238. Research Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- Soviet World-Wide Demarches on Vietnam Seek to Isolate the US and Deter Escalation
Soviet diplomats have been active in recent weeks in pressing Moscowʼs views on Vietnam. In this paper we sort out the diverse and occasionally inconsistent elements of the Soviet demarches to governments other than the US.
Abstract
The USSR has approached a large number of governments in the past six weeks on the Vietnam issue. This campaign has not indicated any shift in Moscowʼs position on the settlement of the war and may be the prelude to a Soviet effort at the forthcoming UN General Assembly to generate opposition to US policies in Vietnam. The Soviet demarches appear intended to isolate the US on the Vietnam issue, to discourage the US from further escalation of the war, and to underline Soviet support for Hanoi and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV).
In a number of cases, these demarches appear intended primarily to intensify pressures on the US to desist from further intensification of the war by citing the potential dangers of Chinese or even Soviet intervention. These demarches and recent Soviet propaganda have shown a concern at the possibility that the war might spread into Laos and [Page 645] Cambodia. The Indian delegation left the USSR after Mrs. Gandhiʼs visit in July convinced that Moscowʼs major fear was that the extension of the war into these countries would lead to Chinese intervention. Kosygin, moreover, warned Mrs. Gandhi that World War III would result if the US crossed the 17th parallel, stating that the USSR would have to stand by its ally. On a number of occasions, Soviet officials have mentioned the possibility of “volunteers.”
Soviet statements about the precise type of American escalation which it might hope to deter has been deliberately vague, since Moscow has not wished to imply approval for some further American step to intensify the war. Soviet emphasis has varied over time, primarily as it has responded to events. Thus, at the time of Mrs. Gandhiʼs visit, Kosygin stressed the dangers inherent in an invasion of North Vietnam at a moment when North Vietnamese infiltration through the DMZ was getting underway. At other times, when Western press reports have mentioned mining Haiphong, the Soviets have given public indications of their concern on that score. A general step up in Soviet emphasis upon Moscowʼs aid to the North Vietnamese air-defense effort has reflected Soviet concern over the relatively poor showing of the SA–2s as well as over the possibility of American extension of bombing beyond the POL facilities to include populated centers. Finally, press reports in the West about operations in Laos and Thailand have evoked expressions of Soviet concern over the prospect of the warʼs spreading to the rest of Southeast Asia.
In other cases, the Soviets have used these demarches to indicate opposition to negotiations as long as Hanoi refuses them. The Soviet leaders continue to resist efforts to reconvene the Geneva conference or to bring about negotiations under any other aegis until Hanoi is ready for them. Gromyko told the Japanese in late July that the USSR had not and would not act as an intermediary. Gromyko asserted that the solution of the war must be found among the participants. This position was probably not meant to be taken literally as the Soviets have given some evidence of a concern about a peace settlement which would exclude them from Indochinese affairs. Rather, Gromyko merely sought to emphasize Moscowʼs position that it will take no initiative on a peaceful settlement until Hanoi indicates that it desires negotiations.
The theme of full support for Hanoi is reflected also in Soviet public statements which seek to refute Chinese charges of Soviet indifference to the North Vietnamese cause. Recent publicity of pilot training given North Vietnamese in the USSR and of the alleged effectiveness of Soviet surface-to-air missiles are examples of Soviet efforts to demonstrate the extent and effectiveness of the support given Hanoi.
Both private and public Soviet statements, then, are intended to convey the same message that Moscow is wholly loyal to Hanoi and will not take any step not already acceptable to the North Vietnamese. This message, [Page 646] while limited in scope, reflects continued Soviet desire to exert a voice in any future Vietnamese settlement. This concern reflects Soviet determination, since the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, to play a significant role in Far Eastern affairs. This determination has led Moscow to render Hanoi extensive economic and military aid as well as full diplomatic support. Having chosen this course, the Soviets find few diplomatic options open to them as long as Hanoi refuses to consider negotiations on any terms other than its own.
[Here follows the body of the memorandum, including a list of 29 Soviet demarches on Vietnam during July and August 1966.]
- Source: Department of State, EA/ACA-Vietnam Negotiations: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives—Soviet. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.↩