Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

400. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan ¹

Washington, August 30, 1971, 1608Z.

158910. Subject: Chirep—Co-Sponsorship and Tabling Resolutions. For Amb From Secretary.

1. Our sense of timing on Chirep issue in NY is that it is highly desirable to submit DR Res with reasonably balanced group of sponsors by Labor Day. Japanese co-sponsorship in our view will be essential in obtaining such a list and to prospects for ultimate success.

2. We have also concluded that inclusion of provision on SC seat will ultimately be critical in prospects for favorable vote. As Japanese know, Australia, New Zealand, and Philippines are strongly urging that such provision be included at outset, in fact have said their co-sponsorship hinges on this point.

3. Our impression of ROC position is that it has evolved not only to point of urging its friends to support DR but also to point where ROC will acquiesce in SC seat going to PRC. We gather Japanese are getting similar impression. At same time we remain concerned at possibility inclusion SC seat in our own text when initially tabled could cause Chiang to react adversely or GRC to cease urging favorable vote—with possible loss several conservative votes in GA.

4. Accordingly, I would like you to consult with Sato in way you consider best with view (a) to obtaining Japanese agreement to cosponsor both IQ and DR, (b) to obtain their views on how SC para should be brought into the Res and (c) to obtain their active lobbying support with others.

5. Presentation, whether orally or with assistance of written note, would be along following lines:

“The Secretary has asked me to counsel with you personally on the next steps we should take in the matter of Chinese representation in the UN. Because of Japan’s importance in this entire endeavor, we are anxious to discuss with you the considerations set forth below in advance of consultations with any other government.

“We believe we have made a good beginning in putting forward our new initiative. Many governments around the world have been receptive to our proposals. We think the time has come when we must take a further step and formally table by Sept 6 the dual representation resolution in order to consolidate and broaden our support. For the moment we are undecided on the timing of tabling the IQ Resolution. For tactical reasons in obtaining treatment as a procedural motion it may be desirable to delay its submission until close to the vote.

“This raises the question of co-sponsorship. Although well-disposed to our initiative, many countries whom we would very much wish to have as co-sponsors are hanging back in order to see whether the principal countries of the Asian region, and Japan in particular, are willing to commit themselves. We ourselves believe that Japanese co-sponsorship of both the Important Question and Dual Representation resolutions is essential to success of the policy on whose broad outlines our two Governments are in agreement. We therefore would hope that Japan could concur in this and join with us in urging others to cosponsor as well.

“The Security Council aspect is one which must be handled with special care. A number of countries have forcefully stated the view that the Dual Representation resolution is unlikely to succeed unless it includes a recommendation that Peking hold the Security Council seat. Our analysis is that this is correct and that the most favorable impression would be created if we included such a provision at the outset. For Japan and the United States to sponsor a recommendation to that effect, however, would cause obvious problems for the Government of the Republic of China. Our impression is that the GRC is moving toward acquiescence in the SC seat going to the PRC but still would prefer the issue to be precipitated by countries other than Japan and the US.

“For these reasons, we have come to believe that the best approach might be for the US and Japan to seek co-sponsorship of the present DR resolution from Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, one or two Latin American countries, one or two African countries and, if possible, Belgium and Ireland, but with the prior understanding that within a week several of these countries (Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Belgium) possibly with others not on our original list, would submit an amendment on the SC seat, which we would incorporate into a revised text before the GA opens. It may be that Australia and New Zealand would not agree to such an approach and that we would then have to revise it. Or you may believe that relations with the GRC do not require us to go through such a process and that we could safely have the SC seat recommendation in the text before we submit it. I would appreciate your views on this point.

“We recognize that a commitment to co-sponsor and to include the SC seat are serious steps which your government must carefully consider. If we are to maintain and build our momentum, however, the tabling of the dual representation resolution should take place as early as possible. We therefore would like to ask that you agree to join with us and other like-minded states to accomplish this necessary task in the immediate future.”

6. Comment: We consider Australia and New Zealand support for such an approach to be essential. If they did not agree we would then probably want to proceed on the basis of including the SC seat from the outset. We would not consider Belgium or Ireland necessary, though they would be desirable.

7. If Sato asks whether we are sure we can win the vote if the US and Japan co-sponsor and the SC is in, you should say no one can be positive at this point because the situation is too fluid. Without Japanese sponsorship and the SC seat recommendation we believe it would be unlikely; with GOJ sponsorship and active support, and continued GRC acquiescence, we believe the prospects are favorable. That is probably all we, or they, could honestly say at this point.

8. As passage of time is beginning to cause us problems we would hope Japanese could give us answer next week.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Pedersen, Herz, and Feldman; cleared by Assistant Secretaries De Palma and Green, Richard A. Ericson, Pedersen, and Miller; and approved by Secretary Rogers. Repeated to Taipei and USUN.