194a. Editorial Note.

Beginning in April 1969, the Nixon administration called for a reassessment of covert operations against Cuba. Henry Kissinger asked the Director of Central Intelligence to study the feasibility of stepping up action programs against Cuba and the renewed use of Cuban exiles. The CIA provided the 303 Committee with background on the history of CIA-sponsored covert operations against Cuba after the Bay of Pigs and described current covert operations, which included covert intelligence collection through the penetration of national Communist Parties; communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and overflight photography; and psychological operations using radio, Latin American news media, singleton propaganda agents, and misinformation programs. Additionally, the CIA commented on the feasibility of additional operations, including coastal incursions, economic harassment, false radio messages, deceptive radar emanations, and stimulation of rumors. Included in the CIA’s discussion was an assessment of Cuban exiles and their operational utility. In April Assistant Secretary Charles A. Meyer indicated to Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson that ARA and INR found the thrust of the CIA’s memorandum acceptable, and recommended that Johnson endorse it.

At a May 1, 1969, meeting of the 303 Committee, the CIA briefed Henry Kissinger on past and present covert operations, including covert collection of intelligence, covert propaganda, covert cooperation with other agencies in economic denial efforts, infiltration of dissident elements within Cuba, covert support for exile incursions into Cuba, and economic sabotage. While large-scale paramilitary operations were ruled out, it was suggested that the CIA undertake coastal harassment operations and conduct covert economic warfare operations in support of overt economic warfare. In May 1969, at Kissinger’s request, the CIA prepared a study on covert economic warfare, which examined the feasibility of 5 techniques: (1) denial/sabotage of Cuban exports to the Free World; (2) sabotage of Cuban imports from the Free World; (3) utilization of incendiary devices against Cuban ships; (4) blacklisting firms trading with Cuba; and (5) denial to Cuba of Free World sugar markets. Of the 5 suggested options, the CIA deemed only the fifth feasible. Although there is no indication that the Nixon administration adopted any of the suggested options, consideration of those options was central to determining what course U.S. policy toward Cuba should take.

In March 1970, Meyer recommended to Johnson that he approve, in the 40 Committee, the continuation of covert radio broadcasts for Fiscal Year 1971, consistent with 303 Committee decisions in 1967 and 1968. The 40 Committee unanimously approved the CIA's broadcast capability against Cuba. In August 1971, Meyer again recommended that Johnson endorse the continuation of the CIA's radio broadcasting against Cuba in the 40 Committee. The program's continuation was approved in April 1972 at a total estimated cost of $560,000 for the two years.