Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

New Delhi, December 15, 1971, 0738Z

1.: Up until last few days I have felt able to defend U.S. policy on the basis of our over-riding concern to bring a halt to hostilities. I am now troubled by fact a number of my diplomatic colleagues view deployment of carrier task force as military escalation by U.S.
2.: This was forcefully brought to my attention by Canadian High Commissioner George who believes that our decision to deploy carrier task force at this time has served as encouragement to President Yahya to continue Pak military effort. In this regard George believes that Yahya’s disavowal of initial Farman Ali message and subsequent message from Governor Malik was directly related to word of carrier task force deployment.
3.: Furthermore, George views deployment as direct injection super power involvement which bound to increase nervousness of both Soviets and Chinese and likely prompt or serve as screen for their increased involvement.
4.: George has indicated that he is sending strong message along these lines to his Prime Minister, recommending that Trudeau in turn contact President.
5.: In order to place me in a position to defend this development [Page 2] I would welcome fullest possible rationale to respond to foregoing arguments advanced by my colleagues here.

Keating

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-PAK War, South Asia, 12/14/71–12/16/71. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to the White House.↩
Ambassador Keating asked for the rationale behind the decision to deploy the U.S. carrier task force into the Indian Ocean.↩