Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

259. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 7, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Meeting at the White House 7 April 1964
• Subject—Review of Covert Program directed against Cuba

PRESENT

• The President
• State Department: Secretary Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, Assistant Secretary Mann, and The Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Mr. Crimmins
• Defense Department: Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Vance
• JCS: General Maxwell Taylor
• CIA: The Director, Messrs. Helms and FitzGerald
• White House Staff: Messrs. Bundy and Dungan

1. Mr. Bundy presented to the meeting a memorandum² to guide discussion concerning the Cuban program against Cuba. Seven categories of activities were listed in this memorandum as follows:

(1) Collection of intelligence.

(2) Covert propaganda to encourage low risk forms of active and passive resistance.

(3) Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial.

(4) Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential dissident elements inside Cuba.

(5) Indirect economic sabotage.

(6) CIA-controlled sabotage raiding.

(7) Autonomous operations.

2. Mr. Bundyʼs paper recommended continuation of the first five items listed and recommended discussion of the last two.

3. There was a brief discussion of item (5) during which various methods of economic sabotage were described. There was no disposition on the part of those present to interfere with this program.

4. With respect to sabotage raiding by CIA-controlled assets, Secretary Rusk said that two things presently militate against a resumption of the program: (a) the pending OAS matter with respect to the Venezuelan arms cache which may be strengthened by discovery of arms in Argentina as well as in Brazil, and (b) the prospective turnover of the SAM sites by the Russians to the Cubans in April or May. Secretary Rusk said that we would wish to maintain a clean hands posture while the OAS case is pending and that if the Cubans are to misuse the SAMs we would wish the onus to be fully on their backs. Secretary Rusk said that in addition he does not believe that hit-and-run raids are in any event very productive; that they have a high noise level and, furthermore, that he suspects the Cuban exiles who actually conduct the raids of possibly wishing to leave fingerprints pointing to U.S. involvement in order to increase that involvement. Mr. Bundy said that in the past he had been an advocate of sabotage operations, but in view of the history of the program since June, he had come to the conclusion that it is unlikely that an effective sabotage program will be conducted. In explanation he pointed out that the policymakers, each time for good reasons, had turned sabotage operations on and off to such an extent that a program of the type envisioned in the June paper simply does not, in the nature of things, appear feasible.

5. Mr. McCone called attention to the paper dated 8 June 1963³ which is the basis of the Agencyʼs current program against Cuba. He quoted from the 8 June paper as follows:

Paragraph 2: “The ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba.”

With respect to the interdependence of the various courses of action comprising the program, he quoted from paragraph 5 of the paper as follows: “Unless all the components of this program are executed in tandem, the individual courses of action are almost certain to be of marginal value, even in terms of achieving relatively limited policy objectives. This is clearly a case where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.”

With respect to the sabotage program, he quoted from paragraph 6.E. as follows: “It must be recognized that no single act of sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate significant resistance. However, it is our opinion that a well-planned series of sabotage efforts, properly executed, would in time produce the effect we seek.”

Mr. McCone pointed out that five relatively low-key sabotage operations since June 1963 do not in effect constitute a test of the program and that the statements quoted from the 8 June paper remain valid. He said that there was a surge of anti-Castro sentiment during the fall of 1963, corresponding with the period during which the sabotage raids were conducted, but that resistance sentiment has now fallen into apathy. He said that the five items for which approval is recommended in Mr. Bundyʼs paper would not have the effect envisioned by the 8 June paper although they might have the effect of slowing down Castroʼs consolidation of his regime.

6. The Secretary of State said that part of our problem has to do with the Soviet Union which is now going through a crisis period, particularly with respect to the Sino-Soviet split. He said that he felt sure that were Ambassador Thompson present at the meeting he would indicate the danger of forcing Khrushchev to take a militant defensive attitude with respect to Cuba. Secretary Rusk said that should the Cubans shoot down a U–2, raid peaceful shipping off the coast or should there be a strong OAS resolution, the question of the conduct of sabotage raids could be reconsidered. (I do not think that I am in error in quoting the Secretary as equating a U–2 shootdown with a good OAS resolution as a basis for resuming raiding operations.)

7. Mr. Mann said that his attitude towards CIA-conducted raiding operations would depend upon getting a clear legal basis for action against Cuba out of the OAS. He said that he doubted that all seven courses of action combined would result in the overthrow of Castro. He said that he leans away from CIA-conducted raids and towards autonomous operations. He said that at the present time, particularly in the light of the Brazilian events, favorable action by the OAS on proposed paragraph two of the resolution looks like a fifty-fifty chance. In reply to Secretary Ruskʼs query, I said that I believed that CIA-controlled raiding assets could be held together for another two months pending the resolution of the Secretaryʼs two points (OAS and Cuban use of SAMs).

8. I briefed the President on the present status of autonomous operations, including the fact that Artime is planning to launch his operational program on the 12th of April. There was some discussion of these plans but no one appeared disposed to try to stop Artime. I said that Manolo Rayʼs plans were not as well known to us but that he had made it clear that he intended to move by May.

9. The Secretary of Defense said that it was his opinion that the covert program has no present chance of success in terms of upsetting Fidel Castro. He suggested that it might be useful, for reasons which had not been brought out at this meeting, and pointed out that the principal decision to be made was a broader one—presumably what the overall U.S. attitude should be with respect to Fidel Castro. He said that he felt that the present raiding assets should be held in being pending resolution of Secretary Ruskʼs two points but that in the meanwhile the fundamental question should be debated. Mr. Vance said that he agrees with the suggestion of continuing these assets in being but that he believes that the program, if permitted to go forward as planned, would at least have the advantage of hindering Castro in the consolidation of his power. He pointed out that the noise level of the raiding operations had not in fact been very high. He would advise resuming raiding operations following the resolution of Secretary Ruskʼs points. General Taylor said that the Joint Chiefs favor the program in its entirety, that they believe the program has never been given a fair test and that we should move forward with it in the interests of making Castroʼs life as hard as possible. Mr. Bundy said that the CIA covert program is the only matter to be resolved today, that the matter of our negotiations with the British on the economic program and sugar support would be ready for discussion next week.

10. Secretary Rusk recommended to the President that we keep the raiding assets in being for the next two months and that the question be discussed again following the resolution of OAS events and the Cuban use of the SAM sites.

11. The President accepted this recommendation.

Desmond FitzGerald
Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

Attachment

Washington, April 8, 1964.

Dictated by Mr. McCone:

McCone went on to say the real issue to be considered at the meeting and by the President was a question of whether we wished to implement the policy as outlined in the 8th June paper and also less specifically in the paper circulated in the meeting by Mr. Bundy, or abandon the basic objective of bringing about the liquidation of the Castro Communist entourage and the elimination of Communist presence in Cuba and thus rely on future events of an undisclosed nature which might accomplish this objective. Specifically McCone said that he could envisage such issues as extreme economic distress caused by sharp drop in sugar prices or other external factors arising which might cause Castro great pain and, ultimately, his downfall. In summing up his position McCone stated that the actions favorably looked upon, that is, intelligence gathering, propaganda, economic denial and surreptitious acts against Cuban ships all would have some effect but definitely would not accomplish the stated objectives.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Mtgs with the Pres., Jan–Apr 1964, Box 6, Folder 7. Secret.
2. Dated April 7. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Intelligence, Covert Program, 1/64–6/65)
3. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Document 346.