Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

237. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, September 15, 1966, 1455Z.

1343. Following on my talks with Ambassador Hart last week and private luncheon Tuesday with Greek Prime Minister I have following comments on Greek-Turkish dialogue and possible U.S. involvement:

1. Comparison of Stephanopoulos report to me of GOG and GOT positions (Athens 1293)² with that given the Secretary by Caglayangil would indicate that, unless Turks still not revealing their full hand to us, either (1) Greeks are confused as to substance of GOT position or (2) to encourage U.S. involvement they are deliberately portraying gap in positions as narrower than it really is. I believe it would be helpful to probe further in September 17 meeting with Toumbas for confirmation Turks are actually considering enosis, even though “loose” as reported in para 3 of Athens 1293.

2. First task may be to clarify communication between two sides rather than more direct participation, particularly if Caglayangil’s statement in para 1 State 46636³ implies Turkey intends to view U.S. support for Turkish position as touchstone U.S.-Turkish relations. Further discussions while FonMins at UNGA might elucidate this.

3. Revelations volunteered so far give inadequate basis for judging utility of U.S. re-entry into negotiations along lines GOG is about to propose. My net impression, however, is that Greece and Turkey have not yet exhausted their maneuvering room in current dialogue. It would follow that they should be pushed to try harder to reach a settlement. Our basket is already pretty full and they have at least as much interest as we in peace in Eastern Mediterranean. In any event U.S. ability to exert influence toward settlement would depend on what U.S. would be prepared to do or not to do to bring Turkish position nearer to conditions that could be imposed on Greece and Greek Cypriots.

4. However, since demise of Stephanopoulos government could bring Greek-Turkish negotiations to grinding halt, we have interest in seeing dialogue move as rapidly as possible. It may be long time before we again see combination as constructively committed to resolution of Greek-Turkish difficulties as are Demirel-Caglayangil and Stephanopoulos-Toumbas. Also, it would be brash to forecast how much longer extraordinary secrecy so far maintained in dialogue can continue. When leaks start, public reactions could build up rapidly. For these reasons, I hope we can be in position to offer assistance such as Ambassador Bunker’s services on very short notice if two parties demonstrate willingness to take his suggestions seriously.

5. I gather Caglayangil may involve U.S. assistance for interim solution. In considering whether there would be opportunity for constructive U.S. action along this line, we should keep in mind several factors: (1) status quo (including presence UNFICYP) is almost impossible to freeze precisely. Negotiating interim solution would therefore involve some of same compromises regarding internal structure as would permanent settlement; (2) unless basic revisions of Zurich-London could be agreed upon as basis of interim solution, which seems unlikely, Treaty of Guarantee and possibility of Turkish intervention under Article IV would continue to exacerbate Greek-Turkish relations; (3) under interim solution Cyprus would presumably remain independ-ent, in which case Greeks are convinced Ankara would have to address itself to Nicosia rather than Athens and negotiate with Makarios. GOG considers interim solution just as difficult to negotiate as permanent one. I would tend to agree.

6. Nor am I sanguine about peaceful prospects of solution of “unfettered” independence. In that event, Cyprus would seem likely immediately to become cockpit of international struggle. Soviets and non-aligneds would develop sudden vested interest in preserving Cyprus as uncommitted country outside NATO area. Simultaneously Greeks (with or without government inspiration or support) would undoubtedly mount strident, intensive campaign for quick referendum to bring enosis. Presumably Turks would regard such Greek actions as betrayal of understanding, and might reserve right to counteract. In one case we could be confronted with serious derogation of Western interests in Cyprus area; in other, with sharpened bitterness between Turkey and Greece. “Unfettered” independence with prior implicit Turkish acquiescence in enosis campaign would be a different thing, and might be workable compromise.

7. With reference to Stephanopoulos report that Greeks and Turks are discussing disposition of Dhekelia base area, this at least is progress over 1964 Karpas Peninsula debate which if raised now would in my opinion be non-starter. Question of nature of Turkish rights in base area would be closely related to issue of demilitarization of Cyprus along Dodecanese lines. A Turkish military base on a demilitarized island would seem anomalous, though Turks would presumably find restriction to Dhekelia less attractive if rest of island were within Greek active border defense zone. It may be that Dhekelia issue can be resolved only within context of an Acheson-style Greek-Turkish defense board, a device by which defense needs of Cyprus could be reduced to proper proportions.

As to form of enosis, we here have been pondering idea of commonwealth along Puerto Rican line. From Greek (and U.S.) point of view this would have serious deficiency of leaving Makarios in saddle internally while making Greece responsible to Turks and rest of world for policy pursued in Cyprus. Nonetheless, if idea of enosis is still shocker to Turks, commonwealth theme might be worth examining by both parties despite Greek resistance to getting committed to anything short of full enosis.

9. I advance these random thoughts at this time on assumption Department will in immediate future be intensively considering next steps.⁴

Talbot

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara and Nicosia.
2. Telegram 1293 from Athens, September 13, reported Stephanopoulos’ belief that dialogue with Turkey had reached a point that might require U.S. mediation. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 46636, September 13, reported on talks between Rusk and Caglayangil on Cyprus. (Ibid., POL TUR–US)
4. In telegram 48821, September 16, the Department of State commented that while the Turkish Government might not have totally ruled out a dialogue on enosis, the Greek Government should avoid raising the issue. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)