90. Memorandum for the Greek Ambassador (Nikolareisis)1

After reflecting on the Prime Minister’s message, I wish to repeat to you my deep appreciation of his constructive effort toward a fair settlement. I do not detract an iota of appreciation or admiration, in asking again for his understanding help. Though the gap has been narrowed, there still remains a gap. If both sides can find a way to help, it may be bridged. No one will understand the situation better than Your Excellency if I put it in Robert Browning’s words:

“O, the little more, and how much it is!
The little less and what worlds away!”

[Page 194]

The gap which from the Turkish point of view the Prime Minister’s reaction to my suggestions leaves unbridged lies in the politico-military area. The protection of minorities seems in a fair way to being solved. If we look for a moment at the change in the Turkish position provided in the agreements of 1959–1960 to that contemplated by the Prime Minister’s views on my suggestions, we can see what seems to them a serious deterioration in it.

May I summarize the Turkish views as follows:

When the Ottoman Empire ceded Cyprus to the British in 1878, it was ceded to a great naval power for the most part friendly to Turkey, except when in the two world wars Turkey made the same mistake as the Germans in miscalculating American intervention to change the relative military power of the embattled forces. So far as life on the island was concerned, the two ethnic groups lived peacefully together under British rule until the mid-1950s.

Under the settlement of 1959–1960, the island passed from the control of a world power to qualified independence under the guarantees and quasi-guardianship of three powers. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, to protect their relative interest, gained the following rights guaranteed by treaties:

1.
A position in legislative and executive branches of the government for the Turkish Cypriots giving them veto power, the same right on questions of judicial interpretation of the constitution and separate courts for intra-Turkish Cypriot disputes.
2.
A treaty right to maintain troops on the island.
3.
A treaty right to reinforce those troops by intervention, after complying with specified procedures, and to use the troops if necessary to preserve the constitution, independence and territorial integrity of the island, as provided in the Treaty of Guarantee.

President Makarios maintains—and I am not here disputing the fact—that some of these provisions are “unworkable”, and he is changing them unilaterally. Our present search is for a way to change them by agreement. Such a change by its very nature contemplates a diminution of the Turkish position from the present so-called “unworkable” one. The task is to gain mutual agreement to alteration by recognizing the essential elements of the various positions.

First: Turkish Position in the Government

The Greek and Cypriot views contemplate abolition of the veto power in the Government of the island as a whole. The Prime Minister has indicated a willingness to substitute for this a considerable degree of local self-government along the lines which I suggested and further spell out in an accompanying memorandum.2 But while this is a happy contribution [Page 195] to protection of minorities under a constitutional system akin to that of Greece, it would not offer security against a change in the regime which would produce a communist government on the island. While we hope this is unlikely, it cannot be called absurd. This question requires further consideration.

Second: The Legal Position of Turkish Troops on Cyprus

This right is now established by the Treaty of Alliance. The troops are to form part of a tripartite headquarters on Cypriot territory to defend the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The Prime Minister’s proposal is to abolish this treaty right and—presumably by a new treaty, either a bilateral one with Britain, or a quadripartite one with Greece and Cyprus added—to have facilities provided by the British on one or both of their sovereign bases.

One sees at once—or if one does not, the Turkish representatives are quick to point it out—that by this exchange the Turks lose a right of military presence on the island which runs directly to them, and become instead tenants of the British. They point out that the British bases are already under attack in the Cyprus House of Representatives. Should the British come to believe that a change in their Middle Eastern commitments or other considerations might render the bases on Cyprus less necessary or desirable, the Turkish position as their tenants might be tenuous indeed. They also stress the difficulty of joint use of such small bases, even should the British be willing to consider it, and the complexity of the use of the rights ancillary to the bases provided the British under the Annex to the Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom.

In this situation, I respectfully urge the Prime Minister to reconsider his position on a Turkish military presence on the island running directly to them. If the conception of a cession of sovereignty presents grave difficulty, is there another conception which might be more acceptable, such as a lease of an area, or the grant of administrative control, or something of the sort?

The Turks now have a right for their troops to be in Cyprus—and they are stationed in the heart of the island. The right to be in Cyprus, of course, carries with it a right to a location. The mere force of gravity requires it. Surely our imaginations are equal to adapting to a changed situation a new, stable and secure situs for the exercise of this military presence.

Third: The Interest, Right and Duty of Turkey to Share in Protecting and Maintaining a New Settlement

If the settlement provides for the continued independence of Cyprus, while keeping open the opportunity for the people of Cyprus to choose enosis, an agreed change in the present treaties would doubtless [Page 196] contain treaty assurances from Cyprus that in the meantime it would not enter into engagements with a foreign power permitting the use of its territory in a manner hostile to the interests of Britain, Greece or Turkey. Turkey, as well as Greece and Britain, would have a great interest in maintaining the new settlement. The granting of military or other facilities to unfriendly foreign powers would be contrary to the interests of the three powers mentioned above and would be inconsistent with a new settlement. Doubtless enosis would be a safeguard against this danger. But enosis is not a foregone conclusion and Turkey cannot be expected to rely on this alone. A Turkish legal military presence on the island would still be necessary for Turkish security.

These considerations underline the importance of what has been said about a proper, stable and secure location for this military presence.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Transmitted to the Department of State as an attachment to airgram A–44 from Geneva, July 27. There is no drafting information on the source text but presumably the memorandum was drafted by Acheson. The airgram indicates the memorandum was revised after discussions with Ambassador Nikolareisis and a copy was sent to the Embassy in Athens on July 27 for delivery to Prime Minister Papandreou.
  2. Not printed.