Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

6. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, June 5, 1964, 8:30 p.m.

1106. For Assistant Secretary Mann and Crockett ARA.

1. We have become increasingly concerned in recent days over behavior of Reid Cabral. Meeting which King, Bramble and I had with triumvirate June 3 (reported Embtels 1091 and 1097)² on IMF discussions (Deptel 660)³ may have accomplished purpose but it was distinctly an unpleasant affair. Reidʼs almost hysterical reaction to suggestion that DomRep has serious financial problems, and his outburst of anger when we made point Dominican delegation seemingly not coming to grips with IMF problem were response of tense, unstable man, in fact quite irrational at times.

2. In past two weeks it has become increasingly difficult to have serious conversation with Reid, and his tendency hear only what he wants to hear has grown more marked. I have found this myself and a variety of contacts both local and foreign report similarly. He is apparently listening to no one and brooks no advice, even from old friends and well wishers. He is driving himself to exhaustion with attention to every detail of administration while at same time rushing about over the country in his “vigorous program” and making all manner of promises for grandiose projects which cannot possibly be filled in any reasonable time. Both Nuncio and British Chargé have commented to me on his irascibility in conversation. All elements of Mission are receiving reports similar to above, and we have had several local approaches this week asking us to “talk to Donnie.”

3. Hal Hendrix, for instance, told me yesterday he fed up with Reid and returning to Miami to write story for Scripps-Howard which he says will “cause Donnie to strike me off his list of friends.” Hendrix expressed himself as thoroughly disillusioned with Reid and local situation and seemed particularly upset over evidences of broad extent graft and corruption he found pervading local scene. He did not accuse triumvirate personally of this, but various American and foreign businessmen resident here for many years have approached me and other members of staff in recent days to express their view that graft worse now than under Trujillo. There is marked increase of complaint and triumvirate being held responsible even if not personally involved.

4. This deterioration in Reidʼs behavior has been precipitate. Our telegram 1053⁴ called attention to erratic, strong-willed aspects of his nature and he seems to have given these qualities full rein in last two weeks. His cocky overconfidence has grown apace. I believe this is due to a variety of factors: his elation over his govtʼs success in handling recent taxi strike and the approving New York Times editorial in connection therewith, on top of his feeling which he has expressed to more than one visiting newsman that he now has both Dominican armed forces and U.S. Govt in his pocket.

5. I believe he has overestimated our recognition of his regime, favorable decisions on several economic matters coincident with first weeks of new U.S. Ambassadorʼs presence in country and support he justifiably received in connection taxi strike. He seems to have taken all this to mean that he has full U.S. support to do what he pleases on political scene (including some highly dubious radio censorship actions, and ominous complaints beginning to emanate from high sources about press criticism of regime actions). He appears, despite cautionary talk from me, to be convinced his promises will be paid for by us (his aid ideas are obviously exaggerated). It is becoming a matter of conjecture among the informed as to how long this can go on unless Donald Reid can be pulled back off this kick.

6. We have reported (Embtels 1078 and 1081)⁵ mutterings within armed forces. These are continuing. Yesterdayʼs and todayʼs papers carried stories of “subversive group” discovered within police (we understand Reid participated personally in grilling of enlisted personnel involved). As of now our attachés do not regard Reidʼs military support so united and secure as Reid apparently thinks.

7. I believe most effective step that can be taken at this time would be for you to have frank and vigorous talk with Bonilla. Bonilla has strong influence on Reid and, as we know, has steadily encouraged him in his political aspirations. We feel here that Bonilla often misleads Reid (witness IMF discussions) and that his reporting seriously offsets our efforts here. So long as Reid is being fed overoptimistic accounts by Bonilla, as we believe, about his (Reidʼs) high standing in Washington and U.S. Govtʼs readiness to back him all the way, I am afraid our efforts here to put matters in perspective are lightly regarded and taken with resentment.

8. I urge you to see Bonilla without delay and stress our concern over trend of situation here. You could take as point of departure Deptʼs surprise over Reidʼs statements to press during recent Samana visit that new port works would be built with Alliance, i.e. U.S. money (without slightest mention of project before or after to Embassy) and his comments reported front page yesterdayʼs papers following our June 3 meeting primarily for IMF matters but during which he listed without discussion some of projects he expected U.S. pay for (para 6 Embtel 1099).⁶ Without any further ado Reid told press U.S. financed Alliance program would include roads, ports, hospitals, etc. It would be desirable to make point to Bonilla that reports of concern over Reid handling matters here are coming in from various sources, including press and business (i.e. not confined to Embassy).

9. I hope you can talk with Bonilla over weekend so that his report can reach Reid before our Monday⁷ meeting (which I shall attempt postpone until Tuesday). I expect hard knuckled discussion in view Reidʼs exhilarated state and am fully prepared do my part in making him face facts. It should be made clear to Bonilla that we cannot do business on basis of Reid promising and then expecting us to pick up the check (he devoted table-pounding emphasis in June 3 discussion to what he “deserves” in way of U.S. aid) and that Alliance program is meant to raise living standards rather than serve as political vehicle. It could also be stressed that U.S. does not wish be associated in eyes of public (as we are being more and more tied in with Reid in local opinion) with govt in which graft and corruption so rampant—and growing according to all reports of those who have to do business on local scene. Shaking Bonilla up would, I hope, have effect of infusing a little more reality into Reid. You will have to douse Bonilla with ice water for it to come out cold on Reid. I donʼt want to exaggerate in view paucity of alternatives here. However, unless we can get Reid back on path, and quickly, I am afraid all signs point to serious trouble.

10. All senior officers, including [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and attachés, share this assessment and join in these recommendations.

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 10 DOM REP/IMF. Secret; Priority; Limdis.
2. Dated June 3 and 4. (Ibid. and FN 10 DOM REP, respectively)
3. In telegram 660 to Santo Domingo, June 2, the Department reported that discussions in Washington with Dominican Republic representatives on a draft IMF standby arrangement for $25 million had nearly reached an impasse “over apparent Dominican unwillingness come to grips with financial problems they face.” The telegram further stated, “unless Dominicans willing to implement meaningful program of reforms, prospect is for rapid deterioration of already serious financial situation.” (Ibid., FN 10 DOM REP/IMF)
4. Document 5.
5. Dated June 1 and 2. (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)
6. Not found.
7. June 8.