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  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967
  4. Document 196

196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel1

Washington, June 7, 1967, 5:42 p.m.

208985. You should make strongest presentation of dangerous situation so graphically portrayed in Amman’s 41282 to highest available level GOI. You should stress influx refugees to East Bank and rapid disintegration Jordan security forces now constitute real threat to regime and to large American and foreign community in Jordan. We are taking action with Eban3 but you should make most vigorous plea for Israeli acceptance cease-fire offer and immediate public notice this action.4

Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by Davies. Repeated to Amman, Moscow, London, Paris, Jerusalem, USUN, CINCSTRIKE, COMSIXTHFLT, CINCEUR, and DIA.↩
  2. Telegram 4128 from Amman, June 7, reported that Prime Minister Juma had told an Embassy officer that the Jordanian army on the West Bank was retreating on foot and under fire. Juma charged that there had been continuous, massive Israeli violations of the cease-fire for the preceding 18 hours. He said the Jordanians were convinced the Israelis had agreed to the cease-fire to entrap the Jordanian army, and the U.S. failure to stop the attack raised serious doubts as to U.S. intentions. He said that 150 Israeli tanks were moving through northern Israel toward the Jordan border, apparently en route to Syria, and if they crossed the border, Jordan would have no choice but to resist. He declared that unless Israeli attacks ceased immediately there was “no hope for the Jordan regime or for any further American influence in the country,” and he pleaded that the President take immediate action. Burns commented that if the United States could not stop the Israeli military action, the 1,200 Americans in Amman and on the West Bank could be subject to mob violence, and the regime would probably be unable to protect them. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Goldberg reported in telegram 5650 from USUN, June 7, that he had contacted Eban in the late afternoon and urged him to ensure an immediate cease-fire. Eban said he understood that orders to this effect had been given shortly after 4 p.m. Eastern time but that he would contact Tel Aviv to be certain they were being carried out. (Ibid.) Goldberg called Rusk at 8:05 p.m. and said Rafael had just stated the Israelis were sending a letter to the Secretary-General announcing that a cease-fire with Jordan was in effect. (Notes of telephone conversation, June 7; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls↩
  4. Barbour reported in telegram 4003 from Tel Aviv, June 8, that he had made the representations requested in telegram 208985, even though word of the cease-fire made them out of date. (Ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 ARAB–ISR)↩