Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

426. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State ¹

New York, October 22, 1971, 0440Z.

3760. Subj: Chirep—Contingency Planning. Ref: State 193137.²

1. We anticipate priority will win by a slender margin but the IQ is likely to lose. We understand that the 21 Oct staff-level count of the Dept is 57–57–16. Ours is less optimistic since we do not think we can count on such countries as Barbados and Senegal whose affirmative votes are included in Dept’s estimate of 57 in favor. Therefore, we anticipate actual result will be closer to 55–58–17.³

2. We agree that the two possibilities in event of defeat of the IQ are (A) seeking adoption of Baroody amendments to AR or (B) seeking to delete AR expulsion clause. As to (A), ROC Vice-Minister Yang told us 20 Oct he believes ROC could live with AR as amended by Baroody proposals. Nevertheless, we think that we could not pick up a majority in favor of Baroody amendments in atmosphere of just-defeated IQ. We do not know of any AR supporters who, in likely time frame, could be prevailed on to support these amendments, and doubt we would pick up enough additional support for deletion to compensate for erosion of a number of our IQ supporters that would be inevitable in view of their lack of instructions to support the amendments. Defeat of Baroody amendments thus seem likely assuming he decides to press them to a vote.

3. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for adopting this course of action’s first fallback position. For one thing, it would be a Saudi text that had been rejected by the GA, not a US proposal. Second, we would have shown our determination to pursue every alternative reasonably open to us to oppose the ROC’s expulsion. Finally, if Baroody amendments are maintained, we do not have to move to have them voted; they must be put to the vote (unlike a motion for division).

4. As you note, there is no certainty of Baroody’s maintaining his amendments, but we think if we get behind them he might do so. He is, of course, not reliable, and has spoken recently of a “completely new resolution” whose contents and effective purpose remain unknown.

5. As to (B), an effort to defeat the expulsion clause of the AR, we come to a parallel conclusion that we could not, in the wake of IQ defeat, put together a majority to support our motion for a separate vote on the expulsion clause. Even if, by some regrouping of votes that does not now seem possible, we were to win both a motion for a separate vote and the deletion of the expulsion clause, we would be faced in the GA with exceedingly difficult problem of interpretation. We would insist that by deleting the expulsion clause the GA had expressed its will to continue ROC representation. Others would argue to the contrary; the President would refuse to rule and would put the question to the vote; the GA would probably vote that the deletion of the expulsion clause had no effect on the AR and the ROC would be obliged to leave. At best the outcome might be ambiguous.

6. We conclude that alternative of a motion for separate vote is a second line of defense. Although as noted above, we are not optimistic we could win a vote on division, we lose nothing by making the attempt.

7. We were attracted to the possibility of seeking a delay at one or another stage to permit renewed efforts in capitals. But a proposal for suspension involving even a few hours would likely be shouted down and voted down in the PRC-“victory” atmosphere that would immediately follow defeat of the IQ.

8. As to situation in event IQ is adopted: believe we and the Dept concur that we cannot get a simple majority for the DR. If IQ is adopted, we agree we could raise a point of order and read out the text of a revised DR whose principal changes would involve deletion of the 2nd and 3rd operative paras. (We would want to consider, as well, shortening the preamble.) We would at same time seek suspension of the plenary to gain some time. But we are uncertain of advantages of this course. As of now, chances of success appear dim and should we win we are left with same problem of interpretation outlined in para 5 above. At best, we would face interminable series of wrangles throughout entire UN system as to practical effect.

9. Re option (C), last para your tel, we concur your judgment such course would only compound defeat.

Bush

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII. Secret; Nodis.
2. See footnote 2, Document 424.
3. Circular telegram 194327, October 22, requested from the posts “clear information” on how the host governments would vote on the IQ. The telegram noted that all replies should be received by the morning of October 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)