77. Telephone Conversation Among the Presidentʼs Advisers on the Dominican Republic and President Johnson1

Bundy: Mr. President, we have [met] with both sides tonight and by the use of the very strenuous verbal measures with the loyalists military we have a bargain. We want you to know that we have in effect said that we are taking the responsibility—this is what they said to Cy—that they accept the fact that we have the power to do so, that they themselves will accept it but they cannot vouch for their forces. There is a sadness on their side which is shared by many of us. The fact remains that within the basic terms State worked out over the last three days, we are in a position now to go ahead. While we differ in our enthusiasm, I think itʼs fair to say that that is our basic recommendation. Itʼs certainly mine. We have a number of specific things which I propose to say to Mr. G[uzman] within the next half hour, not in a way that will engage him in a lot of negotiation with some of the people he has to be careful about, but in a way which I hope will engage him to you. In return for which I will say: while these things are going on, he can expect you to move in the two directions in which Mr. Davidson discussed with you this afternoon with respect to troops and assistance.2 The most important thing I will get clear with him is just as we have defended the “si,” we expect him now to work continuously on the “no.” And that we will be with him and that he will be with us and that we will be watching this in all its manifestations in terms of internal political activity, in terms of attempts to worm into the bureaucracy, in terms of party relations, and indeed across the board. We have no doubt of his good faith, but his skill and energy are another matter. We will press very hard for both public attitudes and real performance with respect to an outbreak of vengeance which we expect to appear primarily from what are now the rebels, but also individual cases of revenge from the other side. I donʼt know how to describe to you the levels of personal hatred we have encountered as we have gone around to the different factions in recent days. We want both [Page 189] his posture to be, and our practice to be, that we are going to protect individuals whose lives in this sense are in vengeful danger.

This may involve us, it will involve us, in asking General Palmer to offer local asylum, which he is already doing, and also in our offering asylum within the United States, possibly by special waivers under the Immigration laws. We will be expecting to press also for the maximum Inter-American Force presence in terms of Inter-American relations—at least in scope and size for as long as needed and we think it will be some time. We expect to press for maximum OAS participation within the Inter-American law which means essentially observation of the referendum. This is something which will help us with the soldiers with which Cy Vance has been talking.

We expect to press for OAS participation in the announcement that we are considering now—at what time to turn around the chicken-livered lazybones that went home this afternoon because they wouldnʼt believe us.3 We hope to wake them up at the hour that is most inconvenient for them.

We will plead for magnanimity in public expression towards those who have held temporary roles on both sides. This is something which we need very much for those who feel or will feel more and more as the thing comes out that we have merely used them in a stop-gap role. Finally, or next to last, we will reinforce in him a conviction which he has expressed to me at least six times that the most important practical task in the government is to find ways to bring arms in out of the hands of the civilians and into the hands of authorities, and that we share this view and that our means will be available to him. We are inclined to think that in the first stages people may be much more ready to give their weapons to General Palmer than to any other Dominican, and in later stages there may be a matter of bounty in which we would be willing to take into account.

We will stress to him what I am sure he will understand because it has been the spirit of our discussions for the last 3 days that everything we are asking of him is within the terms of what we have understood and that everything we are able to do for him will necessarily be related to continued performance so that we enter into a continuing partnership in which their dependence upon us becomes continuous to their doing what we hope and believe and urge needs to be done. This conversation I believe will have about 80 percent success in specifics and 90 percent success in attitude and I think it will then lead us off to the practical matter of how we announce it and who says what and that and at what time during the next 24 hours. But before we [Page 190] move to that, I would like to ask you if this basic line of argument and operation is satisfactory to you.

President: Yes, it sounds all right. What he had agreed on for the army, the name we gave?

Bundy: We agreed on the young man whom we were checking this afternoon J[uan] L[ora] F[ernandez].

President: All right. Are you all pretty well satisfied on all these people so far as the second part of our slogan is concerned?

Bundy: As far as the “no,” yes—we are satisfied about all three of them, but I should tell you that there are some other people whom—I didnʼt mention one other thing we wish to do which is to arrange to have the most hated men on both sides go on agreeable military assignments outside the country, and a couple of those if we can work it will be bad hats, but I canʼt be sure that this will be done in the first day or so. There are people whom we have to be watchful of. This is known by Mr. G[uzman], but there is a problem of timing here on which I cannot give guarantees, but the public names and the official responsibilities which we have agreed to, are without exception, clean as far as we know.

Fortas: What did you do on the top minister?

Bundy: We couldnʼt get him, we have none. I have tried very hard to get them to reconsider that because it would help a lot but I donʼt exclude that down the road he may want to make an appointment of his own in that area.

Fortas: You mean Mr. G[uzman] will hold that.

Bundy: No. No one will hold it. The Constitution makes him the Commander-in-Chief. He thus avoids being in the position that Reid Cabral was which was very unpopular with everybody. Now, our notion of the announcement, if youʼre ready to move on to that.

President: Yes.

[Omitted here is discussion on the timing of the OAS announcement and concurrent announcements in Washington.]

President: How does it look to you?

Mann: Well, I recommend it.

President: When you precede it with a “well” it makes me think youʼre less than—

Mann: No, I recommend it wholeheartedly. I want to underscore what Mac [Bundy] said that the hatred here is almost ancestral and the most savage that I have ever seen on all sides, and weʼre just not going to have peace and harmony, in my opinion suddenly, out of a thirty year tradition of this kind. Itʼs just a tough situation.

President: Now, weʼre not getting into any position where the people can truthfully or effectively say that we sold out and turned it over to the Commies?

[Page 191]

Mann: No, no they canʼt say that truthfully, and weʼve done a great deal of talking about this and this is something that will have to be done—weʼll have to watch it and continue to work on it and have our best people working on it. It can be accomplished gradually.

President: What can we say to the right-wingers, up to the end that we have insured against their running the government?

Mann: Well, we have in this work an undertaking in several parts. One, is to fight them politically all across the board—on labor unions and the places—education—the places where they usually concentrate. Two, not to take any of them into the government into positions of power, including the armed forces and the police, and in general to consider them as political enemies and not political allies. Now we expect to have that kind of an understanding.

President: Are they going to let you bring in J. Edgar Hooverʼs man4 to come in as legal adviser to the Embassy to advise Mr. G[uzman] on the bad characters and have him watch them?

Mann: Yes, they have agreed to that.

President: How are you going to get Mr. Imbert to quit making these inflammatory statements?

Mann: We may get some more.

President: I thought Mac said you were going to take care of it.

Mann: Iʼm going to do my best.

President: You know us right-wingers are supposed to hang together, Tom.

[Laughter]

President: I thought we gave him what we wanted when we said weʼd give him a referendum.

[Omitted here is an update by Bundy on news that Imbert would hold a press conference the next day.]

President: What is your [General Palmerʼs] assessment of the relative strength of the two forces—the loyalists versus the rebels?

General Palmer: I would say in the northern part of the city, thereʼs an even stand-off and in the southern part where the rebelʼs main strength is, which is the strongest part, I donʼt think that the loyalist forces are strong enough to take them on.

President: What would you envision if we didnʼt have an agreement?

General Palmer: If we just let them continue to fight, sir?

President: Yes.

[Page 192]

General Palmer: I donʼt think the loyalists could do it.

President: Well, is it better to let them demonstrate that?

General Palmer: How do you mean, to let them continue to fight, sir?

President: Yeah.

General Palmer: This could go on, but, I donʼt think they can clean up the northern part for several days at least and I feel quite certain that they could not take the rebels in the South.

President: All right, now, would it be better from the reaction in this country and in the world, if we let it come to more or less an impasse. Would it look like now we sold out pretty quick?

General Palmer: No sir, I donʼt think it would look this way.

President: Do you recommend what they are suggesting?

General Palmer: Yes, I do.

President: Do you think we have insurance against the Communists taking control of the government?

General Palmer: I believe we could block that, sir. I think the danger is what Mr. Bundy pointed out.

President: Is this the way to block it? Is this agreement the best way open to us at this stage to block it?

General Palmer: Yes sir, it is. I think this is the best way to handle it.

President: What is your judgment if these Chiefs say theyʼll go along as to whether their troops will follow them or not or will we have a lot of sporadic fighting under somebody elseʼs leadership.

General Palmer: We canʼt really tell. I donʼt believe that this will cause much trouble unless very strong leaders come forward and, I donʼt think they will come forward.

President: Are you impressed with the strength of any of the people in the government that we are proposing?

General Palmer: Yes.

President: Do you think they are honest?

General Palmer: Yes.

President: Do you think they are anti-Communist?

General Palmer: Yes. Thereʼs always going to be sleepers in there, but this is a chance you run regardless. In this situation, youʼre going to come to a conclusion like this sooner or later whether you control all the cities or not.

President: Are you going to be in a position if we make the agreement to control the loyalistsʼ equipment?

General Palmer: You mean to block them?

President: Yes.

[Page 193]

General Palmer: Yes. We can physically keep the Air Force from taking off, and the Navy.

President: What about the tanks?

General Palmer: I donʼt think thereʼs enough of them to worry about. We can block them too.

[Omitted here is a brief report by Palmer on the number of Dominican troop casualties and the economic situation in the Dominican Republic.]

President: Is your country team down there pretty generally in agreement that this is the thing to do?

General Palmer: Yes, sir. I would say they would agree that this is the lesser of many evils, sir. There is no approved solution to this, Mr. President.

President: Well, it doesnʼt look like to me thereʼs much evil in this if we (a) get reasonably honest people, if theyʼre anti-Communist, if weʼre going to have a popular referendum in two months on the basics of the machinery, the constitution, and if weʼre not going to let the men go back in office who were thrown out illegally some time ago. Now, I donʼt know what else you can do. We can pick a dictator and just say, well, to hell with the constitution, or we could pick the constitution and say, to hell with the people. Weʼre not going to let them decide on it one way or another, but doing neither, and it looks like to me that weʼre being about as democratic as you can be and weʼre giving them protection and weʼre giving them food and feeding them and giving them supervised elections, while whatever elements of democracy they have in the country are permitted to function. I donʼt know what else we could do if we stayed there a million years.

General Palmer: I agree with that assessment. As you say we either go to do it today or 10 years from now, you canʼt delay the issue today.

President: What does Bennett think about this agreement?

Bennett: Well, I feel frankly that we weʼre running a risk, keeping a lot of our assets without getting anything very firm, but I think weʼve gone into it and we have to go ahead.

President: Is there any better, more hopeful alternative to us at this stage?

Bennett: I donʼt see much quite frankly. I think this is best in our own interests and that is what we have to think of at this stage.

President: Well, if thatʼs true, then it would be better in the countryʼs interest too, wouldnʼt it?

Bennett: Well, thatʼs our hope, yes sir.

President: What does Ambassador Martin think of the agreement?

[Page 194]

Martin: I concur. I think itʼs probably the best of a bad bunch of alternatives. I think that the side that was militarily winning is now in fact going to be declared the winner. I think that same side has the kind of popular support throughout the country that we can read it and for that reason also I think itʼs correct. I do feel very likely that Mr. G[uzman] may not prove strong enough to hold this place together and we may have to go under ground later on, but I think that would be true of almost any solution that we found. I think that Mr. I[mbert] will denounce us and say that we double-crossed him, and heʼs right to a considerable extent. Heʼll make trouble in statements tomorrow and may try to make other trouble which we can stop. He will make trouble for Mr. G[uzman] in the future. I think trouble of this kind is probably inevitable in this. This is about the way I feel about it.

President: You recommend the agreement, you think itʼs the best we can do under the circumstances and it gives us something to work for.

Martin: Thatʼs right sir.

President: You believe we have the best man that we can get thatʼll take over?

Martin: I think in the present set of circumstances, that that is the best we can do sir.

President: Do you think there are any Communists in the crowd?

Martin: I do not think this would be a major problem. No, sir.

President: The answer is no?

Martin: Thatʼs right.

President: The country team, the AID people, the attachés, and Admiral Rabornʼs people—do most of them generally share your views?

Martin: Insofar as I know.

President: Is there anyone representing the United States that is violently disagreeing with us?

Martin: No, I think not.

[Omitted here are comments by Johnson praising Martin for his efforts and warning him not to work too hard.]

President: How many people are going to wind up in this Cabinet?

Mann: We do not have a complete Cabinet yet.

President: How many do you think will wind up in it?

Mann: I would guess eight or ten. Thereʼs a total possible slate of 15 cabinet slots. We just heard that one of the naval secretaries may not serve as Chief of Staff which is really not Cabinet but itʼs very important. So, I would say we donʼt have more than four or five of the top posts with agreed candidates at this point.

[Page 195]

President: Are those people who are taking it are they agreeable to doing it?

Mann: As far as I know all of those we have talked about were agreeable except one which might not go along.

President: Whatʼs his problem?

Mann: He just doesnʼt like it. Itʼs the feeling that this is not going to be good for the country and that it is going to bring instability and create a danger from the military point of view of a left-wing take over—an anti-Bosch feeling.

President: I thought he had been agreed upon.

Mann: Well, Mr. President, that is true at one time or another, but that depends on what hour you talk to people. The emotions are running very high. They have in the past agreed on Mr. G[uzman], but they have also said that he is nothing but a puppet. We donʼt think that is necessarily true, but the political emotions here are just at this particular time absolutely indescribable. Iʼve never seen anything like it. I donʼt think any of our group has.

President: All right. I guess weʼve talked long enough. Everybody down there seems to think that it is the best thing to do, so I think that you and Bennett ought to go out and put on your Sunday-go-meeting clothes and take this Imbert and give him the best that youʼve got.

[Omitted here is a short discussion on the timing of the announcement.]

President: Whatʼs your evaluation of this?

Vance: My evaluation is, Mr. President, that this is the best that can be done, and we ought to do it.

President: Do it even if the Chiefs went against us?

Vance: Yes, because I think that this depends on a meeting with Mr. Imbert later on tonight that they will not actively oppose it, but will accept it under protest. Now they say they cannot speak for their troops, but itʼs my evaluation that they will not actively oppose it. They might in words, but not in deeds.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation among President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, Tom Mann, General Bruce Palmer, Tapley Bennett, and John Martin, Tape F65.30, Side B, PNO 1, Tape F65.31, Side A, PNO 1, and Tape F65.31, Side B, PNO 1 and 2. Secret. This transcript was prepared in the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume. McGeorge Bundy placed the call from Santo Domingo to President Johnson in Washington; they spoke for approximately 48 minutes.
  2. Not further identified.
  3. Reference is to the 5-man OAS Commission; see footnote 2, Document 52.
  4. Not further identified.