In accordance with your suggestion at today's meeting of the Principals,22. See Document
138. I am forwarding herewith a few comments, from the
intelligence point of view, on the proposed Threshold Test Ban Treaty
(TTBT).
[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] On the
Soviet side, we believe that ABM deployment
has begun at Moscow. In our judgment, the chances are about even that the
Soviets have developed an exoatmospheric ABM
system [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].
Our evidence, however, is skimpy, and the Soviets may well be further along.
If not, there will be great pressure on them to develop a highly
sophisticated system, since they are certainly aware in general terms of
U.S. plans for improving warheads and penetration aids, e.g., multiple
re-entry vehicles. The Soviets have shown considerable willingness to risk
violation of the present test ban treaty, and even one or two tests a year
above magnitude 4.75 would give them significant advantages. Thus, the
Soviets could forge ahead of the U.S., unless the U.S. were itself willing
to violate the TTBT, or at least risk doing
so.
I do not believe that the TTBT will have
much effect in slowing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was agreed
at the Principals' meeting that the technical restraints imposed by the
treaty would create additional difficulties for non-nuclear states in
carrying out nuclear programs meaningful to them, but would not prevent it.
On the political side, we are all agreed that China will not sign. Hence,
the pressures on the countries being threatened by China will continue to
grow as China conducts further tests. I do not believe that the TTBT or even a non-proliferation treaty would
deter a country from going nuclear if it felt that its vital interests were
threatened.
Regarding verification of a TTBT, there is
an important distinction between convincing ourselves that a violation has
occurred and proving it to others. There could be endless controversy about
the magnitude and especially the nature of events which we believed were
over magnitude 4.75. In general, convincing proof of a violation could come
only from on-site inspection.
[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not
declassified]
Sincerely,
W.F. Raborn
1 Source: Department of State,
S/S-RD
Files: Lot 71 D 171. Top Secret;
Restricted Data.