Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

68. Intelligence Memorandum¹

OCI No. 1754/65

Washington, May 14, 1965.

THE SITUATION IN THE INTERIOR OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Summary

The calm which has generally prevailed in the Dominican countryside may be misleading. Under the surface there is a good deal of popular support for the Bosch–Caamano movement and there is little positive support for the Imbert Government of National Reconstruction. At the same time, lack of food or its high cost and the general economic dislocation are stimulating discontent.

This situation is made to order for radical agitations, and it is clear that both pro-Bosch and Communist elements in the rebel movement are attempting to exploit it, particularly through inflammatory broadcasts over Radio Santo Domingo. Disturbances have already occurred in some localities, most significantly in the relatively conservative city of Santiago on 13 May. The chances of growing unrest, confusion, and rebel gains in the interior are almost certain to increase if the political stalemate is prolonged in Santo Domingo.

1. Developments in the provinces of the Dominican Republic have normally been dominated by what is going on in the capital city. Santo Domingo is not only the political, military, and financial center of the country; it is also the hub of the countryʼs commercial, transportation, and communication systems. It is the Dominican industrial center. All major industries, except for chocolate manufacturing and mining, are based in the capital.² Even more important is the fact that Santo Domingo is the location of the countryʼs major wholesale houses, which provide domestic and imported goods to local merchants all over the country. Well over ten percent of the Dominican population lives in the capital.

2. Political and military decisions reached in the capital have historically been accepted in the countryside. Most Dominicans want to be on the winning side. During the crucial days of the insurrection prior to the landing of US military forces, it was apparent that the bulk of the populace in the interior was simply waiting for an outcome in the capital before joining forces with the winner. There is little doubt that if the rebel forces in the capital had won, most of the military commands throughout the provinces, as well as the provincial and local government bodies, would have swung to the rebel side. A few ranking military officers would have recognized that a rebel victory signified the end of their careers, and these officers might have tried to resist, but it is more likely that they would have run away. The conservative business class in the Cibao area would have been opposed to the rebellion, but its reaction probably would have been ineffectual and passive.

3. What actually happened after the landing of US forces was that the wavering and waiting Dominican military commands in the interior suddenly stiffened and became “loyalist.” They evidently believed that the coming of US troops had significantly reduced the chances of a rebel victory. It must be assumed, however, that “loyalist” control in the interior at present is only as secure as it is in the capital. If the situation in the capital should shift toward some other group, those now exercising control in the countryside would probably follow suit.

4. There is one element in the present political-psychological situation which could cause some shift from the traditional pattern. This new element is that potential rebel strength—in the interior as well as in the capital—is probably much greater than is apparent on the surface. There is little doubt that the Caamano government does represent to many people throughout the country the forces of “constitutionalism” and of general revulsion against the old “establishment.” In this sense, there are elements of a genuine popular revolution in the Bosch-Caamano movement.

5. In addition, Caamano personally has shown some of the qualities of a charismatic leader. The Imbert Government of National Reconstruction, on the other hand, has as yet no base of public support and, where it is respected, it is respected as the source of authority and police control. The Imbert government is, rightly or wrongly, regarded by many Dominicans as the defender of the discredited military establishment and of the conservative economic oligarchy.

6. The issue of Communism in the Caamano government is not well understood by most Dominicans. Reports from a number of interior towns during the course of the insurrection reveal that the young people throughout the countryside were the ones most ready to commit themselves to the rebel cause. Groups of young men left their home towns on the first two days of the insurrection and traveled toward Santo Domingo to fight for the rebels. Many of these youths subsequently drifted back home during the first week of May. They remain an as yet unorganized but potential source of active rebel support in many towns throughout the country. There were 200 such young men in the town of Santiago Rodriguez alone who left for the capital.

7. Given the degree of Communist influence which is believed to exist in the rebel movement, the potential for Communist exploitation of the existing pro-rebel sentiment in the countryside and for Communist organizational efforts must be regarded as considerable.

8. There are reports, from clandestine sources in or close to extremist groups, of Communist preparations to organize guerrilla warfare in the interior. Communists are stockpiling weapons and planning to exploit popular sentiments, using the customary nationalistic and reformist slogans to enlist the militant non-Communist revolutionaries. These reports must be taken seriously.

9. The Communists have a fertile field. It is quite possible, over the coming months, that they may succeed in developing a broadly-supported paramilitary capability at certain points in the interior. Such an effort would threaten to complete the job of stealing the revolution from its former moderate leaders. The result might become effective pressure from the countryside on the city—a reversal of the traditional pattern, but the identical pattern which did, in fact, occur in Cuba in 1958 and 1959.

10. At the same time, discontent has been stimulated by the economic disruption throughout the country caused by the rebel control of most important portions of the capital city. Santo Domingo is now unable to supply the goods needed to maintain the local economies. This condition is exacerbating the already chronic unemployment problem in many towns and cities. Small industries have been forced to close down because they have received no raw materials from Santo Domingo. The commercial banking system, headquartered in the capital is inoperative throughout the country and there is little money to pay the workers who do have jobs. The traditionally passive campesinos are bringing some locally produced foods into the towns and cities, but it is not enough.

11. Worse yet—because of its serious social and political implications—is the fact that local Dominican merchants—who seem to have even less social awareness than the usual Latin Americans in this class, have raised their prices to levels at which the poor in some areas cannot obtain food even though supplies exist in local stores and warehouses. That this is an explosive problem is demonstrated by the food riots that have taken place this week in almost every location where charitable organizations have set up free food distribution centers. The extremists are being handed a perfect issue with which to rouse public hatred against the middle class.

12. Against this background, the propaganda which the rebel government has been able to broadcast throughout the country over the transmitters of Radio Santo Domingo, at least through 12 May, can only serve to arouse more public discontent and more support for the rebel cause.

13. A possible foretaste of things to come occurred in Santiago on 12 May when Communist and other pro-rebel elements tried to organize a demonstration in a city park. In this case, the local military authorities reacted vigorously in breaking up the small groups which attempted to demonstrate, and one demonstrator was shot when he threw rocks at the police. On the same day members of the medical and law associations in Santiago were canvassing for signatures for a petition against the US military intervention.

14. It is apparent that the longer the political stalemate continues in Santo Domingo, the greater the chances of disturbances and pro-rebel gains in the interior. Also, as the impasse is prolonged, more of the relatively moderate rebels or rebel sympathizers are likely to adopt increasingly extremist attitudes.

15. The one possible development which could significantly undercut extremist potential in the countryside, as well as in the capital city, would be the establishment in Santo Domingo of a government which is more representative of popular aspirations for revolutionary change, less burdened by the ineffective and outmoded traditional Dominican military establishment, not beholden to the old economic oligarchy, and not perverted by Communist influence. The formation of such a government is complicated by the short supply of qualified leaders who can fill the bill.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. V, 5/19/65–5/31/65. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency.
2. In the city are food processing plants, the countryʼs only cement plant, the largest flour mill, a shipyard, a foundry, a brewery, a distillery, and plants producing nails, vegetable oils, textiles, batteries, fertilizers, asbestos products, shoes, soap, and explosives. [Footnote in the source text.]