Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980

230. Memorandum From Secretary of Energy Schlesinger to President Carter¹

Washington, August 23, 1979.

SUBJECT

• Protecting Our Vital Interests in the Persian Gulf

In view of my impending departure,² I believe it appropriate to leave with you an expression of my views regarding the military balance in the region of the Persian Gulf and the military protection needed for Free World oil supplies. You will recall our discussion in January regarding my proposal for a Save-the-Gulf Task Force.³ In subsequent months the PRC has examined various options. Since I shall no longer be a participant in those deliberations, and since my views perhaps reflect a higher sense of urgency (or alarm) than some of my colleagues, I had better present them again to you directly.

Briefly stated, it is necessary to provide adequate military deterrence in the region. That will require a visible and continuing American military presence. If the nations of the region feel a continuing, nearby, and formidable Soviet military presence and the general absence of American military power, it will lead to a steady erosion of our influence with potentially catastrophic results. A stable American military presence should be built up as rapidly as political conditions, and a revived recognition of American will and capacity, permit. This will take time, but the ultimate objective should be clear. Only such a presence has the potential, long term, of dispelling the current mixture of fear and distrust.

Thus, I believe, in providing greater long-term insurance for regional stability and protection of Free World energy supplies, the time is long overdue for a substantial increase of the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. The dangers that warrant such an increase can be briefly stated.

The United States and, more important, the entire Free World have now developed a heavy and alarming dependence on Middle East oil. We can no longer depend on the automatic growth in the supply of Middle East oil as Free World demand grows. Nor can we even count automatically on the continued production and delivery of oil at the existing level of supply.

We face three major dangers. One of them is in the future. The other two are already here.

Until recently, the producing countries were willing to let the oil market and technical considerations bring supply into equilibrium with demand. Increasingly, however, the producing countries are determining the level of supply in response to other considerations: considerations such as fear of excessively rapid rates of growth and social change; the desire to extend the life of their oil reserves; the determination to resolve the Palestinian issue on a basis acceptable to all the Arab states. Previously, there had been an excess in production capacity of about 4 million barrels a day which could be used to respond to normal fluctuations in world demand. That margin now has virtually disappeared. Short of a major and prolonged recession, demand is likely to exceed supply in the near future even if there is no interruption in the production and distribution of oil.

Unfortunately, there is an increasing danger that production or distribution will be interrupted. Despite American hopes, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty⁴ has not yet brought increased stability to the region. We have already seen the effects of a temporary halt in and then a lower level of production in Iran. That troubled country is likely to undergo still further internal convulsions and another interruption in its production of oil. The danger of conflict between Iran and Iraq has not ceased. Nor has the danger from Iraq, now perhaps the most dynamic state in the region, to the states of the lower Gulf been eliminated.

The leaders of the smaller Gulf states face at least three threats to their regimes: domestic upheavals growing out of socio-religious and, in some cases, economic issues; radical or Palestinian subversion externally supported but using local sympathizers; Soviet-Cuban aggression, either direct through local client states or through Soviet-sponsored insurgencies. Because of its public support for the Middle East peace process, Oman already occupies an exposed position in the Arab world. Attacks on it from South Yemen could be renewed. Quite modest programs of sabotage could knock out vital production and transportation facilities, or seed the Strait of Hormuz with mines and thus disrupt tanker schedules.

Libya may still execute its threat to curtail production of oil for foreign sale. Worst of all, Saudi Arabia could be buffeted with subversion, revolution, and a catastrophic decline in its output. To minimize these risks, and because the Saudis wonder increasingly about capacity or the willingness of the United States to protect its own interests, they may seek to appease the Soviets—through oil or other means—at our expense.

Perhaps none of these dangers to the supply of oil will materialize. But the Middle East remains an unstable region. The probability of a particular disrupting event in the region may be low. The probability of at least one disrupting event in the years ahead is high.

Perhaps the most significant danger comes from the specter of growing Soviet power in and near the Middle East. Soviet activities in the Horn of Africa, Yemen, Syria and Iraq give the impression that the USSR is moving into positions from which it can strangle the entire region.⁵ Not only could such a stranglehold prove devastating to the West, it would enable the Soviets to exert near irresistible pressure for a sizable share or even control of Middle East oil, as they themselves encounter shortages in the 1980s.

The specter of Soviet power looms so large, in part, because the nations in the region are losing confidence in the willingness and ability of the United States to counterbalance Soviet power in the region. Because of this, along with the dangers of revolution, subversion, and sabotage from the Soviet-supported left, these countries are increasingly willing to make deals with the Soviets. Even Saudi Arabia appears to be losing its immunity to this temptation.

Over the long run, efficiency, conservation, and new sources of energy could reduce the Free World’s dependence on Middle East oil. Over the short run, we must try to reduce the chances of disruption or try to minimize its effects. We must also restore the confidence of the region that its future lies with the United States and the Free World rather than the Soviet Union.

An increased U.S. military presence in the Middle East cannot deal with all these dangers. But an increase can strengthen regional stability and help to reverse the growing impression of Soviet omnipotence. What remains at issue is the size and character of the increase. One option is to increase by a few surface combatants our permanent naval presence in the Persian Gulf, to make somewhat more frequent naval deployments to the Indian Ocean, and perhaps to improve our ability to surge forces from the CONUS to the region. A more ambitious course is not only to increase our permanent naval presence and our surge capability—as indicated—but also to maintain, if possible, a continuous deployment of at least one attack carrier battle group and several Marine battalion landing teams accompanied by aircraft in the Indian Ocean. On several grounds, I strongly urge you to adopt this more ambitious objective.

The forces we program for a minor non-nuclear contingency are probably adequate in size and composition for many foreseeable emergencies in the Middle East. However, unless we have significant capabilities in or near the region, I question whether we could respond to a crisis there in a timely fashion. We already have the equivalent of six divisions and supporting aircraft more or less locked into Europe; another two divisions in the Far East and one in Hawaii would be difficult to move elsewhere. In any major emergency, the remaining nine active divisions in the CONUS would be seen as the reserve for Europe and are being, for the most part, trained and equipped for that theater.

That problem aside, the ground forces in the CONUS are sluggish. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate that presently it would take 10 to 11 days to move the first brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division to the Persian Gulf even if there were no other demands on our airlift. Moreover, we lack the enroute and overseas base structure and logistics assets to support a major movement of forces from the CONUS to the Persian Gulf. It will take time and resources to repair these weaknesses. Pending action, any quick response to a crisis will require the stationing of significant forces in the theater.

These technical factors are only one consideration. We also have to face the fact that we have drawn heavily (perhaps even overdrawn) on the deterrent account we accumulated during World War II, Korea, and Cuba. It is no longer enough to depend on the awe of American power alone to ensure respect for our interests. We must once again demonstrate the will and capability to protect our interests with military power.

This is particularly the case in the Middle East. For many years a presupposition of American strength—an image of determination as well as capability—pervaded the area. It made unnecessary the visible presence of U.S. power in the Middle East. However, with the overthrow of the Shah and the revolution in Iran, the perception of U.S. will and capability has dimmed; while an important barrier to direct and oblique Soviet penetration of the region is seen to have fallen. If U.S. power remains largely absent from the area, the hovering, nearby presence of Soviet power will continue to change the regional appreciation of the military balance—and not to our advantage. Indeed, the ultimate outcome would almost inevitably be that the region would pass into the Soviet domain of influence or control.

I realize that an increased U.S. presence in or near the Middle East will attract attention and comment in the region. Most such public comment would be adverse, though that should not be taken as representing the underlying desires of those in the region—whose interest in American strength would not out of fear be overtly expressed. Nonetheless, we cannot allow actions to protect the vital interests of the Free World to be decided by transient waves of approval or disapproval emanating from countries in the region. These countries are not up to nor do they want the responsibility for those decisions determining Free World security. That, in their view, is the responsibility of the United States. In these circumstances, they want unilateral decisions for which they need not bear the onus. We ourselves must decide what constitute the essential additions to our military posture in the region and take the necessary steps unilaterally to put them in place. What the times call for and what we need now is the clear demonstration of U.S. fidelity and resolve.

It makes sense to increase our ability to surge military forces into the Middle East. It would also be desirable to encourage improvements in the indigenous military infrastructure—in local ports and airfields—that we could exploit for military buildup during a crisis. Stockpiles of war reserve material in strategic locations would contribute to the speed and power of our response as well.

But a surge capability is not enough. We must also have a significant military presence in or near the region. And that presence must be considered normal rather than simply a temporary and fluctuating response to a crisis. We already bear all the political onus in having a fleeting or transitory and minor presence. We obtain none of the strategic benefits from having a significant and permanent force in the area.

Surge capabilities by themselves, and responses induced by a crisis, have other drawbacks as well. In a crisis, not only would we have to worry about the availability of those forces and their ability to react rapidly, we would also have to calculate the consequences of sudden and large-scale movements—whether from the CONUS, Europe, or the Far East—in a time of relatively high international tension. Domestic and allied pressures for caution and military restraint would be heavy, and the Soviets would undoubtedly seek to exploit them. We can both deter crises more effectively or handle crises more effectively, with greater freedom of action but with the necessary degree of control, if we have forces already deployed in or near the region and taken for granted.

This is not to recommend that we suddenly and dramatically augment our current Middle East deployments with large additional forces. To plunge into the region all at once would indeed incur large political risks and create major logistical problems. A strategy of sequencing is what we need to follow. But we need to get on with it now.

If we time our buildup carefully, the regional states will become used to it, and their confidence in us will increase. We could, for example, begin the buildup with a continuous or near-continuous deployment of naval air and Marine forces in the Indian Ocean—readily at hand but discreetly over the horizon—staging out of Diego Garcia. Later, as circumstances permit, we would be able to move land-based fighter-attack units into Oman. From that point only future circumstances can determine further steps.⁶

In sum, we must look to the long-term threat and recognize that the military balance is seen as tilting against us in the region. Key countries in the Middle East have seen us as their protector; that has been the great leverage we have had in the area. Unless we take steps now to redress the balance, the area will slip increasingly into the Soviet orbit. We cannot risk that eventuality.

Our primary objective must be to eliminate the image of weakness and establish the fact of significant U.S. military power in the Middle East—just as we have done in Western Europe and Northeast Asia. To do so may strain our resources, but an increased military presence in the area is essential if we are to repair our image and contribute to the stability of the region. Without such an increase, the military balance will be seen as eroding still further, and the oil reserves of the region will begin to go elsewhere than to the Free World. Without access to Middle East oil the Free World, as we have known it since 1945, will collapse.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 68, Subject Files, Middle East: Security, 7–8/79. Top Secret. Brzezinski forwarded this memorandum to Vance and Brown on September 11 and wrote: “Attached for your information is a memorandum written by Jim Schlesinger just prior to his departure. The President has seen it. This copy is for your personal information and should be very closely held.”
2. Schlesinger’s tenure as Secretary of Energy ended on August 23. Charles Duncan, Jr. succeeded him on August 24.
3. Not found.
4. Reference is to the Camp David Accords, which were signed in Washington on September 17, 1978.
5. Carter underlined “Syria” and “Iraq” and wrote a question mark in the margin. He also wrote “US/Egypt, US/Israel, US/Saudi Arabia, etc.,” apparently indicating disagreement with Schlesinger’s assessment.
6. In an undated covering memorandum to the President, Brzezinski wrote: “I share Jim’s analysis of the dangers we face in this vitally important region, and I fully concur that we need to begin now to establish a credible U.S. deterrent capability in the region. However, all member of the PRC agree with Jim’s evaluation on page six that we cannot suddenly and dramatically augment our Middle East military presence with large additional forces without paying an unacceptable price politically and in terms of other defense requirements.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Brzezinski Material, Middle East File, Box 77, Persian Gulf, 9/77–12/79)