89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic ¹1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, Bundy's Mission on the Dominican Republic (2/2). Secret; Flash; Exdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram; it was received in Santo Domingo at 4:55 p.m.

Washington, May 22, 1965.

1199. Cite CAP65192. References: Embtels 1893²2. This reference should be to telegram 1894, Document 86. and 1896.³3.  Document 87. For: Bundy, Vance and Bennett. From: The President. Bundy should make strong efforts with Guzman along the following lines:

1. You should not accept Guzman's refusal to consider departure of three leading rebels without making further effort. There are serious dangers in creating a government under admittedly weak leadership while ring leaders of present rebel headquarters group remain in country with possible capability of exercising substantial influence.

2. You should insist on agreement that specially trained discreet U.S. security team will assist in constant control of Communists. Measures to be taken on findings of team to include, among others, surveillance, detainment and deportation if necessary. In other words, you should return to firm stance of May 14 San Juan agreement with Arnold, insisting that security team must remain in Dominican Republic until, in U.S. judgment, situation no longer requires their presence.

Vance should simultaneously pursue following line with Imbert and separately with military chiefs:

A. Imbert and chiefs should be told categorically that neither Caamano nor Imbert can be President or occupy any ministerial post in the government.

B. The U.S. will insist upon an anti-Communist government in Dominican Republic and will take all necessary measures to secure this objective. In elaborating this, you should explain that we are insisting on anti-Communist safeguards agreed at San Juan and that we are insisting on elimination of worst rebel elements.

C. You should emphasize that the Guzman formula is the best achievable and therefore Imbert and the chiefs should accept it. But for the present, at least, you should not repeat not issue any threats of force or ultimata.

D. We hope that by continuing talks with military leadership—not just with Imbert—Vance can obtain their agreement or acquiescence on the basis that the proposed coalition government could be clearly anti-Communist and provisional pending elections. It should be made clear to senior military officers that we are just as concerned as they that Communist influence be removed from public institutions of Dominican Republic and that the professional military establishment be maintained which supports a constitutional government.

E. Imbert will, as a minimum, insist on arrangements to guarantee his personal safety. If he knows that he cannot be president or a cabinet minister, what ideas can he then suggest to assure his own protection?

Rusk