54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France ¹1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 SEATO. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Mendenhall and Manhard; cleared by Green, Bundy, Assistant Secretaries of State for European Affairs Wiliam R. Tyler and Congressional Relations Douglas MacArthur II; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bangkok.

Washington, March 30, 1965, 6:15 p.m.

5052. Paris 5450.²2. In telegram 5450 from Paris, March 26, Bohlen reported that French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had told him that he would not attend the upcoming SEATO Council in London. The last meeting had been “disagreeable,” and Couve was thinking of sending an observer instead. Asked by Bohlen if this meant France was leaving SEATO, Couve said that was not the present intention but it was impossible to foresee the future. (Ibid.) Prior receipt reftel we had been considering what we might do about French attitude toward SEATO. We had developed major pros and cons in regard to French withdrawal from SEATO.

We see these advantages: First, withdrawal of France (and perhaps Pakistan as well) would make it possible for SEATO to play a more active role in Vietnam including if desired initiation of collective SEATO action. If this results in substantial commitments from other SEATO members, result might be to correct impression in some quarters that Vietnam is just a US war and might help with US Congressional opinion. Second, French withdrawal might increase deterrent against aggressive Communist move by demonstrating a revitalization of SEATO. Third, by French withdrawal we could signify politically that we have no intention of accepting French political approach to Vietnam and SEA.

Principal disadvantages appear to be: First, actions causing France to publicize further formal policy disagreement with US over SEA might play into both Chicom and Soviet hands. In Asia and Europe this might encourage Peiping and Moscow to push us further and might induce France and USSR to work harder to harmonize their policies, e.g., some sort of bilateral understanding on Germany. Second, forcing the issue with France on SEATO at this time might stir De Gaulle to take some unwelcome initiative in regard to NATO.

We had come to the conclusion that French participation in SEATO likely to pose serious and unavoidable problem for them and for us. We were nevertheless reluctant to move directly against the French in SEATO and in interest of maintaining at least correct relations we doubted that a suitable opportunity could be found to approach French Government to this end.

Couve's proposal now seems to represent change in the problem and Couve at least seems to see the French problem in SEATO very much as we do. Therefore we think we might simply let nature take its course and if France sends only an observer to meeting in May would offer no objection.

Would appreciate your comments on above.

Rusk