111. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State 1
2570. 1. Following presentation this morning by Caamano group of their reply to committee plan,2 Ambassador Bunker and I went for private talk with Imbert. Our purpose was to advise him that reply had been received from other side and to talk with him regarding personal contribution he now in position to make to help in achieving settlement of Dominican crisis.
2. Imbert indicated he had had advance word of Caamanoʼs reply and in brief comment asserted seemingly forthcoming attitude by “constitutionalists” was only a tactic to gain time. He said GNR reply would be ready for presentation to Ad Hoc Committee at meeting scheduled for 4 pm today.3 He did not attempt to anticipate discussion in GNR document and mentioned only one point, arguing that a constitution should be drawn up before elections are held. He expressed [Page 277] opinion that Constituent Assembly provides an opportunity to measure popular and party feelings before elections and avoids danger, as with Bosch, of winning party then writing its own constitution.
3. We then got on to subject of visit. Ambassador Bunker spoke first, stressing US respect for Imbert as Dominican patriot who twice has stepped forward in moments of crisis to save his country, first against Trujillo and now against Communist threat. He would always deserve gratitude of his people for these acts and he would always enjoy high reputation in US for them. Now he was being called on to make a further sacrifice, i.e., voluntarily to renounce his position as chief of GNR and give way to broader-based provisional government which could repair deep cleavages in Dominican society and take country to elections. Such a gesture on his part at this time would be act of highest patriotism and would enshrine his name in Dominican history.
4. Imbert was obviously caught by surprise at this approach but recovered quickly and began to stress his own patriotic motives. He had assumed power for two reasons, and two only; one, his love of country, and two, because the United States, the country for which he has had life-long admiration above all others, had asked him to step forward, he “hates” politicians who have brought nothing but misery to country and looks forward to nine months of administration before elections as opportunity to clean house and to make a real fight on corruption which is such an enervating influence in this country. His own desire, he asserted with emphasis, is for real democratic government.
5. I then spoke in support of Bunker approach, putting remarks in personal framework. I reviewed events of critical days of late April and recalled very real contribution Imbert had made in keeping country from falling apart. I remembered his assistance in sending men from his own troops to guard foreign embassies which were in great danger of mob violence after police protection had dissolved. There was no doubt he had held the pass at critical moment and he would always be remembered and honored by my country for it. We had gone through two very hard months here and now we had arrived at new situation; an outstanding committee representing the entire hemisphereʼs concern in the Dominican situation was here finding a solution. Danger of Communist take-over, concern over which had brought him to fore, was not averted, and we could depend on committee to find reasonable solution with guarantees against Communists. Having saved his country for second time, progress of events now permitted his return to private life. This would not only be act of high patriotism and self-abnegation but in my convinced opinion it would serve his own personal interests best. He knew Dominican history better than I, and its tragic course in that even good men in power had never known how or when to step down. Even a leader so recent as Donald Reid [Page 278] had lost his footing largely because of public suspicions over his desire to continue. He, Imbert, had opportunity to serve his own interests as well as nationʼs by bowing out with appropriate statement and resuming his honored position as Dominican patriot anxious only for welfare of country as a whole. He could now with confidence leave the details to the OAS; his mission was accomplished. Shades of Duarte, San Martin and Cincinnatus as well were invoked during this part of our conversation.
6. While Imbert was noticeably moved by these two approaches, neither really convinced him. He came back to associate himself with national destiny and to stress his own high moral worth (all this said with the sincerity of a man who believes strongly in his own star) as compared with nearly all other Dominicans. To retire at this critical junction would be to “run away” before the problem is solved. Among other evidence, recently intercepted correspondence of Pablo Mella “proved” the link of Bosch with Communists and Caamano and his group were Boschʼs stooges. Imbert said he could not leave now but we knew he wanted to work with US in every way. Just tell him which people to put in the government and it would be done. His only purpose of staying was to get the government going and give the country honest administration until election time. He would not leave except under force since that was the only kind of departure which would make it possible for him to live with his children in good conscience. He went on to say that all Dominicans knew that he is firmly committed to the United States and they know why he is in power today. He asserted parenthetically that at the time his government was being formed, he had been promised US recognition a few days later. If he should leave now, it would do US reputation in this country no good. Everyone would say US had used him and then dumped him. This would not redound to credit of the US. Our approach was really making him the main problem in the current situation. We were saying he had to go in order to have a solution. This was not the way to treat a friend. All Dominicans had rejoiced when the US troops came; the latter had saved the situation but then they had stopped short of finishing the job and the politics had begun.
7. Ambassador Bunker resumed the effort. He stressed the deep cleavages in the country and the need for a political truce to allow time for wounds to heal. The committeeʼs talks with people from all sectors of population had convinced them the great majority who were not involved in the conflict above all wanted peace and a chance to work; but pacification was not peace. The need now was for an apolitical group to begin the work of restructuring the country and attacking the critical economic and military problems. Imbert had contributed greatly to saving the country; it was only natural that in taking vigorous [Page 279] action one stirred animosities. A contribution in the greatest tradition of patriotism could be made by him.
8. Imbert replied once again in the negative; his job was not yet finished. His time estimate was different from ours and he knew his people best. It was necessary that he continue and lead the country to honest elections.
9. The conversation ended on that note. It was friendly, intimate and in low key throughout. Ambassador Bunker asked him to give further thought to our conversation and suggested that we meet again.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received in the Department of State on June 23 at 9:51 p.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.↩
- On June 23 at 10 a.m. the Ad Hoc Committee and the Secretary General of the OAS received the “Constitutionalist Governmentʼs” 7-page written reply to the Committeeʼs June 18 proposal (see Document 109) for a solution to the Dominican crisis. Colonel Caamaño, Anibal Campagna, Arevalo Cedeno, Alfredo Conde, Salvador Blanco, Hector Aristy, and Jottin Cury signed the reply on behalf of the “Constitutionalist Government.” The demands were: a reassertion that the U.S. military intervention was an illegal act; a condemnation of the OAS for ratifying the U.S. action; a call for the evacuation of the Inter-American Peace Force within 1 month of the installation of the Provisional Government; an insistence that the weapons controlled by its irregular forces be turned into the Provisional Government rather than to the OAS; an insistence that all regular military personnel on its side, as well as those who were dismissed after the September 1963 coup against Juan Bosch, be reinstated in their previous ranks, and a proposal that the “Institutional Act” be ratified by the “constitutionalist” congress. For text, see The OAS Chronicle, Vol. 1–2, 1965–1967 (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, August 1965), pp. 32–38.↩
- The afternoon of June 23 the Ad Hoc Committee and the Secretary General of the OAS met with the “Government of National Reconstruction” and received a 4-page written reply of that government to the Committeeʼs June 18 proposal. The GNRʼs key points included the following: a call for elections to be held in 9 months, subject to postponement by the OAS; the departure of the Inter-American Peace Force as soon as a plan is adopted; the exclusion of amnesty for common crimes unrelated to acts of war; the stipulation that only the military who did not violate the military code of justice be allowed to return to their barracks; arms surrendered to the OAS be transferred to the Dominican Armed Forces within 15 days of collection; the desirability of all Communists to leave the country; the approval of the concept of the “Institutional Act”; the installation of the constitution before the elected government takes office; the urgency of returning Santo Domingo to normalcy and allowing the government to exercise police functions, and the reservation of the right to modify its position. (Ibid., pp. 38–41)↩