Following further preliminary consultations between Hope (UK) and Pedersen,
Caradon (UK) called on Goldberg for further ME
discussion this morning. Discussion was most fruitful one we have had in
two weeks, and we believe we have gotten over, for moment at least, main
difficulties between two delegations.
Caradon said SC Pres was calling on him today following
meeting of non-perm members, and he understood he had called on us last
night. Goldberg said this was
correct and we had authorized him to report to SC members we were not in agreement with USSR but did not wish to discuss details, that we
concurred in effort on non-perm members to seek new approach, and that
we thought consultation with parties was important.
Caradon said he thought it was
very important US and UK not speak with
different voices to non-perm members. Caradon said he planned to make similar points, i.e.
approval of non-perm members efforts, importance of consultations with
parties, desirability of producing an early draft, and interest in
general and balanced statement of principles followed by appointment of
special rep. Goldberg said this was quite satisfactory.
Caradon said he wished to raise
important question on content of res. UK
had always assumed res must include provision for withdrawal. In recent
conversations with him Goldberg
had used different formulations of possible language covering this
point. Caradon said he had
raised questions about our formulations but now he understood Goldberg had talked to FonMin Riad (UAR)22. See Document 474. in framework
which did not refer to withdrawal at all. He had been very worried about
this yesterday, as we knew.
Goldberg replied that on this
matter we thought it was very important not to be more Catholic than the
Pope. Every effort to produce agreement in past had floundered over
relationship between wording of withdrawal and of non-belligerence. It
was now our impression that Arabs were stressing more strongly
terminology referring to territorial integrity and political
independence. We had previously conveyed this reaction to him after
conversation with Riad, and subsequent info,
including conversation with Rifai (Jordan), tended
to confirm this. Goldberg said we
could of course not be sure until people began to look at actual texts.
Caradon said he would be
extremely surprised if this proved to be correct but indicated he had no
objection to possibility being explored.
Goldberg observed that consensus
in that group had been that best approach was to start with shorter
version, i.e. without para containing language on withdrawal and
non-belligerence and then see what developed.
Caradon expressed appreciation
for receipt of texts, said he would respect our confidence, and
reiterated agreement to continuing on course outlined.
Comment: There is still difference of assessment
of chances of progress along lines we have outlined. There also
continues to be difference of opinion between US and UK which could re-appear at subsequent
stage, on proper balance of wording between withdrawal and
non-belligerence. However for moment we are operating in coordinated
tactical fashion.
Goldberg
1 Source: National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59,
Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR/UN. Secret; Exdis.
Repeated to London and Tel Aviv. Received at 2323Z.