288. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations 1

282. For Ambassador Stevenson. Subject: Security Council meeting on torpedo boat incidents. Following is general guidance and suggestions for SC meeting Wednesday morning. Additional memo on legal aspects in septel.2

1.
We are coming to the SC to report a threat to the peace, and to report the action we have felt necessary to take as a responsible member of the world community. Although an attack on a U.S. destroyer in international waters is clearly an armed attack on our nation within the meaning of Article 51, our case for UN concern rests more broadly on Charter doctrine that all governments have responsibility to refrain from aggression and armed attack. We are not angry, but sorrowful. It is not (as one TV commentator tonight called it) “a drastic retaliatory action”, but rather a single action designed to make unmistakably clear that U.S cannot be diverted by military action from its obligation to help its friends establish and protect their independence.
2.
We hope you can encourage other friendly members of SC to make appropriate statements of support. It seems to us that there are five clear votes (US, UK, GRC, Brazil and Bolivia) against any unsatisfactory proposition, but that seven votes are probably lacking for condemnatory res. French, who as usual are swing vote, may take occasion [Page 629] to plug for Geneva Conference; desire to heat up atmosphere in order to get a Geneva Conference may indeed be one of Hanoi and Peking motivations in this affair.
3.
In the event North Vietnamese ask to be heard, suggest you not oppose but try to arrange so that they are heard under Rule 39 (under which SC “may invite…3 persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its competence”). In these circumstances, believe Government of South Viet-Nam should also be invited to appear, not under Rule 39 but as government of non-member state concerned.
4.
As in Cambodian border case, every occasion should be taken to emphasize (a) general context of Geneva Agreements violated by communists and (b) our desire for enforceable peace and assured independence as only motive our military assistance to SVN and our military activity in the area.
5.
We do not see any need for seeking formal action of SC and would be satisfied to have SC conclude with no resolution. However, following is suggested draft resolution for possible tactical use in event hostile resolution proposed by Soviets or some other SC member. It is too early to make any definitive judgment as to whether, in absence of hostile resolution, it would be politically desirable to put forward such a resolution, since this would depend in part on amount of support we could get from other Council members as well as what counter-measures, if any, other side may take in response to our retaliation.

We recognize that resolution put forward by others would undoubtedly include evenhanded appeal to both sides to refrain from any action which might exacerbate situation. For this reason, we have included in suggested resolution paragraph along these lines which would be acceptable to us and avoids fixing blame on United States.

Text of resolution follows:

“The Security Council

Noting that the North Vietnamese have launched unprovoked attacks on American naval vessels in international waters,

Having considered the complaint of the United States,

Noting further the measures taken by the United States,

Concerned that the continuation of the present situation could lead to a serious threat to peace in the area,

Condemns the attacks by the North Vietnamese on U.S. ships;

Calls on the Hanoi regime to respect the freedom of use of the high seas in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law to vessels of all nations, and to cease and desist from any further hostile and provocative acts;

[Page 630]

Calls on all concerned to refrain from any actions which might further exacerbate the situation.”

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by Cleveland.
  2. Not found.
  3. Ellipsis in the source text.