Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

343. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, July 1, 1969, 1325Z.

973. Subj: Cyprus: Perspective June 1969 Versus June 1968. London (King or Spiers) pls pass Ambassador Popper.

1. In June 1968 outlook for and atmosphere surrounding Cyprus problem were optimistic. Positive attitudes prevailed in spite of nearness in time of violent events of 1967.² Today Cyprus has witnessed virtually no violence for unprecedented period of eighteen months and, in spite of this, atmosphere and outlook are not as good as in June 1968. In fact, in our darker moments we (and some of our diplomatic colleagues) experience disturbing feeling of uneasiness, of deja vu, regarding situation. What has happened?

2. One important factor is that nothing positive has happened lately. First half of 1968 witnessed real progress including substantial normalization and deconfrontation moves by Greek Cypriots and establishment of local talks. Since June 1968 precious little progress, particularly visible progress, has been made. Bloom is definitely off rose. Local talks are widely viewed as stalled on local administration issue. Normalization is practically dead letter since Greek Cypriots regard Turk Cypriots as completely unresponsive to earlier series of unilateral GOC normalization moves. In spite of repeated efforts by UNFICYP (particularly in Artemis Road area) there has been no real military de-confrontation since early 1968.

3. In short forward momentum has largely been lost. With public realization of and official disenchantment over lack of progress, hardliners—both Greek and Turk in official and non-official circles—have been regaining influence. For instance:

A. Intelligence reports (being circulated by MinInt DirGen Anastassiou, well-known hawk) claiming Turk Cypriot intention to provoke GOT military intervention which were disregarded in mid-1968 are now gaining currency. MinInt Komodromos appears believe this canard fervently (see NKI 326)³ and there are many other hardliners in GOC who want to believe it. National Guard G2 also taking line that Turk Cypriots preparing for offensive action and his view has infected Greek Embassy here.

B. Sensationalist press, primarily Makhi, repeats daily “big lie” of Turkish military preparations and partitionist intentions. This line is creeping into other papers and is beginning to be believed by less sophisticated Greek Cypriot readers. Entire press campaign is making Turk Cypriots uneasy as well, and beginning provoke reaction in Turkey (see para 1 Ankara 4401).⁴

C. Turk Cypriot press now beginning to respond by accusing Greek Cypriots of “war-like preparation” and of intention to break off talks after Turk reply on local administration, simultaneously blaming Turkish military activity for this action.

4. As we enter period of summer recess additional negative factors on slate are:

A. Fact that during their recess the Clerides–Denktash mechanism will not be available to adjudicate differences (e.g., as in Naoussa Street patrol episode).⁵

B. Lack of progress in subcommittees on electoral process and reintegration of Turk Cypriots into semi-government bodies.

C. Apparent judgment by Archbishop that departure of Pipinelis will preclude additional meaningful Greek pressure on GOC since colonels will be otherwise occupied.

D. Upcoming events which may be problem-making, such as human rights seminar (June 26–July 9) and Turkish elections (mid-October).

E. Possible loss of heart and concentration by Clerides due tragic illness of his only child.

5. In spite of foregoing, picture not completely black. We have indications that Turk Cypriot counter-proposals on local administration will move somewhat forward from their original position. Moreover, Denktash has now admitted that Cleridesʼ compromise offer did, in fact, have some good points. Despite public view that talks stalled, fact is these are not dead and potential exists for further forward progress, however slow and painful, when Clerides and Denktash resume meetings.

6. Furthermore, neither National Guard nor TMT seems to have policy of looking for trouble. Solution of Naoussa Street patrolling issue and speedy defusing of recent shooting incident (UNFICYP reports National Guard did not return fire) tend to support this view.

7. All factors considered we would describe situation as in very delicate balance. It could go either way. Significant change in military status quo (such as large arms importation by GOC) or violent incident involving loss of life could cause serious deterioration. On balance, we moderately hopeful that UNFICYP and Western Embassies can contain situation and preserve calm until local talks back on track. In short, chances are we will get through summer without serious trouble. However, chances are not as good as they were last year.

Crawford

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Ottawa, USUN, and USNATO.
2. For documentation on the crises in Cyprus of 1964 and 1967, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey.
3. Not found.
4. Dated June 30, it reported Turkish views on the status of intercommunal talks. (Ibid.)
5. Reference is to a confrontation at Omorphita between Greek Cypriot and TMT fighters between February 10 and 12.