8. Action Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Scandinavian Affairs (McKillop) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy)1

SUBJECT

  • Talking Points-Anticipated Danish Request for Assurances re Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland

Discussion

1.
In view of our earlier conversations with the Danes and in view of the resolution passed February 8 by the Danish Parliament (Paragraph 1, attached Talking Points), we expect Ambassador Ronne to seek an appointment in the Department of State in order to request assurances that the US is acting in accord with Danish nuclear policy in Greenland. They will probably request either a public USG statement and/or an exchange of notes between the two governments.
2.
We believe that some formal USG assurance is necessary in order to maintain our present defense capability in Greenland. We wish to avoid taking a stance so rigid as to cause the Danes to question the desirability of retaining the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland. The Danes have not raised this point and probably do not now intend to. However, we believe that both State and Defense should keep in mind the fact that the Danes do hold the strongest cards in any bargaining sessions.
3.
Danish nuclear policy encompasses one basic ambiguity; i.e., on the one hand they wish to demonstrate that all Danish territory is free of nuclear weapons; on the other hand, they realize that Denmark’s security ultimately depends on the US nuclear deterrent.
4.
We believe that the attached statement (Talking Point 5) meets this situation. It provides [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and allows the GOD to make a policy decision, in time of grave danger, to allow nuclear deployment and/or overflights.
5.
Both we and the Danes realize that a situation might conceivably arise where there would be no time for consultations before initiating overflights or deployment. We believe that this contingency can best be handled by an oral statement such as the Undersecretary made to Ambassador Ronne on February 2.2 (At that time the Undersecretary said that it was difficult to conceive circumstances where we would initiate nuclear storage or overflights in Greenland without consulting the GOD unless conditions were so extreme that reasons for such actions would be readily apparent.)
6.
We hope to have an agreed State-Defense position prior to our discussions with Ronne. We would like to tell DOD that the attached talking points reflect a bureau level decision on this matter.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached talking points as the EUR position on the questions of nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland.3

Attachment

TALKING POINTS

Danish Request for Assurances re Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland

1.
The Danish Parliament on February 8 passed a nearly unanimous resolution stating that, “Inasmuch as Parliament presumes that the Government, in attempting to obtain absolute guarantees that no [Page 15] nuclear weapons are stored in Greenland and that Greenland air space is maintained as a zone free of atomic weapons, will make certain that Danish atomic policy will be maintained in all parts of the realm and Danish sovereignty will be respected, the house continues its debate on the proposed budget bill for the fiscal year 1968-69.”
2.
The USG is prepared to give the Danish Government assurance on a confidential basis that we will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons except as a result of a joint Danish-US decision that such storage or overflights were necessitated by a threat to Free World security.
3.
As Undersecretary Katzenbach indicated it must be recognized that in circumstances of extreme emergency the situation may not permit advance consultation.
4.
In our view such a statement would meet the current needs of the Danish Government and preclude a stronger stand on their part that could call into question the entire 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland.
5.

Under the circumstances, we would suggest that the Danish Government might wish to make a statement along the following lines:

“On the basis of recent discussions with the USG, the Government is satisfied that United States activities in Greenland are and will continue to be in accord with Danish nuclear policies.”

6.
As the Ambassador is aware the USG cannot publicly confirm any statement on the deployment of its nuclear weapons which may be made by the Danish Government, nor can it agree to make public any assurance it has given to the Danish Government.
  1. Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Klebenov and cleared by Baker (EUR/RPM), Berlack (L/EUR), and Trippe (G/PM).
  2. Ronne’s meeting with Katzenbach on February 2 was reported in telegram 109698 to Copenhagen, February 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1)
  3. There is no indication whether Leddy approved or disapproved the recommendation.