israelis know that it is under consideration. If we do make such a statement it will simply cover where we stand and where we hope things will go before the end of the year. Ambassador Dinitz said he hoped the statement would not be given to Israel in final form, but that the Israelis would have a chance to comment and propose changes. The Secretary said they would.

Dayan remarked that the Secretary had earlier told him that we had given the Egyptians a copy of Israel’s draft treaty. Only the treaty, the Secretary said, not the letter. Dayan asked if Israel could get something similar from the Arabs in return. The Secretary said we may be able to get something from the Egyptians and the Jordanians; the Jordanians have given us a very full paper. The Secretary said we would give the Israelis anything we could.

Dayan asked about the possibility of Arab resolutions modifying Resolution 242. The Secretary said our position on this is that we are discouraging anybody from trying to modify 242 or reinterpret it. We have discouraged all parties from doing anything in regard to 242. We are saying, “leave it alone.”

What about resolutions concerning Israeli settlements? Dayan asked. The Secretary said that will come up. We will be faced with a resolution on settlements and it will create a problem for us. Dayan asked whether this would be in the Security Council or the General Assembly. Mr. Habib said so far there is a proposed GA resolution. Ambassador Lewis pointed out that the likelihood of a resolution condemning Israeli settlements depends on the situation. If there is no progress toward Geneva then a resolution becomes much more likely. If there is progress towards Geneva we will be in a much better position to fend one off. Dayan asked what we would do in case such a resolution were presented in the Security Council. The Secretary said that would depend on what the resolution says. He added that Dayan knows our views regarding Israeli settlements. Mr. Rosenne asked if we could get such a resolution stopped if we knew Geneva was going to convene? The Secretary said if we make progress toward Geneva, it should be possible to stop such a resolution.

Dayan asked if the Secretary saw negotiations with Egypt possible before Geneva. The Secretary said if we can agree on Geneva and can resolve the problem of Palestinian representation and how Geneva will be organized, then we might be able to make progress also on substance before Geneva. Dayan asked if the Secretary thought there could be West Bank mayors in the Palestinian delegation. The Secretary said he thought there could be some mayors in the Palestinian delegation. The Secretary added that he did not think, however, that not-well-known PLO could be excluded from the Palestinian delegation.

Dayan said Israel is very interested in knowing whether there is a possibility for negotiations between Israel and Egypt. The Secretary said there can only be such a possibility if there is a real Geneva Conference coming up, a conference which deals with all issues and at which the Palestinians are represented. Dayan asked about the problem of the Soviets. The Secretary said the difficulty with the Soviets is that they are concerned about being left out. We have to give them a role that gets them off their insistence on functional negotiations. The Soviets want functional negotiations because they feel it gives them a role. If we can assure them that they will have a role in non-functional working groups they will feel good. Dayan observed wryly there will be groups at Geneva but they won’t be working.

Dayan asked what he should tell Prime Minister Begin about what had been agreed between himself and the Secretary. The Secretary said let’s try to put something down on paper. Mr. Habib pointed out that even after we put our understanding down the Israelis should not announce it until we get Arab agreement. Dayan agreed and turned to Ambassador Lewis and suggested that the Ambassador might see Prime Minister Begin when he (Lewis) returns to Israel later this week and inform the Prime Minister of what was agreed. The Secretary said the U.S. side would do a paper that evening which Ambassador Lewis could take with him to Israel.¹⁵

The Secretary said he would be meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam on September 28. It was important to hear what Khaddam would have to say since the Syrians will be the most difficult of the Arabs to deal with. The Secretary said that after the talk with Khaddam he would want to speak again with Dayan, perhaps on September 29. The Secretary said we will want to keep in touch with the Foreign Minister on a daily basis. Dayan agreed. He said he would be away in Los Angeles October 6 and 7 but otherwise he would be in New York.

Dayan asked what the Israeli and American sides should tell the press about their meeting. The Secretary said he was inclined to say this was one of a series of meetings, and that such meetings would continue while we are in New York. That is enough, the Secretary said. Dayan said it would be good if the U.S. side said that it was pleased by the meeting. The Secretary replied that we would be glad to say that. Mr. Habib remarked that the press will ask about the Israeli government’s statement regarding the convening of Geneva. Dayan said we can say we discussed Geneva. The Secretary said we would say we discussed the whole range of topics, and that he had already said all that he intended to say about the Israeli government’s statement. In parting, Dayan said to the Secretary that he was sorry he had spoken out so hotly on the question of south Lebanon but he had to tell the Secretary how he felt about this problem as an Israeli. The Secretary said he fully understood.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Trips/Visits File, Box 107, 9/19/77–10/25/77 Vance Meetings with Middle East Foreign Ministers: 9–10/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Korn on September 28. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s suite at the UN Plaza Hotel.
2. See footnote 3, Document 111.
3. See Documents 107–109.
4. See footnote 3, Document 112.
5. The letter has not been found.
6. See Document 110.
7. The Washington Post reported that the Israeli Cabinet had approved the U.S. proposal for a unified Arab delegation that would include Palestinians. (Yuval Elizur, “Israel Accepts Palestinian Role At Geneva Talks,” Washington Post, September 26, 1977, p. A1)
8. See Document 106.
9. September 25.
10. U.S. officials cautioned that the Arabs had not yet accepted the idea of a unified Arab delegation, nor what role the Palestinians would have. (Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Effort for Talks on Mideast Seen to Gain,” New York Times, September 26, 1977, p. 1)
11. See “Vance Says U.S. and Israel Still Differ on Talks,” Washington Post, September 27, 1977, p. A11. Telegram 230645, September 25, also instructed the Ambassadors in Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damacus, and Jidda to contact their host governments regarding press reports that the Israeli Cabinet had agreed to participate at Geneva with a unified Arab delegation, with certain reservations.The telegram stated that the reservations as described by media reports did not reflect U.S. views. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770349–0523)
12. See footnote 12, Document 103.
13. Not found.
14. See footnote 4, Document 118.
15. Not further identified.