Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

401. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, August 30, 1971, 1804Z.

158911. Subject: Chirep—Co-Sponsorship and Tabling of Resolutions. Ref: Taipei 4290.²

1. We are repeating to you message to Tokyo asking personal démarche to Sato requesting his cooperation in the two-stage approach on the Dual Representation resolution.³ We are making it clear to the Japanese that we expect stage two to be reached very soon and that, in fact, we are resorting to the two-stage approach largely because of the delicacy of the problem for the ROC and also because of Japanese concerns. At the same time, we are pointing out to Sato that the two-stage approach might have to be abandoned if we could not get Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines to agree to co-sponsor on that basis.

2. Reftel states the GRC hopes we can muster a large and well-balanced slate of co-sponsors for a DR resolution which did not include a recommendation that the PRC hold the Security Council seat. It is precisely the question of putting together a large and well-balanced slate of co-sponsors which is the crux of our present difficulty. Frankly, the prospects are quite bleak at present.

3. Having approached some 90 countries in New York and in capitals, and with repeated follow-ups where appropriate, only one country (Costa Rica) thus far has agreed to co-sponsor the DR res without the Security Council seat recommendation. While it is possible that the Australians and New Zealanders will agree to the two-stage approach if the Japanese come on board, their past repeated statements to us have been to the effect that they would not co-sponsor unless the SC seat is covered. It is thus possible that the two-stage approach may get into serious difficulties at the very outset, due to Japanese or Australian and New Zealand non-cooperation. We would then have to decide whether it is desirable to table with only a corporal’s guard of cosponsors, instead of a large and well-balanced group, since we must assume in that case that other key countries such as Philippines, Thailand, Belgium, Mexico, Colombia, etc. would also stand aloof.

4. Given the considerable risk factor in the two-stage approach even if we can get it going (as some countries would interpret our action in tabling the resolution without any reference to the SC seat as evidence of “lack of seriousness” on our part, and as an effort that was doomed to failure), and in the light of recent indications that the ROC may be becoming more flexible, we would like to have your assessment of what the ROC reaction would be if we explained subsequently that the two-stage approach is not workable and that it is necessary to success that the Security Council seat be covered in the resolution when it is tabled.

5. Of course we are mindful of your conversation with Foreign Minister Chow reported reftel, and of his statement that the ROC would prefer that the resolution as tabled make no reference to the Security Council seat, though the ROC clearly expects the resolution to be adequately co-sponsored as well. On the other hand, we are impressed by the recent accumulation of indications that the ROC is becoming more flexible on this entire question, perhaps including its tactical aspects as well:

(a) Tokyo’s 8434 reporting that according to Vice Foreign Minister Hogen, several ROC Ambassadors have told their Japanese counterparts that President Chiang has indicated his willingness to stay in the UN even if the Security Council seat is given to the PRC;⁴

(b) USUN 2426 reporting that Ambassador Liu not only appears to accept the necessity of including a recommendation on the Security Council in the DR res, but that he displayed “equanimity at the prospect;”⁵

(c) Blantyre 968 reporting that the instructions issued to ROC Ambassadors overseas state ROC Ambassadors are to ask host governments to vote for the DR resolution “regardless of how amended;”⁶

(d) USUN 2406 reporting that a “special emissary from Taipei” had told a recent meeting of ROC Ambassadors to LA countries that the Security Council seat question had become a “side issue;”⁷

(e) Maseru 494 reporting that the ROC Ambassador to Lesotho told our Chargé that the ROC would not oppose a DR resolution which includes a recommendation that Peking hold the Security Council seat.⁸

6. Subject to your concurrence, we think it may be useful to acquaint the ROC with the realities of the bleak co-sponsorship situation now facing us, even though we are proceeding to discuss the two-stage approach with the Japanese. We consider (and we assume from his statements that Chow agrees) it is essential to have on board with us from the start the core group of influential Asian countries as well as at least one or two influential co-sponsors from Europe, Africa, and Latin America. We believe the ROC should be made aware that the two-stage approach carries with it a substantial risk, and that this risk could become unacceptable if we are able to launch stage one with only a small group of minor states that have no influence in the international community.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Herz; cleared by Assistant Secretaries De Palma and Green, Pedersen, Leo J. Moser, and Miller; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Repeated to Tokyo and USUN.
2. Telegram 4290, August 27, described a meeting between Ambassador Mc-Conaughy and Foreign Minister Chow. (Ibid.)
3. Document 400.
4. Dated August 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)
5. Dated August 26. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 301, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VII)
6. Dated August 24. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)
7. Dated August 26. (Ibid.)
8. Dated August 17. (Ibid.)