338. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State 1
New York, March 13, 1971,
0021Z.
681. Chirep.
- 1.
- As requested in Armitage–Newlin telcon,2 USUN has attempted to predict vote count on varying Chirep reses. Dept will appreciate that this is inexact science at best, since any change in usual Chirep scenario introduces many uncertainties. Even if ground is prepared for new Chirep res well in advance, there are likely to be alarms and excursions created by submission of last-minute reses or amendments, procedural wrangles and the like. Under such circumstances, unpredictability heightened by fact that some dels will be operating without instructions if there are last minute maneuvers.
- 2.
- With these caveats, fol are our head counts:
- A.
- We share view of practically everybody at UN that IQ will be defeated if strategy of past years is followed. Our head count is 52–55–20 with situation deteriorating fast as US and others get noses further under dual rep tent. We have assumed UK will oppose IQ but have not taken other potential Anglophone dissenters into account.
- B.
- A dual rep res, such as Belgian, could command a sizeable majority, but not two-thirds, if US works hard for it, GRC acquiesces, and it is understood that SC seat goes to PRC. Our estimate is 71–49–7 provided all above conditions fulfilled. We assume PRC’s supporters would oppose such a move strongly and that PRC would refuse to join if dual rep res passed. This would result in Chirep issue coming up in subsequent Assemblies with attendant erosion of support for dual rep. We would guess that dual rep would be viable for 2–3 years under these circumstances.
- C.
- A dual rep res would not fare nearly so well if GRC opposed it and implied or announced that they would withdraw if it passed. We would guess that pressure from US and others could still carry day for dual rep under these circumstances but by a very narrow margin (55–52–20 is our best estimate). There is a real risk that the AR would obtain about same vote and an uncertain fight over priority could be decisive as to which received larger vote. In any case, we doubt that a dual rep res strongly opposed by both Chinas could carry for a second year.
- D.
- We do not believe that combining dual rep with universality would significantly affect either of above two votes.
- E.
- We believe that submission of IQ and a dual rep res would be perceived by many as a procedural gimmick to block PRC membership. In such a case, both IQ and dual rep res would probably lose votes. IQ might lose only 2–3, but since we see it losing anyhow this would be more than enough. Dual rep res could lose ten or more votes if combined with IQ.
- F.
- Japanese suggestion of a res declaring that expulsion of GRC is an IQ would probably command greater support than traditional IQ since it goes to the heart of a principle many here support—that GRC expulsion should not be the price of PRC admission. If proponents of such a res handled it carefully and GRC kept quiet, we could see a majority as high as 76-45-6 for it. This majority would erode also if it became evident that the PRC would not come in under these conditions, but it would probably last longer than a dual rep res.
- G.
- Another possibility which is gaining popularity here is a simple res admitting PRC and not mentioning GRC. This would command broadest support of all, but in our view would be procedurally dangerous since it would be subject to amendment to conform to AR.
Bush