95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1
165. Athens 170, 40 to Geneva.2 Reuters story (Modiano) received prior to your telegram. Greek Ambassador was called in for explanation of leak.3
Talbot explained we cannot understand reasoning behind “confirmation” by Greek Government spokesman of “Acheson Plan”. He noted Papandreou has insisted on essentiality absolute secrecy regarding talks. We understood his desire that information be held close so that various ideas could be discussed without governments having to take firm positions on one or another. Talbot assured Ambassador Matsas Mr. Acheson [Page 203] has worked very closely with Mediator, has not pushed himself forward and that we have been fortunate so far in that press has not covered his activities. Talbot asked Matsas for his explanation. Ambassador said he was completely in dark.
Talbot said we had two problems: (1) how to answer press questions; and (2) what do we say to Turks. As Papandreou aware, talks have proceeded with candor and Mr. Acheson has reported back and forth to each representative. Fact that some of points mentioned in Reuters story have been reported to Turks and others not might arouse suspicions of Turks we are not playing fairly with them.
Matsas asked if there were a coherent plan. Talbot said a variety of ideas had been discussed but there was not a “plan”. Matsas speculated that only first point “Union with Greece” would appeal to Greeks and other points, cession Kastellorizon, base, financial compensation, etc., would be detestable. Therefore he could not see it in GOG interest to leak this information. He surmised that since all of points at one time or another had been mentioned in press, Modiano had possibly read as “confirmation” a “no comment” reply by GOG official.
He proposed telephoning PM Papandreou for clarification and instructions. After talking to Papandreou Matsas reported that Prime Minister was very annoyed by the leak, indicating Greeks had endeavored to brief Cypriots on status of talks and Cypriots had talked too much. Prime Minister proposed to deny flatly that there was any such thing as “Acheson Plan”.
Subsequently Matsas reported second telephone call with Papandreou, after latter had investigated Reuters story on Makarios’ press conference. PM repeated his extreme annoyance and asked Ambassador convey to Department his sincere regret this had happened since he realized efforts at Geneva are being directed to fruitful results and this might be counterproductive.
No questions at noon briefing. Future queries will be answered: “Mr. Acheson has been discussing a whole range of ideas with Mediator, Greek and Turkish representatives. There is no such thing as an Acheson plan.”
If Matsas had correctly reported Papandreou’s regret and intention to deny along lines we are taking, we assume Nikolareizis will have early instructions on Mr. Acheson’s memorandum and that exchanges will not be interrupted.
For Athens: Impress strongly on Papandreou our distress at possible deleterious effect this could have on talks in Geneva, and Mr. Acheson’s efforts to help Mediator arrive at agreed settlement. We have understood and cooperated with Greek desire for secrecy because we recognize problem of domestic pressures on GOG as well as their difficulty in handling Makarios. The speed and forthcoming nature of Nikolareizis’ next [Page 204] instructions will indeed be test of Papandreou’s good faith and sincerity of his intentions to arrive at early negotiated settlement rather than “fait accompli” tack of Makarios, with all potential dangers of Turk resistance that approach implies. We understand Nikolareizis is returning Athens today. In order not to give Turkish public opinion leeway to suspect breakdown of talks and accelerate pressures by Turkish extremists, we hope he can return to Geneva earliest (certainly by Monday).
For Ankara: Drawing on above help Turks look at this in perspective. Mr. Acheson reports that Erim and Sunalp are calm about whole thing. Assure Turks that we hope that Makarios explosion will not have serious effect on negotiations.
As another sensitive period approaches when Turks might again think of intervention as their only alternative, we are dismayed at reports they might contemplate intervention by air bombardment. We recognize that neither Sunay nor Inonu has made such statement. However, we believe it useful if as opportunity arises you convey to appropriate quarters US position that we could not under any circumstances regard air bombardment as coming within purview of “action” contemplated under Article IV Treaty of Guarantee.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis-TAG. Drafted by Bracken, cleared by Sisco and Talbot, and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USUN, and Geneva for Acheson.↩
- Telegram 170 from Athens, July 30, transmitted the text of the Greek press report outlining Acheson’s proposals for a Cyprus settlement. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 265 from Geneva, July 30, Acheson expressed concern about the impact of press reports on the negotiations and stated that the Greeks had agreed to respond to inquiries with a “no comment.” (Ibid.) In telegram 269 from Geneva, July 30, Acheson reported that the Turks were “disgusted” with the leak, which they blamed on the Greeks. (Ibid.)↩