Office of the Historian

410. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, June 23, 1965.

SUBJECT

  • British Guiana
1.
Attached are some State documents which describe the problem we are now having with Greenwood2 [3 lines of source text not declassified]
2.
Rusk spoke to Ambassador Dean yesterday and made a hard pitch.
3.
Harry Shullaw called me this afternoon to say that we have indications that we may be getting a negative answer from the British. To ward this off, your help is needed. He offered the following possibilities:
(a)
You could call Ambassador Dean and, without mentioning the fact that we know the British are thinking negatively, refer to the Secretaryʼs conversation with the Ambassador yesterday and indicate that the White House (the President, if you can say it) is also very interested in an early affirmative3 answer. Also, you want the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to know this.
(b)
You could authorize the State Department to make the above point to the British on your behalf.
4.
Shullaw feels that a direct call from you to Dean will be most effective and that the sooner you make the call, the better (the British may be replying to us any time now).4 I agree with Harry on both accounts.
GC

I will call Dean as per Paragraph 3(a).5

Tell State to make the pitch on behalf of the White House.

See me.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, British Guiana, Vol. III, Memos, 12/64–11/65. Secret; Sensitive.↩
  2. In a June 22 memorandum to Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs John M. Leddy recommended informing Dean “We believe it is absolutely essential we continue as necessary our covert financial support to the anti-Jagan political parties in British Guiana” and that it would be appreciated if the Ambassador would convey to Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Secretary Stewart “our deep concern [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].” (Ibid.)↩
  3. The words “early affirmative” were underlined and a marginal note in Chaseʼs handwriting reads: “FYI we need to write some checks for Burnham.”↩
  4. According to a July 9 memorandum of conversation Dean advised Rusk that [text not declassified] had approved the U.S. covert support program. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, British Guiana, White House Meetings)↩
  5. A marginal note next to this paragraph reads: “done.”↩