Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

176. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 21, 1965, 6 p.m.

1377. For the President and the Secretary from Lodge. Subj: If Hanoi decides to negotiate.

I. Vietnam not ready

A. This telegram is occasioned by General Thieu’s statement to me on Oct 13 that he guessed there would eventually be an offer to negotiate from the Viet Cong (presumably through Hanoi). To this Thieu added the statement (concurred in emphatically by FonMin Tran Van Do and on Tuesday, Oct 19, by PriMin Ky) that Vietnam is absolutely unready for the serious political warfare with the Communists of which such a move would be the beginning; that this offer would cripple Vietnamese military activities; and that it would thus jeopardize all that we and they have struggled to achieve.²

B. I concur with the remarks of these Vietnamese leaders. At present South Vietnam suffers from a fragile political structure, governmental authority is not strong in the countryside. The govt is so overwhelmed with immediate pressures that it has not been able to prepare public opinion for a negotiated settlement. Unless the way has been most carefully prepared—and perhaps even then—entering into negotiations could lead to a direct threat to the existence of the govt. It might not lead to a coup but it would almost certainly lead to frantic jockeying for position in Saigon and encourage Viet Cong political and military pressure against the stability of the govt. To minimize these dangers requires stating conditions which the GVN can endure. Any pressure on the GVN to depart from what they consider a satisfactory outcome could have disastrous consequences.

C. Clearly Hanoi can call for a meeting at any time that it wishes. It is prudent to assume that they will do so at a moment of maximum disadvantage to us. In the light of what has been said we cannot refuse to meet. The protection of our vital interests, therefore, depends on the terms of the negotiation rather than on a refusal to meet. It also means that we be clear and specific in our own minds with respect to these terms. I say this as one who approves the decision of last spring to express a willingness to enter into unconditional discussions, which, I believe, played a big part in bringing about public support of our Vietnam policy in the United States and abroad.

D. If we are going to get ready to negotiate—or to discuss—then I believe it is essential that we have as a standard of measurement what concretely we consider would be a satisfactory outcome of our efforts in Vietnam. In other words it is time to attach specific meaning to such phrases as “ward off the aggression” or “to help the Republic of Vietnam achieve and then maintain its independence.” A satisfactory outcome could be achieved by military, civil-political, economic, and psychological means within South Vietnam or by persuasion on North Vietnam, or by a combination of these various factors. We should decide to remain here until it has somehow been accomplished.

E. The opinion of the U.S. Mission here on what concretely constitutes a satisfactory outcome is obviously pertinent. Accordingly, this matter was discussed at a meeting of the U.S. Mission Council on Tuesday, Oct 19. What follows is the consensus which emerged, broken down into its component parts, of what seems reasonable at this juncture.

II. A satisfactory outcome in Vietnam

A. A satisfactory outcome is, to be sure, distinct from a negotiating position. Off-hand, I would think that an opening negotiating position might insist on a complete elimination of all Viet Cong activity in the entire country, removal of the Viet Cong to North Vietnam, a UN inspection system in North Vietnam to see that no further aggression is committed, freedom for anti-Communists in North Vietnam to move south, and assurance of economic aid (to pull them away from Peking)—all to be agreed to by the GVN.

B. What we consider a satisfactory outcome to be would, of course, be a very closely kept secret. It would include the following, not necessarily in this order:

1. The area around Saigon and south of Saigon (all of the Delta) must be pacified. This area includes about 55 to 60 per cent of the population of Vietnam. “Pacified” is defined as the existence of a state of mind among the people that they have a stake in the govt, as shown by the holding of local elections. It also means a proper local police force. In brief, a pacified area is economically, socially and politically a part of the RVN.

2. The thickly populated northeastern strip along the coast which includes 25 per cent of the population would be completely pacified.

3. The GVN would retain its present control of all cities and all provincial capitals.

4. All principal roads would be open to the Vietnamese military day and night.

5. Those areas not pacified would not be safehavens for the Viet Cong but would be contested by energetic offensive forays to prevent consolidation of a Communist base.

6. The Viet Cong disarms; and their weapons and explosives are removed from their hands. Their main force units would be broken up.

7. North Vietnam stops its infiltration.

8. North Vietnam stops its direction of the war.

9. Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”) rehabilitation would be extended to individual Viet Cong who are suitable (including those who were impressed into the VC by terrorism), with plans to resettle them.

10. Hardcore VC to go to North Vietnam.

11. GVN to approve.

Comment: This means that we would not be insisting on the complete elimination of the Viet Cong from all corners of the country although no land of safehaven would be allotted to them. It would mean that we and the GVN would control 80 to 85 per cent of the population and that the Viet Cong would be limited to the jungle and mountainous areas where they would go on as bandits, much as their counterparts do today in Malaya and in Luzon—and where the GVN would have the right to pursue them and try to destroy them.

III. Conduct of talks

A. I assume, of course, that the above will not become relevant unless Hanoi itself asks for talks.

1. If this happens, I would advise that our military activity be at first intensified and then continued during the talks. Without continuing military pressure by us, no worthwhile results can be expected.

2. Under no circumstances should a cease-fire be agreed to, because a cease-fire would legalize and make permanent the present occupation of part of the country by the Viet Cong and would stultify our sacrifices. Communists never give up the terrain where they are except under pressure. Moreover, the VC would try to expand their present influence into new areas under cover of the cease-fire.

3. We should place a time limit on the talks—perhaps not more than a month. Failure to set such a time limit will give scope to the favorite Communist tactic of delay which makes us look contemptible, impatient and undignified. It also means that they will use the time which their diplomats gain for them to bring about an improved military position which their soldiers, unaided, had been unable to achieve.

4. Agreement on supervision of any understanding should be item one on the agenda, at the beginning, when our pressure is greatest.

IV. Value of talks

A. In spite of the fact that the Communists will attempt to violate any agreement which is reached if they think it is in their interest to do so, negotiation with the Communists can be said to have value if, in fact,

1. It ends or reduces the bloodshed, and

2. Sets down enforceable conditions which, if we are strong enough to maintain them, will prevent a relapse into the aggression which brought about the conflict in the first place. While we must never depend on the given word of the Communists, an agreement can have value if it can be inspected and enforced.

B. A prolonged negotiation, or one in which we aim to force Ho Chi Minh into a corner by requiring him to admit his defeat by signing a paper, can drag out the conflict and increase the bloodshed. A de facto end of hostilities would be preferable to either of these alternatives and would also be easier for the GVN to accept.

C. It seems clear that we were not as ready for the end of hostilities in 1945 and in 1953 as we should have been. Surely we should learn from these experiences and be perfectly ready for the new turn this war will take if Hanoi decides to try negotiation. You have mounted an American effort here which is unprecedented in the breadth of its sweep, the thoroughness of its execution and in the extent to which all Americans are pulling together. I am sure that our reaction to the next move—if it comes—will be on the same level of excellence.

Porter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Received at 8:37 a.m. and passed to the White House.
2. See Documents 166 and 172.